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The great classics that have studied Capitalism, those that have criticised it as 
well as those that have lauded it, have undertaken the task by privileging the 
most diverse range of variables. However, in the studies published up to the 
third quarter of the twentieth century, flows of Knowledge have had to settle for 
supporting roles in the drama of capitalism, when they haven’t been sidelined 
and excluded from it altogether.
But if knowledge has received rough treatment at the hands of those who 
have applied themselves to studying the transformation of productive pro-
cesses, even more brusque has been the treatment given to the frameworks of 
regulations around access to that knowledge: what we now, simplistically, call 
Intellectual Property. Ostracised and condemned to dwell in a marginal branch 
of law, it has had quite a different fate to that of physical private property.
In recent years, along with digital technologies, digital social media and other 
associated phenomena, authors have emerged who, approaching the question 
from different disciplines, have attempted to consider the role of knowledge 
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and intellectual property within the dynamics of capitalism. Indeed, it has 
become clear that it is not possible to scientifically understand what happens 
to flows of digital information without understanding how they engage with 
diverse forms of knowledge (beliefs, ideologies, skills, norms etc.).
However, it has not been noted, apart from certain exceptions, that knowledge 
only exists materially, and that this very materiality is crucial when studying it. 
On the contrary, there is a tendency to understand knowledge as an ‘immate-
rial’ entity, which seriously limits the possibilities for its scientific analysis.
Without doubt, the efforts of various authors have produced valuable, 
although partial, contributions. And where they haven’t provided sustenance 
they have at least contributed to stimulating the appetite. Notwithstanding, 
the social sciences still lack a systematic, multi-disciplinary, materialist and 
scientific conceptualisation of how knowledge works in the productive pro-
cesses, and what its relationship is to the different stages of the capitalist total-
ity. This book is an attempt to take a step in the direction of redressing that 
situation.
II
The foundations of this book are in my 2010 Doctoral thesis, Capitalism and 
Knowledge: Cognitive Materialism, Intellectual Property and Informational Cap-
italism. After my defence, I organised the text into three sprawling volumes 
(Zukerfeld 2010) and sent it to the most eminent publishers in Argentina to 
offer them the privilege of publishing it. Unanimously, the seasoned editors 
gave my manuscript the warmest of welcomes, opting to incinerate the ram-
bling drafts. Despite being misunderstood by these arbiters of the analogue era 
and, more generally, by the academic elite, the trilogy won the popular acclaim 
of digital natives and sectors of the working class. More precisely, its thousands 
of pages were made use of with great delight by my daughter Laura (Bassa and 
Zukerfeld 2008) and her kindergarten friends to make collages and paper air-
planes. Likewise, a carpenter of dubious competence benefitted greatly from 
volume II, which he used as a substitute leg for my sofa. Emboldened by these 
successes, I shared the manuscript on the web and ever since then I have been 
craftily serving it up to a captive audience comprised of my students.
In terms of the contents, the first volume primarily undertook the theoretical 
presentation of cognitive materialism. The second and third volumes were ded-
icated to applying this theory to two complementary fronts: on the one hand, 
the history of capitalism, characterising its three stages (mercantile, industrial, 
and informational), with particular attention to informational capitalism; and 
on the other hand, the evolution of a group of capitalist regulations of differ-
ent types of knowledges, including principally those institutions that today 
we assemble under the expression intellectual property (encompassing copy-
right, patents, trademarks, industrial secrets, but also traditional knowledge, 
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geographical indications, right of publicity, sui generis laws, various types of 
licenses and many others).
Above and beyond logical order suggesting priority position for the presenta-
tion of the theoretical framework of this analysis, I am also convinced that as 
a result of the gap in the literature, development of the theory should be given 
priority. This book, therefore, consists of an updating and development of what 
was the first volume of Capitalism and Knowledge. To that end, I have corrected 
and expanded the first four chapters and eliminated some discussions pertain-
ing to the literature on the knowledge economy and social studies of science 
and technology. Additionally, I have added chapters 5 and 6 which provide an 
account of two significant shortcomings of the original text: the absence of a 
theory of exploitation, and a theory of classes from the perspective of cognitive 
materialism.
III
There are those who say that the first thing that should be made clear in a text 
such as this, is who it is engaging in discussion with. In this sense, it is important 
to point out that this book dedicates practically no space to the time-honoured 
enemies of the critical, emancipatory, tradition. I do not dwell on attacks aimed 
at the handful of powers in whose hands are concentrated the resources of the 
world economy, financial capitalism, neoliberalism and its personnel (like the 
foot soldiers who are currently destroying my country), American imperialism, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other parasites living off human 
societies and nature. There are many excellent texts already dedicated to those 
matters and, without doubt, there will be many more to come.
Instead, here I will enter into a discussion with closer traditions with which 
I share concepts, ambitions, outlooks. Traditions I admire, but in which how-
ever, in some of their manifestations, I find aspects that I intend to criticise in 
the most emphatic way. These traditions are manifold, but there are three it is 
worth delineating here.
The first is Marxism, with which I share, among other things, the idea that 
the concept of capitalism is the key to embarking on the scientific study of our 
societies, that exploitation is a phenomenon inherent to capitalism and that the 
contradiction between what it describes as productive forces and social rela-
tions of production is central to understanding the transformation from one 
stage to another.
However, I will attempt to argue with those dogmatic aspects that transform 
what was an innovative wissenschaft into a conservative religion, which in 
many cases is completely incapable of dialogue with other traditions. I am as 
convinced that Marx was the most important thinker in the social sciences as I 
am that his work contains inescapable limitations. The fact that many Marxists 
are unable to perceive Marx’s cognitive production, and their own, as products 
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historically conceived in a particular stage of capitalism is an incoherence that 
never fails to astound me. More specifically, I will debate the humanist aspects 
that various forms of Marxism are rooted in and, connected to this, I will point 
out the limits of the Marxist theory of exploitation, as a consequence of the 
problems inherent to the labour theory of value. More importantly, I will try 
to show that Marxism has neglected the analysis of the role of knowledge in 
capitalist productive processes.
Secondly, in relation to autonomist and post-structuralist authors, includ-
ing those from the cognitive capitalism tendency, I share the vocation to 
highlight the discontinuity, the change of stage from industrial capitalism to 
what we call informational capitalism (and what these authors describe as 
societies of control, cognitive capitalism, semiocapitalism, etc.). Additionally, 
I hold with with the observation concerning the blurring of working time and 
free time that the current stage is characterised by, I vindicate the gesture of 
studying the relationship between knowledge and capitalism from a critical 
perspective and admire the search for new theoretical tools which with which 
to analyse this new stage.
Nevertheless, I have some important differences with this perspective. On 
the one hand, much of its indisputable publishing success has been based on 
concepts that, even though they seem attractive initially, are ultimately beauti-
ful but of little use. On the other hand, many of these critical philosophical ini-
tiatives, when they engage with discussions about the capitalist economy, adopt 
concepts from orthodox economics in a completely naturalised and acritical 
way.
Thus, they ascend to their concepts upon the scaffolding provided by the 
dominant ideology. More generally, I do not share these approaches’ rejection 
of the categories of totality, contradiction, negativity, and I believe that much 
of their blithe positivity makes them functional to the dominant ideology of 
informational capitalism. Finally, this tradition brandishes the banners of dif-
ference, otherness, multiplicity. However, in practice it is no more adept at dia-
logue with difference (in other words with those viewpoints that do not echo 
its mantras) than any other dogmatism. This intolerance in the face of plural-
ity, debate, and constitutive contradictions, that for Marxism, scientism, or any 
religion can be explained (disagreeably but with coherence) by the belief that 
there is one truth, which they are in possession of, is completely unsustainable 
when observed in these ‘philosophies of difference’.
Thirdly, with social scientists, that is, the producers of academic papers (in 
the fields of sociology, STS studies, philosophy, communication, economics, 
law, among others). I share the vocation to submit research findings to the 
judgement of independent reviewers, to accept the opinions of colleagues with 
other points of view, and produce results based on empirical evidence and sys-
tematic reasoning. In turn, I intend to incorporate specific contributions from 
each of these fields, which would be onerous to enumerate here.
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However, I cannot avoid expressing the most energetic repudiation of the 
enthusiastic submission to the current norms of the academic world by these 
academic paper producers. The increasingly frequent choice to devote one-
self to research, and within it to one area in particular, in virtue of securing 
a smooth career path, exercising intellectual dilettantism or travelling around 
the world with the excuse of anodyne conferences, has greatly impaired the 
potential of the social sciences to understand the world, let alone to change 
it. There is no tragedy in admitting that one lacks passion, love, or commit-
ment towards the research object (there are even those who take pride in it). 
In that case, it would suffice to change the object, or activity. No one should 
deprive themselves of trying to do work they love, not even in the context of 
the unjust societies we live in; at the same time, no one should deprive others 
of that opportunity either. On the contrary, I have unfortunately seen time and 
again how some of the most original, serious, and committed researchers (who 
immerse themselves in texts and not in speculations about academic posts and 
funding), are relegated and even ejected from the academic world in favour of 
research bureaucrats. Bureaucrats who regurgitate vacuous papers, polluting 
the cognitive ecosphere, who, with dispassionate expertise, poach posts and 
funding on the basis of artificially bloated CVs.
Now, in terms of concrete individuals, the aspects I appropriate and those I 
criticise from each of these traditions cannot be cleanly disentangled from each 
other. They combine, in greater or lesser proportions, in the same human sub-
jects, inhabiting them as dialectical contradictions. Furthermore, these contra-
dictions inhabit the author of these lines and spill out into this book. Criticism, 
at least of the variety attempted here, is always the critique of contradictory 
totalities and is, simultaneously, self-criticism.
IV
This book is structured into six chapters. Chapter 1 opens with the follow-
ing question: how do all goods and subjects relate to capitalism (understood 
as a totality that governs our societies)? I argue that, in the last instance, it 
is through two types of regulations: those shaped by physical property and 
those by intellectual property, which in general act simultaneously. This rests 
on the fact that goods and subjects are made up of variable combinations of 
two entities: physical matter and knowledge matter. A comparison is presented 
between these two entities in philosophical, physical, and economic terms. 
While physical matter is consumed in the process of its productive use, knowl-
edge matter does not erode in this way; while the former can only be trans-
formed, knowledge can be accumulated. However, knowledge matter does not 
exist as an immaterial entity (contrary to arguments sustained by numerous 
authors), but instead exists as an emergent property of physical matter. This 
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leads me to propose a materialist analysis of knowledge. Indeed, the particular 
characteristics of a physical bearer of any knowledge condition several of the 
ontological, economic and legal properties that such knowledge assumes.
In chapter 2, leaning in part on the first, cognitive materialism is located in 
relation to the gnoseological traditions. I advance this as a third position in 
confrontation with epistemology on the one hand, and Marxism and the soci-
ology of knowledge on the other. In all cases the fundamental point in common 
that all the disciplines that have studied knowledge share, is that they under-
stand it as a product of human subjects – individuals, collectives, etc. From the 
perspective of cognitive materialism I have encountered three shortcomings 
in the previous approaches: idealism, humanism and the lack of a definition 
of knowledge. Next, my approach is defined on the basis of its following fea-
tures: materialist, emergentist, dialectical, non-humanist, scientific, cognitive. 
Both the question of what knowledge is (chapter 1), and the question of how to 
understand knowledge (chapter 2) lead to the need to study knowledge on the 
basis of its physical bearers.
Therefore, chapter 3 introduces one of cognitive materialism’s central tools: 
the typology of knowledge based on its material bearers. Four kinds of bearers 
will be identified: biological, subjective, intersubjective, and objective. Biolog-
ical knowledge includes the genetic, endocrinological and neural information 
flows of living beings. Subjective knowledge includes the explicit and implicit 
memories of an individual’s mind. Intersubjective knowledge rests on ‘social’ 
groups. Five sub-types of the latter will be distinguished: linguistic, recogni-
tion, organisational, axiological and normative (regulations internalised by 
subjects and usually enacted by the law – physical property and intellectual 
property are the two main types of normative intersubjective knowledge). 
Objective knowledge encompasses technologies on the one hand, and infor-
mation on the other.
Then the concept of cognitive material configuration is introduced to 
describe the totality of this variety of knowledge for a historically determined 
situation. By way of an example, the cognitive material configurations of the 
three periods of capitalism (mercantile, industrial and informational) have 
been characterised in a condensed fashion.
While chapter 3 is concerned with stocks of knowledges, presenting them 
as immovable entities, chapter 4 introduces the categories necessary to under-
stand the dynamics in order to give an account of the flows of different types 
of knowledges. The principal concept in this sense is ‘translation’. Among other 
concepts associated with translation, ‘human attention’ is introduced. But the 
type of translation our argument focuses on is that which we define as ‘pro-
ductive processes’. Within them, capitalist productive processes are focused on, 
and from there I go on to define the capitalist system. As part of this objective 
three concepts are encountered which merit a specific exploration: regulation, 
exploitation, and expropriation. It is to these three concepts, and to exploitation 
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in particular, that the lengthy chapter 5 is dedicated. Firstly the generic, ahis-
torical concepts of exploitation, expropriation and regulation are discussed. I 
assert that exploitation relates to the asymmetrical exchanges of physical matter 
and, above all, knowledge matter, that occur within productive processes and 
which result in one of the parties, the exploiter, obtaining a greater economic 
value than the other and that this is obtained at the expense of the latter. Expro-
priation, by contrast, entails the direct confiscation of physical matter – often 
with no compensation – that, decisively, occurs within the sphere of exchange 
and not that of production. Regulation, for its part, consists of the imposition 
of norms (legally sanctioned or by other means) that frame exploitation and 
expropriation. For each case, after the generalities, the capitalist particularities 
of each concept are discussed. In this way the central object of this chapter is 
arrived at: capitalist exploitation.
Capitalist exploitation means the appropriation (neither violent nor illegal) 
by the capitalists of surplus value that arises from the partially or completely 
unremunerated knowledge produced by or borne by other subjects. I will dis-
cuss three forms of capitalist exploitation: exploitation through alienation, 
exploitation through reproduction, and exploitation through attention. Naturally, 
the theory of exploitation is connected to a theory about stratification and 
classes that constitutes the focus of this book’s final chapter.
Thus, chapter 6 puts forward a theory of social classes for different stages of 
capitalism. To that end, on the basis of the concepts elaborated over the pre-
vious chapters, an abstract schema of classes is defined, underpinned by the 
level of access to productive resources that different groups of actors enjoy. In 
that way, I characterise the capitalist class (encompassing capitalists per se, 
cognitive capitalists, physical capitalists, cognitive rentiers, and physical rent-
iers) and the working class (including cognitive workers, physical workers, 
excluded workers and self-employed workers). This schema is concretised in 
the analysis of classes in the mercantile, industrial, and informational stages 
of capitalism.1
V
This book was not originally written in English, but in Spanish, and as a result 
it is necessary to complement the invaluably meticulous work carried out 
by the translator with three clarifications. The first concerns the narration 
of this book, after the introduction, in the first person plural. This is a rela-
tively strange choice for a text signed by an individual author in the English 
language. However, in Spanish it is quite a standard practice. Nevertheless, I 
do not wish to take refuge in linguistic customs, but instead to offer a logical 
justification. The first person plural in this book serves at least three distin-
guishable functions.
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The first of the uses of ‘we’ includes the reader, for example when reference 
is made to the trajectory covered in the previous chapter. Thus, there is a first 
person plural that alludes to the productive process shared by the author, the 
bearer that is found between the book and the reader. The second use of ‘we’, 
which is in fact the most frequent, aims to acknowledge the collective nature 
of cognitive production. With this I am not alluding to a generality (of the sort 
that all production is done resting ‘on the shoulders of giants’), I am rather 
referring to having chosen to produce social sciences in the framework of 
research teams, internal seminars, shared office space. This is not the only 
option possible, nor am I entirely certain that it is the best. But it is the modal-
ity I chose years ago, and this book is the product of these collective spaces 
and time. Therefore, many colleagues, students, teachers, friends and others 
have made significant contributions, sometimes taking an interest and offer-
ing suggestions, in general arguing, or even demonstrating a notable lack of 
interest. All this feedback has encouraged me to reformulate different areas of 
this proposal. More specifically, some of the ‘we’ employed in this book refers 
to fieldwork conducted collectively, or even co-authorships (such as the article 
that chapter 6 is based on).
On other occasions, however, by using the first person plural my aim is to 
absorb, not those already known to me, but instead the anonymous mem-
bers of diverse academic and intellectual disciplines which I engage with. 
The ‘we’ in these cases refers to groups I partly include myself in, justifiably 
or otherwise, such as sociologists, economists, postmodern social scientists, 
philosophers, Marxists. In some of these cases, the intention of the text is to 
laugh at some impostures that not only correspond to these groups, but also 
some I recognise as my own. This leads me to the second clarification, one 
that concerns the general tone of the text. For the most part I have adopted 
a style that is currently not recommended either in the academic world or in 
essayist productions in English (although it is not in other languages either). I 
am alluding here to the practice of ridicule, irony, or satire, but not merely or 
especially aimed at intellectual adversaries, but first and foremost targeted at 
fellow travellers, those to whom this book is addressed, and especially, myself. 
The culture of informational capitalism, so-called ‘postmodernity’, has many 
frankly despicable aspects. However, if a virtue has presented itself in opposi-
tion to the solemn rigidity of industrial capitalism, it consists of the possibility 
of laughing at ourselves, the subjects who inhabit this dispiriting epoch. But, 
and this is the key, allowing ourselves the liberty of mockery or irony as forms 
of self-criticism does not suppose that the arguments we wield are weak or 
will be impaired as a result. On the contrary, being able to laugh at oneself is 
an unmistakeable sign of vitality. If anything unequivocally signals the fragil-
ity of an argument (or a political regime, or a personal relationship) it is the 
inability to digest or even nourish oneself on laughter. However, for readers 
who do not share this view and who may consider that some of these ironies 
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are excessive or disrespectful towards a particular field or author, I offer my 
apologies in advance.
The third and final clarification is that of translation. Cognitive materialism 
uses a typology of knowledges as one of its fundamental tools. Thus, as we shall 
see, there are four types of knowledges, defined on the basis of their material 
bearers. However, in English the term knowledge is almost always used in the 
singular. Here, in contrast, to give an account of this variety, we must effectively 
use the plural form: knowledges. This is not a purely terminological question. 
The use of knowledge in the singular is the progeny of a tradition discussed 
in chapter 2, epistemology. For this tradition, knowledge cannot be expressed 
in plural because it is associated with the idea of truth (specifically the truth-
falsity axis), and the truth cannot be multiple.2

CHAPTER 1
Capitalism, Physical Property and 
Intellectual Property
1.1 The Two Arms of Capitalism…
The starting point of the reasoning presented here is lacking in originality, theo-
retical flair, and if scrutinised, even precision. We begin by observing any mate-
rial entity integrated into a contemporary capitalist society. ‘Any entity’ means 
exactly that: public and private goods, means of consumption and production, 
tangible and intangible goods, natural and social products and, of course, com-
modities and non-commodities. Is there anything that can be said about each 
and all of those entities? Is there any common feature that underlies so much 
variety? Naturally, if there were, this feature would not be found in the things 
themselves, irrevocably heterogeneous as they are, but rather in the relation-
ships that capitalist societies have established with them. But is it possible to 
unearth a single social relation in common between the chair that the reader’s 
body is sat upon, that body itself, the shoes the reader is wearing, the streets 
those shoes tread, the paper this book is printed on, the tree that the paper 
was made from, and the ideas found here? Some would say ‘yes’, inspired by 
the reflections of brilliant modern thinkers: it is physical private property that 
governs all fates in the world of capital. ‘No’, another would respond, seduced 
by the loudspeakers of the much less brilliant postmodernists: the multiplicity 
of being cannot be reduced to a single relational principle. Then what? Is there 
a single social relation that binds any particular entity to the capitalist totality 
or is there no regulation capable of achieving that? In our opinion, the first 
opinion is mistaken, and the second is even wider of the mark.
There is no single type of social relation that connects all material entities 
with the capitalist totality – not because there is not any at all but in fact because 
there are always two. Now we have arrived at the first idea to be proposed here. 
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Under capitalism each good finds itself subject to a double regulation. On the 
one hand is a set of institutions that can be roughly congregated around the 
pole of Physical Property. On the other hand are a bundle of diverse regulations 
magnetised by the expression Intellectual Property. Both types of regulation 
represent the two arms of capitalist machinery and both act simultaneously. Let 
us look at some examples that will help to clarify this idea.
Consider, for instance, a car. Our first impression is that its connection with 
capitalism is defined by physical property. This establishes that on the one hand 
is the legitimate owner of the vehicle, who can do with it whatever they please 
(use it, obtain profit with it, or dispose of it: usus, fructus or abusus) and that, 
on the other hand, there are non-owners who are excluded from access to this 
good. However, this image is not entirely correct because, above all, a bun-
dle of intellectual property rights pertain to the car. Trademarks and patents, 
for example, mean that the legal owner of the physical private property has 
restricted use of some elements: they cannot reproduce the distinctive logo of 
the car manufacturing company for commercial ends, or commercially pro-
duce parts similar to those belonging to the vehicle, or copy the design of any 
of the parts either. This point is made more apparent in reference to a means 
of industrial production: a steam engine in eighteenth-century England, a con-
veyor belt in twentieth-century USA or an assembly line robot in twenty-first 
century China. Of course, access to these goods is still delimited by physical 
property, but the arm of intellectual property becomes more visible. Patents 
for the machinery and processes involved, the trade secrets associated with 
these productive processes and other similar rights surface as powerful barriers 
before the potential user of some of these technologies. The above examples 
should be sufficiently illustrative to convey that the relative weight, relevance, 
and conspicuousness of both regulations vary in each case according to diverse 
circumstances.
In order to develop this point, it is worth clarifying that the type of regu-
lation we are generally summarising under the category ‘physical property’ 
Physical Property Good Intellectual Property
Private property Car Patents
Trademarks
Private property Table Public domain
State-owned public 
property
Book by Borges in a public 
library
Copyright
Private property Play by Shakespeare bought 
by an individual
Public domain
Table 1.1: The double regulation of goods in capitalism.
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
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includes private property strictly defined, but also state-owned public prop-
erty, cooperative property and other forms. Similarly it should be pointed out 
that the term ‘intellectual property’ subsumes both different rights pertaining 
to the private sphere3 as well as the regulations related to the public domain. 
Hence, it is not uncommon that from the viewpoint of one of the regula-
tions a good is ‘public’, while being considered ‘private’ from the perspec-
tive of the other. The table in the cafe where these lines are being written – a 
generic wooden table without any distinguishing features – illustrates one of 
the forms of this uncoupling. The intellectual property rights acting upon it, 
for example the design patents, may have expired, and so from this perspec-
tive it stands in the public domain. But the physical property rights, naturally, 
are still absolutely valid, as the owner of the cafe would soon make us aware 
if we were to attempt to make off with their table. In a more general way, this 
combination can be recognised in all goods whose intellectual property rights 
have expired due to their age, or that have failed to cross the threshold of 
patentability requirements due to their lack of originality. The reverse is also 
true of course. The typical example of this is a text subject to copyright that is 
stored in a public library. The physical property of the good is public, but the 
work found within it is protected nevertheless. Many more complex and pol-
ished examples could be imagined, but for the purposes of our argumentation 
here, the aforementioned will suffice.
Now, although up to this point we have referred to the double regula-
tion that weighs upon goods, this should not obscure the fact that this duo 
also acts in the same way upon human subjects. Do physical and intellec-
tual property also govern humans, our bodies, our energies and minds? 
We would argue that they do, and in a variety of ways. Indeed, capitalism 
is juridically founded on the idea that each subject has exclusive property 
rights over their own body. As Locke, amongst others, indicates, it is from 
this initial property right that the possibility of conquering other proper-
ties stems. Actually, the subject is first affirmed as owner of their own body, 
and along with it their own labour, and only then can they appropriate the 
fruits of exercising this first property. Furthermore, each subject has the 
right to exclude others – the basic condition of ownership – from the use of 
that organism. The human body is a quite special physical private property 
for capitalism: it cannot be legally sold, but the conditions are generated in 
which it must be rented. As regards intellectual property, a counterintui-
tive phenomenon occurs: that which is housed within the body itself can be 
property of another owner. For example, numerous knowledges acquired in 
the performance of work can be owned by the employer, even though they 
are lodged within the individual mind of one worker or another. Thus, in 
addition to the double regulation, an idea begins to emerge which we will 
revisit: goods and human subjects are not so very distinct for capitalist regu-
lations as they are for some social theories.
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To backtrack a little, the idea that entities are subject to a double regulation 
can be traced all the way back to classical antiquity. Seneca, in a marginal pas-
sage of De Beneficiis (59 ce) says:
In all the cases I have adduced, there are two owners of the same thing. 
How can that be? One of them owns the thing and the other owns the 
use of the thing. We say that some books are Cicero’s; Dorus the book-
seller says that the same books are his own, and both claims are true. 
One claims the books on the grounds that he wrote them, the other on 
the grounds that he bought them. And it is right to say that the books 
belong to both, for they do belong to both, just not in the same way. 
(Seneca 2011, 171).
Much later, in the capitalist world that had started to ruminate on the modern 
idea of copyright, the book was also the good, which stimulated reflections 
about the double property regulation. Kant in his Metaphysik der Sitten distin-
guished between the book as a corporeal artefact (opus mechanicum), associ-
ated with a real right, and the book as discourse (praestatio operae) associated 
with a personal right (Kant [1797] 1991, 107). Fichte’s (2008) similar division 
should also be mentioned, which he elaborates in a 1793 article.4 Shortly after-
wards, not focusing on books but on artefacts, Jeremy Bentham established this 
distinction with crystal clarity in a footnote:
Property is in fact of two kinds. In the instance of one of them, the crea-
tion is effected by interdicting to persons at large in most ways, or per-
haps in any way, the use [and the] liberty of occupancy with regard to 
the thing itself, which is deemed the subject of the property in question. 
In the other instance, the creation is effected by interdicting to persons 
at large the liberty of occupancy not with regard to any one corporeal 
object in particular which thereby is constituted the person’s own, but 
with regard to all corporeal objects whatsoever, when exercised in such 
a manner as to produce a certain effect. (Bentham [1795] 1954, 265)
Of course, these antecedents are no more than curious exceptions, tender green 
shoots in the winter of industrial capitalism; the double regulation of property 
only unfurls into full bloom in informational capitalism, the current stage.
In summary, some ideas can be distilled from what we have explored thus far:
1. Physical property and intellectual property act simultaneously upon enti-
ties and regulate different aspects of these.
2. Different ownership rights can coexist and converge on these entities.
3. These ownership rights can be, independently of each other, public or private.
4. The double regulation does not only apply to goods, but also to human 
subjects.
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But, which of these aspects are governed by physical property and which fall 
under the aegis of intellectual property?
1.2 … and the Two Aspects of Goods: Physical Matter and 
Knowledge Matter
A simplified answer to that question could be: physical property regulates access 
to physical matter, which entails what is usually called ‘matter’ and energy, while 
intellectual property regulates access to knowledge matter, which encompasses 
what is commonly labelled as knowledge, information, culture, communication, 
etc.
This statement merits some clarifications that will occupy at least the rest of 
this chapter and the three that follow.
‘What is all this business about matter and energy?’, the reader could ask, in 
irritation, ‘Isn’t this a social sciences book?’ Reading the introduction should 
have been sufficient to deduce that throughout this book a fair deal of preten-
tious verbiage about economic, sociological, philosophical and juridical mat-
ters is par for the course: but is it really necessary to dishonour the immaculate 
cognitive geography of the natural sciences as well? Unfortunately, it is, yes. 
However, while the outrages committed on other terrains will be extensive, 
those related to the latter will be brief, although more due to cowardice than 
wisdom. 
Where does the discomfort come from that the sentence in italics gener-
ates? The discomfort actually seems to spring from two ideas, tacitly but assur-
edly included in the phrase that opens these paragraphs. On the one hand, the 
expression ‘knowledge matter’. Is this not a contradiction in terms? Isn’t knowl-
edge anything but material? We would argue that this is, in fact, a misconcep-
tion and over the following chapters we will try to demonstrate that knowledge 
is nothing but material.
On the other hand, that physical matter and knowledge matter are the two 
aspects from which Being is composed in the eyes of capitalism; that everything 
can be conceived, in the last instance, by means of these elemental substances, 
and that they combine in a variable way in all the entities under the sun. Let 
us situate this in a narrow historical context, although a brief clarification 
should be introduced beforehand. The word matter has at least two differ-
ent meanings that are relevant for this book. On the one hand, it could refer 
to entities defined by having a mass. This is the meaning that many authors 
(particularly those coming from exact sciences) give to the term, and the 
one we are going to refer to at the beginning of the next section. This mean-
ing will be indicated by quotation marks hereafter: ‘matter’. On the other 
hand, matter can refer to a much broader set of entities: the group of entities 
that are material, that is, changeable, as we shall discuss in chapter 2. This 
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second meaning is the one that we will endorse, manifested in expressions 
like physical matter, knowledge matter, material or materialism. So, ‘matter’ 
(as a native category of scientists and philosophers who will be mentioned) 
is a subgroup of matter (as a concept of cognitive materialism), as should 
become clear by the end of chapter 2.5
1.3 Physical Matter: A Brief History of ‘Matter’ and Energy
As is fitting for a contribution to a tradition that strives to dress itself up with 
cheap erudition, the retrospective panorama presented here opens by swagger-
ingly mentioning Greek philosophers that we have merely studied a little, and 
ineptly at that. Among the pre-Socratics,6 the Ionian thinkers (in opposition 
to the Pythagoreans and the Atomists) placed special emphasis on bestowing 
a material aspect on the unity of Being. Seeking a universal substance from 
which all things derive, Thales of Miletus found it in water, and Anaximenes, 
his neighbour, found it in air. It was fire that fulfilled this role in the philosophy 
of Heraclitus of Ephesus, but in a more complex way: it was the materialisa-
tion of logos, understood as the principle which gave equilibrium to a universe 
undergoing constant change.7 As far as Anaximander is concerned, his concep-
tion that the essential is the indeterminate or the boundless, still maintains a 
rigorous relevance for post-structuralist philosophy, after a stopover in Simon-
don’s concept of individuation ([1958] 2005, 339).
From among the atomists, Democritus of Abdera – and his mentor Leucippus – 
must be mentioned immediately. With him appears the idea of the atom and a 
decisive form of materialism. However, his philosophy is much richer than that 
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of the Eleatics with whom he engaged in dialogue. He conceives of Being as 
composed of two substances: what exists (τοον), which can always decompose 
down into the level of atoms – homogeneous and indivisible; and what does 
not exist (τομηον), that space between atoms – where they move, attract and 
repel each other. Notably, and here lies the materialist foundation, not only the 
body (soma) but also the soul (psyché) were conceived of as being made up of 
atoms, just that in the first case these were heavy, and in the latter they were 
light (Novack 1977, 118).8 As is well known, these fundamental ideas were later 
developed by Epicurus and, to a certain extent, by Lucretius.9
However, it is from the Pythagoreans that the idea of distinguishing between 
diverse elements first emerges. In fact, the term element is imprecise: more 
accurately described these are the stoicheia  – roots, foundations, syllables. 
Empedocles of Acragas advances the separation between earth, air, fire and 
water. This distinction was promptly assumed to be valid and lasted two millen-
nia, thanks in particular to Aristotle’s reformulation (Lang 1998) who, rejecting 
the materialists’ concept of the void, added ether as the fifth essential substance, 
or more precisely, as a container of the other elements and the cosmos (for a 
more detailed description see Böhme and Böhme 1996). Naturally, divisions 
very similar to these appear in traditions far removed from Ancient Greece 
and its Christian heirs: they appear in Taoism, Chinese philosophy, Hindu-
ism, and almost all cultures that have left a written legacy (Maartens 2007). But 
Aristotle’s contribution to this history is not merely related to matter but also, 
following Plato to a certain extent, his establishing the hylomorphic doctrine. 
Matter, with its five foundations, is only determined through form. The former 
is the purely indeterminate, that which possesses receptivity as its decisive fea-
ture, while form is the active principle, the ultimate cause of being (Ferrater 
Mora 1964, Volume 3, 153). It is not difficult to appreciate the virtues that this 
conception offers – as against atomist materialism – upon being adopted by the 
monotheisms that would come to prevail. Thus, the Aristotelian synthesis with 
greater or fewer scholastic adornments, stood firm for centuries.
It is worth noting that the four elements and form can be easily related to 
the concepts of ‘matter’, ‘energy’ and ‘information’ (or knowledge matter). Earth, 
water, and air are associated with the three states of ‘matter’ (solid, liquid and 
gas) and fire can be similarly related to energy. Form, for its part, is nothing more 
than the objectification of different types of knowledge, as we shall see later on. 
However, the term energy wouldn’t appear until well into the nineteenth century; 
the word matter (hyle) in Greece referred to that which was maintained in the 
transition from one form to another, and not necessarily to entities with mass, as 
the concept is understood today (in the first meaning mentioned above). Finally, 
form (morphos) bore no relationship with knowledge understood as episteme: 
it was an imposition extrinsic and independent to the matter, such that it made 
no sense to proclaim, as with the latter, its closeness to the truth. But, of course, 
in the twilight of the Middle Ages, while Thomism still consecrated Aristotelian 
physics, disagreements with it started to be perceived. Above all, these concerns 
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are expressed in the writings of Al-Biruni, Al-Khazini,10 and other Arabic sci-
entists (see Rashed 1996). Europe would also join in the heresy, although with 
considerably more timidity: Jean Buridan, Oresme, Albert of Saxony, Domingo 
Soto, and Juan Bautista Benedetti, among others, preceded Galileo. Thus, while 
the four elements – with or without ether as a complement – would maintain 
their influence on various metaphysical concepts, they would gradually lose 
ground under the dominion of modern science. Soon Newton and industrial 
capitalism would establish a world in which the ontology is that of masses and 
forces. Above all, bodies attract or repel each other on the basis of some relation-
ship between their masses and distance. It is from these variables that forces are 
derived (note the difference with the later notion of energy), and the mission 
of physics would be to reduce the world to simple equations of attraction and 
replusion between bodies, as Helmholtz puts it.11
Thus, if Aristotle and the medieval world consecrated the vision of the pre-
Socratic Ionians, modern science would depart from this to reappraise the 
ideas of the materialists of antiquity: atoms prevailed at the hands of Lavoisier, 
Dalton, Avogadro, Mendeleyev and others.12 One of the important ideas in this 
conception is the law of conservation of ‘matter’, intuited in the mid-eighteenth 
century by Lomonosov and specified later by Lavoisier: in a chemical reaction 
‘matter’ is neither created nor destroyed but rather transformed, maintaining 
the total mass of the product. More generally, ‘matter’ was the key concept until 
the nineteenth century.13
However, the development of what will later be described as the Cognitive 
Material Configuration (in chapters 3 and 4), meaning the development of 
flows of knowledge in the productive processes, contributes to the emergence 
in the nineteenth century of a new ontological component that would supple-
ment ‘matter’: energy. Beyond the obvious relationship with the development 
of capitalism14 there seems to have been, at least on this introductory and inter-
nalist territory, which we are traversing, three bases for this novel development.
Firstly, at the hands of Faraday, Hertz, and especially Maxwell, the concept 
of field arises. Along with it begins to take shape the concept of energy – and 
no longer of force or work: ‘Field represents energy, matter represents mass’15 
(Einstein and Infeld 1938, 256). On the other hand, the discussions about 
whether heat – that wasn’t homologous to a force or ‘matter’ – was a substance 
in and of itself or not, would result in a remarkable discovery. The studies 
of Mayer, Black, Rumford and Joule (who belonged to all professions except 
physics itself) demonstrated that heat is nothing but a form of energy, like 
mechanical energy is (Einstein and Infeld 1938, 38–47). Finally the laws of 
thermodynamics, associated with Carnot, Kelvin and Clausius, must be men-
tioned. These were also decisive to the development of the concept of energy. 
The first law postulates the conservation of energy, acting as a complement 
to the much older one related to ‘matter’. In effect, in a closed system energy 
can be transformed, but not created or destroyed. The second law of ther-
modynamics, which has a variety of formulations, establishes the principle 
of entropy – energy that cannot be used to perform work, disorganisation of 
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a system, irreversibility of changes, growing uncertainty in closed systems. As 
is well known, this has enormous not only physical but philosophical conse-
quences, some of which we will avail ourselves of shortly. In summary, towards 
the end of the nineteenth century we are presented with two key consolidated 
concepts: ‘matter’ and energy.
Our two concepts of substance are, then, matter and energy. Both obey 
conservation laws: An isolated system cannot change either in mass 
or in total energy. Matter has weight but energy is weightless. We have 
therefore two different concepts and two conservation laws. (Einstein 
and Infeld 1938, 54)
Now, the crucial innovation that brings the twentieth century into this brief 
history is the theory of relativity. Our limited ability to understand it, resistant 
as we have been to the impression of books and varied pedagogies, does how-
ever allow some chinks of comprehension through which to glimpse a simple 
fact: the theory mathematically demonstrates the equivalence of all forms of 
‘matter’ and energy, through the famous formula E=mc2.
From the relativity theory we know that matter represents vast stores of 
energy and that energy represents matter. (Einstein and Infeld 1938, 256)
With this as a point of departure, it seems reasonable to speak of what was 
called ‘matter’ and energy as a unitary entity. Scientists have done so,16 and so 
we shall follow suit here.
Naturally, ‘matter’ and energy are perfectly distinguishable in many of their 
phenomenal manifestations. However, the point is that both share the same 
properties, just like, if the inaccuracy can be forgiven, water and steam. Both 
possess mass and energy (although in extremely dissimilar quantities). In turn, 
‘the two conservation laws of mass and energy are combined by the relativ-
ity theory into one, the conservation law of mass-energy.’ (Einstein and Infeld 
1938, 259–260). But beyond the opinion of science on the matter, what interests 
us here is that capitalist regulations are, in a manner of speaking, in agreement 
with them. Electrical energy does not have fewer property rights assigned to it 
than the cables that conduct it do; the water that falls during a storm and the 
bolts of lightning generated at the same time, are both equally public.17 In sum, 
the shared properties of what scientists call ‘matter’ and energy allow us to sub-
sume both under the expression physical matter18 from here onwards.
1.4 Towards the Other Entity? Beyond Physical Matter
So far, an explanation has been provided detailing how the idea of physical 
matter was reached. But where does the other side of the coin appear from, the 
other flow which we have pompously called knowledge matter? In fact, without 
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realising it, the concept of Aristotelean form – that is partially associated with 
the meaning attributed to knowledge here – has been lost somewhere along the 
way. Physicists and chemists washed their hands of the matter during the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries, and up to the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, and it has been left in the hands, somewhat less favourable to materialism, 
of philosophers and social scientists. Concerned with atoms, forces, masses, 
heat, energy and quantums, scientists relegated the question of Aristotelean 
form to the arena of religion, philosophy, or sociology. After all, this does not 
seem so illogical, being due to a tacit or explicit acceptance of a certain form 
of ontological dualism, a certain division of epistemological labour. However, 
halfway through the twentieth century,19 particularly from the 1970s, certain 
perspectives began to gain momentum that, coming as they did from the hard 
sciences, consider that there is another entity, conceived of as distinct from 
physical matter. As is well known, after the Second World War the terrains of 
information sciences, cybernetics, computing and related disciplines started to 
develop. In this context Norbert Wiener bluntly asserts:
Information is information, not matter or energy. No materialism, 
which does not admit this, can survive at the present day. (Wiener 
[1948] 1961, 132)
This emphatic assertion not only postulates the idea of a third entity denomi-
nated in-formation,20 but also situates it within a materialist perspective that at 
the same time criticises various forms of Marxism which are incapable of con-
sidering the materiality of this new entity (Capurro and Hjørland 2003, 359). 
The theory of information, besides Wiener’s contributions, is supported by the 
decisive interventions of Shannon (1948, Shannon and Weaver 1963) and Bate-
son (1972, 1979), among others. However, the term information is not used in 
all cases in a strictly analogical way21 and, above all, it is invoked in a completely 
different sense to the one employed in this book. Leaving to one side the sub-
ject of the relationship between information and communication that interests 
Shannon – signals, noises, probabilities – and also setting aside the question of 
cybernetics that enthuses Wiener – command, order, control – and many other 
questions, we are left with the modest consensus that emerges in some corners 
of the physical and information sciences related to the existence of an entity 
that is not, strictly speaking, only ‘matter’ or ‘energy’, in other words, physical 
matter, and that, in fact, seems to have quite different properties.
In more or less the same period, the discovery of the structure of DNA and 
a whole series of other advances in the world of biological sciences led to 
theories of information widening beyond the world of physics, electronics and 
their embryonic developments at the time. Now it is the life sciences, in their-
wide variety, that lean upon the theory of information.22 Not only medicine 
and biotechnology, but also experimental psychology and its repercussions 
in the neurosciences.23 Information is no longer a principle limited to certain 
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human creations, and becomes a crucial concept for understanding nature, 
and Being.
Evidently nature can no longer be seen as matter and energy alone. Nor 
can all her secrets be unlocked with the keys of chemistry and physics, 
brilliantly successful as these two branches of science have been in our 
century … A third component is needed for any explanation of the world 
that claims to be complete. To the powerful theories of chemistry and 
physics must be added a late arrival: a theory of information. Nature must 
be interpreted as matter, energy, and information. (Campbell 1982, 16)
The information content of amino acid sequences cannot increase 
until a genetic code with an adapter function has appeared. Nothing 
which even vaguely resembles a code exists in the physio-chemical 
world. (Yockey 1981, 13)
In brief, a broad range of scientists with a background in the natural and exact 
sciences currently adopt the distinction between physical matter and this other 
entity, principle, or concept that, in the majority of cases, they call ‘information’ 
(Wiener 1961; Miller 1978,24 1992; Karpatschof 2000; Kirschenmann 1970;25 
Campbell 1982; Umpleby 2007;26 Gershenson 2007;27 Madl and Yip 2007;28 Gitt 
2006; Maartens 200729). Also, for social scientists, the theory of information 
began to appear as a base upon which different disciplines can be integrated. 
The approaches of complexity and systems theory, in diverse ways, believe in 
this potential and make use of it (among others, Parsons 1977; Luhmann 1995; 
Morin 2008; García Camarero 2001;30 partially Simondon ([1958] 2005)).
Thus far we have attempted to demonstrate that the idea of bestowing entity, 
from a materialist perspective, on something that is neither ‘matter’ nor energy, 
is not original in the slightest. However, we have only appealed to the authority 
of some cited texts, without delving into the argumentation that sustains this 
idea. In turn, and at best, the suggestion has been made that this third entity 
is information, while above we alluded to the fact that in our schema ‘matter’ 
and energy, that is, physical matter, are complemented by knowledge matter. 
The next step in our reasoning consists of attempting, still on a very abstract 
level, to surmount these two limitations. We will have to replace information 
with knowledge matter, explain why this is done, and give a positive content to 
this last concept.
1.5 From Information to Knowledge Matter
A broad brushstrokes history of the term ‘information’ can be found in the 
studies of Rafael Capurro and Birger Hjørland (see, for example, Capurro and 
Hjørland 2003). As in other cases, success and tarnishing through overuse go 
hand-in-hand, and the triumph of the concept of information has burdened it 
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with the most diverse definitions (for an exhaustive list see Hofkirchner, 2013). 
A similar phenomenon took place with ‘knowledge’ as well, although in that 
case over centuries rather than decades. An article from a few years ago, with 
no claims of exhaustiveness, compiles 130 definitions for these two concepts 
(sourced from academic publications) and classifies them into 28 groups of 
opinions (Zins 2007). Repeatedly, the lack of scientific definitions of these 
terms has been noted.31 It is easy to agree, as a consequence, that it is not pos-
sible, on any scientific basis, to assume a single point of view is valid, rejecting 
all the others a priori. Different definitions produce framings that shed light on 
certain problematics while relegating the rest to the shadows. As long as these 
concepts are used within coherent, systematic schemas, it seems reasonable to 
give each one the benefit of the doubt until in the end the papers, books, or 
programs of investigation show what the benefits of their use are. Only practi-
cal application and the subsequent destiny of such schemas will reveal how 
fruitful their initial definitions have been. Indeed, the only way of arriving at 
well-polished concepts is starting from provisory definitions, which must be 
whittled into shape or even replaced at an opportune moment. In this sense, 
we will proceed in the following way. At first a succinct explanation will be pro-
vided as to why we have recourse to the idea of knowledge rather than informa-
tion. Then some elements will be provided which superficially delimit what we 
understand by knowledge in ontological terms. This task will be completed, in 
abstract terms, by the end of chapter 4. Once that milestone has been reached, a 
general vision of the perspective we intend to propose will become clear.
So, why knowledge and not information? Firstly, let’s look at the modes in 
which information is defined. Some of them are extremely broad. They encom-
pass, like the Aristotelean morphus, the organisation of all physical matter. 
Others, the majority, refer to the design/organisation/form of different living 
systems: information is merely an attribute of biological entities. Here, follow-
ing in Shannon’s footsteps, information is associated with the phenomenon of 
communication (independently of whether it is produced among humans or 
between unicellular organisms). But for some economists (e.g. Varian 1995, 
1998; Shapiro and Varian 1999), information is something much more specific: 
everything that can be codified as digital signals. Both the more general uses 
and these more specific ones have, as we will try to show, great practical virtues 
for the categorisation of different productive processes. However, it is not pos-
sible to preserve a single word for both things. A concept is needed to designate 
that type of entity that complements physical matter and another to describe 
the small subset of flows of bits. Here a semantic incompatibility surfaces 
between the information sciences, systems theory, and economic approaches.
Secondly, and in relation to this subset, it should be made quite clear that we 
do not in any way reject the concept of information. In fact, it will be one of the 
central concepts of this book. However, this will be introduced in chapter 3, as 
a specific type of knowledge. In other words, the concept of knowledge that we 
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advance, subsumes the concept of information, along with various others. This 
connotes another peculiarity: for our purposes information will be a tightly 
circumscribed concept, with a much smaller scope than that used in the theory 
of information and more closely resembling that used in economics.
The third point is a little more complex. It is frequent, among the varied theo-
ries concerned with information and knowledge, that either tacitly or explicitly 
a striking division is established. On the one hand, recourse is made to the 
idea of knowledge – situating it on the axis of truth-falsity or something simi-
lar, such as science-common sense – and it is referred to in relation to what 
occurs with humans at the level of individual consciousness or social structure. 
Meanwhile for the biological and inanimate levels, the concept of information 
is used – with its corresponding language of codes, probabilities, messages etc. 
However, in both cases, by one name or another, this entity that is not knowl-
edge matter is being alluded to. Why must this distinction be made? On the one 
hand, it arises from the Greek tradition that situates knowledge on the axis of 
truth-falsity. This axis, however, has been criticised by the sociology of knowl-
edge (Mannheim [1936] 1949; Stark [1958] 2010) and later by the sociology of 
science (starting from Bloor’s strong programme [1976] 1991). In chapter 2 we 
will return to this point. But, on the other hand, in a more profound way, the 
distinction seems to be rooted in the humanism of industrial capitalism. This 
methodological humanism has also been the object of criticism from the most 
varied corners of the social sciences (three extreme cases which share only 
this argument: Latour 1993, 2005; Luhmann 1995; Sloterdijk 2009). However, 
its conceptual repercussions continue to be felt, with its legitimacy undented. 
Although this is a tangential point in our argument, it is unavoidable to insist 
that the idea that the human and the non-human merit different gnoseologi-
cal treatment is far from being self-evident. In fact, it is worth wondering if 
the elective affinity (in the sense that Weber confers on Goethe’s expression) 
between this methodologically humanist conception and industrial capitalism 
has not had its repercussions in the irreversible damage to our ecosystem that, 
doubtlessly, has effects which are difficult to describe as humanist. At best, this 
distinction is acceptable as an a priori for idealist perspectives. No one demands 
that the Christian worldview or certain forms of methodological individualism 
shift from the centre to the individual human subject. However, something dif-
ferent should be expected from the perspectives that cleave to materialism. To 
clarify, the third point consists of inverting the burden of proof of the humanist 
equation: we argue that there are no elements that justify conceiving a priori 
of a discontinuity between what is usually called ‘knowledge’ (the human indi-
vidual and social) and what is commonly labelled as ‘information’ (the non-
human, biological and inert). This point shall also be returned to in chapter 2.
In short, the term knowledge matter will be used here to refer to that entity 
that natural scientists differentiate from physical matter, shifting away from the 
truth-falsity axis and from the human/non-human distinction. Information 
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will be a subset within the world of knowledge matter (in the same way that 
calorific energy is a type of physical matter). The expression knowledge matter32 
attempts to convey one of the main claims of our theory: that knowledge only 
exists on a material basis, in a physical bearer. This claim will become clearer 
over the course of the next section and following chapters. However, it is neces-
sary to specify what we understand by knowledge matter.
1.6 Knowledge Matter and Why it Matters: Towards a 
Materialist Perspective of Knowledge
What is this concept of knowledge about? What is the positive content that 
corresponds to the term within this theory? How does it differ from physical 
matter, or to pose the question more precisely, upon what basis can such a divi-
sion be justifiably sustained? More importantly, how is this notion of knowl-
edge related to a materialist theory? Over the following pages some rough, and 
still very abstract, ideas for an analytical definition will be offered, while in 
chapter 3 an exhaustive nominal definition will be provided. These ideas are 
presented as contrasting knowledge matter and physical matter.
The first and principal contrast, already discussed above, is of a legal or reg-
ulatory order: capitalism governs knowledge matter by means of intellectual 
property (and similar institutions), while physical matter is ruled by physical 
property. Let us take a determinate wheel, devised and constructed by a par-
ticular artisan, at some indeterminate time and place in the history of capital-
ism. The wheel, evidently, combines physical and knowledge matter. It might 
be the case that the artisan is the owner of the physical bearer (she can exclude 
third parties from it), but not of the knowledge matter (which may be in public 
domain).
Secondly, knowledge matter is an emergent form. Emergence means that 
knowledge matter, even though it only exists on the basis of a material support, 
has properties that are not reducible to those of the physical matter that sustains 
it. It is vital to point out that emergence is a feature of all material entities, not 
only knowledge: emergence is also observed in inert physical matter. However, 
knowledge matter is associated with living beings, that is, with the emergence 
of systems that reproduce and maintain themselves (autopoietic, according to 
Maturana and Varela 1984; Luhmann 2012). Life, in fact, constitutes a signifi-
cant threshold separating different forms of being, placing on one side pure 
physical matter (atoms, molecules, etc.), and knowledge carriers on the other. 
Prior to the appearance of life on earth, there were only blind forces and inani-
mate masses: mute physical matter. After a certain moment, simple forms of 
knowledge emerged, carried by the first beings capable of reproducing them-
selves. Much later, with the advent of humanity, knowledge was objectified in 
artefacts and codified in varied symbols.
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Thirdly, and in the same sense, physical matter is finite, limited, cannot be 
created nor destroyed but only transformed (as the aforementioned laws of con-
servation indicate). Knowledge matter, by contrast, is born and expands, but can 
also die. The idea of the wheel appeared at some specific moment and as we 
all know it has been disseminated or reinvented without major spatiotemporal 
limitations. However, there is nothing that guarantees its immortality, and the 
same applies to other knowledges that our mortal artisan has adopted.
Fourthly, knowledge matter represents negative entropy (Schrodinger 1944; 
Von Neuman 196633), or negentropy (Brillouin 1953). Negentropy can be 
defined as a deficit of entropy in a subsystem which is dynamically ordered 
in relation to the chaos that surrounds it (Mahulikar and Herwig 2009). Put 
simply: it expresses the inverse of the tendency to disorganisation that governs 
physical matter. A wheel, and also the human who produces it, remain articu-
lated and resist the physical forces of uncertainty and decomposition. It is the 
objectified knowledge in this rotating artefact that has given it a form that the 
laws of physical matter would have denied it. In turn, the artisan herself who 
materialised knowledge in the wheel depends, for the continuation of their 
own metabolism, on the concurrence of diverse cognitive flows.
Fifthly, we follow the lead of economists who often hold that a feature of 
knowledge matter is that its consumption is non-rival34 (Romer 1993;35 Stiglitz 
1999; without using the term the idea is also in Samuelson 1954), infinitely 
expansible (David 1993) and has zero subtractibility (Ostrom and Hess 2006). 
What do these terms mean? Basically, that the consumption of a determined 
knowledge matter does not deplete the available quantity of that knowledge. 
The idea of the wheel can be used by additional artisans without the available 
quantity of that idea diminishing.36 In the same sense, knowledge matter does 
not wear out with use.37 Any given wheel can suffer wear-and-tear, or the mind 
and muscle of the artisan can be exhausted; in other words, the bearers of the 
idea of the wheel can be consumed. But the knowledge itself does not suffer 
from intensive use.38 In turn, the positive externalities (Cornes and Sandler 
1996) of knowledge matter also hinder, as Jefferson indicates, the material pos-
sibilities of excluding subjects from it, and from it alone.39 In contrast, it is usu-
ally possible to operate an almost perfect exclusion from physical matter. It is 
difficult, for the artisan who uses the wheel, to prevent his or her neighbour 
from observing the knowledge carried by it. It is much easier to protect the 
physical aspect of the wheel. Thus, the exclusion in relation to knowledge oper-
ates through the exclusion regarding the physical matter with which it is bound 
up. How difficult or easy it is to exclude subjects from a determined knowledge 
depends upon the level of difficulty posed by exclusion from the material basis 
in question.
In sixth place, another common idea in economics is that the marginal 
costs40 of knowledge matter or of some of the forms it takes, are comparatively 
low either with regards to other goods or with regards to fixed costs41 (Bentham 
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1954;42 Arrow 1962; Nelson 1959; Varian 1995). Reproducing the idea of the 
wheel is much easier than reproducing the wheel itself and, at the same time, 
the costs of producing the first wheel are much greater than those associated 
with the second. In the first case our artisan must elaborate a design, supply 
themselves with tools and calibrate them, make test models and correct faults. 
In the second, these expenses are reduced to the inputs in question. However, 
this formulation of neoclassical economics is not quite correct. It would seem 
that there are some goods that are made up of knowledge matter and others that 
are not. The former would have the properties described, while there would be 
others lacking them. Actually, as we have asserted, almost all entities – except 
the inert entities that have not received cognitive flows, such as the wind or a 
stone – combine, in diverse measure, different types of knowledge matter and 
different types of physical matter. The wheel as an artefact, the idea of a wheel 
in the mind of the artisan, and that same wheel described in a text all involve 
varied mixtures of these. The cost of the reproduction of the knowledges var-
ies in each case, based on the proportions of this combination and the type of 
bearer that the knowledge is embedded in (Romer 1993). Let us set aside the 
example of the wheel and take up the idea of God or of money. When it is said 
that knowledge matter reproduces itself with low marginal costs, this is a rea-
sonable claim for the knowledge codified in texts (the idea of God in the Bible, 
the monetary signs on notes or bank accounts), but it is completely unsustain-
able for the intersubjective form of that knowledge (the collective belief in God 
or the social faith in the contract that money implies). Indeed, reproducing 
knowledge carried intersubjectively is extremely costly, when not impossible,43 
as the inflation of atheism and the atheism of inflation show.
In summary, the reproduction costs of the goods in which knowledge has 
been materialised depend on the forms of physical matter with which they are 
entangled. Having stated that caveat, it can be said that, on the highest level 
of abstraction, knowledge matter has lower reproduction costs (or marginal 
costs) than physical matter, whose reproduction costs tend towards infinity 
(insofar as it cannot be produced or reproduced).
In seventh place is the asymmetry of the relationship between physical mat-
ter and knowledge: although there is physical matter that is devoid of knowl-
edge matter, knowledge only exists supported by some form of physical matter. As 
already pointed out, knowledge matter does not exist as an independent entity, 
but only as an emergent property of knowledge matter. Now, the key is that this, 
from the standpoint of knowledge matter, becomes a Bearer44 that moulds knowl-
edge, bestowing particular properties on it. Contrary to the belief in the Platonic 
topus uranus (inhabited by pure and perfect eidos, uncontaminated by contact 
with matter), here we argue that the idea of the wheel does not exist without 
a seat in subjective consciousness, the rotating artefact, a codified representa-
tion, or some other physical bearer. Indeed, the perishable form of a perennial 
content is a necessary evil. The destinies of knowledges which do not wear out 
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and the bearers that do, are tragically bound up with each other. In turn, it is 
evident that the particular features of the bearer of any knowledge matter deter-
mine various properties that such knowledge assumes. That the idea of the wheel 
exists subjectively as an individual mental representation, as an objectivisation 
in a determined artefact, or as a codification in a text, confers on that knowl-
edge highly divergent possibilities of, for example, being disseminated, being 
considered useful, or falling into oblivion.
Next, providing that the above holds true, it seems conducive to utilise the 
physical bearers as a tool with which to distinguish several classes of knowledge 
matter.45 Indeed, with regards to ‘matter’ (as entities with mass), the various 
levels on which it exists are well known: atoms, molecules, and cells, among 
others. The same applies to energy: thermal, electrical, nuclear etc. These are 
classifications between different levels (with hierarchies) or planes (without) 
but, in any case, all are classifications of a materialist variety. It is noteworthy 
that in terms of knowledge, this kind of typology46 has not been elaborated 
more than tangentially and, more importantly, they have not become com-
mon sense. Of course, this is due to the fact that knowledge has tended to be 
conceived of in an idealist way, disconnected from the materiality of its exist-
ence. The Cartesian dichotomy, now superseded on so many planes, persists 
in relation to knowledge. But what are these planes or levels that knowledge 
exists on? For the time being, in relation to knowledge these are the bearers. 
Although in chapter 3 a detailed typology will be elaborated, here it will satisfy 
our purposes to preview this answer in order to introduce the comparison with 
physical matter.
In this sense, some forms that here we describe as knowledge (matter) resem-
ble what is habitually understood by the term in the social sciences: the sub-
jective and conscious knowledge of individuals. Without stretching the point 
too far it is also commonly accepted to consider knowledge to be what the 
neurosciences call implicit memory: non-declarative knowledge, akin to what 
economists call ‘know how’, sociologists of science and technology call ‘tacit 
knowledge’, and psychologists refer to as the ‘unconscious’. A second bearer of 
knowledge, accepted from its inception in anthropology and sociology, and 
later recognised by economics (especially Evolutionary economics) is the inter-
subjective: referring to those knowledges that are situated, so to speak, beyond 
the particular human subject. Values, norms, languages, institutions, and 
beliefs would seem to dwell in this sphere. In turn, the impact of the theory of 
information on the biological sciences means that there are forms, that here we 
call knowledge, which exist at a smaller scale than the individual subject. This 
is a third type of bearer, belonging to the biological order: flows of data codified 
in various ways, e.g. genetically that inform all living beings.
Lastly, there are knowledges with an objective bearer in some inert entities. 
Wherever humans have intentionally translated their knowledge onto inani-
mate material, there is knowledge of this type. For now it matters little whether 
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these knowledges have been objectified in a wheel, a cave painting, or a com-
puter. Thus, the human individual, the human collective, the biological human 
and non-human, and the inert entity that has been shaped by ‘social’ flows of 
knowledge, all these are forms of knowledge matter. In other words, knowl-
edge matter exists in four bearers: subjective, intersubjective, biological, and 
objective.
Returning to the level of analysis of the goods (and subjects) with which this 
chapter opened, we must reiterate that these are combinations of variables, 
diverse proportions and heterogeneous qualities of physical matter and knowl-
edge matter. But it is important to emphasise that the variability has significant 
consequences in relation to both the economic properties of the goods in ques-
tion (for example, their reproduction costs as mentioned earlier) and to the 
regulations that principally affect these goods. In this last sense, let us cast our 
minds back to the idea that physical private property regulates access to the 
physical matter aspect of a good while so called intellectual property acts on 
knowledge matter. We can now add that the proportion of physical matter and 
knowledge matter is one of the variables that have an impact upon the differ-
ential weight that the different types of capitalist regulations have. Let us imag-
ine that the wheel in our time-honoured example has physical material inputs, 
implying significant costs, and requires large energy resources to power them. 
We shall conjecture as well, that the knowledge that the artisan makes use of is 
found in the public domain and easily learnt. In this extreme case, it is evident 
that physical property will make itself felt more than intellectual property. Let 
us now suppose, and on the contrary, that we encounter a different wheel: one 
Physical Matter Knowledge Matter
Physical property Intellectual property
Emergence Emergence
Irremediably limited Potentially infinitely accumulable
Entropy Negentropy
Subtractability Expansibility
Infinite reproduction costs Comparatively low reproduction costs 
(varies according to bearer)
Can exist without knowledge matter Cannot exist without a physical matter 
bearer
Levels or planes: Atoms, molecules, 




Table 1.2: Physical Matter and Knowledge Matter.
Source: prepared by author.
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that objectifies knowledge matter perfected and handed down over generations, 
with secrets guarded by families or craft guilds, and that the physical materi-
als and energy needed to produce it are few and extremely cheap. In this case, 
although once again both regulations are present, intellectual property (or its 
historically situated equivalent) would weigh more heavily upon the object.
To close this chapter it is crucial to introduce a clarification about the his-
toricity of the concepts and theories that have been put forward. Naturally, all 
concepts and theories are subject to historical development. Their origins, suit-
ability, and limits are indissociable from the contexts in which they emerge and 
circulate. This simple idea is accepted by all authors regarding the currents and 
concepts of other disciplines, but is rarely adhered to in relation to their own. It 
is difficult to convince an economist that, to pluck an example from the air, the 
trisectoral division of the economy (into farming, industrial and service sec-
tors) is not a natural and unalterable product but that it instead took shape in a 
determined period. It would be even more difficult still to hold a critical discus-
sion with a Marxian (who would nod approvingly right up until the previous 
sentence) about the historicity of Marx’s own categories. Having said that, here 
we would like to avoid committing that sin, as far as is possible.
Indeed, our approach in relation to distinguishing physical matter and 
knowledge matter (along with the other concepts presented over the course 
of this book) is as subject to the contemporary epoch (informational capital-
ism, as we shall see) as any other. Thus, it is essential to bear in mind that what 
appears as a physical, philosophical, legal or economic ontology, is as transitory 
a historical product as any other. It is not a question of plugging up one’s ears 
to block out the seductive song of the sirens, but rather of heeding Odysseus’ 
precaution: by binding oneself to the mast of historicity.
If the starting point of our reasoning has been forgotten, by now one could 
have the impression that our intention is to hypothesise that physical mat-
ter and knowledge matter are the two aspects that animate Being, that we are 
attempting to resolve the ahistorical mystery of ontology. Fortunately, due to 
both lack of skill and vocation we shrink from such a display of philosophical 
fencing. We have no well-formed opinion, nor does it seem relevant to know 
for certain, if Being is composed of physical matter and knowledge matter, of 
fire and water, or of an indeterminate multiplicity and events. We do maintain, 
on the other hand, that there is a dialectical totality which we can agree to call 
capitalism. Suffice it here to hypothesise that it is (what in chapter 3 will be called) 
the cognitive material configuration of this stage of capitalism that is organised 
around this distinction between physical matter and knowledge matter and that, 
therefore, it can be profitably understood through it. These capitalist regulations, 
conceive of physical matter and knowledge matter as two aspects of a Being, 
two aspects that, by definition, appear as natural and immutable. How fruitful 
our approach turns out to be is for the reader to decide once the end of this 
book has been reached.
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This chapter opened with capitalist regulations and has finished by highlight-
ing the characteristics of two aspects of entities. We touched on knowledge 
(matter) being one of them, that is to say that knowledge presented itself to us 
in an ontological way. However, knowledge has not been approached in a gno-
seological way, which is of course the most usual. Thus, we have not entered into 
debate with the tradition that begins in epistemology and continues through 
Marxism and the sociology of knowledge. This is what will be attempted in the 
next chapter in order to be in a better position to introduce our perspective, 
cognitive materialism, in a systematic way.
CHAPTER 2
How to Know Knowledge? Introducing 
Cognitive Materialism
The ideas presented in the first chapter will have alerted the reader to the fact 
that we intend to give the concept of ‘knowledge’ a meaning which is quite 
distinct from the varied definitions it is often given in epistemology, Marxism, 
and the sociology of knowledge. In this sense, it is now advisable to situate 
our approach in relation to these traditions. Indeed, any reflection on the term 
knowledge should take into account the different approaches and strands of 
thought that have intersected with the concept. But far from tracing this his-
torical trajectory in any detail, evaluating critiques and integrating the research 
presented here into the solid foundations of philosophy and the social sciences, 
the objective of making this comparison here merely lies in revealing the par-
ticularities of cognitive materialism.
2.1 Epistemology
Let us start from a completely naturalised idea in order to facilitate our 
presentation. The different disciplines that have studied knowledge share an 
understanding of it as a product of human subjects  – individual, collective 
etc. But, is it that clear-cut? We will try to show that it is not, but for now we 
shall abide by this idea. As a consequence, the relationship between subject 
and knowledge can be useful, in order to assemble these diverse viewpoints 
around it (Mannheim [1936] 1949, 12, but above all see Cassirer 1906, 1907).
Now, beyond popular stories, myths and religions – which it might be worth 
lingering over – the first discipline that dedicated itself to thinking about the 
features of knowledge was philosophy, and within it what we today call episte-
mology (Mannheim [1936] 1949, 12).
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In all likelihood much to the horror of the diligent devotees of this philo-
sophical branch, we suggest a crude simplification: that the traditions of philos-
ophy, particularly epistemology, have as a fundamental characteristic the analy-
sis of the subject-knowledge relationship in ideal terms. Of course, this idea is 
not at all original, having been formulated by Marx and Engels, for example 
in The German Ideology (see below). Perhaps it would be more interesting to 
add that one of the features of this epistemological idealism – and certainly of 
the so-called ‘historical materialism’ that engages in a critique of it – is that it 
locates all debates around the truth-falsity continuum. How is truthful knowl-
edge produced? How can it be distinguished from false knowledge? What are 
the guarantees that the knowing subject is on the path to truth? Is it possible 
to gain access to the truth or even draw close to it? How can the falsity of a 
supposed knowledge be demonstrated? These have been, ultimately, the ques-
tions that have animated the debates since Classical Antiquity. Neither is it 
surprising, when epistemology remains semantically anchored in the Platonic 
notion of episteme, as immutable, truthful, transcendent knowledge (and in a 
good deal of the conceptions of it, inaccessible to the senses). Thus, the term 
that came to be used for the entire history of this tradition to designate knowl-
edge – i.e. episteme – means that the idea of false knowledge is understood to 
be an oxymoron. But the point we would like to make here is more about the 
association between epistemology and the truth-falsity axis than about the link 
between knowledge and truth. This emphasis lacks significance in Plato’s case 
and his distinction between two classes of doxa and episteme in book vii of The 
Republic. But it becomes increasingly important for subsequent epistemology. 
Popper’s falsifiability – along with coterminous authors and debates – limits 
the potential of humanity – especially scientists – for gaining access to the pole 
of truth on the axis in question, but it does not alter the axis itself to which 
the joys and sorrows of knowledge are condemned. For Plato the philosopher 
could, under certain circumstances, reach the end of the race and cross the 
finishing line of truth (which was also the starting point, in their forgetfulness 
of the topus uranus); while for Popper, the scientist is condemned to assume the 
role of a self-aware Achilles who runs knowing that the tortoise and its truth, 
sooner or later, will inch further away. Science draws ever closer, but the elu-
sive epistemic reptile unremittingly interposes a certain distance. Beyond these 
metaphors, it is evident that we are still talking about the same axis. Whoever 
reads through this book, whether they are philosopher or scientist will have no 
bearing on how far or how close to our objectives they get.48
Besides the location of knowledge along the truth-falsity axis, it is important to 
emphasise that the other distinctive feature of epistemology is its idealism in the 
analysis of the relationship between subject and knowledge. Even within the broad 
level of generality we are navigating in these paragraphs, perhaps it is possible 
to slightly reduce the level of imprecision. To that end, we will adopt a historical 
division that Karl Mannheim suggests, placing on one side the periods in which 
the epistemological question was directed towards the objects of knowledge, and 
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on the other the periods in which the knowing subject was examined. The for-
mer, the author claims, are typically rooted in the pre-modern era:
In periods in which the objective worldview remains more or less 
unshaken, and in epochs which succeed in presenting one unambigu-
ously perceivable world order, there exists the tendency to base the exist-
ence of the knowing human subject and his intellectual capacities on 
objective factors. Thus in the Middle Ages, which not only believed in an 
unambiguous world-order but which also thought that it knew the exis-
tential value to be attributed to every object in the hierarchy of things, 
there prevailed an explanation of the human capacities and thought 
which was based on the world of objects. (Mannheim [1936] 1949, 12)
The idea is clear. In a stable world, in which the good, the beautiful, and the 
truthful have not been rent asunder, in an ordered and balanced world, in a 
world that counts on the guarantee of omnipotent gods, ultimately there is 
no reason to doubt the objects of knowledge. Additionally, Mannheim holds 
that the shattering of medieval certainties regarding the order of the world of 
objects, connected to the ascent of modernity, drove epistemology to take ref-
uge in the subject itself, shifting the emphasis of its investigations onto it.
…the conception of order in the world of objects which was guaran-
teed by the dominance of the church became problematical, and there 
remained no alternative but to turn about and to take the opposite road, 
and, with the subjects as the point of departure, to determine the nature 
and the value of the human cognitive act, attempting thereby to find an 
anchorage for objective existence in the knowing subject. (Mannheim 
[1936] 1949, 12)
Thus, from Classical Antiquity until the Medieval Age, the central focus of epis-
temology was knowledge itself, understood as a pure, abstract, ethereal entity. 
In other words, idealism understood knowledge as a form of being independ-
ent from the subject, a carrier of characteristic properties. Modernity, and espe-
cially the tradition that since empiricism and rationalism converged in Kant 
and led to transcendental idealism, changed this radically. The focus of episte-
mology becomes analysis of the knowledge-creating subject. What are the ena-
bling conditions, that categories of understanding must possess,49 what are the 
general features necessary for this subject to produce knowledge (remember: 
‘truthful knowledge’)? Of course, the point is that now it is the subject who is 
considered in ideal terms. The subject whose knowing-potential is explored is 
either a universal, ahistorical, completely abstract subject, or an incarnation of 
the systematic thinker: the philosopher or the scientist. No analysis of material-
ity, of ‘social’ circumstances, of the empirical features of cognitive processes is 
invited to that particular philosophical banquet.
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Certainly, for epistemology, even more distant than the question of the mate-
riality of the knowing-subjects is the concern about the materiality of knowl-
edge itself. This is due in part to the difficulty of wrestling with knowledge 
epistemologically and ontologically simultaneously: as a knowledge about the 
world and as a thing in the world. This is how Steve Fuller puts it:
Philosophers generally think that knowledge is about things, but rarely 
is knowledge itself conceptualised as a thing. To make a 2500 year-old 
story short, the main reason why philosophers have shied away from 
thinking about knowledge as a thing turns on conceptual difficulties 
that are supposedly involved in treating knowledge as something both 
in the world and about the world. (Fuller 2005, 1)
In short, epistemology tends to either consider knowledge itself as a purely 
ideal entity, or to imagine the knowledge-producing subject as an ideal subject. 
Materiality continues to be viewed as a contaminating residue that should be 
filtered out in order to arrive at the knowledge of the essence of Being.
2.2 Marx and the Sociology of Knowledge
The reflections of this second important group start from the assertion of a 
fundamental concept whose clearest, if not the first, formulation comes from 
Marx. This is that the ideas and subjects that produce them are tightly bound 
up with the ‘social’50 context that surrounds them.
Evidently, this implies a departure from one of the idealist aspects of episte-
mology. The social circumstances in which these subjects are immersed, with 
different particularities he points out, must be analysed, in all the perspectives 
of this group. Schematically, there is agreement that: i) knowledge is a product 
of concrete, material, empirical, and contingent human subjects, and not of 
transcendental beings such as those of epistemology; ii) the subjects elaborate 
these knowledges while conditioned or determined by diverse, generally ‘social’, 
factors; iii) consequently, to study the features of knowledge these factors must 
be studied and elucidated. Two heterogeneous approaches are subsumed here. 
The first is proper to Marx. The second, closely related to the former, belongs to 
the sociology of knowledge.
2.2.1 Marx
The first clear formulations of Marxist materialism are found in The German 
Ideology, written with Engels in 1846, but which wouldn’t see light until its 
publication well into the twentieth century.51 However, the most general (and 
in a way, the bluntest) enunciation of the relationship between subjects and 
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knowledges for this approach can be found in a well-known passage from the 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy:
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into 
definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations 
of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their 
material forces of production. The totality of these relations of produc-
tion constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, 
on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which cor-
respond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production 
of material life conditions the general process of social, political and 
intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their 
existence, but their social existence that determines their conscious-
ness. (Marx [1859] 1977, 20)
What does this paragraph (and those from The German Ideology) tell us? Firstly, the 
critique of philosophy, particularly German idealism, makes its appearance, that 
Marx never tires of repeating: we must set aside speculations and start from the 
concrete reality of human social subjects. Materialism derives from this, for this 
author: analysing the concrete conditions of the production and reproduction of 
real life, integration into the social relations of production and, only on the basis of 
these, studying the products of the mind. Secondly, it should be noted that Marx’s 
emphasis is not on the materiality of individual subjects. If this were the case, we 
would be confronted by a psychological explanation: a subject experiences one or 
another personal situation, and this leads them to conceive this or that idea. But for 
Marx, and in the quote above this can be seen clearly, the problem is the integration 
of the subject in the web of ‘social relations’. These, particularly those of production, 
are what determine ‘social consciousness’.
A third relevant element for our synopsis is the resignification of the concept 
of ideology.
The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, subli-
mates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and 
bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest 
of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no 
longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no 
development; but men, developing their material production and their 
material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their 
thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by 
consciousness, but consciousness by life. In the first method of approach 
the starting-point is consciousness taken as the living individual; in the 
second method, which conforms to real life, it is the real living indi-
viduals themselves, and consciousness is considered solely as their con-
sciousness. (Marx and Engels [1846] 1970, 47)
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In Marx, terms such as representations, consciousness, and ideas, occupy the 
place of (a part of) what we call knowledge, and this is no coincidence. The 
former are part of ideology, of the beliefs distorted by material interests, while 
knowledge would be associated with science52 and, in the last instance, with 
reason and truth (Naess 1956). As Tom Bottomore remarks:
The theory of ideology is not present as a new epistemology, and Marx 
would not have developed the theory in the way he did if he had not 
already believed that the doctrines that he was attacking were false. 
His theory of knowledge was implicitly that of the natural sciences. 
(Bottomore 1956, 54)
All this is the source of bitter polemics but in any case, it is not a significant 
issue for our analysis. Here it suffices to point out that Marx situates knowledge 
(in the broad sense in which we understand it) in relation to the materiality of 
the subjects that produce it. However, he does this only for that part of knowl-
edge which he calls ideology. In the paragraph cited above from Marx, an idea 
surfaces that would take on various different formulations later on: that of the 
historicity of ideas. This means not only that beliefs are a product of the mate-
rial embodiment of human subjects, but also that the transformation of the 
modes of production, class struggle etc., cause these beliefs to be modified. The 
notion (that would gain popularity with Kuhn) that the legitimacy of ideas is a 
transient historical product is one that we also owe to Marx.
2.2.2 The Sociology of Knowledge
By sociology of knowledge we are referring to a perspective that took shape at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, in Germany and later on in the USA 
(Merton [1948] 1968, 511). Among its founding authors are Mannheim ([1936] 
1949), Scheler ([1926] 1980), Merton ([1948] 1968), and a number of other 
illustrious contributors.53 Both the perspectives of authors such as Schütz, 
Garfinkel, and Goffman (phenomenology, ethnomethodology, symbolic inter-
actionism) and, especially, Berger and Luckman’s well-known study ([1966] 
1991), are the descendants of Wissenssoziologie through the branch of the soci-
ology of common sense knowledge. Through the opposing branch – although 
it grows increasingly closer to its estranged sister – we have the version which 
came after the 1970s, the sociology of scientific knowledge, or simply, of sci-
ence. Authors such as David Bloor, Harry Collins, and Bruno Latour, among 
many others,54 engage in dialogue with this familial legacy.
Discussing the origins of the sociology of knowledge is inconceivable with-
out mentioning its debt to and critique of Marx. The most important book 
in this tradition, Ideology and Utopia, reveals this with its very title. Indeed, 
Mannheim extends the principle of the ‘existential determination of ideas’ 
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(Mannheim [1936] 1949) to all forms of what he calls knowledge, i.e. to ideas, 
representations, and beliefs, regardless of whether they are true or false, scien-
tific or common sense. As one commentator points out, comparing the soci-
ology of knowledge with Marxism (which he refers to with some disdain as 
the ‘doctrine of ideology’):
We see here already the decisive difference between the doctrine of ide-
ology and the sociology of knowledge. The former deals with a mode 
of thinking which is thrown off its proper course, the latter with all 
modes of thinking, and especially with those which form the intellec-
tual framework of our whole world-view and which exist long before 
any falsifying interest-begotten tendency can assert itself. (Stark [1958] 
2010, 48–49)
Perhaps the best synopsis of the programme of the sociology of knowledge, 
which distinguishes it from both epistemology and Marxism, is offered by Tom 
Bottomore in an article from 1956:
All knowledge is a subject for sociological study. I use “knowledge” here, 
not in the philosopher’s sense to denote “a subclass of true beliefs”, but 
to denote any product of reflective thought, as distinct from intuition or 
immediate experience. Knowledge in this sense includes true and false 
beliefs, as well as beliefs which are neither true nor false … The sociol-
ogy of knowledge, then, is the study of the relations between the con-
structs of reflective thought and social structure, that is, between such 
constructs and social groups (occupations, communities, etc., as well 
as social classes), institutions and total societies. (Bottomore 1956, 56)
The sociology of knowledge, in general, maintains its emphasis on the social – 
as opposed to individual – aspects in the determination of ideas. At least, this 
is how Mannheim sees it:
The principal thesis of sociology of knowledge is that there are modes of 
thought which cannot be adequately understood as long as their social 
origins are obscured. It is indeed true that only the individual is capable 
of thinking. There is no such metaphysical entity as a group mind which 
thinks over and above the heads of individuals, or whose ideas the indi-
vidual merely reproduces. Nevertheless it would be false to deduce from 
this that all the ideas and sentiments which motivate an individual have 
their origin in him alone, and can be adequately explained solely on the 
basis of his own life-experience. (Mannheim [1936] 1949, 2)
Nevertheless, this perspective carries along with it some risks of relativism, 
which in fact Mannheim is often accused of.55 Marx situated, at best, the 
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possibility of knowledge (truth and science) in the material determination 
of the proletariat – as we now know Soviet science took this unsustainable 
idea quite far. But Mannheim’s solution to the relativist threat and the prob-
lem of reflexivity56 is hardly more satisfactory. He advances what he would 
call ‘perspectivism’ or ‘relationalism’: he holds that there is a ‘class-less posi-
tion’ of the ‘socially unattached intellectuals’ (Mannheim, cited in Merton 
[1948] 1968, 561). Mannheim himself, naturally, belongs to this stratum. 
Once again, here we are not interested in how to resolve this problem, but 
rather in the fact that the debate about relativism would not be abandoned 
by the sociology of knowledge or by its progeny.
Indeed, both the branches of sociology that hierarchically structure quotid-
ian existence (Schütz’s ‘life world’, and branches of the sociology of science 
subsequent to the 1970s) maintain the central arguments of Wissenssoziologie, 
and sometimes advance no further than to reiterate them with some linguistic 
adornments. In other cases there have been developments, or elaborations. In 
this last sense, the propositions of David Bloor’s ‘Strong Programme’ ([1976] 
1998) and Harry Collins’s ‘Empirical Programme of Relativism (EPOR)’ (1981, 
1982) ultimately took the principles of the sociology of knowledge to the 
extreme.57 The same is true of Latour, Callon, and Law’s actor-network theory 
(vide. Latour 2005), although this perspective exceeds the programme of the 
sociology of knowledge. In turn, the different sociologies that analyse the eve-
ryday production of knowledges (the key reference text is Berger and Luckman 
1991) tick a sometimes forgotten box. Both currents point out that the issue is 
not that there are one or several social, independent, causal factors pre-dating the 
knowledge that they produce, but that the production and circulation of knowl-
edges also constructs social relations.58
In all these cases, the emphasis progressively shifts from theoretical construc-
tions to fieldwork. In daily life or in the laboratory, with the mentally ill or with 
scientists, the study of the routine nature of the production of knowledges by indi-
vidual subjects became crucial. ‘Practices’ and ‘actors’ plant their flags on every 
mountaintop. The authors cited above and their readers wonder, what could be 
more concrete than fieldwork and, especially, case studies? What more effective 
check on idealist speculations than the narration of reality such as it is pre-
sented in ethnography? Knowledge is studied ‘in the making’, everything is pro-
cess, instability, action, and should be captured thus. Capitalist relations and 
far-reaching theories, from which the sociology of knowledge originates, are – 
keeping up appearances or not – banished from the mainstream of the sociol-
ogy of knowledge. In short, the sociology of knowledge maintains the analysis of 
the relationship between subjects and the production of knowledge with reference 
to the social incorporation of the former. But it broadens the analysis in various 
ways: i) It includes what is true and what is false, and also that about which it 
makes no sense to claim as truth-falsity. It partially sets aside the truth-falsity 
axis which in epistemology and Marxism has been preserved; ii) It expands the 
social factors considered ad infinitum: the social relations of production, the 
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labour process, and social classes would not only lose their prior protagonism 
but in the constructivist turn of the 1970s, would be completely forgotten and 
diluted. In contrast, institutions, culture, traditions, schools and thought, and 
above all ‘networks’ and the ‘practices’ of ‘actors’ would win broad approval; iii) 
In some cases the unilateral direction of the link between ‘social relations’ (to 
employ a neutral term) and knowledge went through a process of transforma-
tion, until it came to be understood as being bilateral.
2.3 Cognitive Materialism
In this section some shortcomings contained within the approaches reviewed 
over the last few pages will be indicated, and then the approach of cognitive 
materialism will be presented.
2.3.1 Limitations of the Previous Approaches
Unfortunately, from the standpoint of cognitive materialism, both Marxism 
and the sociology of knowledge have, despite their valuable contributions, some 
significant and interrelated limitations: idealism, humanism and the absence of 
a definition of knowledge.
Idealism? But, are not some of these perspectives the champions of material-
ity? Is it not the case that Marxists are materialists par excellence? And, do not 
the other theories take into consideration the economic and cultural contexts 
in which subjects’ lives unfold, in a thousand and one different ways? Are they 
not inundated by fieldwork? Do they not produce tonnes of case studies that 
analyse each and every detail related to the ‘concrete practices’ of knowledge 
producers? This is precisely the problem. All of these approaches often only 
take into consideration the materiality of subjects and their social contexts. But 
that is only the materiality of knowledge in the cases in which social subjects are 
acting as bearers. If there were other forms in which knowledge could exist, any 
analysis circumscribed to the joys and hardships of humans and their social 
fabric would, evidently, impose narrow boundaries on a materialist approach. 
This leads us to cautiously wonder: have any of these theories considered the 
possibility that knowledge could exist as something independent of ‘social’ 
human subjects? The answer, sadly, is no. With some partial exceptions,59 these 
dozens of theories have not paused to evaluate such a simple concern. Thus, the 
connection between humanism and the idealism with which it is inextricably 
linked can be observed. Humanist reductionism placed limits on materialist 
inclinations towards knowledge itself.
Instead, one could ask in a general way what the material resting-places are 
that knowledge wanders through? Or, more precisely, in which forms of physi-
cal matter does what we describe as knowledge matter reside? This question 
40 Knowledge in the Age of  Digital Capitalism
shifts the focus completely. Even though it impels us, as a first customary ges-
ture, to analyse the subjective (such as individual consciousness) or intersub-
jective bearers (such as the values of a given society), in other words those 
which Marxism and sociology examine, now we can approach them in an 
entirely different light. Furthermore, at a second instance, the materialist ques-
tion urges us to analyse other bearers in which knowledge resides. Do we not 
find knowledges objectified in the inert bodies of technologies? Does the ink 
impregnated into a text not carry codified knowledge?
The criticism about lack of attention paid to the materiality of knowledge has 
been proffered by very few authors from philosophical or sociological back-
grounds. One of those who have ventured to do this is Steve Fuller. Although 
his target is philosophy, his argument can be easily extended to the different 
forms of sociology of knowledge.
…epistemologists have ignored knowledge’s diverse material contain-
ers, such as books, brains, databanks, and communication network, 
despite the different costs involved in getting access to the knowledge 
they contain. In fact, rather than making this point a matter for empiri-
cal disputation, epistemologists usually presume that only that which 
can be conserved as it is conveyed through diverse containers — that is, 
“content” — can have genuine epistemic import. (Fuller 2005, 3)
There will be an opportunity to discuss all these details in the next chapter, but 
for now we have enough evidence to suggest that Marxism and the sociology of 
knowledge are, at best, materialist with regards to the diverse factors that affect 
human knowledge-producing subjects, whether these are individual or social. 
However, they remain idealist in relation to knowledge itself.
On the other hand we have the problem of a definition. It is noteworthy that 
in the cases in which knowledge is subjected to a treatment that distances it 
from the truth-falsity axis, when it begins to be treated as a thing, in other 
words when it is dealt with in a less idealist way, in this same operation it loses 
all specificity, all definition regarding what knowledge is and what its attributes 
are as a thing. This is the case for the sociology of knowledge and social studies 
of science and technology. Indeed, in these approaches knowledge is no longer 
considered in terms of the truth-falsity axis, but in general there are no clear 
definitions with respect to what its content is, what its features are. A distancing 
is undertaken, with good intentions, from the erroneous certainties of epis-
temology and Marxism that associate knowledge with truth. But this usually 
lapses into a striking uncertainty regarding how to give a positive content, a 
clear physiognomy, to knowledge.60
However, this criticism should be attenuated with two extremely impor-
tant caveats. The first is that the limitations of the approaches mentioned do 
not imply that they are lacking in importance, or are useless. The distinction 
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regarding scientific and non-scientific knowledge which epistemology has 
been concerned with, and the analysis of the mechanisms through which cer-
tain knowledges are legitimised while others are silenced, which has aroused 
the interest of the social sciences, are of enormous value for the construction of 
more just, egalitarian, and free societies.
The second is that in social studies of science and technology, and in innova-
tion and knowledge economics, there are numerous pertinent contributions on 
these questions, capable of being valuable inputs for a materialist understand-
ing of knowledge. Indeed, although knowledge matter is not always defined 
from an ontological viewpoint (let alone discussing materialism as a theoretical 
framework), in many cases its different forms of material existence are ana-
lysed, different types of knowledge are distinguished and their properties are 
examined, in ways which, to a greater or lesser extent, are beyond humanism 
and idealism. In previous studies three bodies of literature that assume this 
perspective have been identified. There are at least three conceptual families 
that have offered opinions about the properties of knowledge, rather than the 
human subjects connected to it. These will now be mentioned in ascending 
order of proximity to our approach.
The first of these groups revolves around the concept of public goods and 
similar concepts. Focusing on the properties of rivalry/subtractibility and 
excludability, various positions have been developed in the sphere of econom-
ics regarding how to classify knowledge (Ostrom and Hess 2006; Kaul and 
Mendoza 2003; Romer 1993).61
The second group refers to the concept of tacit knowledge, and especially to 
the discussion about its opposition to codified knowledge. This includes origi-
nal contributions from Michael Polanyi (1958, 1967) and interpretations and 
developments of the concept across three fields: management literature (par-
ticularly Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995); evolutionary and neo-Schumpeterian 
economics (Nelson and Winter 1982; Cowan, David and Foray 2000, among 
others) and the sociology of scientific knowledge, mainly through the works of 
Harry Collins (1974, 2010). Additionally, the neurosciences and their anteced-
ents in experimental psychology have made valuable contributions (Damasio 
1995; Schacter 1987 and Kandel 2006).62
The third group includes authors who have introduced typologies of knowl-
edge: in other words, demarcations between different types of knowledge. In 
disciplinary terms, the origins of these classifications can mostly be traced back 
to economics, although there have also been worthwhile interventions from the 
world of management (Lundvall 2000; Machlup 1962; Mokyr 2002; Spender 
1996; Blackler 1995 and Chartrand 2007).63
So although in this concise book there is no space to discuss these bodies of 
literature, it is important to indicate that the systematisation of cognitive mate-
rialism presented below (and in a good measure the features of knowledge mat-
ter presented in chapter 1 and the typology in chapter 3) is based upon them.
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2.3.2 Characterisation of Cognitive Materialism
The systematic exposition of our approach can be organised around its basic 
characteristics. It is a materialist, emergentist, dialectical, non-humanist, scien-
tific, and cognitive approach. Although some of these features have already been 
mentioned, here they will be set out together. Warning: the following pages 
contain explicit scenes of philosophy and we recommend that impressionable 
readers jump straight to chapter 3.
Materialist
Cognitive materialism holds the basic assumption of every materialist phi-
losophy: all and only material objects are real.64 Material objects (entities) are 
defined by the fact that they are changeable (Bunge 1981, 20), as opposed to 
immaterial or conceptual objects. This approach seeks to distinguish material 
objects from Plato’s worlds of ideas, Christian philosophy and others in which 
ideas are immutable, motionless, and not subject to change, while for Bunge 
matter is the set of material objects. Of course, this assertion of materialism 
refers to all entities, not only to humans or their social relations.65 Crucially, 
material entities are not necessarily physical entities.66
Now, according to cognitive materialism, matter comes in three forms: ‘mat-
ter’ (the set of entities that have mass and volume), energy and knowledge. 
‘Matter’ and energy are the physical entities or physical matter67. Knowledge, 
which only exists in a material bearer, is a non-physical but material entity, 
therefore, always knowledge matter. Therefore there is no knowledge that exists 
as an immaterial entity, only as an emergent level of physical matter. This, from 
the point of view of knowledge, becomes a bearer.
To return to the example provided in the previous chapter, the artisan’s 
knowledges are far from existing immaterially: they are memory traces, flows of 
neural, endocrine, or genetic information, subjective consciousness, and many 
other elements that are embedded in the artisan’s material corporeality. Some 
of them may be translated to the wheel, or a text which describes how to make 
the wheel, or to a neighbour desirous of learning how to copy the artefact in 
question, but in all cases the knowledges will be received by material bases, 
which are varied but indispensable. The same applies to software, works of art, 
so-called ‘human capital’, and other entities that academic and media narratives 
currently in vogue describe as immaterial.
Therefore, the discourses that revolve around the immateriality of some 
knowledge forms (from Negroponte to Negri) may be better or worse, more 
or less suggestive, but in our view are not materialist in any way. These post-
modernist discourses, despite originating from disparate positions on the 
ideological spectrum, have a number of errors in common. The main one is 
the assumption that the diminutive, invisible, or intangible, implies lack of 
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materiality: typically, that the knowledges codified as digital information are 
immaterial.68 This, however, is unsustainable. The way in which human senses, 
especially sight, do or do not perceive any entity does not tell us much about 
its materiality. Are organ systems material, while electrons are not? Are energy 
or magnetic fields not material? For example, when Negroponte, in a famous 
text (1995), remarks that the passage from the world of atoms to the world of 
bits entails the transition from matter to immateriality, he forgets that these bits 
have a very specific materiality, as Cafassi (1998)69 opportunely argues. Indeed, 
it is precisely the material characteristics of bits (being electrical signals) that 
confer to them their fundamental economic properties (they can be cloned 
with costs close to zero).70
A second similar error consists of denying the materiality of those knowledges 
that can easily switch bearers. It is believed that ideas that can be translated from 
a brain to a book, and from there to a third bearer, or data that travels from a 
server to a computer network and from there to a hard drive, are incorporeal 
phantoms. The evident mistake consists of failing to take into consideration 
that all these translations entail passing through different forms of materiality. 
Whether they are few or many, it is vital to understand what these bearers are, 
as will be elaborated later on. The authors who gesture towards this volatility 
of knowledge, this circulation through different bearers, discover nothing less 
than the fact that there are certain forms of knowledge that shrink from mate-
rial monogamy. From this they deduce, paradoxically, that these knowledges 
lack a material character; in other words, they deem them to be celibate. But on 
the contrary, what really occurs are forms of polygamy and diverse promiscuity. 
The analysis of material bearers is equally or more important in cases in which 
a life-long partnership is established (because the translation, as we shall see, 
entails changes of ownership, economic properties, and power). But this is a fact 
that slips unobserved by the champions of immateriality, who perceive Platonic, 
puritan chastity where there is nothing less than Dionysian orgies.
So far we have differentiated cognitive materialism from non-materialist 
approaches. However, other forms of materialism should now be mentioned, 
which share some points of view with ours, and which have been gaining vis-
ibility in recent years. Among them, on the one hand, are the various forms 
of new materialism, and on the other hand, cultural materialism. Although a 
detailed analysis of both would cause us to stray too far from the thread of this 
book’s argument, a brief comment can be offered. New materialism (Coole and 
Frost 2010) includes numerous perspectives that are difficult to summarise. 
However, in general they have an essayist, not scientific, vocation (definitions 
and operationalisations are not even attempted). Despite sharing an empha-
sis on the non-human, they keep (similarly to Latour, as indicated in an end-
note) their focus on the concept of agency. Therefore, they are far from locating 
knowledge as a central core. Furthermore, in the majority of cases, the analysis 
of capitalism is not their objective.
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Cultural materialism, for its part, is highly relevant to the series that this book 
is published as part of. Through various studies, mainly by Fuchs (for example, 
2015), following Raymond Williams, an approach is offered that coincides with 
ours in terms of being designed to analyse capitalism (exploitation, classes), 
recuperating dialectics, and bringing into a dialogue another material entity 
(culture or communication in their case, knowledge in ours) with physical enti-
ties, although not in a binary way. However, we have at least two differences 
with this approach. The first relates to the cultural materialist standpoint being 
humanist. The second touches on the limitations of the concept of culture. Our 
argument in a nutshell would be that the notion of ‘culture’ (as used in that 
literature) is itself a product of industrial capitalism and, therefore, might not 
be the most appropriate for dealing with different stages of capitalism, let alone 
other modes of production. More precisely, culture represents one of the poles 
of the legal dichotomisation between the instrumental and the non-instrumen-
tal that industrial capitalism performed. Thus, we tend to believe that it is not a 
concept capable of dealing with the totality.
Emergentist
It is not unusual to split materialist philosophies between emergentist and 
physicalist (or reductionist). Cognitive materialism is, to some extent, a kind of 
the former which claims that matter organises itself in systems with emergent 
properties. This means, first and foremost, that the properties of a certain level 
cannot be reduced to the properties of another level. In this vein:
The material unity of the world means that the motion of matter results 
in a natural hierarchy of relatively autonomous forms of movement of 
matter where each level has new, emergent qualities that can’t be reduced 
to lower levels or an assumed “materia prima”. (Fuchs 2003, 197)
Of course, this does not mean that the levels are unrelated. Furthermore, it is 
important to underline that in cognitive materialism the levels or planes are not 
necessarily organised hierarchically.
All matter, that is, physical and knowledge matter, is emergent. Emergence 
is related to the self-organisation of matter (Fuchs 2003), but it is not identical 
in physical and knowledge matter. Indeed, while physical matter emerges from 
itself, knowledge matter emerges from physical matter. Thus, the origins of 
knowledge matter are associated not only with self-organisation, but also with 
autopoietic systems, i.e. living beings (Maturana and Varela 1984; Luhmann 
2012; Hofkirchner 2013). However, it is crucial for our perspective to empha-
sise that knowledge matter may exist in objective, inert bearers produced by 
those autopoietic systems. Imagine the artisan trying to produce a wheel she 
has devised. Naturally, the artisan carries emergent knowledges – of a diverse 
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nature – and is herself an autopoietic system. But the wheel she constructs, hav-
ing no potential to reproduce and perpetuate itself, is also a carrier of knowl-
edges that have been objectified in it. As a consequence it has emergent proper-
ties, properties that did not exist in the knowledgeless physical matter that it is 
made of, for example the feature of rotating on an axle.
In order to frame an emergentist and materialist perspective into a dialectic 
framework, it is important to recall that the Hegelian ‘law of the transforma-
tion of quantity into quality’ is the ultimate antecedent of the modern notion of 
emergence (Hodgson 2000; Fuchs 2003).
However, to give greater precision to what should be understood by emer-
gence (and what should not), it is necessary to understand the dialectical char-
acter of cognitive materialism.
Dialectical
So, what is the relationship between an emergentist materialism (that is usu-
ally associated with evolutionary theory and systems theory, sciences of com-
plexity) and the dialectic? The question should be elucidated because, in fact, 
some authors oppose dialectical and emergentist materialisms (Charbonnat, 
2007). However, it is our belief that emergentism can fruitfully be interpreted 
on the basis of Hegelian dialectic (Levins and Lewontin 1985; Wan 2013; Fuchs 
2003). Our reading of Hegelian dialectics should therefore be explained. ‘Oh, 
not the whole thesis, antithesis, synthesis thing again’, the reader may groan. 
However, these are in no way categories from Hegel’s dialectic. In that case, 
what is it?
The rushed synopsis that follows has the double demerit of being vexingly 
elementary for those who are acquainted with Hegelian dialectics, and com-
pletely obscure, or even irritating, for those who are not at all familiar with it, or 
those who renounce it altogether. Unfortunately, there is no better alternative 
available, and in spite of these drawbacks, this brief presentation seems to be 
preferable to either eliding or overly expanding it.71 The presentation is organ-
ised around three key points: firstly, the moments of the dialectic, including 
the role of negation; secondly, the relationship between the whole and its parts; 
and thirdly, some clarifications about the relationship between contingency 
and necessity, around the notions of irreversibility and retroactivity.
So, the first point to discuss refers to three moments, three states of being 
that are repeated successively and infinitely, and the negativity that binds them. 
This is why the only thing that is eternal in the dialectical process is change, 
movement.72 In visual terms, this development can be described with a spiral: 
the development of being passes through the same moment an infinite number 
of times, but it does so on different levels. Thus, the third moment that a given 
dialectical movement culminates in, transforms into the first moment of the 
movement that follows it.
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Contrary to the widespread belief that the categories of thesis, antithesis, and 
synthesis represent the sine qua non of Hegelian thought, it is vital to make clear 
that the three moments of the dialectic are the following. The first, the abstract 
universal, is that in which the totality presents itself in a confused and undif-
ferentiated way. It is the moment of immediacy, where the contradictions have 
not yet revealed themselves; they have not ‘arisen’. The unity here is given from 
the position of the external observer: it is a unity ‘in itself ’, but internally is not 
clearly recognised as such. The second moment, the concrete particular, is that 
of splitting. The dichotomies confront the parts of the whole. The being divides 
itself into counterposed individualities that assert themselves through negation 
of the other. These individualities produce an initial form of self-consciousness: 
they constitute subjective unities, ‘for themselves’. The third moment, the con-
crete universal, represents the sublation (‘aufhebung’), the negation of the divi-
sion and reunion of that which was separated, but now under a mediated unity. 
For the avoidance of doubt, it is worth reiterating that dialectical movement 
does not end at the concrete universal; it is converted into the abstract uni-
versal of a new movement and so on, ad infinitum. The constitutive negativity, 
the inherent contradiction of being is the driving force of this movement. To 
some extent, a dialectical relationship between two entities may be summarised 
around three principles. ‘(1) mutual exclusion as opposites (2) depending on 
each other (3) in an asymmetrical relation.’ (Hofkirchner73 2013, 155).74
The second point necessary to mention is the relationship between the whole 
and its parts that the dialectic proposes. To elucidate this point we shall make 
use of some simple ideas outlined by Levins and Lewontin. The first two refer 
to the idea of totality:
The first principle of a dialectical view, then, is that a whole is a rela-
tion of heterogeneous parts that have no prior independent existence as 
parts. The second principle, which flows from the first, is that, in gen-
eral, the properties of parts have  no prior alienated existence but are 
acquired by being parts of a particular whole.75 (Levins and Lewontin 
1985, 273)
Thus, in the dialectical idea of totality, the totality imparts meaning to the parts. 
This goes further than the simple principle of emergence: it does not just mean 
that the emergent levels have properties which do not exist in previous levels, 
but that, once the emergent levels surface, some properties of the previous lev-
els are actually reliant upon them. To put it simply, there is a dual directional-
ity of emergence.76 Thirdly, the relationship between the whole and its parts is 
indissociable from their rejection of the split between subject and object.
A third dialectical principle, then, is that the interpenetration of parts 
and wholes is a consequence of the interchangeability of subject and 
object, of cause and effect. (Levins and Lewontin 1985, 274)
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Thus, from a dialectical standpoint, the perspectives of subject and object are 
interchangeable. This is extremely important as it helps to sustain the non-
humanist dialectical approach developed below. It is not the case that the sub-
ject constructs the object, that there is an active and a passive entity, a cause 
and effect, but that dialectical development includes that which in determined 
historical situations we designate as subjects and objects.
Now, one of the most frequent criticisms of the dialectic consists of dismiss-
ing it as evolutionist, determinist, historicist or, especially, teleological. This 
is not a preposterous accusation: some readings of Hegel, and certainly some 
forms of Marxism (that undoubtedly have led to political failure, if not horror), 
have adopted this approach. In fact, the idea of three moments that succeed 
each other and the figure of the spiral that we have employed could be inter-
preted in this way. Conversely, many of those who aim to rescue the dialectic 
(similarly to those who would like to bury it) lay emphasis on the perpetual 
movement it suggests, the constitutive instability of being, the ceaselessness of 
the dialectical process etc. Indeed, the dialectic accepts the circumstantial char-
acter of all fixity.
Which of these positions is correct? Does the dialectic imply contingency or 
determination? Freedom or foreclosure? This brings us to the third and final 
point: the connection between the dialectic and the notions of contingency and 
necessity. In our opinion both poles are integrated into the dialectic by means 
of the features of irreversibility and retroactivity.
The dialectical process does not imply determination or foreclosure, but 
rather contingency and opening in the present tense. But this does not mean 
absolute indetermination. The key lies in the irreversibility that dialectical 
mediation gives rise to. Once a contradiction has arisen, there is no possible 
return to the pre-existing condition. This means that each dialectical figure is 
distinct from those preceding it, but not that it proceeds along a predetermined 
path, or the best possible ex ante etc. (Žižek 2012, 145). The dialectic entails 
indeterminacy and contingency, but at the same time something similar to 
what innovation economists call path dependence (David, 1985) in the face of 
bifurcations: choices made for contingent reasons at a given moment limit the 
options available later on; history progressively carves out paths which, once 
trodden, are difficult (if not impossible) to retrace. Expressed in more precise 
Hegelian terms, once the mediations have manifested themselves, immediacy 
cannot be regained.
On the other hand, when looking backwards from this point in the dialectical 
process, this sum of irreversible contingencies assumes a definite sense. Hegel 
condenses this dialectical constitution of the past in the famous and beautiful 
phrase, ‘The owl of Minerva begins its flight only when the shadows of night 
are gathering’ (Hegel [1821] 1991). Thus, only in the twilight (in the sense of 
the last possible moment: the present) of a society, a life, or a system can its 
reality, its meaning, be described (the owl of Minerva represents wisdom), in 
hindsight. The unfolding of the day is contingent, free, indeterminate, but the 
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night infuses it with meaning in which its symmetries, harmonies, and rituals 
stand out.77 Here we can see clearly the relationship between part and whole: 
the totality that is constituted at dusk is that which confers meaning to the parts 
as parts. It must be emphasised that this twilight is constantly drawing in: the 
past must be reinterpreted time and time again. The present reconfigures the 
past, as emergent levels reconfigure the preceding levels. This leads us from 
Hegel’s owl to Marx’s ape, as Žižek remarks:
This is how one should read Marx’s aforementioned thesis about the anat-
omy of man as a key to the anatomy of ape: it is a profoundly material-
ist thesis in that it does not involve any teleology (which would propose 
that man is “in germ” already present in ape; that the ape immanently 
tends towards man). It is precisely because the passage from ape to man is 
radically contingent and unpredictable, because there is no inherent “pro-
gress” involved, that one can only retroactively determine or discern the 
conditions (not “sufficient reasons”) for man in the ape. (Žižek 2012, 172)
Cognitive materialism, in sum, adopts a dialectical perspective that includes, at 
least, the three moments bound by the contradiction inherent to being, the relation-
ships between the whole and its parts, and the relationship between contingency 
and necessity that emerges from the notions of irreversibility and retroactivity.
Non-humanist
The bulk of the social theories that were born during industrial capitalism 
(those from sociology, political science, economics, Marxism) were based on 
the concept of ‘action’, which invariably anchors this tradition to anthropocen-
tric perspectives. The concepts of ‘social relations’, ‘labour’, and ‘rational choice’, 
are nothing less, in the last instance, than categories derived from the former. 
The same applies to the concepts of ‘social actor’, ‘agent’ etc. The concept of 
action unequivocally places the human subject as the beginning and end of 
‘social science’. The same notion of society and the social is closely associated 
with this concept of action in these theories of industrialism. However, those 
theories are exposed as limited when thinking about the capitalist totality from 
the current stage, informational capitalism. Actually, there is a common core 
of ideas held by authors as diverse as Latour,78 Deleuze, Haraway, Sloterdijk, 
Luhmann, Dawkins and others (including the pre-Socratics and numerous 
non-Western philosophers) regarding the theoretical and political limitations 
of humanism. Not only in relation to the ecological disasters of capitalism or 
the emergence of entities that resist binary categorisation as subject or objects, 
but also with regards to humanist theoretical perspectives, from both left and 
right, which have led to the worst atrocities suffered by humans. An explana-
tion of political barbarity is incomplete if humanist thinkers are exonerated 
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from having lost sight of the category of totality, of having maintained the divi-
sion between subjects and objects, and having treated the non-human with the 
logic of sense-certainty (in the Hegelian sense).
In this context, we have the strong impression that the economic, legal, onto-
logical and epistemological significance of non-human entities should not be 
left to postmodern perspectives, on one extreme, or functionalist and evolu-
tionist perspectives on the other, which are undialectical in all cases. In con-
trast, cognitive materialism reclaims the possibilities of a non-humanist dialec-
tic. In other words, it applies the principle of general symmetry (as it is known 
in Science Technology and Society studies) to the analysis of capitalism. Thus, 
the coming chapters will try to show how the utilisation of categories from 
a non-humanist perspective (starting from the idea that knowledge exists in 
non-human bearers, the analysis of productive processes in terms of flows of 
physical and knowledge matter rather than dead and living labour, the analysis 
of forms of capitalist exploitation that do not necessarily include ‘labour’ in the 
usual sense of the term etc.), could be advantageous for a approach which is 
both dialectical and scientific.
Now, it is crucial to assert that the adoption of a perspective which does not 
start from or prioritise the study of humans is not a free choice in the philosophi-
cal supermarket, as it may seem to the reader from the paragraph above. It does 
not arise from an evaluation of the merits or limitations of the humanist and 
non-humanist approaches. In fact, the non-humanism of cognitive materialism 
is a consequence of taking knowledge as a central concept, and searching for the 
material bearers through which it circulates. And the centrality of knowledge 
matter, in turn, arises from our initial question about the relationships between 
entities and capitalism as a totality. A particular knowledge can be owned by 
a company, being carried by an individual mind (a subjective, human bearer) 
or by a piece of paper (an objective, non-human bearer). It would simply be 
empirically wrong to restrict the analysis to humans. Thus, in the last instance, 
the non-humanist approach is a result of the need to understand the relation 
between the capitalist totality and the entities that it is composed of.
However, non-humanist does not equal anti-humanist. Cognitive materi-
alism starts by analysing flows and stocks of physical matter and knowledge 
matter. This leads us in many, in the majority of, cases to study humans, their 
‘actions’, their ‘work’, their ‘social relations’ etc. But this is done after our cru-
cial mediation, this change of perspective. In other words, the study of human 
subjects is not a priori but a consequence of the analysis. Neither is this an 
approach that considers humans and non-humans on equal footing, in ethi-
cal terms. On the contrary: in order to be able to create emancipatory social 
relationships, we believe it is necessary to understand how capitalism acts as a 
totality upon humans and non-humans.
Returning to the comparison with other standpoints discussed over the 
course of this chapter, it should be noted that cognitive materialism also implies 
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radicalising the dual directionality of the subject-knowledge connection. As men-
tioned above, some tendencies in the sociology of knowledge – although also in 
structuralism in its diverse manifestations – assert that it is not enough to grasp 
the fact that subjects produce knowledge: knowledge flows also produce sub-
jects. However, generally for these perspectives the flows of knowledge under 
consideration are purely human: subjective or intersubjective. In our point of 
view, this must be expanded: flows of genetic and neural information, knowl-
edge objectified as technologies (such as buildings and machines) or as informa-
tion (such as software and music), also participate in the production of subjects. 
The relationship between subject and knowledge is radically bivalent – which, 
clearly, associates it with what has just been elaborated as regards the dialectic.
Scientific
Cognitive materialism attempts to be scientific in a quite modest sense, which 
can be encapsulated into four principles. First, an attempt is made to define 
the concepts used, in the least bad way possible. In contradistinction to the 
postmodern gesture, which hides its imprecision with literary (often beautiful) 
ornamentation, we will endeavour to offer a systematic theory. In this sense, 
and second, cognitive materialism does not seek to be essayist or proclamative 
in style, but rather to be a contribution to scientific research. Third, the abstrac-
tions used (which we do not abjure, as the banal empiricism which dominates 
vast swathes of the academic world does) must be capable of being operation-
alised, and thus, of engaging with empirical material, with quantitative and 
qualitative sources, both primary and secondary. Despite the space restrictions 
inherent to this concise book limiting any demonstration of this operation-
alizing, it is essential to be cognisant of its necessity.79 Fourth, this approach 
could be mistaken in some, or indeed all, of its concepts. What is asserted here 
will need to be rectified in the near future, to a greater or lesser extent. The 
arguments, silences, and happenstances of debate will determine the rhythm 
of this metamorphosis. There should be no acritical religious beliefs here (such 
as those that the slaves of their own trajectories practice, those who before the 
death of God pray to the philosophers that have killed Him, or the cloistered 
monks of Marx’s labour theory of value).
Cognitive
Cognitive materialism holds that knowledge is the fundamental concept to 
understand how capitalism works. In this vein, we will employ the idea of 
knowledge we started to develop in chapters 1 and 2 to give an account of dif-
ferent stages of capitalism, define capitalist regulations, develop a theory of cap-
italist accumulation (particularly of capitalist exploitation), advance a schema 
of classes under capitalism and so forth.
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Although from the 1970s there has been a lot of hype regarding knowledge, 
the concept has been put to use mainly with idealistic meanings, has not been 
defined clearly enough and has mostly been framed by humanist perspectives, 
as discussed above. Strictly related to these shortcomings, but much more 
importantly, knowledge appears as a concept derived from ‘action’, ‘social rela-
tions’ or ‘labour’, rather than as the basic building block of a theory. By contrast, 
from a cognitive materialist standpoint, knowledge matter is the ultimate bed-
rock upon which the other concepts are built.
So far the word knowledge has been accompanied in almost every instance by 
the word matter, in the phrase knowledge matter. This was due to the necessity 
of contrasting knowledge matter with physical matter while at the same time 
emphasizing that knowledge is nothing but a material entity. However, as our per-
spectives on knowledge and materialism have been sufficiently defined, it is not 
necessary to continue taxing the reader with extra words. Thus, from now on we 
will employ the words knowledge or knowledges alone, resorting to the expression 
knowledge matter sparingly, when direct comparisons with physical matter arise.
In this chapter, which partly leans on the first, cognitive materialism has been 
located in relation to gnoseological traditions. It is proposed as a third position 
confronting epistemology, on the one hand, and Marxism and the sociology of 
knowledge, on the other. In all cases what is fundamental is that the disciplines 
that have studied knowledge share the practice of having understood it as a 
product of human – individual, collective etc. – subjects.
The bulk of the epistemological tradition is idealist, in two senses. Firstly, in 
locating these discussions around the truth-falsity axis  – specifically, for the 
association between epistemology and the truth-falsity axis rather than for the 
link between knowledge and truth. Secondly, the subject whose possibilities 
of knowing are explored is either a universal, ahistorical, completely abstract 
subject, or an embodiment of the systematic thinker: the philosopher or the 
scientist.
The tradition of Marxism and the sociology of knowledge, in contrast, gravi-
tates around three ideas: i) knowledge is a product of material, concrete, empir-
ical and contingent human subjects, and not of transcendental beings like those 
of epistemology, ii) subjects elaborating those knowledges are conditioned or 
determined by diverse factors, in general social in nature, iii) as a consequence, 
in order to study the characteristics of knowledge, these factors should be elu-
cidated and studied.
From the perspective of cognitive materialism three limitations of these pre-
vious approaches can be found: idealism, humanism, and the lack of a defini-
tion of knowledge. Ergo, the next step was to define our approach on the basis 
of its features as follows: materialist, emergentist, dialectical, non-humanist, 
scientific, and cognitive.




The Typology of Knowledge
As has already been suggested, there are four bearers in which knowledge 
exists, four levels of materiality in which knowledge can be situated. These are: 
objective, biological, subjective and intersubjective.80 Before these are introduced 
individually, a few clarifications are necessary.
The first concerns the division in general. It is immediately evident that the 
first level is the only one in which knowledge exists outside of living beings. For 
the remaining three, the subjective and intersubjective levels inevitably relate to 
humans. The biological level, in turn, incorporates other types of living beings. 
Once this separation between objective knowledges on the one hand, and bio-
logical, subjective and intersubjective knowledges on the other hand, is estab-
lished, an objection could be raised. Would it not be more correct to indicate 
that there are only two types of material bearers, instead of four? Would it not 
be more precise, from a materialist perspective such as is proposed here, to 
show that there are objectified knowledges on the one hand, and that all the 
other forms have a living being as their bearer?
The error in this argument is that it confuses the materialist approach here 
with reductionism (or monism, in Searle’s terms, 2004, 4881). The former is con-
cerned with the properties of the knowledge bearing material, while the latter 
reduces all its properties to those of the ultimate bearers. The former is based 
on the idea of emergent properties, while the latter rejects them. Indeed, as 
discussed in chapters 1 and 2, here the idea is accepted that there are emergent 
levels of organisation of matter. Here, we follow those who point out that not all 
properties at each level can be explained by the properties of other levels (Morin 
2008; Maturana and Varela 1984; Luhmann 1995; Polanyi 1967). This idea is 
actually incorporated into common sense ideas about physical matter. Nobody 
questions whether analysing cells is a materialist task nor suggests a need to 
break them down into molecules, atoms, or subatomic particles. Or rather, the 
analysis of the micro and macro cellular levels (e.g. molecules and tissues) is 
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complementary to analysing the cellular level. Meaning, whatever the ultimate 
material unit may be, all the sciences agree that matter is organised on levels 
with properties which are not reducible to the previous ones, even though they 
are physically supported by them. It goes without saying that between the lev-
els there are relationships, exchanges, and transformations that, in the case of 
knowledge, we shall call translations.
It is in this sense that we can speak about the materiality of the three levels 
of knowledge that flow through living beings. Evidently, the biological level 
operates under its own logic, but it is also clear that the subjective level, that of 
the human individual, has characteristics that surpass the sum of its biological 
components. But it is the third level, that of intersubjective knowledge, whose 
existence proves difficult to accept for some theoretical approaches. Suffice it 
to say that our approach is constructed on the foundations of the traditions of 
sociology (for example Durkheim [1895] 1986; Luhmann 1995), anthropology 
(eg. Lévi-Strauss 1963), linguistics (e.g. Saussure [1916] 2011), some schools 
of psychology (e.g. Jung [1934] 1981; Vygotsky [1934] 1986), philosophy (e.g. 
Castoriadis [1975] 1997, Deleuze and Guattari [1972] 1983), and Marxism 
(excising the reductionist element that we do not share in any measure, for 
example Lukács [1922] 1971). All of these traditions accept the existence of a 
level of intersubjective realities that are not reducible to the individual, much less 
to the biological. Despite this, the objection could be sustained. The existence 
of ‘intersubjective realities’ could be accepted, but how can a material status be 
conferred on them? How can it be accepted that intersubjectivity constitutes 
a bearer, according to the definition in chapter 1? It must be remembered that 
this is a bearer for which the properties of the knowledge are not entirely reduc-
ible to those of the other levels, although they do interact with them. Just as sub-
jective phenomena – for example, consciousness and free will (Searle 2004) – 
cannot be explained fully by reference to the biological brain, intersubjective 
knowledges – e.g. language and social norms – cannot be understood by simply 
reducing them to the knowledge held in the minds of individual subjects. This 
is not to say that we are dealing with metaphysical entities. The mind emerges 
from the individual brain. And intersubjective knowledge emerges from the 
connections between collective minds (Collins 2010). Knowledges are located 
there, in the last instance, as organ systems are supported by atoms. And, of 
course, there is a relationship between all these levels. It is precisely for that 
reason that we refuse to deal with different forms of knowledge in isolation 
from each other.
Let us now criticise the position on the opposite side of the spectrum from 
reductionism, which imagines an absolute autonomy of levels. This, for exam-
ple, could be the case for sociologists who repudiate the importance of study-
ing the functioning of the biological brain in order to account for intersub-
jective phenomena (or Lacanian psychoanalysts who dismiss contributions 
from the neurosciences). In spite of the limitations of current advances, it is 
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clear that each level of knowledge is not self-sufficient. The beautifully tragic 
story of Phineas Gage with which Antonio Damasio opens his Descartes’ 
Error illustrates this (Damasio 1995, chapter 1). From this narrative, it can 
be comprehended that lesions to specific parts of nervous systems can cause 
damage to the observance of social norms  – in other words, intersubjective 
knowledge – without altering motor skills or intellectual faculties.82 However, it 
is perfectly understandable that the idea of the existence of knowledges at the 
biological level generates resistance from social scientists. Sociologists who do 
not hesitate to accept the existence of knowledge at the intersubjective level, 
and economists who accept technology as an embodied knowledge maintain a 
distrust, which is the offspring of methodological humanism, of the idea that 
there could be knowledges in the flows of biological information. In contrast, it 
is equally understandable that for a ‘hard’ scientist amenable to reductionism, 
intersubjective and objective knowledges don a metaphysical character similar 
to that which knowledges in biological bearers have for economists and soci-
ologists. Inviting dialogue between these perspectives, although it may not be 
possible to reach shared conclusions, is one of the objectives of the proposal 
presented here.
The last comment is the following. Within each of the levels of knowl-
edge, various subcategories can be presented. Here one subclassification will 
be developed that has proved useful in previous studies, but plenty of other 
alternatives are perfectly valid. In our view, while the materiality of the bearers 
should be identified as a starting point, any subdivision made within each type 
of knowledge is welcome and we believe that is dependent on the empirical 
material that must be dealt with, the available data, intentions of the research 
etc. What follows, therefore, is a proposal relatively limited by the object of this 
book, but completely malleable for the purposes of further exploration. Next, 
the four types of knowledge are explored.
3.1 Objectified Knowledge (OK)
Knowledges carried by an objective bearer are those that are crystallised out-
side of living beings, materialised in the most varied goods.83 A distinction must 
immediately be made between two forms of objectified knowledge. Firstly, 
technologies; and secondly, information.
3.1.1 OK Technologies and their Different Types
In informational capitalism the use of the term ‘technology’ in academic dis-
course (although this is also true of political and media discourse) is frequently 
a source of misunderstandings. The pertinent confusions are of at least two 
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kinds. On the one hand, interlocutors attribute extremely heterogeneous mean-
ings to the concept, which each assumes to be valid. For example, technology 
could be synonymous with artefact for some, while for others it could refer to 
applied science. In particular, the currently fashionable idea that ‘technology 
is everything’ is especially damaging for a discipline that seeks to scientifically 
understand the relations between technology and society. Claiming that ‘tech-
nology is not just the thing itself ’ is very well regarded in conference papers and 
journal articles. We are told that ‘it is also the overarching set of practices, the 
social fabric, which resignifies the technological object’. Thus, practices, tradi-
tions, cultures, social actors and more elements are progressively stacked up 
on top of each other which, it must be underlined, are not alleged to be related 
to technology (which would be perfectly reasonable) but rather that they are 
technology. As a consequence of this programmed voraciousness, the concept 
of technology loses all practical utility, all its analytical incisiveness and empiri-
cal precision. The author receives laudations or citations, while the idea that 
‘technology is everything’ is seasoned with words like ‘networks’, ‘contingency’ 
and, especially, criticisms of the bogeyman figure of ‘technological determin-
ism’ (whose arguments are defeated upon diluting the concept of technology 
into the ill-defined mire of ‘the social’). The fieldwork that this ‘technology is 
everything’ conception permits cannot soar beyond the precarious genre of 
object-distorted-to-fit case studies. But the empirical sterility does not at all 
diminish the sophistication of the enunciation, or the benefits of this approach 
for furnishing prefabricated theses. Furthermore, it excites the febrile mind of 
a postmodern public that takes pleasure in unnecessary complexity and, above 
all, delights in savouring the snake oil of impostured passions.
However, beyond the disparate uses of the concept of technology, the other 
common source of confusion is synecdoche. In effect, the part is confused with 
the whole. Therefore, it is very common to find the term ‘technology’ refer-
ring to ‘digital technologies’. Indeed, the ‘technology’ sections of newspapers 
are concerned with nothing else but the technologies that process, transmit, or 
store digital information. The same occurs, for example, with the abundance of 
opinions, recipes, courses, and consultancies concerned with ‘educational tech-
nology’. In none of these are desks, blackboards, chairs, pens etc. mentioned, 
but only a tiny fraction of the world of technologies – the digital. One version of 
this confusion, which is attenuated but endemic in academia, lies in confusing 
information technologies (IT), or information and communication technolo-
gies (ICT), with digital technologies. However, IT or ICT extends far beyond 
digital technologies: they include the telegraph, analogue telephones, books, 
abacuses etc. These superpositions, in addition to hindering dialogue, have 
other negative consequences. In effect, they obscure non-digital technologies, 
which are thus denied priority or even existence. Additionally, they prevent us 
from grasping what is specific about digital technologies, that which distin-
guishes them from the vast continent of technologies in general, and it even 
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means that they are confined to the thoroughly mapped territory of informa-
tion technology.
But, let us start from the beginning. For cognitive materialism, technologies 
are those knowledges which are concretised in the form that a determined good 
assumes with an instrumental purpose (and that, in general, function as a means 
to produce other goods or services84), following Machlup, Mokyr, Chartrand 
and other authors.85 For example, there are technological knowledges in com-
puters that are used to design cars, the assembly lines that the cars are produced 
on, the cars themselves, and even the keys that turn on the ignition. Despite the 
diverse complexity of the knowledges that they bear, these four types of goods 
are utilised as means: to design and produce vehicles, to transport people, or 
to start the car.
It is necessary to differentiate technologies (that are pure knowledge) from 
the goods they are objectivified in (the key, the computer, the car, and the 
assembly line belt), that are best described as artefacts (and combine physi-
cal matter with technological knowledge, among other elements). In turn, it 
is important to clarify that the definition of technologies as objectified knowl-
edges is by no means an understanding that they are mere functionality or that 
the original functionality is preserved in the evolution of the artefact. As is cur-
rently acknowledged, artefacts bear other knowledges that are not what here we 
categorise as technologies: they reflect all kinds of values and beliefs, and even 
norms (Heidegger [1953] 1977; Habermas 1970, in part Foucault [1975] 1995, 
but especially, Feenberg 1991, 2000). They can both regulate behaviours and be 
resignified by their users (Winner 1987; Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 1987). The 
rejection of the notion of efficiency as the only element necessary to under-
stand the diffusion and stabilisation of technologies is widespread, even in eco-
nomics (David 1985). The diverse approaches taken by the authors cited above 
nevertheless share a rejection both of the idea that technology is completely 
neutral, as well as the idea that the knowledges materialised in the act of creat-
ing the artefact irrevocably determine their subsequent uses. While in broad 
agreement with this, our approach has a distinctive characteristic: instead of 
situating the debates about stabilisation and standardisation of technologies 
around the actions of ‘social actors’ or ‘economic agents’, the emphasis is on 
contemplating the relationship between technologies and the flows of all the 
other types of knowledge which are taxonomised here. Thus, the argument pre-
sented here is that technologies can only be understood as a part of the tapestry 
of historically situated knowledge, that towards the end of this chapter will be 
described as cognitive material configurations: nodes of diverse technologies, 
techniques, ideologies, organisational modes, laws, gods, texts, and other forms 
of knowledge.86
So, it is evident that technologies are extremely varied. It is useful to dis-
tinguish between two types. Referring back to the four examples given above, 
evidently the car and the assembly line belt are similar: they are machines; they 
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put physical matter into motion. But the ignition key and the computer have 
an equally close, although less obvious, resemblance: the primary role of both 
is to support a certain form of codified knowledge, of information. It could be 
argued then, that there are two types of technology: physical technologies, and 
information technologies.
Physical technologies are those which, it is worth repeating, transport, process, 
manipulate, store or transduce (see chapter 4) flows of physical matter. Examples 
are abundant and it is not necessary to resort to complex technologies like the 
assembly line or the car. Most of the goods that surround us are ‘matter’ or 
energy technologies: the coffee pot, the coffee cup, the table we place them on, 
the floor this is resting on in turn, the water pipes that run under the flooring, 
the hydraulic pumps that force water through the pipes etc.
Information technologies, for their part, store, process, reproduce, transmit 
or convert (see chapter 4) information. Although they may seem quite dis-
similar, the key and the computer share the characteristic of storing certain 
codified knowledge, certain types, although very dissimilar, of information.87 
The latter, in addition, can perform other tasks with it, such as processing or 
copying. Thus, there are some information technologies that perform a single 
function, and those that perform various. These technologies, the usual vic-
tims of a reductionist approach, as mentioned above, are actually very diverse. 
Among those that store information, besides those mentioned, we could list 
paper, vinyl records, or USB drives. The Gutenberg printing press or an old 
tape cassette recorder reproduce information; the telegraph or fibre optic cables 
transmit it. Sensors, such as thermometers and other measuring instruments 
convert physical matter into information. Conversely, the mechanical arms of 
an industrial robot, called actuators, convert information into physical matter. 
It is highly important to note that information technologies are not limited 
to operating with linguistic symbols: images and sounds are also within their 
range of capabilities.88
To understand the functioning of the current stage of capitalism we must 
venture one step further, and separate the technologies of analogue infor-
mation (Gutenberg’s press, the vinyl record) from the technologies of digi-
tal information, or more simply, digital technologies (a USB stick, a mobile 
phone). The importance of this distinction is two-fold. On the one hand, 
the economic properties of digital technologies, ruled by Moore’s Law (see 
below), differ from those of any other type of technology.89 But on the other 
hand, it should be borne in mind that some digital technologies have the 
special feature of being able to integrate all the functions particular to this type 
of technology in their artefacts. Computers, and all devices resembling them, 
tend more and more to store, process, reproduce, transmit and convert digi-
tal information. This distinctive feature, completely alien to analogue tech-
nologies, is related to the fact that digital information acts as a sort of general 
equivalent.
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Nonetheless, while being of great importance, the distinction between physi-
cal and information technologies is not sufficient. Anyone who observes the 
wide variety demonstrated by the examples given so far will tend to interject 
a division prior to the one suggested above, a division that distances the key 
from the computer and the coffee cup from the hydraulic pump, in other words 
a division that separates technologies on the basis of another variable. Intui-
tively, it can be seen that some of these technologies are very simple and com-
posed of a single piece. Meanwhile, others gather together thousands of small 
units and combine them into sophisticated forms. This distinction has been 
circumscribed and bifurcated into the concepts of tools and machines. How 
best to define the frontier between them remains a matter for debate. For our 
purposes, it is only necessary to define the terms and explain how they will 
be put to use in this text, it is not beholden to us here to resolve prolonged 
disputes. Suffice it to say that the definition employed here takes as its start-
ing point the criticism and reappraisal of the distinctions Marx ([1873] 1990, 
Volume I, Chapter XIII), and also Mumford (1934, chapter 1) make between 
machines and tools. Above all, these distinctions are combined with the sepa-
ration between physical matter and knowledge matter that characterises the 
theoretical framework of cognitive materialism.
Our proposal is very simple: three kinds of artefacts should be distinguished:
  i) Raw materials: forms of ‘matter’ or energy that are transformed com-
pletely in the productive process that awaits them. Paper that has been 
produced to be later printed on, and steel rods that are embedded in 
concrete during construction, are two examples.
 ii) Tools: work tools that survive a determined productive process and are 
characterised by being put into motion by biological energy (human or 
animal). Of course, tools vary in their level of complexity. Some (like a 
walking-cane, for example) consist of a single object and we call them 
simple tools: one object that intermediates between the source that 
inputs energy and directionality and the object which is the recipient 
of the work. Others (like a piano) combine hundreds of parts. They are 
complex tools: they comprise many simple tools that are interposed 
between the energy source and the object of their action.
iii) Machines: simple or complex tools driven by a non-biological energy 
source.90 Whether the source is water, wind, coal, oil, or electricity is a 
secondary question, as is the level of complexity of the machine. The 
important point is that the fallible biological forces give way to other 
more systematic and powerful ones. The mill and the computer, the sun-
dial and the assembly line belt are, for our purposes, machines.91
Now, finally it is possible to combine the two types of technologies presented 
above with raw materials, tools and machines in Table 3.1 below. This is  significant 
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because, in general, authors that discuss tools and machines do this only thinking 
about physical technologies. However, it is easy to find varied examples of arte-
facts that carry information technologies. They all have their place but digital 
technologies are possibly the most relevant to our purposes here. Among other 
reflections that can be made by studying the table, one that stands out is that the 
technologies of information represent an infinitely broader group with a longer 
history than digital technologies. Mixing them up, as media discourse usually 
does, is a grave mistake which it would be wise to avoid.
In terms of regulation (what further on will be called normative intersubjec-
tive knowledge), technologies can be appropriated by means of different kinds 
of patents, utility models, industrial designs, sui generis protection of chips and 
other resources. It may also be the case that from their inception or after a cer-
tain length of time has elapsed, the technological knowledges find themselves 
in the public domain, or are awarded compulsory licenses by the state that sus-
pend ownership rights.
But, as indicated above, technologies are only one of the forms in which 
knowledge can exist in an objective way.
3.1.2. Codified OK
Knowledges that are materialised through a certain kind of codification in the 
content of an objective bearer are designated as information. In the key – that 
as explained above, contains an information technology – the unique arrange-
ment of notches that it supports constitute information, a set of codified knowl-
edges. Of course, the same is true for any written text, the grooves of a vinyl 
record, the instructions contained within a software program. The definition 


































Table 3.1: Technologies and Artefacts.
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
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differences are derived from the materialist character of our approach. In effect, 
various authors (among them Collins 2010 and Chartrand 2007) only recog-
nise information when codes are emitted and interpreted by humans. Here, in 
accordance with the materialist perspective laid out in chapter 2, this distinc-
tion is inadequate, and it is not necessary to include humans in the definition. 
The key is in objective codification. For example, the notches on the key and 
the symbols of a computer program are destined to be received by the lock or 
by other programs.92 However, for our purposes verbal exchange is not consid-
ered to be information. This is a form of subjective or intersubjective linguistic 
knowledge, as shall be seen further on. Only codified knowledges that are fixed 
in an objective medium that can circulate after the moment of their production 
are considered to be information. Thus, a conversation becomes information if 
it is recorded in an audio file, for example.
This brings us to the third point already anticipated above. Contrary to the 
emphasis on associating information or codified knowledge with oral verbal 
language and particularly with texts (common in the economics of knowledge 
and the STS field), here stress is laid on language, of whichever variety, being 
only one of the forms of knowledge that can be codified objectively. Audio-
visual recordings (and, in the future, tactile or whatever other type becomes 
possible) are highly significant. Therefore, the bulk of information that circu-
lates in the world takes the form of images or sound, and not texts (Grantz and 
Reisel 2009).
(Objective) information can be of two types: analogue and digital. The for-
mer is associated with continuous physical magnitudes and relies on captur-
ing the entirety of the signal. In practice, we can find analogue information93 
in the symbolic content of books, paintings, vinyl records, old telephones etc. 
Digital information (DI), that in the current stage of capitalism is hegemonic 
in the sphere of information, can be defined as all forms of knowledge codified 
in binary form through on-off electrical signals. Each unit of information is a bit 
(Cafassi 1998). Some features of DI should be mentioned. Put simplistically, 
rather than being analogue, digital information is the result of sampling: only 
some points are chosen of the magnitude that is captured.94 Although this may 
seem to be a defect, it is in fact a remarkable virtue. The lightness of digital 
information allows it to be reproduced and transmitted in much more eco-
nomical ways than analogue information. Therefore, a distinctive feature of DI 
is that it has marginal production costs close to zero (Varian 1995; Cafassi 1998; 
Moulier Boutang 2004; Rullani 1999). In other words, the special characteristic 
of digital codification as a bearer is that it enables the knowledge that has been 
translated into it to be cloned with negligible reproduction costs. This charac-
teristic, the importance of which is difficult to overstate, is called the replicabil-
ity of DI. On the other hand, bits have a striking property: one is exactly the 
same as another. One bit of an audio file, and one from an image, one from a 
text, and one from a software program, are all perfectly identical (Cafassi 1998). 
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In contrast, the analogue units that make up audios, images, and texts are insu-
perably heterogeneous. This implies a decisive feature: all types of digital infor-
mation can be easily translated from one to the other, and the same digital 
technologies, as we shall see, can operate with its diverse forms.
Among the many examples of digital information, the majority have ana-
logue relatives: images, texts, data. However, there is a very particular form of 
digital information, with no analogue ancestor: software, that is, computer pro-
grams. Where is its particularity derived from? Its origin is that its materiality 
is that of a text, but its activity is that of a machine. To paraphrase Austin and 
Foucault, software programs are ‘bits that do things’.95
In general, digital information is a crucial concept in order to understand 
the functioning of the current stage, informational capitalism, but to repeat, 
its significance can only be grasped by observing its connections with other 
flows of knowledge, which is to say in the framework of the totality that it is 
integrated into.
Finally, when the terms information (on its own), analogue information, 
or digital information are used here, they refer to knowledge with an objec-
tive bearer, meaning those which are embedded in inert beings. However, it is 
immediately noticeable that among the knowledges with a biological bearer 
there are also knowledges codified as ‘information’. This will be referred to as 
‘biological information’, given that the corresponding bearers are living beings. 
Naturally, the sheer diversity of these bearers confers extremely diverse proper-
ties to these two forms of codified knowledge.96
The knowledges codified as information are regulated by copyrights and, in 
some cases, by sui generis protections of databases. Information (the ‘work’ in 
which it results, in legal terms) can also be in the public domain after the lapse 
of the monopoly that the law awards to its owner, or have a license that limits 
the exclusions that the law confers on it (like Creative Commons or similar 
arrangements).
3.2 Biological Knowledge (BK)
Knowledges with a biological bearer are flows of codified knowledge that cir-
culate as biological information:97 genetic,98 neural,99 or endochrine,100 in all 
living beings. We will distinguish between natural or organic flows (such as the 
genetic information carried by a seed coming from a natural fruit), and post-
organic101 flows (such as the information carried by a seed which is the result of 
genetic engineering). It should be clear that in all these cases, the codes of the 
knowledges with a biological bearer are of a natural (or divine) origin. Human 
intervention – in the post-organic flows – only acts upon the content, but not 
on the form. This distinguishes the varieties of biological knowledge from the 
rest, for which not only the content, but also the codes themselves are human, 
and ‘social’, creations.102
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Although still little is known about the relationship between these and other 
knowledges, it is not only evident that a link exists, but that genetics and the neu-
rosciences, among other disciplines, are advancing in strides towards hypothe-
ses related to the content of such a link. Thus, the inclusion of knowledges with 
a biological bearer in our typology is done, above and beyond the intention to 
fulfil the requirement of exhaustivity,103 with the hope of offering a basis from 
which to understand the translations between different flows of knowledge that 
will potentially characterise the twenty-first century. The emphasis on the need 
to integrate (as a part of the totality) the knowledges with a biological bearer 
is an attempt to avert both biological determinisms, which attribute excessive 
significance to this type of knowledge, and sociological speculations, in which 
the confused dogma that ‘everything is social’ negates any explanation. Inte-
grating biological knowledge with the other types in the same typology helps 
us to analyse the translations from one type of knowledge to another, without 
the need to resort to reductionisms.
The following two examples of the relationships between biological knowl-
edge and other types illustrate our point. Firstly, the link between genetic bio-
logical information, and digital technologies and digital information. Secondly, 
that between neural biological information and subjective knowledge. The 
association between the transformations that occur on the terrain of knowl-
edge with a biological bearer and those that take place on the terrain of technol-
ogy and digital information has been noted by several researchers (Kelly 1995; 
Castells 1996; Sibilia 2005; Rifkin 1998; Sulston 2005). The link has been going 
through a process of construction since the mid-twentieth century, when Wie-
ner’s theory of information prepared the ground for DNA being conceived of 
as a carrier of information (Rifkin 1998). In the 1960s, for the characterisation 
of living organisms, the importance of knowledge with a biological bearer – 
generically named information – had already been well established (Simpson 
and Beck 1965, 145). This association expanded remarkably in the 1970s when 
the development of computing fed into the mass diffusion of the concept that 
information was a decisive element needed to define living beings (Thorpe 
1977, 2). Of course, in the 1980s and 1990s, when digitalisation conquered the 
world, and genetic engineering revealed its potential, the conception of life as 
biological information firmly planted its flag on every summit.104
In this way we have arrived at the point at which knowledge with a biological 
bearer is no longer conceived of merely as biological information, but also as 
translatable into digital information and digital technologies (Freeman 1999, 
10; Keller 1996, 118). The clearest in tracing the affinity between both types of 
knowledge is Richard Dawkins, radical neo-Darwinist, staunch enemy of all 
religions, and author of several best-sellers.105
If you want to understand life, don’t think about vibrant, throbbing 
gels and oozes, think about information technology. […] There is very 
little difference, in principle, between a two-state binary information 
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technology like ours, and a four-state information technology like that 
of the living cell. (Dawkins 1986, 112–115)
Several years later, Dawkins reiterates this argument and, in fact, considers that 
the translation – he uses the term in the sense that is employed in the next 
chapter – between the organic BKs and the digital information OKs constitutes 
the greatest revolution in the history of human understanding:
What has happened is that genetics has become a branch of informa-
tion technology. It is pure information. It’s digital information. It’s pre-
cisely the kind of information that can be translated digit for digit, byte 
for byte, into any other kind of information and then translated back 
again. This is a major revolution. I suppose it’s probably “the” major 
revolution in the whole history of our understanding of ourselves. It’s 
something that would have boggled the mind of Darwin, and Darwin 
would have loved it, I’m absolutely sure. (Richard Dawkins, in Dawkins 
and Venter 2008)
Someone else that concurs with Dawkins is the businessman and scientist 
Craig Venter, president of the patent-seeking team that also managed to decode 
the human genome a little after the Human Genome Project.106 Venter tells us 
that the current challenge is translation in the opposite direction: transforming 
digital designs into biological realities.
Now, for the first time, we can go in the other direction. With synthetic 
genomics and synthetic biology, we are starting with that purely digi-
tal world.  We take the sequence out of the computer and we chemi-
cally from four raw chemicals that come in bottles, we can reconstruct 
a chromosome in the laboratory, based on either design, copying what 
was in the digital world, or coming up with new digital versions. (Craig 
Venter, in Dawkins and Venter 2008)
In summary, genetics and modern biotechnology have been associated with 
digitalisation via two paths. Firstly, the idea of code, a set of instructions that 
are converted into physical matter is shared by both tendencies. The code of 
the nitrogenous bases is converted into amino acids; computers’ binary code 
into electrical signals.107 Secondly, decoding the genomes of different species 
was carried out inseparably from the use of digital technologies as a means of 
production. This does not only mean that the storage of monstrous quantities 
of information required the capacity of modern hardware, but also that with-
out the appropriate computing programs to automise the decoding process, the 
task would have been impossible. But beyond the deciphering of the organic 
knowledge, computers are crucial to the elaboration of post-organic knowl-
edge, as the last quote above from Venter, indicates.
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Regarding neural biological information, it is useful to analyse its relation-
ship with the subjective level. Empirical developments in cognitive psychol-
ogy since the 1960s offer clear signposts about this link. Indeed, among oth-
ers, Brenda Milner’s research into the ‘HM case’ showed that the two types of 
memories that will be alluded to in the following section (explicit and implicit) 
have clear, discernible, and – most remarkably – largely autonomous cerebral 
bases. It is currently understood that memories (which are mental phenomena, 
in other words, subjective knowledge) are clearly associated with cerebral phe-
nomena (that is, with a biological bearer). Thus, the neurosciences distinguish 
two types of memory based on the duration of the synaptic changes. On the one 
hand, short-term memory (that arises from the simple transitory excitation of 
the synapses of the prefrontal cortex) and long-term memory (that arises from a 
fixed reinforcement of the synapses due to the activation of genes and the sub-
sequent synthesis of proteins). While short-term memory, or working memory, 
depends on the prefrontal cortex, long-term memories are stored in different 
regions, as we shall see.
In fact, neurobiological bases have been found for two types of long-term 
memory (as several authors who studied the problem of the subjective level 
had already intuited). The neurosciences designate them explicit (or declara-
tive), and implicit (or procedural) memories (Schacter 1987; Squire 1987). In 
the following section each of these terms referring to mental phenomena will 
be explored but for now it is their biological aspect that is of interest. In the 
explicit memory circuit, short-term memories about people, objects, places, 
and events are stored in the prefrontal cortex to later pass through the hip-
pocampus and finally be stored in different regions of the cortex, constituting 
long-term memories. Implicit memory, related to skills and habits, by contrast, 
is stored in the cerebellum, the corpus striatum, and the amygdala. In reality, 
from a biological standpoint, ‘implicit memory is not a single memory system 
but a collection of processes involving several different brain systems that lie 
deep within the cerebral cortex’ (Kandel 2006, 81).
With regards to intellectual property regulations, organic biological knowl-
edges can be partially overseen by plant breeders’ rights but, most often, they 
are public access. Post-organic knowledges can be protected in many countries 
by biotechnology patents. The ethnobotanic knowledges of diverse communi-
ties are protected by a new collective right called traditional knowledge.
3.3 Subjective Knowledge (SK)
The existence of knowledge with a subjective bearer is easy to accept. In fact, this 
category alone is included in all the theories of knowledge and, furthermore, it 
is this knowledge that the majority of the theories consider to be the only form 
of knowledge. The SKs are those knowledges for which the bearer is human 
subjectivity. As pointed out above, here we are referring to the knowledges that 
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are situated in the individual mind, as opposed to the brain, which is found on 
the biological level. Searle (2004, 301–304) suggests that the mind has free will 
as its defining characteristic, meaning that one of the features of the subjective 
level, absent from the biological, is more or less conscious choice between a 
variety of alternatives.
Stocks of subjective knowledges are known as memories. Although at first 
glance this may seem strange, the entire mental life of an individual subject, 
except the fleeting moment in which we live, stems from the memory.108
From at least since William James onwards, numerous authors have differen-
tiated between two types of subjective knowledge, two types of memory. Psy-
chologists like James or Freud, philosophers such as Michael Polanyi or Gilbert 
Ryle, economists such as Foray and Lundvall, and many more from a range of 
disciplines, agree on the opposition of two poles: consciousness, verbal expres-
sion on the one hand, and on the other the unconscious and non-verbalised 
knowledge.
Perhaps the simplest manner of distinguishing both types of subjective 
knowledge is as follows. Those knowledges with a subjective bearer which we 
can access via a conscious recollection of memories are explicit knowledges 
(explicit or declarative memories): a date, a name, a way of performing a move-
ment. In contrast, those which are activated unconsciously and unintentionally 
are implicit knowledges (implicit or procedural memories): knowledge which 
enables us to ride a bicycle, speak a language fluently, or recognise a face.109
A specific form of implicit knowledge is technique. In other writings we have 
defined technique as a ‘form of procedural subjective knowledge acquired in an 
instrumental way and performed implicitly’ (Zukerfeld 2007, 36). Techniques 
are knowledges which are concretised in an action – bodily or intellectual – 
and from this is derived their ‘procedural’ character. Likewise, not only do they 
have the characteristic that they are stored in implicit memory, but also that 
they have usually been acquired (they are not natural) with instrumental – not 
consummatory or recreational – purposes. Therefore not all implicit knowl-
edges are techniques. For example, the ability to regulate body temperature, 
walk, or talk are not, generally speaking, techniques.
Several authors link, or even use synonymously, the terms ‘technique’ and 
‘technology’. In some cases, they are linked with ‘science’. Suffice to say that 
these approaches, which nevertheless can be useful for many purposes, do not 
adopt a materialist perspective towards knowledge. In other words, they do not 
consider that the bearer of a particular knowledge is the fundamental variable 
necessary to typologise it; instead they tend to prioritise complexity, abstrac-
tion, or usefulness of those knowledges. Here, in contrast, the most basic differ-
ence between technology and technique lies in the bearer. In one case, this may 
be objectivised knowledge, in another, subjective knowledge. Their relationship 
with science or truth holds no significance when defining them. However, both 
types bear the stamp of instrumentality.
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Returning to explicit and implicit knowledge, there is evidently a significant 
interchange between them. The process of learning techniques often facilitates 
the passage from the former to the latter. While the apprentice’s clumsy hands 
await the conscious recollection of instructions related to how to perform, those 
of a skilled master receive fluent, unconscious and automatic orders. Anyone 
who has learned to play a musical instrument or drive a car will be familiar 
with this passage from the forced and deliberate fumbling through the steps of 
a procedure to their eventual smooth and automatic flow.
Capitalist regulations protect knowledge with a subjective bearer through 
trade secrets, confidentiality agreements, aspects of certain laws that deem 
an industrial invention to be a possession of the employer, and other related 
mechanisms. In some cases, subjective knowledge can be protected by patents, 
and in others as traditional knowledge. Likewise, professional qualifications 
(awarded by labour unions, the state, companies, or other organisations) are 
highly relevant to the regulation of subjective knowledge. Of course, these sub-
jective knowledges may also be in the public domain.
3.4 Intersubjective Knowledge (IK)
Knowledge with an intersubjective bearer is hugely important but difficult to 
pin down empirically. There are several kinds. All varieties share the character-
istic of being impossible to be understood on the basis of biological or subjec-
tive phenomena, and not being objectified outside of human beings. In this 
Author Explicit Knowledges Implicit Knowledges
James [1890] (2007) Knowledge-about Knowledge of acquaintance
Freud [1915] (1996) Conscious Unconscious
Ryle (1949) Knowing that Knowing how
Polanyi (1958, 1967) Explicit knowing Tacit knowing
Mokyr (2002) Propositional knowledge Practical or Prescriptive 
knowledge 
Schacter (1987) Explicit memory Implicit memory 
Blackler (1995) ‘Embrained’ knowledge ‘Embodied’ knowledge
Foray and Lundvall 
(1996)
Know what Know how
Spender (1996) Conscious Automatic
Table 3.2: Knowledge with explicit and implicit subjective bearers under 
different names.
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
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sense, they are forms of knowledge that can, partly, be related to what Dur-
kheim calls ‘social facts’ (Durkheim [1895] 1982, chapter 1)110, and Luhmann’s 
concept of ‘communication’ (Luhmann 1995, 2012)111, or even the ideas of 
experimental scientists (Pentland 2007; Huberman 1995)112. Knowledges with 
an intersubjective bearer are embedded in the collective, intersubjective or, to 
use the more common but imprecise term, ‘social’ aspects of humanity.113 They 
lie in the connections that pre-exist the human subjects and have a life which is 
relatively independent from any particular individual. As has been repeatedly 
stated here, there are various types of intersubjective knowledge, each display-
ing distinctive properties. In our opinion it is necessary to consider five types: 
linguistic, recognition, organisational, axiological, and normative.114
Before venturing into an analysis of each one, it is worthwhile commenting 
that all of them tend to display shared economic characteristics, which can 
be described as ‘increasing returns to scale’ or ‘network externalities’. To put 
this simply, these terms refer to the usefulness of these knowledges increas-
ing as their diffusion spreads, and that this evolves geometrically. This idea 
is usually known in the sphere of economics as ‘Metcalfe’s Law’. Hal Varian 
explains it thus:
Metcalfe’s Law is more a common sense rule than a law, but it arises in 
a relatively natural way. If there are n people in a network, and the value 
of the network for each of them is proportional to the number of other 
users, then the total value of the network (for its users) is proportional 
to n × (n − 1) = n2 − n. (Shapiro and Varian 1999, 175)
Let’s take an example from the first type of intersubjective knowledge that will 
be explored next: languages. Making the assumption  – perhaps unfair, but 
practical – that the number of connections possible between the speakers of 
a given language is proportional to the usefulness or total value of the lan-
guage, and supposing that this language is spoken by four people, the number 
of possible exchanges is 12 (= 42 − 4; each subject can speak or listen to the 
other three). However, the internalisation of this intersubjective knowledge by 
an additional speaker provokes three consequences: (i) it increases the useful-
ness of the knowledge in question; (ii) it does this geometrically (one more 
speaking unit generates an increase of 8 units in the usefulness of the network: 
52 − 5 = 20; 20 − 12 = 8); (iii) the additional speaker, adding usefulness or value 
to the network, creates, as an externality, an additional attraction for others to 
learn the language. Leaving to one side the numerical definition, the general 
feature that the more a knowledge is propagated, the more it is worth, can be 
observed for other forms of intersubjective knowledge, although it would be 
onerous to discuss it here without having explored each type in turn.
However, it is important to underline that this economic property is not nec-
essarily present for knowledges that have other bearers. It is often said that 
‘knowledge’, that is to say all knowledge, possesses these features of increasing 
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returns to scale and positive network externalities. This is a simple example of 
the mistakes that a non-materialist approach leads to: the fact that the proper-
ties of a knowledge depend on its bearer is not taken into account. Indeed, it is 
clear that for knowledge with a biological bearer, generally speaking, no such 
thing occurs: a gene is not more useful or valuable because another individual 
does or does not possess it. In the case of subjective knowledge, specifically 
techniques, there are not necessarily any network externalities either. In some 
cases they could arise – learning to play football requires other players, and 
each additional player, to a certain extent, is beneficial to the others’ knowledge, 
but in most situations whether or not more skill-bearers are added is irrelevant 
to the performance of the subjective knowledge in question – the technique of 
the artisan is exercised equally well or badly regardless of the number of others 
that have mastered it. Furthermore, if we move into the specific terrain of eco-
nomics, leaving to one side the usefulness of said knowledges and concentrat-
ing instead on their market value, the dissemination of a technique produces a 
fall in the price that the artisan can charge for her product or in the probability 
the football player has of being lauded as a great striker. Finally, the case of 
knowledge with an objective bearer is interesting. This is where Metcalfe’s Law 
originated (Bob Metcalfe invented Ethernet) and is the source of the standard 
examples given in economics textbooks: telephones, faxes, to a lesser extent 
DVD players and so on. However, only some technologies have this property. 
Cars and lathes, which more closely resemble the knowledges of our artisan, 
don’t share it. In fact, it only applies to what we have described as information 
technologies – and even then, not to them all. Neither an abacus, a calculator, 
nor an un-networked computer has this property. It barely arises in the sub-
group of information technologies that transmit information.
But, if knowledges with an intersubjective bearer always have network exter-
nalities while technologies only have them in some cases, why is it the case that 
the latter are chosen as examples of this particular economic phenomenon? 
For a very simple reason: technologies operate within the price system while 
knowledges with an intersubjective bearer, in general, do not. Knowledges with 
an intersubjective bearer are tricky to measure and consequently, to integrate 
into economists’ analyses. However, this does not reduce their importance to 
the functioning of capitalism. The methodological difficulties of quantifying 
them should not impede us from discussing their relevance, or investigating 
their properties.
3.4.1 Linguistic IK
As has just been mentioned, another type of intersubjective knowledge is 
linguistic. This refers not only to the collective human ability to encode and 
decode knowledge, but above all to the ability to create codes. In other words, 
even though a bacterium, much as a human collective, can decode information, 
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only the latter can create forms of coding and decoding, can invent codes. This 
ability to encode and decode is categorised as an IK and not a SK because we 
consider it to be a knowledge that is embedded in the human species being and 
not in subjective individuality.
Needless to say, the study of these types of knowledge from the perspective of 
their intersubjective character has been undertaken by various schools of lin-
guistics (Vygotsky [1934] 1986; Saussure 1983; Bakhtin and Voloshinov [1930] 
1998; Voloshinov [1929] 1973) and other disciplines (Castoriadis [1975] 1997; 
Virno 2015; Habermas 1984). The following quote could reasonably be claimed 
to summarise the views of these authors:115
The word (and in a general way the sign) is inter-individual. Everything 
said, everything expressed, is situated outside of the soul, outside of the 
speaker, it does not belong to him exclusively. We would not contem-
plate abandoning the word to a lone speaker. The author (speaker) has 
imprescriptible rights to the word, as the listener has his rights, and all 
those whose voices resound in a word have their rights. (Bakhtin, cited 
in Lazzaratto 2006, 157)
These authors and the definition given relate to so-called ‘natural languages’ – 
emerging from the biological capacities of our species and from historical 
intersubjectivity, like English or Greek.116 However, one of the multiple features 
of industrial capitalism is the mass development of ‘artificial languages’. These 
are consciously and systematically planned, like Esperanto, Braille and others. 
In turn, a specific type of artificial language is ‘formal languages’ (Crystal 2003; 
Houde, Kayser and Koenig Oliver 2003). These assume a maximum degree of 
abstraction, rationalisation and instrumentality. Formal languages completely 
eliminate the ambiguities, polysemies, redundancies, and temporal variations 
which characterise other types of languages. Of course, logic and mathematics 
are formal languages par excellence. As a consequence, although Spanish and 
the language of music, for example, are currently forms of linguistic intersub-
jective knowledge, their origins have a notable difference. The first, as with all 
natural languages, was also elaborated in an intersubjective manner. In con-
trast, artificial languages – that of Western music among them – proceed from 
a series of rationally and intentionally conceived rules, as knowledges with a 
subjective bearer. Only later, in the second instance, do they find a resting-
place in intersubjectivity. In any case, we should not confine languages to a 
determinate category. In natural languages there are also determined rational 
and intentional interventions (such as the Oxford English Dictionaries) while 
within formal languages there are ambiguities, disputes over meaning etc.
It is important to differentiate between the subjective and intersubjective 
aspects of language. Saussure’s distinction ([1916] (2011) is a practical one in 
this sense. Here we use the term language in a sense similar to that of Saus-
sure’s ‘langue’. This refers to linguistic intersubjective knowledge. By contrast, 
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he uses the term ‘parole’ to refer to the individual use of language, to subjective, 
implicit and explicit, knowledge. Of course, langue and parole are intertwined 
in a dialectical process – although we would add that, strictly speaking, they 
have the same relationship with the other types of knowledge as well.
Beyond the flows of different types of linguistic intersubjective knowledges, 
in previous studies we have analysed the relationship between signifiers and 
signified (again, in Saussure’s sense, [1916] 2011) through the different stages 
of capitalism, as well as their quantitative dispersal over time. The signifier 
refers to the word, the chain of phonemes, the form. The signified refers to the 
concept, the idea that is evoked, the content. Therefore, in our view it is useful 
to investigate the origin of key determined concepts and the frequency with 
which they appear, the variations of signified that a signifier can undergo, the 
tension between different signifieds that can arise at a determined moment, 
the anachronistic uses of signifiers and signifieds etc. Naturally, this procedure 
aspires to link this type of knowledge with others, for example, with what are 
described as ideologies. For example, in previous research we have examined 
the idea that while during the pre-industrial period the signifier ‘individual’ 
designated the indivisible character of the subject, in industrial capitalism it 
started to assume the signified of an autonomous and self-sufficient subject. 
Likewise, while the signifier ‘inventor’ during mercantile capitalism referred 
to a particular type of importer, someone that brings knowledges into the 
kingdom that were previously unknown to it, during industrial capitalism the 
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Fig. 3.1: Classification of language types.
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(Zukerfeld 2011b). In turn, the sudden expansion of the signifiers ‘intellec-
tual property’ or ‘network’ in informational capitalism can be relatively eas-
ily measured, and help us to understand some features of the current stage 
(Zukerfeld 2010, Volume II, Chapter 10).
Under capitalism, linguistic knowledge is not directly regulated by intellec-
tual property rights. As with the majority of intersubjective knowledge, this is 
due to the aforementioned Metcalfe’s Law: in general, dissemination benefits 
those who possess the knowledge, including in economic terms. Thus, natu-
ral languages have no owner. However, there are two kinds of regulations that 
should be mentioned. On the one hand, the regulation of what is permitted or 
prohibited in each language, the linguistic rules and corresponding accredi-
tations. For example, in Spanish, the Real Academia Española determining 
which terms are permissible is indissociable from the wielding of power over 
other varieties of the Spanish language. Likewise, the regulation of English lan-
guage certificates by various institutions, for example Cambridge University 
or TOEFL, intervenes decisively in the capitalist dynamic. On the other hand, 
in computing, the coded version of some languages (not Linguistic IKs, but a 
derivative of them) is subject to copyright.
3.4.2 Recognition IK
The second category of IK is Re-cognition. The word may seem strange. How-
ever, it is the least worst option we have been able to find to describe this type of 
intersubjective knowledge. Generically, we understand that recognition refers 
to the forms that the connections assume through which the subject is integrated 
into human groups or collectives, is recognised by other subjects and through 
which she recognises herself. Recognition refers, therefore, to the triple opera-
tion of recognising others, being recognised, and self-recognition, through a 
series of bonds or connections.
Of course, this idea is influenced, at a more abstract level, by the Hegelian 
Anerkennung, especially by Ricoeur’s reading of it (2005, 171–263). In the 
sphere of sociology, Durkheim’s forms of ‘solidarity’ ([1893] 1993) and Weber’s 
concept of ‘social relation’ ([1922] 1968, 21) yield some retrievable elements: 
both concepts speak, in their own way, of different types of connections between 
subjects, which here will be designated as recognition. Finally, the simplest and 
most compact definition of the notion of recognition emerges from comparing 
it with Bourdieu’s idea of ‘social capital’.117
… the aggregate of actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised rela-
tionships of mutual acquaintance and recognition (Bourdieu 1985, 248, 
emphasis added)
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The types of recognition are therefore varieties of this ‘network of relationships 
of mutual acquaintance’. But in the sense that recognition is mobilised here, it 
does not only cover these tapestries of relationships as something extrinsic to 
the subject, but actually includes her, bestowing on her an identity, a ‘knowing 
oneself likewise in its other’, according to the Hegelian formulation (Ricoeur 
2005, 182).
Now to bring all these references together. The forms of recognition can be 
conceptualised as being on a continuum ranging from the micro to the macro. 
From the most modest and singular subject up to the widest social collective, 
recognition can be found on all levels. How does a particular determined sub-
ject recognise their self? On the micro level, only since the advent of the indus-
trial period has the subject been recognised as an individual (in the sense of 
being autonomous, along with the evolution of the linguistic knowledges men-
tioned previously). By contrast, under informational capitalism, the changes 
in the dominant modes of recognition have created a situation in which it 
is more reasonable to speak of dividuals (subjects who know themselves to 
be incomplete, and dependent on reticular connections), as Deleuze (1992) 
 suggests.
However, it is on the macro level that recognition becomes particularly relevant 
to us. There are two historically situated modalities that have been well studied by 
sociology: community, characteristic of the preindustrial period, and society, typi-
cal of industrial capitalism. Of course, recognition at the micro and macro levels 
is indissociable. For example, as various authors have indicated (R. Williams 1978, 
11–20; Bauman 2000), the constitution of the ‘individual’ and ‘society’ are pro-
duced in tandem in industrial civilisation. In previous studies we have attempted 
to show, following Castells (1996), that recognition in informational capitalism, 
tends to organise itself primarily into networks (Zukerfeld 2010, Volume II). Thus, 
on a broader level, recognition refers to this kind of linked aggregates, webs of 
belonging and identity.118 The forms of macro recognition (community, society, 
and networks) co-exist and overlap beyond the historically situated dominance 
of one or the other. Similarly, the above is not an exhaustive list of forms of rec-
ognition; for example, on the macro level are also ethnic, national, and religious 
identities, which can be highly significant.
Naturally, between the forms of macro and micro recognition a range of pos-
sible webs with varied significance exists: professional networks, networks of 
Facebook contacts, social classes etc. In the case of industrial capitalism, the 
impacts of which continue to be felt, between the individual and society the 
ensemble of institutions organised around work intervene as mediators. From 
the association of personal identity with one’s work (‘I am a teacher’, ‘I am a 
taxi driver’), to the membership of union collectives, recognition connected to 
work played a crucial role in that stage and, to a certain extent, continues to do 
so. In turn, the micro and macro forms of recognition are intrinsically related, 
for example through the ideal character type of each period. While the ideal 
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type of subject of the community was the martyr and that of the individual/
society was the hero (the self-made man, but also the revolutionary individual), 
for informational capitalism, the era of the networks, the dividual in whom the 
values of the era are congealed is the celebrity, or simply, the famous-for-being-
famous (Bauman 2005).119
In materialist terms, the celebrity is the ideal typical subject of informational 
capitalism for a simple reason: in a world in which flows of digital information 
are superabundant, human attention becomes a scarce and valuable resource 
(as we shall see in chapter 4). The celebrity is nothing more than the centralis-
ing focus of attention. Thus, the typical subject is not merely integrated into a 
network of relationships, but is the node through which flows of attention must 
pass.120 This leads us to one of the special characteristics of recognition: it is the 
IK most susceptible to capitalist regulation. One of the forms through which 
this occurs is the right to trademarks. This is nothing less than a crystallisation 
of the recognition that a company or a subject has achieved. Some associated 
rights are geographical and source-of-origin certifications that, above all, also 
protect reputation. In a complementary, and increasing, fashion (particularly 
associated with celebrities), rights and contracts arise which are related to pub-
lic image, for example the right of publicity.
3.4. Organisational IK
Ever since Adam Smith’s description of a pin factory ([1776] 1904), it has 
been widely accepted that the organisation of productive processes involves 
knowledge that cannot be found in individual workers, nor in the mere sum of 
their actions. In the functioning of a company’s productive activity a form of 
knowledge is revealed which is external to each subject that participates in it. 
Associated with the division and connection between the tasks carried out, a 
collective knowledge that is usually maintained even when the workers of the 
productive process are changed: an organisational knowledge that is both mute 
and powerful. Although this type of knowledge also appears in extra-economic 
activities – like an orchestra or a football team – it is in the economy where it 
has been most assiduously studied (for an account of these ‘organisation effects’ 
see Coriat 1990, chapter 3). After Smith, it was Marx who, with the concept of 
‘co-operation’, turned his attention to this impact of organisation as a produc-
tive force:
The form of labour in which many, in the same place and in a team, 
work in a planned way in the same process of production or in different 
but connected processes of production, is called co-operation (…) This 
does not only involve an increase of the individual productive force, as a 
result of co-operation, but the creation of a productive force that in-itself 
and for-itself is necessarily a mass force (Marx [1873] 1990, 395–396).
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From another angle, and much later, the notion from evolutionary economics 
of ‘routines’ (Nelson and Winter 1982, 134) refers to this form of knowledge 
that is embedded in organisational intersubjectivity. Of course, organisational 
knowledge has also been studied by management literature (Dixon 2001; Dav-
enport and Prusak 2000; Baumard 1999; Blackler 1995). If we restrict ourselves 
to the limited idea of organisational knowledge in relation to labour processes, 
two pertinent observations can be made.
The first relates to how different organisational modes (intersubjective 
knowledges) interact with other forms of knowledge: they become entwined 
with technologies (objective knowledges), in artefacts, and with the subjects 
that internalise them (subjective knowledges). Indeed, in some historical cir-
cumstances (such as manufacturing) organisational knowledges remain as 
they are in intersubjectivity alone, and exercise a powerful influence without 
the assistance of objectifications or subjectivisations. In other modes, organi-
sational knowledges are also translated into other bearers. For example, in a 
medieval craft guild, the organisation of the productive process relied heavily 
on the subjectivity of the master craftsman who held all the knowledge which 
would be set in motion during the intersubjective process. By contrast, in Ford-
ism, the organisation of the productive process is aided by assembly lines and 
other machinery that objectify it. In any case, with greater or lesser support 
from other types of knowledge, productive organisation must pass through 
intersubjectivity.
Secondly, there is evidently one particular variety of organisational knowl-
edge that predominates each different period of capitalism, although they also 
combine. In the pre-industrial period concepts such as ‘artisanship’, ‘manufac-
turing’, ‘simple co-operation’ are often used. With regards to industrial capital-
ism, notions such as ‘mechanisation’, ‘Taylorism’, and ‘Fordism’ (Coriat 1979), 
describe different organisational knowledges. In informational capitalism, there 
are two typical modalities, the ‘network company’ (Castells 1996) or ‘Toyotism’ 
(Coriat 1990), and ‘collaborative production’ or ‘P2P’ (Bauwens 2006). Organi-
sational IKs are not subject to capitalist regulations as such. Their objectifica-
tion in machinery (like assembly line belts) or software can make them viable 
for regulation. In addition, laws and employment contracts (for working hours) 
and even contracts with so-called social networking sites, generally speaking 
place the fruits of organisational knowledge in the hands of companies.
3.4.4 Axiological IK
In fourth place we have axiological knowledge. Although the term refers to values 
in particular, this type of knowledge denotes all forms of intersubjective belief. 
This, of course, includes right and wrong, what is valued positively and what is 
judged to be negative, but it extends much further to include any kind of repre-
sentation: world visions of a religious order, political ideas, scientific paradigms, 
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or common sense knowledge are included indiscriminately. Evidently, this refers 
to an infinite variety of units of analysis. Quotidian and transcendental beliefs, 
either openly manifested or held unconsciously, so long as they are deployed 
intersubjectively are all axiological knowledges.
A theoretical source which helps to conceptualise this type of knowledge is, 
undoubtedly, Parsons’ idea of ‘culture’121 (in his trisystemic model and later in 
the model known as AGIL; see Parsons 1977). More specifically, another refer-
ence that informs the idea of axiological knowledge is Wittgenstein’s (some-
what opaque) concept of ‘forms of life’ (Wittgenstein 1953, 226). Rather than 
relating to articulable beliefs, this is an idea about the ineffable foundations of 
social activity, the implicit fabric of intersubjectivity. Jung’s ‘archetypes’ ([1934] 
1981) must also be mentioned here, and with greater emphasis, the concept 
of the ‘social imaginary’ from Castoriadis.122 These concepts explain that axi-
ological IKs are not only not natural, but neither are they necessarily rational 
(Castoriadis [1975] 1997).123
Of course, these beliefs represent a vast spectrum, and to study them empiri-
cally (that, it is worth reminding ourselves, is an essential task for cognitive 
materialism), it would be necessary to realise operationalisations according 
to the specific object of study. For example, in a national survey our research 
team designed, different flows of knowledge in secondary schools were stud-
ied, teachers and students were interviewed about what values they prioritised, 
and we also proposed an axiological dilemma in which the interviewees had to 
chose between an Apollonian course of conduct (effort, delayed gratification), 
and a Dionysian path (entertainment, immediate gratification). This, in con-
junction with the other types of knowledge, allows us to distinguish tensions 
between divergent values that affect the school dynamic (Zukerfeld and Benítez 
Larghi 2015). However, in the study of historical capitalist development, we are 
primarily interested in other axiological knowledges. Indeed, for the capital-
ist dynamic, the axiological knowledges that fulfil the following three condi-
tions are especially important: (i) being intimately linked to the development 
of the dynamic of the (capitalist) totality of each period. Meaning, they must 
be beliefs and values essential to the harmonious functioning of the productive 
processes and regulations of each period; (ii) being linked to the flows of other 
types of knowledge (entwined with particular subjects, technologies, infor-
mation etc.); (iii) existing in a naturalised way, accepted immediately by the 
intersubjective collectives that bear them. The types of knowledge that share 
these three characteristics will here be called ‘ideologies’. For example, the idea 
of ‘God’, of ‘reason’, of ‘property’, the belief that a whole set of symbols which 
we call ‘money’ is exchangeable for goods and services, the belief that human 
subjects are bearers of ‘human rights’, among other ideas inhabited, or inhabit, 
this intersubjective substratum in some spatio-temporally delimited contexts.
Here ideology closely resembles the sense that Žižek bestows on it. To take 
a simple example: the relationship between a King and his subjects. The King 
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only has subjects if they intersubjectively believe that the King is the King and 
that they are his subjects. We are confronted here with a series of beliefs that 
prop up a determined social order for the very fact of being collectively inter-
nalised. The King is King because his subjects do not question the social foun-
dations of his power. This is the nucleus of ideological reality:
“ideological” is a social reality whose very existence implies the 
non-knowledge of its participants as to its essence … (Žižek 1989, 
15–16)
However, the above quote is insufficiently clear and must be distinguished from 
the Marxist notion of ideology. For Marx, ideology is ‘false consciousness’ and 
will vanish when the ‘truth’ is revealed (the role of the revolutionary party or 
some other source of certainties). In our view, on the contrary, ideology exists 
materially in the intersubjective tapestry: the capitalist totality – or whichever 
other type – depends on it for its continuation. But above all, ideology is not 
necessarily false.
The lesson that must be drawn from this as regards the social sphere is 
above all that belief, far from being a “personal”, purely mental, state, 
is always materialized in our actual social activity: belief sustains the 
fantasy that regulates social activity. (Žižek 1989, 64)
An ideology, therefore, is not necessarily “false”: as regards its positive 
content, it may be “true”, quite precise, given that what really matters is 
not the affirmed content as such, but the mode in which this content 
relates to the subjective position supposed by the process of enunciation 
itself. (Žižek 1994, 46–47)
There are two points to add to Žižek’s perspective. On the one hand, the point 
is not so much that ideology can be ‘true’, but that actually, as pointed out in 
chapter 2, it makes no sense to situate it on the truth-falsity axis. The interest lies 
in how it is articulated with the functioning of the social totality into which it is 
inscribed. Are the dominant beliefs necessary to sustain a determined distribu-
tion of resources, whether they be power, wealth, or other forms of knowledge? 
In the event that they are, we are confronted by an ideological reality. In contra-
distinction to a concept of ideology as an ‘interested lie’ (which could be useful 
in another type of study), here the emphasis is on the axiological intersubjective 
knowledges that are not only or necessarily part of any conscious conspiracy, or 
emitted by a tightly restricted group that deliberately disseminates them for their 
own self-interest. Some ideologies may have this origin, while others do not.
This could be clarified by a second remark about Žižek’s position. Ideolo-
gies, in the most conspiratorial sense of the term, refer to the level of subjective 
knowledge, that is, to a set of subjectivities that produces a series of declarative 
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knowledges and attempts to spread them widely by means of their translation 
into various bearers. By contrast, what interest us here are ideologies as inter-
subjective beliefs only, when they have reached intersubjectivity, whether or 
not they stem from there.124
Other common ideas in the social sciences can be fruitfully categorised as 
forms of axiological knowledge, although discussing them would mean tak-
ing an overly circuitous detour from the aims of this book.125 It is worth reit-
erating that axiological knowledges are intrinsically linked to other types of 
knowledge and, particularly, to other intersubjective forms. Performing an 
analytical separation is not to disavow that in practice the flows of different 
types of knowledge are indivisible. To return to an example mentioned vari-
ous times already, the fact that individuality becomes a key value in industrial 
capitalism (e.g. through the idea of the self-made man), is inseparable from 
the recognition that specific subjects have divided themselves off as autono-
mous entities from the collective mass, from the changes to the meaning of 
the term ‘individual’ (now an autonomous subject who is self-sufficient when 
it comes to knowing and acting upon the world), from regulations (normative 
knowledge) like enclosures (which separate a particular subject from his land), 
and other forms of association between the particular subject and property. 
In general, values are not the object of exclusive regulations through some 
form of intellectual property. However, it is widely known that states act in all 
capitalist societies to promote some values, to the detriment of others. Fur-
thermore, in many contexts, some axiologies are explicitly prohibited. Even if 
there are other agents (corporations, religious institutions, social classes) that 
also participate in the dispute over regulating axiology, the state is the only 
one which wields the power to impose some of those values by direct, or even 
monopolistic, means.
3.4.5 Normative (or Regulatory) Intersubjective Knowledge
Normative or regulatory knowledge concerns the intersubjective internalisation of 
certain patterns of behaviour that are supported by a diverse range of sanctions. 
It concerns the different kinds of norms (laws, decrees, acts, ordinances, trea-
ties etc.), judicial rulings, and institutions, insofar as they are embodied in the 
collective fabric of relationships. That is, decrees, laws and acts constitute the 
means of analysis to give an account of the extent to which certain regulations 
have impinged upon intersubjectivity.126
Once again, we are faced with a vast assemblage of knowledge. Modest 
municipal ordinances coexist with penal legislation accepted by all cultures, 
with a broad spectrum of regulations in between. However, some norms are of 
particular interest to us. These are the ones that form the backbone of capitalism, 
that regulate the relationships between subjects and resources. At this point we 
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can cast our minds back, with a number of mediations, to speak of what at 
the beginning of this book we, slightly gratingly, called ‘physical property’ and 
‘intellectual property’. We have arrived at the moment in which finer grained 
detail about our approach can be provided.
The first thing to point out, which springs from everything discussed so far 
but is not usually taken into consideration, is that regulations and norms in 
general, and in particular what Marxists call the ‘social relations of production’, 
are nothing more than a particular type of intersubjective knowledge. That 
which regulates access to multiple combinations of physical and knowledge matter 
is a type of knowledge matter. Thus, regulations have the economic properties 
of knowledge in general, and those of knowledge with an intersubjective bearer 
in particular.
Secondly, it is vital to develop the idea that the concepts of physical and intel-
lectual property are simplifications or, rather, two common types of a broader 
phenomenon, which is the regulation of access. Therefore, when at the begin-
ning of this book the suggestion was made that the link between capitalism 
and all entities is a given because it embraces them with two types of regula-
tions, they were referred to as physical and intellectual property with deliberate 
imprecision. Actually, it can now be confidently revealed, capitalism regulates 
access to the knowledge and physical aspects of these entities. This regulation 
can adopt various forms. Property, in a strict sense, refers to only one of them, 
which we can describe as exclusive.
It can be argued that different forms of property – in a strict sense – become 
increasingly historically limited in their capacity to account for the relation-
ships between subjects and resources. The concept of property usually refers 
to the dichotomisation between subjects who have the ability to exclude oth-
ers from a resource (property owners), and subjects unable to gain access to 
that resource (non property owners). However, there are many goods, among 
so-called ‘natural resources’ and informational goods (essentially composed 
of digital information), for which exclusion is not desirable or has not been 
accomplished. While the quantity or economic importance of these goods 
that cannot be conceptualised with the traditional notion of property is on 
the increase, the limitations of this concept become evident (Ostrom and Hess 
2006; Rifkin 2000; Bell 1973). The term access (Rifkin 2000) on the other hand, 
enables us to tackle the various ways in which subjects enter into relationships 
with resources, integrating but transcending different forms of property.
Reappraising some elements of the theories about public goods and ideas 
from other authors,127 below are presented various types of access utilised in 
previous studies which may be of some use for other investigations. How to 
classify types of access? Here it will be done on the basis of two variables. 
On the one hand is the distinction regarding the regulated object: between 
physical and knowledge matter, as proposed in chapter 1. Thus, the idea is 
reaffirmed that the primary question regarding concrete resources should 
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be about their dual registration. How is their physical aspect regulated? How 
are the knowledges embedded in it regulated? Access to these two entities is 
subject to disparate regulations which coexist in the same goods, as we have 
already seen.128
It is the second variable, related to the regulations themselves, which leads 
us to specify what was described in chapter 1. The dichotomy property-not 
property is inadequate. The crux of the matter lies in the fact that there are 
different forms of access that do not necessarily imply ownership of the good. 
Among the intermediate conditions can be found, for example, public access – 
mentioned in passing in chapter 1. There we hurriedly differentiated between 
public and private. This is not mistaken: ranging from the minimum to the maxi-
mum level of exclusion, the categories of public and private are useful. However, 
it is possible to be more specific. Leaving to one side the debates related to 
what is private and how from Blackstone’s formulation (‘the despotic domin-
ion of the individual’) we have moved to doctrines in which rights are limited 
(Anderson and McChesney 2003). It is in fact the idea of public which demands 
urgent updating. That is due to the idea that public and state-owned coincid-
ing perfectly (common under industrial capitalism and especially in the post-
war period) has become unsustainable.129 Especially for efforts to understand 
the present stage of capitalism, informational capitalism, it is vital to highlight 
the significance of a public or quasi-public non-state sphere. Besides, in recent 
years a certain consensus has developed in economics related to the distinction 
between open access and common property.130 Generally speaking, both per-
mit some public access. Unlike private access, for both of these there are often 
large communities who share access to certain resources. However, while open 
access lacks all limitation and exclusion, in the case of common property inclu-
sion arises from membership of a determined group (nation, club, library)131 
and, potentially, non-members are excluded.132 Thus, an intermediate zone 
emerges with non-exclusive modes of access that should be considered, both as 
regards physical and knowledge matter.
A few clarifications may be required here. The table presents a typologisa-
tion of norms (in other words, knowledge). It is important to distinguish them 
from a similar conceptualisation introduced in chapter 6, in which relation-
ships between subjects and resources are differentiated. Moreover, the exam-
ples of regulation included are by no means exhaustive: other regulations could 
be included. Finally, the terms employed in the table correspond to currently 
valid concepts, for informational capitalism, and should not be automatically 
extrapolated to preceding stages. Following Marx’s methodological suggestion, 
we are studying human anatomy, as a key to later understanding the ape’s. This 
does not only imply the obvious – that the term ‘GPL licenses’ lacks any analyti-
cal utility for merchant capitalism – but also the rather less obvious idea that 
‘intellectual property’ was not a regulation as we understand it today until half 
a century ago.133
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To recap, the types of access are classifications of the most important forms of 
normative knowledge: they regulate the relationships between subjects on the 
one hand, and physical and knowledge matter, on the other. Their concrete con-
figuration is an essential element to understand historical stages, as shall be 
discussed next. With regard to access to the norms themselves, there are no 
regulations which exclude access to them, but there is however, a concentration 
within the state, by definition, of the monopoly of creation and administration 
of juridically valid norms.
3.5 Cognitive Material Configuration
The table below summarises the typology of knowledge on the basis of the 
material bearers.
With this typology now complete we can suggest how to use it. Taken as a 
totality and applied to a concrete reality we have a cognitive material configura-
tion (CMC). This means the entirety of the stocks of diverse classes of knowledge 
(based on their bearers) for a given dialectical totality. This totality may be highly 
variable. It may be a social meeting, a productive process in a school or a busi-
ness, or stages of capitalism.
Therefore, the concept of CMC shares some aspects with the concept of sys-
tem, such as that within a CMC there may be others, and the idea that it con-
figures a totality in which its elements perform multiple complex reciprocal 
influences.
In turn, the CMC is not a static, self-satisfied totality but rather a dialectical 
totality in which contradictions between different types and sub-types of knowledge 




































Open Open Access Public Domain
Table 3.3: A typology of access: normative knowledges as regulations of 
matter/energy and knowledge.
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Ostrom 1990, 2009; Ostrom and 
Hess 2006; Eggertsson 2003; Vercelli 2009; Zukerfeld 2005b, 2008b.
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are constitutive and constant. For example, there are tensions between subjective 
knowledges and axiological intersubjective knowledges when a subject spurns a 
value held by the society she is a member of, or between subjective and codified 
objective knowledges when the subject wishes to express in writing something 
that has her knotted up inside, but cannot find the words, or between organisa-
tional intersubjective and technological objective knowledges when a group of 
artefacts are not compatible with the organisational mechanism in a productive 
process (as with the case of digital technologies in schools). In sum, there are 
a multiplicity of tensions, of a greater or lesser scale and seriousness, between 
different classes of knowledge. Some demand an immediate resolution, as they 
threaten the totality which they integrate. Others coexist without being trans-
mitted to the rest of the totality.
However, from the viewpoint of the study of capitalist transformation, there 
is one particularly important contradiction, that which arises between some 
normative or regulatory knowledges and the totality of the CMC, that is, the 
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Table 3.4: Summary of the typology of knowledges on the basis of their bearers.
Source: Rearrangement based on Zukerfeld 2007, 2010.
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knowledge matter) that have been studied in relation to the totality of produc-
tive processes. To a large extent, the ideas presented here could be understood 
as a revision of the relation between the productive forces and the social rela-
tions of production elaborated by Marx. Indeed, the link between the CMC and 
one of its components (normative knowledge) is in fact related to a particular 
interpretation of the famous Marxian relationship between those two concepts. 
Actually, the CMC is not dissimilar to the ‘degree of the development of the pro-
ductive forces’.
In contrast to the term ‘force’, so favoured by Marx, in the approach detailed 
here the productive capacities that our species has historically wielded are com-
posed entirely of knowledge matter. If the objection is raised that energy con-
tributes to production, we could not agree more, but with the proviso that it 
is knowledge that channels this energy into producing use values, rather than 
being blind forces of nature  – as will be discussed in chapter 5. But it is of 
much greater importance to state that even if all knowledges function as pro-
ductive forces, it is normative intersubjective knowledge, the forms of access 
in particular, that have an affinity with the social relations of production. This 
expression of both Marxist concepts in cognitive terms leads us to reject the 
idea that the productive forces and the social relations of production are two 
autonomous entities, and that consequently one could determine or condition 
the other. Not only are we opposed to unsustainable economic determinisms 
(of the base-superstructure type), but also, especially, to the positivist and anti-
Hegelian approach that they are underpinned by. If it is considered desirable 
to retain the Marxist vocabulary, something not undertaken here more than 
very occasionally, one must start from the fact that the famous contradiction 
between the productive forces and the social relations of production is the sec-
ond moment of the Hegelian dialectical totality, in which the productive forces 
(the CMC) enter into contradiction with themselves, with a particular manifes-
tation of themselves, which is what social relations of production constitute.134
Finally, the periods in which the contradiction between the entirety of 
the cognitive material configuration and normative knowledge is at its most 
intense are those moments when capitalism sheds its skin. This occurs through 
profound transformations to the norms regarding access to physical and 
knowledge matter, that adapt, although not automatically or even necessarily 
effectively or predictably, to new productive processes. In other words, the dra-
matic metamorphosis of normative intersubjective knowledge is a clear indica-
tor (not the only one, of course) of a transition from one stage of capitalism to 
another. This is what occurred at the dawn of merchant, industrial, and infor-
mational capitalism.
While there may be nothing novel in pointing out this association with 
regards to physical private property, here it is worth stressing two points. Firstly, 
the transformation occurred, in each transition, to knowledge also, that is to 
say, to the ensemble of institutions which today we call intellectual property. 
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Secondly, the changes affect the regulation of access, which exceeds the dichot-
omy between property and not property.135
3.6 The Cognitive Material Configuration of Merchant, 
Industrial and Informational Capitalism
In this section we propose to illustrate the use of the concept of CMC through 
a characterisation of three historical periods which will be referred to through-
out the course of this book. Despite the evident limitations imposed by this 
brief and schematic characterisation, it should suffice to suggest a systematic, 
non-reductionist, way of defining historical periods. The first characterisation 
concerns the pre-industrial period. This includes mercantile capitalism, which 
ranges approximately from the mid-fifteenth century to the end of the eight-
eenth, but also subsumes features from previous stages where there are conti-
nuities. The second moment is industrial capitalism, which covers the period 
from towards the end of the eighteenth century up to the third quarter of the 
twentieth century. Finally, a summary of the present stage, informational capi-
talism, is presented whose beginnings can be approximately dated from the 
1970s and which continues up to today.
In each case some comments are offered about physical matter (that is, ‘matter’ 
and energy) in order to then concentrate on the different types of knowledge, 
without pretending to be exhaustive.136
3.6.1 The Cognitive Material Configuration of the 
Pre-industrial Period
Here ‘matter’ is of a natural character: scarcely removed from its original con-
text. It should be mentioned that during this period the process of expropriat-
ing ‘matter’ principally from the continent that is now called America, offered 
significant material flows for the gestation of mercantile capitalism. The mus-
cles, or the combined force of humans, horses, and oxen constituted a major 
energy source for the period. Unlike the future machines of the industrial revo-
lution, these biological beings generate energy from renewable organic ‘matter’. 
Although from the standpoint of the present the total consumption of energy 
seems negligible, the energy intensity, that it is to say the consumption per unit 
of production, was much higher than that of any subsequent period.
With regards to subjective knowledges, they were traditional knowledges, 
relatively stable over time. Their reproduction was first and foremost face to 
face, individualised, and framed within contexts of close familiarity: blood rela-
tions, guilds or communities. The SKs – their bearers, of course – were highly 
limited in terms of spatial mobility, due to physical barriers and, in due course, 
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the power of feudal regulations and their inertia even when these regulations 
began to be relaxed during merchant capitalism. Finally, limited contact with 
codified knowledges and the absence of specific institutions to transmit those 
knowledges widely, limited their dissemination. Of course, all this is indisso-
ciable from the strategies of regulation and exploitation of those knowledges 
by their carriers.
As regards objective knowledges, firstly we have technologies: in this period 
simple tools that objectify physical technologies predominate. Hammers, spades, 
needles and scissors occupy the hands of agricultural workers and artisans. 
Secondly, and to a much lesser extent, some complex physical tools appear, such 
as the spinning wheel, lathes, and shuttles. In the sphere of information tech-
nologies, of course, the printing press appears, also a complex tool that consti-
tutes one of the landmarks of the period. Machines have an extremely limited 
importance. Watermills and windmills are quantitatively significant, but the 
development of ships that enable the crossing of the Atlantic and consequently 
expropriations and exploitations in the colonies, are decisive.
For their part, codified objective knowledges – information – possess the fol-
lowing characteristics. They were divorced from the production of goods for 
various motives: (i) the reduced diffusion of reading and writing techniques (ii) 
high costs of books in the period leading up to the mass diffusion of the printing 
press (iii) intersubjective beliefs about the role of books in that period (which 
distanced them from goods producing environments). Thus, even while some 
treatises were written which were aimed at artisan workshops, their impact 
seems to have been modest. However, in the productive processes which today 
we call artistic, and some other similar processes, they had a relative influence 
and were decisive in the productive processes of the university guilds from the 
twelfth and thirteen centuries onwards. On the other hand, the first link in 
chronological terms between codified knowledge and productive processes is 
through bookkeeping, in which the codification of knowledges is related to the 
externality of productive processes. For a long period this occurred predomi-
nantly through the measurement of stocks and surpluses, but from the advent 
of merchant capitalism – let us say, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries – 
accounting codification was systematically integrated into the rational assess-
ment of returns. In turn, the codified knowledges played a considerable role 
in spreading terms (stimulating linguistic IKs), values (axiological IKs) and 
norms (normative IKs) that would inform productive activities. Finally, the 
mobile printing press had a direct and immediate impact on the IK productive 
processes and also an indirect, later, impact on the technology IK productive 
processes.
This leads to intersubjective knowledges. We shall begin with recognition. 
Obviously there are many recognition networks that could be outlined, from 
the most intimate social relationships up to the widest ranging. Recognition 
exists among family, in a corporation, at university and so on. But the most 
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general category that captures recognition in this extensive period is commu-
nity. The subjects recognise each other as part of an immediate unity, deeply 
imprinted by mechanical solidarity, by the powerful presence of the collective 
in the individual subject and by the traditional and affective bonds established 
between them, but also by the weak presence of what in sociology is known as 
goal-oriented rational action. The subjects, in general terms, act more under 
the guidance of traditional, affective, and value-based patterns than instrumen-
tal means-ends adaptation. On a much smaller level of recognition, directly 
linked to economic life, it is interesting to mention the existence of brands, 
those used to mark livestock, diverse products, and later those strictly related to 
guilds. These symbols (codified OKs) administrated by corporations or other 
institutions (normative IKs), in the last instance, manage flows of recognition 
usually mediated by a particular good.
Three comments concerning linguistic knowledges are necessary. The 
meaning of terms such as techne (which assembles knowledges that later 
separate) or invention (which means discovery or importation and not crea-
tion from scratch) reveal the unity of categories that would later manifest 
themselves to us as dichotomies, the oneness of knowledge (see below). The 
same unitary conception can be inferred from the terms monopolies, privi-
legi, patents, which in their nomenclature do not distinguish the character of 
the protected knowledges. In turn, some Arabic concepts partly transmitted 
through texts have a decisive impact on the language that propels mercantile 
capitalism: zero, algebra, customs, bazaar, cheque. In general, the predomi-
nant languages throughout this period are the natural languages. From Latin 
to English, Quechua to Mandarin Chinese, they are languages which emerge 
slowly, through the intersubjective tapestry, without being planned or ori-
ented towards a specific goal.
Organisational knowledges, just as all IKs, can be found on different levels. 
On the most abstract level, this stage has a limited functional division, coherent 
with the notion of community that is suggested as the most general form of rec-
ognition. Thus, the form in which the social collective organises its metabolism 
entails a limited division of activities. The spheres that would later separate are 
superimposed here, and particularly some of the spheres that industrial capi-
talism would sunder between instrumental and consummatory are blended 
together in this stage. In this sense, it is notable that the flows of organisational 
knowledges do not in general split the domestic unit from the productive unit; 
consequently the intersubjective injunctions regarding the distribution of pro-
ductive tasks are incarnated, primarily, in the familial group. The family is the 
basic organisational cell of the unit of production for agricultural processes 
but also for the majority of manufacturing or artisanal processes. However, 
in certain productive processes, the situation is somewhat more heterogene-
ous. Thus, in some medieval urban manufacturing, as in textiles, a significant 
organisational development can be observed.
The Typology of  Knowledge 87
The values that flow through a single social collective are, already, abundant. 
Those that circulate for centuries in dozens of societies are essentially infinite. It 
is not possible to present a summary of the axiological knowledges. But it is pos-
sible to restrict our comments to a much more delimited group of values: those 
related to knowledge itself. That is, beliefs prevalent in diverse communities 
about how knowledges are conceived, of which there are basically three. Firstly, 
the oneness of knowledge. It is worth especially emphasising that the distinction 
between the instrumental and the consummatory (theoretical-practical, culture-
economy, etc.) was not frequently expressed. Secondly, the absence of the search 
for originality. It was not groundbreaking knowledges which were valued, but 
rather those consecrated by tradition. Thirdly, and connected to this, the notion 
of an ex-nihili individual creator did not exist. The creator discovered – bringing 
to light what was already there, although previously hidden. Thus, he re-elabo-
rated materials whose origin was lost in the mists of time, or he was inspired by 
supernatural forces, but on no account was he seen as a demiurge.
Finally, this brings us to the normative knowledges. Approximately, according 
to the form in which we believe that capitalist regulations view the world today, 
we can distinguish between two general types of regulation: those concerned 
with physical and knowledge matter. In the feudal and slave relations that 
largely survived in the period being analysed, the regulations of physical and 
knowledge matter are reasonably separate. The feudal lord and the ancient mas-
ter, as seen above, hold sway over the destinies of the former. This merits two clar-
ifications. In the first place, our schema enables us to understand how the lord 
and the master dominate all physical matter, without the distinction between 
whether these are human or natural being as emphatic as it would be for indus-
trial capitalism, with its humanist ramifications.137 They are owners of the ener-
gies of rivers, but also of peasants. Subjects’ bodies, as we know, are bound to a 
region and are not quite different from other resources that the dominus con-
trols. In second place, the master and the lord, for different reasons, have much 
less influence over the regulation of knowledge. In the case of feudalism and its 
transformation into mercantile capitalism, this is due to a relatively strict and 
growing division between the regulation of physical and cognitive aspects. On 
the one hand, religious institutions in all historical periods have played a fun-
damental role in the regulation of IKs, but they have also actively participated 
in the regulation of codified knowledges. The progressive specialisation of the 
regulation of knowledge led in the Middle Ages to forms of trade guilds that 
primarily managed techniques, although also trademarks (recognition) and, in 
a certain way, technologies. In particular, with the appearance of the printing 
press, printers’ guilds emerge which regulate codified knowledges. In turn, the 
university guilds regulate these flows and also the transmission of values (axi-
ological knowledges) and, to a lesser extent, certain techniques.
Starting from the fifteenth century – with the 1474 Venetian Statute and later the 
English Statute of Monopolies in 1624 – even more specific and formal regulations 
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take shape: patent laws are born which to some extent, subvert the logic of prior 
institutions such as monopolies and privilegi – conceded in a discretionary man-
ner. They also, primarily, regulate techniques, but little by little they also came to 
exercise control over technologies. Once again, it should be emphasised that in this 
period there is no distinction made between instrumental and consummatory, eco-
nomic and cultural knowledges etc. Table 3 summarises the CMC for the extensive 
period cursorily examined in these pages.
Type Subtype Characteristics
SK Explicit One to one, face to face transmission
Absence of mass reproduction of SK
Restricted physical mobility of the carriers of SK
Persistence over time 
Implicit
IK Recognition Community
Linguistic ‘Techne’, ‘Invention’, ‘patent’, ‘privilegi’, ‘monopoly’
‘Zero’, ‘cheque’, etc.
Natural languages
Organisational Productive units not distinguished from the home
Low complexity in general, especially in agriculture, but 
advanced division of labour in some manufacturing 
Axiological Oneness of knowledge, absence of a search for originality 







Church and other religious institutions 
OK Objectified
(Technologies)
Simple tools: technologies propelled by biological energies
Complex tools: less common
Machines: practically absent 
Codified
(Information)
Codification strongly associated with the accountable 
exteriority of the productive processes
Low level of written codification of pre-Gutenberg 
 knowledges 
Scarcely any direct relation to the content of the 
 production of goods over the whole period
Close relationship with the university after the seventeenth 
century 
Table 3.5: The Cognitive Material Configuration (CMC) in the pre-industrial 
period. 
Source: Zukerfeld 2010.
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3.6.2 The Cognitive Material Configuration of Industrial Capitalism
As is well known, the explosion of physical matter consumption is a funda-
mental characteristic of this stage. But this does not merely express quantitative 
changes. In the pre-industrial period, energy depended on renewable materi-
als, different forms of biomass, the biological powers of animals and persons, 
on natural forces. In the industrial period, by contrast, energy is increasingly 
derived from fossil, non-renewable, fuels. Of course, the paradigmatic case is 
coal during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but it would later shift to 
oil and gas. The ‘matter’ that flows through the industrial world, mostly trans-
formed by human activity, have already lost all trace of their natural source. The 
intensity of physical matter – the consumption per unit of production – would 
increase at the rhythm of the development of the industrial sector; at a global 
level their decline would arrive with the end of the period in question.
As regards subjective knowledges, they fall into three tendencies, more or 
less separated in time. The first concerns the period contiguous with the indus-
trial revolution: (i) the importance of some specific techniques is foregrounded 
(in agriculture and metallurgy); (ii) the transcendence of the liberation of flows 
of subjective knowledge that the rupture of feudal ties implies, (iii) the rel-
evance, for the most sophisticated knowledges of the era, of the dissemination 
of specific associations which favour their transmission; (iv) the role that flows 
of information begin to play in translations between subjectivities. Points ii, iii, 
and iv refer to explicit SKs. Meanwhile, and this is the second tendency, dur-
ing the nineteenth and twentieth centuries a notable process of unpaid copy-
ing (what we describe as exploitation through reproduction in chapter 5) of 
implicit workers’ knowledges by capital developed. Some of these knowledges 
were objectified in machinery. Others were codified in procedure manuals. 
Thirdly, the importance of formal education (that from the mid-eighteenth 
century conquered vast sections of the populations of industrialised countries) 
to the transmission of subjective knowledge must be noted.
In relation to objective knowledges, the most apparent aspect of technolo-
gies is the development of energy technologies in the form of machines. Human 
beings increasingly dominate physical energies and accomplish the objectifica-
tion of knowledges in order to set them to work in a systemic and continuous 
way. Mechanical driving force first emanated from steam, and then electricity, 
oil, and gas. Although the steam engine would take decades to make its influ-
ence felt on national products, its key feature is that it constitutes a general 
purpose technology: it articulates dissimilar technologies such as marine and 
land transport and, of course, industries like textiles. Nonetheless, information 
technologies also make significant progress. In terms of innovations firstly the 
expansion of sensors should be mentioned – converters of ‘matter’ and energy 
into information – which are pivotal for scientific advances, but also for eco-
nomic production. Secondly the technologies of transmission of information 
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arise, which enable the reduction of distances for the circulation of flows of 
codified knowledge. These and other enhancements naturally have an impact 
on information itself: the quantities of books, magazines and the pioneering 
encyclopedias grow steadily. The growth of stocks of information is also driven 
by translations from other bearers that have been mentioned. The fact that 
information starts to penetrate the productive processes is crucial: time-and-
motion, office procedures manuals, instructions on the use of machines etc. 
However, this is penetration which in every case requires human translation: 
the foreman who operates the clock, the worker who learns procedures, the 
engineer who consults the manual.
From among the intersubjective knowledges, linguistic knowledges express a 
tendency towards the development of formal languages. This concern for the 
instrumental rationalisation of language acquires a ceaseless momentum that is 
inseparable from the increasing flows of information, technological advances in 
general, from the values of the period and, definitively, from the rationalisation 
of productive processes. The latter is expressed in organisational knowledges. 
This group has at least four tendencies worth mentioning: (i) the emergence 
of specific organs dedicated to reflecting upon the organisation of the produc-
tive process (organisational knowledge moves from consciousness to self-con-
sciousness, in Hegelian terms); (ii) the split between so-called ‘manual’ and 
‘intellectual’ labour or rather, between two types which express an inversely 
proportional relationship between corporal energy and subjective knowledges; 
(iii) with the appearance of the assembly line, a large portion of organisational 
knowledges leave intersubjectivity and are objectified in machines; (iv) strictly 
intersubjective organisational knowledges are relegated to a set of internalised 
templates regarding what a productive process should be like: in relation to time 
management, hierarchy etc., that Bell described as ‘engineering rationality’ and 
Foucault as ‘discipline’. To put it in an excessively simplified way, recognition in 
industrial capitalism lies in the division between ‘individual’ and ‘society’. This 
split opposes the elemental unity that the community supposes. In society the 
bond is functional and generally anonymous. The self-recognition of specific 
subjects as individuals assumes they are no longer unitary, indivisible beings 
(the etymological meaning) but self-sufficient, autonomous beings. This con-
ception reaches its zenith with the idea of the self-made man. Both extremes 
are mediated by a series of intermediate insertions, particularly those related to 
the world of ‘work’, as bestowers of identity. Axiological knowledges engage, as 
always, with forms of recognition and with the organisation of productive pro-
cesses. Thus, it is necessary to also treat the dialectical pair individual-society 
as values. In turn, property in the modern sense emerges as a not insignificant 
value for these nascent individuals. Of course, instrumental rationality expands 
over all the axiological schema of the period and it is especially expressed in the 
profound dichotomisation between instrumental and consummatory spheres, 
from which arises, among others, the division between economy and culture.
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All the above provides us with the materials to give an account of rearrange-
ments of Normative knowledges. With regards to the regulation of physical mat-
ter, industrial capitalism establishes a dichotomisation which had not operated 
until then, or at least not at all clearly, in spite of seeming perfectly natural to 
us: some physical matter became the object of property and are commodities in 
the strictest sense. These are inert physical matter. Regulations of land (above 
all the enclosures) place it in the commodity sphere. Others, human physical 
matter, cannot be the property of any being other than the living subject who 
carries them. The tendency of capitalist productive processes, reluctantly but 
definite nevertheless, is towards the abolition of slavery.
The normative knowledges concerned with knowledge are inseparable from 
the other types of intersubjective knowledge. Indeed, the notion of a rational 
profit-maximising property-owning individual, combined with the process of 
separation between the economic and cultural spheres, results in the emer-
gence of the figures of author and inventor. These are expressed, sooner rather 
than later, in specific legislation. In both cases, a certain combination of legisla-
tions and judicial rulings results in the stabilisation of copyright regimes and 
patents towards the end of the eighteenth century. In both cases also arises the 
notion of public domain as a positive, not an unlegislated residual space. That 
means, while the pole of individual proprietor receives copyrights, and indus-
trial property (patents, trademarks, trade secrets), the pole of society is mani-
fested in the notion of public domain. The aforementioned legislations seek to 
achieve a balance between the two poles. During the nineteenth century, while 
capitalist productive processes grew in magnitude, the ownership of knowledge 
would pass from the hands of individuals to those of business. At the end of 
the century, the Berne and Paris conventions would provide – with industrial 
property and copyright always separate – a legal international basis. Thus, the 
CMC of industrial capitalism can be summarised as follows and in table 3.6..
3.6.3 Cognitive Material Configuration of Informational Capitalism
In relation to physical matter, while the quantities consumed rise at a global 
level, in the case of the most developed countries the increase of absolute values 
starts to decelerate from the 1970s onwards, particularly in countries where the 
productive structures are more informationalised. Furthermore, when the per 
capita energy consumption of these countries is taken into account, the reduc-
tions in this decade signal the end of sustained increase and point towards a 
certain stabilisation. In the same sense, it must be noted that oil, being the prin-
cipal energy source in global terms, has experienced a 10 per cent fall in its rela-
tive share (from 46.2 per cent in 1980 to 36.3 per cent in 2006). The intensities, 
that is the relationship between energy consumption and product, offer more 
interesting data: informational productive processes – along with the rise of 
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Type Subtype Characteristics
SK Explicit Strongly driven by flows of information, specific 
associations, and formal education 
Implicit Flows liberated by the movement of subjects, little 
learning in factories
Translation from these knowledges into machines owned 
by capital 
IK Recognition Individual-Society, recognition mediated by intermediate 
institutions, especially those connected to work: profes-
sion, union etc. 
Linguistic Artificial, particularly formal, languages
Resignification of terms like ‘Individual’
Appearance of ‘Copyright’ and ‘Patents’ (modern sense) 
Organisational Self-consciousness in the productive processes: special-
ist officials emerge with Taylorism. Objectification of the 
organisation of machinery
Dichotomisation between workers who use large pro-
portions of energy and low subjective knowledges and 
vice versa (separation between ‘manual and intellectual 
labour’)
‘Disciplinary’ organisation
Axiological Individual, instrumental rationality, property.
Dichotomisation between instrumental-consummatory, 
e.g. economy-culture 
Normative Physical matter:
Physical property (self-ownership of human matter; 
commodification of non human matter)
Knowledge matter:
Copyright and author’s rights




Physical technologies: decisive development of machines




Massification of flows of information
Penetration of information in the productive processes, 
but only through translation towards subjective 
knowledges 
Table 3.6: The Cognitive Material Configuration (CMC) of Industrial Capitalism.
Source: Zukerfeld 2010.
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service sectors and the shrinking of manufacturing – mean that the current 
stage of capitalism has seen the reduction of the quantities of physical matter 
consumed per product unit.
Now we shall explore the characteristics of knowledge matter. Regarding 
biological knowledges, there are four significant tendencies: (i) advances in 
genetics, that is the translation of flows of organic information towards bearers 
legible to humans and (ii) developments in genetic engineering, in the capac-
ity to produce post-organic knowledge bearers; (iii) the decodification and 
manipulation of the grammar of life is bound up with capitalist commodifica-
tion; (iv) the tendencies described in (i) and (ii) are irrevocably linked to digital 
technologies and digital information in those processes, that is to say, with the 
objective knowledge typical to the period, as shall be seen further on.
With regards to subjective knowledges, explicit knowledges become less 
significant than they were in previous periods (‘know-what’ loses importance 
in the face of digital information). However, formal education, which in the 
preceding period was a privileged route by which to transmit these knowl-
edges, expands, especially at tertiary and post-graduate levels. Now, these 
certified knowledges (for under- or post-graduate degrees) have, contrary to 
currently fashionable discourse, a more tenuous link with wealth creation than 
in the preceding period. Other sources of subjective knowledges – ‘learning-
by-doing’, vocational training, home-based and internet-facilitated learning, 
etc.  – by contrast seem to have considerable influence. This leads us to the 
growing importance of implicit knowledges (‘know how’) and to mention 
three issues that partially divorce them from formal education: (i) the impor-
tance of an cluster of meta-skills: the ability to permanently handle a multi-
plicity of stimuli, preparation for constant retraining, capacity to work under 
pressure etc. These are, evidently, a set of knowledges that are not guaranteed 
by any academic diploma; (ii) the growing link between the knowledges that 
circulate, are disseminated, and are learnt in free time and the techniques that 
the labour market requires; (iii) the obsolescence of productive processes and, 
therefore, of specific techniques. Certified knowledges, in most areas, move 
too slowly to keep up with them. Therefore, the continuous renewal of sub-
jective knowledges is indissociable from the speed with which generations 
of other types of knowledges supersede each other. It is the fruit of the ver-
tiginous transformation of the world of digital technologies, presided over by 
‘Moore’s Law’ (see below).
Regarding the objective knowledges, we must distinguish between technolo-
gies and information. In terms of technologies, the hegemonic phenomenon is 
the advance of digital technologies that tend to subsume all information tech-
nologies. This advance is due to the self-fulfilling prophecy known as Moore’s 
Law and that is expressed by the exponential progress and cost reduction of 
the most varied types of digital technologies: processing, storage, transmis-
sion, and conversion. In turn, the fact that these technologies have converged 
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in the same artefacts is crucial: tablets, smartphones, and notebooks. One of 
the implications of the tendencies related to these means of production is that 
the physical property of the means of labour in the informational sector is not 
a decisive element in the determination of the stratification of subjects. The 
workers have access to computers, but this does not necessarily free them from 
exploitation by capital.
In relation to digital information, there have obviously been enormous 
intensifications in production, circulation, and consumption. The divergence 
between the expansion of the first two variables – even greater than Moore’s 
Law suggests – and the modest advances of the third, reveals the problem of 
the scarcity of attention. That is, the consumption of superabundant infor-
mation requires finite, and scarce, human attention. Such a divergence is the 
material basis which explains why attention becomes a particularly important 
value. Goods which are composed purely or principally of digital information 
we describe as informational (software, music, videos, texts, data etc.). Software 
is an especially significant type of informational good. It is the most important 
means of production of our era and has various peculiarities: it can generally 
be reproduced at close to zero costs; in some cases, it arises in non-capitalist 
productive processes like those of free software. Beyond the importance that 
the circulation of informational goods associated with so-called ‘cultural indus-
tries’, it is important to note that money has also become an informational good: 
the material fact that more than 90 per cent of the money in the world exists 
in the form of bits is extremely important if we are to understand the financial 
phenomena that shake the surface of informational capitalism.
Moving on to intersubjective knowledges, in relation to linguistic knowledges 
there are at least three features to mention: (i) the English language spreads 
widely, not so much on the basis of military domination (as was the case with 
the languages of previous empires) but due to intersubjective and technological 
domination. English is the language of digital technologies and software, and 
this galvanises it intensely; (ii) ‘Chat’ dialect: a set of recent but clear codes that 
provide templates for written communication through digital technologies: 
emoticons, abbreviations and the like; (iii) programming languages, beyond 
their importance, have the special quality that in many cases they become com-
mercial products and, for the first time, configure entire systems of exchange 
as commodities.
As for organisational knowledges, there are two characteristic modalities. 
One is that of the well-known network enterprise, in their interior and exterior: 
the company as a group of islands, projects articulated in a relatively flexible 
way, the company as a network reaching towards the exterior, outsourcing any-
thing that exceeds its core business. For this modality, organisational knowl-
edge tends to operate control as a principal mechanism of power (complement-
ing or replacing the discipline of the industrial period). The other modality is 
collaborative production (production of informational goods among peers over 
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the internet, usually during free time). This includes, of course, Wikipedia, but 
also forms which are hegemonised by for-profit firms such as social networking 
sites (e.g. Facebook, YouTube). The network company and collaborative pro-
duction share features related to reticular organisation, the circulation of flows 
of information, the contingency of each particular configuration, etc., that twin 
them as prototypical forms of informational capitalism.
Regarding recognition, the attenuation of the typical mediations of industrial 
capitalism must be mentioned in first place: those associated with labour and 
even the concept of society itself. In contrast, networks impose themselves as 
the prototypical form of recognition in this period. However, they achieve this 
by interacting with those particular nodes which are dividuals, subjects who 
in this period recognise themselves only in the linking framework they share 
with other subjects, only in relation to being connected. Some of the particular 
forms that networks assume, as spheres of recognition, are the social network-
ing sites and mobile social networks. This mediation is not innocuous: depend-
ence on internet platform companies subsumes recognition networks under 
the commercial objectives of those companies.
For axiological knowledges we must also emphasise a regression: that of 
physical property as a value – which, of course, has a certain affinity with the 
swift obsolescence in the world of technology. We find that connection to reticu-
lar flows of attention seems to be the supreme value: being connected and that 
those plugged into this connection will receive massive and continuous flows 
of attention is the supreme desire. Of course, this vocation is constitutive of 
dividuality and is expressed through the value of extimacy: the affirmation of 
a self-identity through the digital display of what during industrial capitalism 
was condemned to the private sphere. Finally, while industrial capitalism val-
ued mediacy, deferred gratification, the long term etc., informational or cogni-
tive capitalism value the immediate and ephemeral.
The normative knowledges of industrial capitalism no longer adequately regu-
late the functioning of the commercial sphere in the present stage. In effect, 
physical private property, in spite of having managed to expand its kingdom 
by commoditizing so-called ‘natural resources’, has serious shortcomings in 
organising informational productive processes. This is because the physical 
component, which is the element that it subsumes, carries much less economic 
weight. The same is true of the crystallisations of such processes, informational 
goods, whose susceptibility to cheap reproduction makes them elusive for 
physical property. Finally, a period in which the CMC – ‘the development of 
the productive forces’ – has placed informational productive processes centre 
stage is a period in which physical private property must abandon its posi-
tion on the pedestal of capitalist regulations. This does not mean that physical 
property will disappear or even that it will dwindle to a role of marginal impor-
tance, but rather that other modalities of regulating access to resources will win 
the spotlight. Naturally, the first regulatory modality to audition for the role is 
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Type Subtype Characteristics
BK Organic Genetics: decoding and translation of the language of 
DNA. Use of Digital Technologies and commodification 
Post-organic Genetic Engineering: creation of post-organic forms of 
information. Use of DT and IT and commodification 
SK Explicit Loss of importance, advances in academic qualifications 
but divorce from the product 
Implicit Meta-skills, ‘Windows subjectivity’ or multitasking, capac-
ity for constant re-skilling. Convergence between work 
skills and those used in free time 
IK Recognition Networks and Dividuals
Commodification of Recognition 
Linguistic Natural Languages: Expansion of English, Chat dialect
Formal Languages: Programming languages
‘Network’, ‘Intellectual Property’, ‘Information’ 
Organisational Network Enterprise
Collaborative Production 
Axiological Immediacy, Connection, Attention, Dividuality, Extimacy 
Normative Physical matter:
Limitations to subsume informational processes; 
commodification of natural resources
Knowledge matter:
Expansion of Intellectual Property








Expansion of production and circulation. Less progress for 
consumption of various types (scarcity of attention)
Expansion of Software, replicable means of production 
Table 3.7: Summary of the Cognitive Material Configuration (CMC) of Infor-
mational Capitalism.
Source: Zukerfeld 2010.
intellectual property. Indeed, the expansion of intellectual property is the main 
adaptive manoeuvre taken by capitalist normative knowledge (‘relations of pro-
duction’) in the face of new productive processes. Such expansion manifests 
itself in seven dimensions: semantic (unification of rights and propertisation), 
magnitude, duration, legislation, scope, litigiousness, and jurisdiction.
However, the very replicable ontology of digital information, along with vari-
ous flows of knowledges mentioned above  – networks, dividuals, scarcity of 
attention, etc., in other words, the CMC – demarcates limits on the success of 
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the mission that in the initial moments of informational capitalism was del-
egated to intellectual property. Therefore, another capitalist regulatory modal-
ity has arisen to complement it. This concerns regulating not to exclude but 
rather, on the contrary, to include, and in that way to obtain knowledges and 
attention from users for free. This kind of inclusive appropriation is configured 
via contractual agreements (typically terms of service of online platforms), and 
provides clear examples of exploitation through reproduction and attention 
(see chapter 5). The business of YouTube and Facebook which takes advantage 
of the unpaid character of the contents created by users, the utilisation of data 
by Google and other companies, and the attention of internauts to sell advertis-
ing, the harvesting of free software as an input by forms that have not invested 
in their development, among others, are examples of this modality.
Thus we have an initial approximation of the CMC of informational capital-
ism. Perhaps the most important point to underline is that the characterisation 
of each period cannot be unilaterally reduced to a single factor (digital tech-
nologies, organisation in networks, etc.), but must be considered systemati-
cally. This represents an ensemble of flows and stocks of knowledges that are in 
permanent tension, overflow, are translated, but without ever losing sight of the 
fact that they constitute a totality.
However, although we have spoken about a dialectical, dynamic approach, 
that gives an account of flows, no concept has been presented which would help 
us to understand how knowledge of one type is transformed into another. Thus, 
next we will turn to the theoretical tools which will be utilised to account for 
how physical and knowledge matter are transmitted through time and space.

CHAPTER 4
Knowledge Flows: From Translation to 
Capitalism
4.1 Three Simple Operations: Transduction, Sensory 
Conversion and Actuating Conversion
Clearly, physical and knowledge matter are not immutable stocks, fixed blocks, 
as they are represented in the knowledge typology table. On the contrary, this is 
an unjust abstraction, a snapshot that misrepresents the moving picture. Flows 
of knowledge are condemned – due to their notorious characteristic of always 
being more than they appear to be at a given moment – to mutate, multiply, or 
vanish. Any form of sedentarism or paralysis within a determined bearer is no 
more than a temporary situation or an imperfect halfway house for practical 
ends. Overall, for the purposes of our theoretical framework the transforma-
tions and replications of different forms of physical and knowledge matter are 
given the name operations. There are three elementary operations.138
The first is transduction. This term, which in various branches of phys-
ics (Busch-Vishniac 1998, 2–3) and biology (Frings and Bradley 2004, 272; 
Krauss 2008, 441) has slightly different meaning, is adopted here with flagrant 
disregard for its strict definition, to indicate the transformation of any form 
of ‘matter’ or energy into any other form of ‘matter’ or energy. When a fuel 
is transformed into calorific energy, or kinetic energy, these are examples of 
transduction.
The second and third operations are forms of conversion. Conversion, as a 
general operation, designates the transformations that link, in one sense or 
another, physical matter with some form of knowledge matter. Thus, starting 
with what in physics are called ‘sensors’ (Busch-Vishniac 1998, 8), the sec-
ond operation is sensory conversion and entails the transformation of physical 
matter into some type of knowledge matter. This occurs when a thermometer 
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transforms a certain magnitude of heat into information about the tempera-
ture, when human tactility converts the material into flows of biological infor-
mation about the qualities of the entity that has been touched, or when a video 
camera transmutes the physical matter moving before it into a stream of bits. 
Thirdly, appropriating the concept of ‘actuators’ (Busch-Vishniac 1998, 9), 
we have the operation of actuating conversion: the transformation of a type 
of knowledge matter into physical matter. The mechanical arms of industrial 
robots that receive digital signals and convert them into dextrous actions are 
an example not too far removed from how human muscles function. Indeed, 
living organisms are brimming with actuating conversions at various levels: 
endochrine, neural, or genetic flows are destined, at some point, to produce 
certain forms of physical matter. Each of these operations represents the cross-
ing of a frontier. However, the most significant operation for the theoretical 
framework presented here is situated on a higher level, and involves traversing 
multiple frontiers.
4.2 A Complex Operation: Translation
Translation  – the fourth and most important operation  – is based on the 
interlinking of conversions and transductions. Translation is a transforma-
tion or reproduction of a form of knowledge matter into another, or the same 
form of knowledge matter.139 However, unlike transduction, it is not a basic 
operation, due to knowledge requiring a physical matter bearer. Therefore, to 
move from one form of knowledge to a new one, it is necessary to resort to a 
multiple stage process that involves long chains of the three basic operations. 
For example, a translation is produced when this sentence is typed into a 
computer. In this case, a form of knowledge with a subjective (explicit) bearer 
stems from a sequence of operations that includes various transductions and 
reaches completion with the actuating conversion of fingertips on the key-
board. Thenceforth, the keyboard performs a sensory conversion, translating 
the impulses of kinetic energy into digital signals. After a series of manipula-
tions of this digital information, it is converted into the symbols that appear 
on the computer screen. The translation in this example, to express it in a 
condensed fashion, moves from certain subjective knowledges to a form of 
digital information.
For these flows of conversions and transductions the two extremes chosen 
were arbitrary points. Indeed, the chain of transformations can be traced back 
to forms of knowledge pre-existing a given conscious idea – e.g. the sequence 
of flows of biological information that partially explain it. We could also follow 
the chain of events forwards, after the words appear on the screen – how the 
idea is sent via email and translated to a subjective bearer etc. Thus, describ-
ing as translation the passage from one form of knowledge to another is not to 
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overlook the fact that the study of determined translations involves more or less 
arbitrary clippings of infinite chains.
In turn, the idea of translation suggested here is closer to the old Italian adage 
(‘Traduttore, traditore’), than the notion of linguistic equivalents. This is because, 
as stated above, the passage from one knowledge bearer to another has conse-
quences: something is always added or subtracted – and in general, both occur. 
Unlike transduction, due to which no ‘matter’ or energy are gained or lost, at 
the end of the process of any translation not only the form, but also the content 
is distinct from how it began. But this is a virtuous flaw. Genetic mutation, and 
along with it the evolution of species, is nothing more than a distortion in the 
natural translation of DNA (organic biological knowledge).
Of course, there is an enormous variety of forms of translation. Some occur 
within the inner life of a subjectivity – when an implicit knowledge is trans-
formed into an explicit one –while others span large processes, such as when 
for a subjectivity, with the mediation of all kinds of objective knowledges, a 
knowledge overthrows the dominant axiological intersubjective knowledges. 
For example, the Protestant Reformation, woven from threads such as Luther 
(subjective knowledge), the printing press (technologies), the Bible (informa-















Fig. 4.1: The operations: translation, transduction, actuating conversion and 
sensory conversion.
Source: Zukerfeld 2010.
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Many other forms of translation can be observed. Combining the typology 
of knowledges with the concept of translation it is possible to define humans as 
those beings who can, generically, translate knowledges to and from biological, 
subjective, intersubjective, and objective bearers. No other species of animal can 
perform these four translations and, of course, no type of machine can either.141 
Furthermore, concepts such as communication, learning and thought,142 among 
others, should perhaps be understood as forms of translation also and thus be 
given materialist definitions. What these notions have in common is that they 
share a reception of knowledge through subjectivity. However, the translations 
that aspire to reach subjective knowledge require, as an obligation, that a cer-
tain quantity of human attention allows them entry. This is a key concept which 
will be developed in the following section. Nonetheless, the main category that 
follows on from the notion of translation is that of productive processes, which 
will be submitted to our scrutiny later on.
4.3 Attention
The concept of attention has been the object of various definitions throughout 
the history of psychology. Perhaps the first came from William James:
Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the 
mind in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultane-
ously possible objects or trains of thought ... It implies withdrawal from 
some things in order to deal effectively with others, and is a condition 
which has a real opposite in the confused, dazed, scatterbrained state. 
(James 1890, 403)
Without launching into a discussion of recent debates, it can be suggested that 
human attention can be understood as a combination of human energies and 
knowledges that lay the foundations for a potential translation (including sen-
sory conversion operations) of determined knowledges (or physical matter) 
from any bearer to a subjectivity.
This, therefore, implies opening the floodgates of subjective knowledge, and 
channelling the translation towards a particular stimulus, to the detriment of 
the others. Needless to say, attention does not necessarily operate consciously.
One type of translation in which the importance of attention is clearly mani-
fested under informational capitalism is the type that moves from digital infor-
mation to subjectivity. In a context of a superfluity of information, as Herbert 
Simon notes, human attention becomes particularly scarce. Thus, the wealth 
of digital information generates a poverty of human attention. Although the 
modulation of subjectivity to accommodate several simultaneous stimuli can 
broaden its range, the limits of human consumption of information cannot be 
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overlooked. This idea, easy to grasp intuitively, and which has been pointed out 
by various authors (Goldhaber 1996; Simon 1996b; Rullani 2000; Rodríguez 
and Sánchez 2004; Davenport and Beck 2001; Piscitelli 2001; Lanham 2006; 
McLellan and Berman 2001; Zukerfeld 2011a), features as the mathematical 
conclusion of a paper by Neuman, Park, and Panek. Beyond the intuitive nature 
of this idea, there are studies which eloquently demonstrate it. In 1960 there were 
98 minutes of information available for every minute of human attention. In the 
distant past of 2005 each unit of attention was competed for by 20,943 minutes 
of digital information (Neuman, Park, and Panek 2009, 11). As the authors state, 
under industrial capitalism the options were within the range of decision-making 
of each individual subject. But a superfluity of stimuli characteristic of infor-
mational capitalism can only be dealt with by digital management of informa-
tion: above all, search engines like Google. It should be noted that, in effect, 
one of the most powerful companies in the digital world, or by extension the 
whole world, is predominantly an organiser of human attention. It signposts 
our way through those 20,000 minutes seeking our consumption, streamlin-
ing (or rather, regulating) our scarce resources in that sea of sounds, images, 
information, and programs. Thus, even though capturing attention has been a 
necessary component of the capitalist dynamic through different periods – for 
example the advertising industry flourished during industrial capitalism in the 
battle to capture it – only in informational capitalism has a real subsumption 
of human attention to capital been achieved. Indeed, it is in the current stage 
that the CMC has laid the groundwork for the development of a true attention 
economy and for the blossoming of a modality of capitalist exploitation based 
on taking unpaid advantage of human attention (as we shall see in chapter 5).
4.4 Productive Processes
On several occasions the phrase productive processes has cropped up, and it 
will appear a few more times hereafter. Although its meaning can, partly, be 
grasped intuitively, we shall now try to circumscribe it within some margins. 
Productive processes are a certain type of translation, specifically intentional 
and significant alterations to the state of existence of some portion of physical 
matter and knowledge matter governed by some form of subjective or intersub-
jective knowledge that result in a product (goods or services).
In summary: (‘Matter’ + Energy) Knowledge = Product
For example, let us imagine the productive process of a small software com-
pany. The subjective knowledges of its owner are present, guiding the process, 
along with the subjective knowledge, usually techniques, of the program-
mers. Biological knowledges participate, for example, in the cerebral processes 
involved. All the forms of intersubjective knowledge are present: linguistic, 
which permits the human subjects to understand each other, recognition, by 
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means of which the humans that participate in the productive process perceive 
themselves and recognise other participants as part of said process, organisa-
tional knowledge which is embodied in the division of labour that the collective 
assumes, the normative knowledge that indicates to them the rules that should 
be respected (from private property to working hours), axiological knowledge, 
that delineates some common parameters about right and wrong which are 
shared for the activity, technological knowledge is implicated in the artefacts 
(computers, tables, buildings) that are used in the productive process, and also 
in the data supply (software, information etc.). Of course, the materials that 
compose the artefacts are necessary. And the energy involved includes not 
only electrical energy, but also the biological energy that animates the humans 
engaged in the process. The main product may be a piece of software (a codified 
knowledge, objectified in an artefact).
However, there are also secondary products, or externalities (like the sub-
jective knowledges that are translated from one subject to another: the learn-
ing that occurs over the course of the process). Productive processes then, are 
distinguishable from the natural alteration of ‘matter’, energy and knowledge, 
such as transformations which arise from meteorological phenomena, natural 
evolution, or any action performed by a resourceful animal. In all these cases 
there is no intentionality involved in the changes and/or there are no flows of 
social knowledges guiding the process.
4.4.1 Types of Productive Process
Naturally, the idea of productive processes includes the processes of commod-
ity production as the principal category. These processes are defined by their 
orientation towards manufacturing products with the aim of exchanging them 
for others. That means, the knowledges which direct the processes have not 
devised them for the purpose of satisfying the appetites of the entities that par-
ticipate in the process itself, but instead so that the goods and services pro-
duced are exchangeable for others on some sort of market.
But the concept of productive processes extends beyond the production of 
commodities: it also includes the combination of flows of physical and knowl-
edge matter which may be far removed from the price system and even from 
instrumental action. Some recreational and after-work activities, certainly 
those connected to personal consumption, are definitively part of the pro-
ductive processes, clearly because sooner or later, they have an impact on the 
dynamic of the economy.143
Reason rebels immediately against this idea: is it possible to equate a casual 
conversation between friends with a Fordist labour process in which those 
same friends are involved? Can the plasticine doll a child makes be considered 
in the same category as the manufacturing process that produces the plasticine?
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The key lies in the degree of alteration that is produced and in the relationship 
with the transformation of the totality (for example, the particular capitalist con-
figuration), in a mediated or immediate manner. In a Weberian sense, the ideal 
type of productive process is one which offers the greatest alteration to the flows 
of ‘matter’, energy, and knowledge that are input into it, and that is essential (in 
its aggregate level) to the functioning of the system. And, to go to the heart of the 
matter, if the transformation is considerable, it is irrelevant whether the process 
produces commodities or not. The most obvious example is housework, which 
even economics has increasingly begun to recognise as a productive process on 
which capitalism depends, to a greater or lesser extent.144 On the opposite fron-
tier of innovation is peer-to-peer production (P2P or collaborative production) 
which produces Wikipedia, open software, and other informational goods. In 
both cases it is clear that there are productive processes which are as important 
for the capitalist dynamic as they are exterior to the price system.
Another crucial example in the capitalist productive dynamic is war. Obvi-
ously, this phenomenon is a productive process according to our definition: 
wars entail tremendous alterations to physical matter. Additionally, they anni-
hilate living humans and inert cities with little distinction (theoretical human-
ism does not have the least practical use, instead revealing itself in practice 
to be its own counterpart). Wars, it must be said, also generate mutations to 
normative knowledge: they lead to changes to prior norms, to capitulations, 
treatises that in all likelihood favour determined commodity production pro-
cesses. However, wars are only the extreme pole of a type of non-commercial 
productive process essential for capitalism: that of organised violence, one of 
the forms taken by what further on will be designated regulation. Of course, 
violence also has an expression as a commercial productive process, under the 
prosperous guise of security firms, mercenary armies, and other proud mem-
bers of capital’s family.
Likewise, the concept of productive processes is an attempt to also include 
the phenomena of the production and reproduction of intersubjective knowl-
edges, which are the most difficult to fathom. Let us imagine, for example, any 
social event: a remembrance day, a festival etc. These environments, appar-
ently opposed to the instrumental logic of economic production, function as 
systematic spaces for the production of knowledge matter. The reader, with-
out too much resistance and perhaps remembering Bourdieu, will accept that 
social capital, recognition knowledge, forging bonds, or whichever description 
is preferable, is an authentic productive process that is set in motion in these 
instances. It is tempting to say that, in practice, the productive processes of 
academics, intellectuals, and artists largely occur within this tapestry of rec-
ognition knowledge rather than among books or easels. But it is much more 
than that. It is quite common that from these environments signifiers emerge, 
and signfieds are established (linguistic knowledge). Is it not thus, that natural 
languages develop? Neither is it unusual that purely casual group conversations 
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end up destabilizing some values and establishing others (axiological knowl-
edge). Who has not witnessed, in the most unexpected places, the intersubjec-
tive death of some belief or other? And who has not observed the rise of some 
alternative belief, or the same one in a new disguise?
Furthermore, we would argue that in the social rumination and digestion of 
the torrents of information that the mass media regurgitates, there is a produc-
tive process. Of course, we are not speaking here of the processes of produc-
tion of media information and its transmission, nor of the capturing of human 
attention (which are effectively commodity production processes), but of the 
complex battlefield of internalisation. Lounging on a sofa in front of the televi-
sion, where subjects seem to be enjoying the height of unproductivity, decisive 
knowledge production processes are in play for the capitalist dynamic. Col-
lective subjects are produced and reproduced, renewed as a consequence of 
the dialectic between the knowledges of a diverse character that they already 
bear, and the flows that reach them, in our example, through the television. 
Naturally, this dialectic is partially tentative and contingent: the media flows 
could be swallowed without a thought, intellectually chewed over, or spat out 
immediately. In the first two cases, if the same occurs at a mass level, we are 
presented with productive processes: there is a profound alteration to the con-
figuration of intersubjective knowledge. That is, if one human reads a news-
paper and incorporates into her explicit memory some of the informative 
flows it transmits, it does not represent any production of intersubjectivity. 
But when millions of humans internalise, with the benefit of naturalisation, 
a set of media discourses, then we have a process of production of collec-
tive subjects, and possibly of ideology. It is important to reiterate, extending 
the example given: there is nothing more remote from our approach than the 
idea that large media corporations unilaterally produce subjects. These corpora-
tions produce flows of information (codified objective knowledge) and capture 
attention through them.145 This is the (commercial) productive process that they 
control absolutely. Here we are referring to another, complementary, productive 
process, which also counts on the participation of the subjects who internalise, 
acritically or otherwise, these torrents of information. It is the collective subjects 
themselves who produce collective subjects, not the large corporations. Far from 
being passive, it is the material configuration of a subject’s prior knowledge 
that moulds the productive process, which permits or denies the new flows 
access to memory etc.
Now, at first glance it could seem strange that we consider individual or 
collective subjects (although actually it is the knowledge that they carry) as 
an output of some productive processes. Resistance to this idea could have at 
least two root causes: on the one hand, humanist ontological inertia. On the 
other hand, a vague idea that productive processes result in ‘goods and ser-
vices’ and not subjects. In terms of the first, in effect the dominant ontology, 
especially since industrial capitalism, accustoms us to making a rigid division 
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between objects and subjects: it is a tacit but firmly held belief that objects are 
produced, but subjects are not. Of course, denaturalising and rejecting this 
perspective is not at all novel. There are recent and fashionable antecedents in 
Foucault ([1966] 2002), but above all in Haraway (1991, 1992), Fuller (2009), 
Sloterdijk (2016) and many more.146 Unfortunately, these authors do not usu-
ally recognise that it is Hegel who, in Phenomenology of Spirit, shows with 
clarity that subjects produce themselves at the same time as they produce the 
world. Our concept of productive processes aims to take this Hegelian element 
and combine it with more contemporary ideas and, above all, to bring it to 
bear on the historical, empirical, and even economic terrain (although in a 
different sense to Marx147).
On the other hand, we are accustomed to associating the result of produc-
tive processes with goods and/or certain services. Let us explore this a little. 
Goods, that is, entities that survive the moment of their production and over 
which property rights can be exercised, are varied. For example, tables, paper 
airplanes, software, or texts. Even though the last two are of a particular type 
(informational goods), it is not difficult to understand that all these examples 
emerge from something that it is appropriate to call productive processes, 
which are not necessarily commodity production processes but could be the 
fruits of leisure time or production for personal consumption.
In the case of services, that is, activities which are consumed at the moment 
of their production, over which property rights cannot be granted, there are 
at least two kinds. Firstly, services that result in a transformation of physical 
matter: a hair-cut, transport in a vehicle, washing up plates, in other words ser-
vices which can be described as physical. Here it is also clear that these produc-
tive processes can, possibly, be outside of the sphere of exchange and the price 
system. Then we have cognitive services: the inoculation of human subjects 
with different forms of knowledge. When this inoculation occurs as a goal of a 
commodity productive process, the situation is well-known: the institutions of 
formal education (schools, universities), non-formal education (courses), and 
informal education (private classes) are obvious examples.148
Additionally, there are cognitive services that occur in productive processes 
which are not orientated towards the production of commodities. These are, 
effectively, most removed from all narrow definitions of productive process. 
However, their significance for the functioning of the totality does not neces-
sarily depend on whether or not they are commercial endeavours, or even if 
they occur outside of ‘working hours’. If, for example, a particular training in 
wine making is injected into a subjectivity as a result of a commercial produc-
tive process (through a specific diploma designed for profit by a private uni-
versity), or if by contrast the training is acquired at a remove from the market 
(taught by a relative during free-time), the nature of the knowledge does not 
necessarily seem to change. In both cases we have ‘cognitive service’ produc-
tive processes resulting in subjective knowledge. In both cases, and this is the 
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central point, we have knowledge productive processes that increase the wealth 
of the system they are involved in. In this sense, some of the examples above 
(intersubjective knowledge production processes at a social event, internalisa-
tion of consumer ideologies and desires emanating from the media) illustrate 
this type of ‘cognitive service’ that takes place outside of commodity produc-
tion processes, and even takes place in leisure time.
Finally, within these non-commercial cognitive services two varieties must 
be identified, while recognising that splitting them apart is mistaken. Some of 
these non-commercial cognitive services produce subjective knowledge that, 
subsequently, can and often is applied to commodity production processes. 
Others, which produce intersubjective knowledge, seem to be more distant 
from the productive totality. However, the fact that some knowledges (for 
example those related to wine-making) are directly useful for a commercial 
process, and others (for example instilling the values of alcohol consumption) 
are only necessary for the ideology that permits the realisation of value of the 
former, is a completely secondary question: they are both processes which pro-
duce cognitive services, or simply subjects, essential for the dynamic of the 
system.
To recapitulate, productive processes can be organised around two variables: 
(i) whether or not the process produces commodities; (ii) whether the pro-
duction is of goods, physical services, or knowledge services (or subjects). The 
possible combinations of these variables generate six categories, as laid out in 
table 4.1 below.
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Table 4.1: Types of productive process and some examples.
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
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4.4.2 Capitalist Productive Processes and the Capitalist System
Capitalist productive processes are a subtype of commodity productive pro-
cesses. In effect, not all processes which produce commodities are capitalist. 
For many of them, there is no planned and systematic striving for profit, but 
the exchange may be for the purposes of subsistence, for example. Further-
more, in many commercial processes, even those motivated by a thirst for 
profit, the regulations are not those which define capitalist processes. This is 
the case, for example, with the slave-owning mode of production: commodities 
are produced with the eventual aim of generating profit, under the command 
of a subjectivity that extracts the energies and knowledge of other subjects – 
subjects over whom a legitimate ownership is exercised. However this is clearly 
not a capitalist productive process. In that case, what are the features that define 
capitalist productive processes? Above all, the fact that the regulations express 
the presentation of physical and knowledge matter in the guise of two per-
sonifications: the capitalist and the worker. But to detail the features of capi-
talist productive processes and define these personifications, we should first 
revisit and refine the three types of access previously discussed when normative 
knowledge was analysed.
The first is exclusive access: it relates to the property forms in which the sub-
ject is owner of the resource149 and exercises the possibility of excluding third 
parties as a means of obtaining an economic advantage. Physical private prop-
erty and intellectual property are some current forms of this type of access, 
although not the only ones.
The second is non-exclusive access: it relates to the possibility of the use of a 
resource of which the subjects using it are either not the title-holders – but have 
acquired a use-right – or being the title-holder use it for themselves – without 
obtaining profit from the use of third parties – without availing themselves of 
the possibility of exclusion as a means by which those third parties are sub-
sumed within it.
The third is the condition of no access: this usually indicates situations in 
which the subject gains access to the resource in question in invalid or pro-
portionally insufficient quantities to be able to have an effect on a determined 
productive process. The condition of no access implies that the resource is not 
useful for the subject in question to differentiate themselves from other sub-
jects and to compete for consumer goods by virtue of this resource.
Capitalist productive processes can therefore be defined in the following way:
1. They are a sub-type of commodity production processes.
2. Normative knowledges150 determine that, within the capitalist productive 
processes:
 2.1  All the human subjects who participate are owners of (they have 
exclusive access to) the physical matter comprising their own body.151
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 2.2  Non-human and non-natural physical matter, objective knowledges 
(technologies, information), and the product are the property (exclu-
sive access) of an entity defined by that title and designated as ‘capi-
talist’, which can take the form of a human subject (an individual) or 
have a juridical existence (a company). The capitalist can have exclu-
sive or non-exclusive access to other types of knowledge.
 2.3  The absence of exclusive access to knowledge or physical matter sepa-
rate from one’s own body, along with non-exclusive access to various 
forms of knowledge152 (subjective knowledges in the form of skills, 
and diverse intersubjective knowledges: organisational, linguistic, rec-
ognition, axiological as well as normative) define an entity denomi-
nated as ‘worker’, embodied by individual human subjects.
 2.4  The capitalist and the worker realise an exchange through which the 
former acquires (although in a manner limited by the quantity of time 
or product153), exclusive access to the energy and the knowledge which 
a worker carries, in order to utilise them in the productive process. In 
exchange for their energy and knowledge, the worker receives a por-
tion of the product or its equivalent.154 This portion of the product is 
approximately equivalent to the value of the energy expended through 
labour during the productive process.
3. Axiological IK determines that the capitalist is governed by a systematic 
and rational striving to obtain profits.
4. Recognition IKs determine that the capitalist and the worker mutually rec-
ognise each other as carriers of the aforementioned characteristics (mean-
ing, as free subjects), not in an individual manner but with the mediation 
of intersubjectivity, of the broadest collective into which the productive 
process is integrated.
5. The subjective knowledges that the capitalist embodies organise the pro-
ductive process, acquiring ‘matter’, energies, and knowledges in human 
and non-human bearers.155 During capitalist productive processes, the 
human and non-human ‘matter’ and energies are obtained in exchange 
for their value, while at least some of the knowledges are obtained for less 
than their value. In turn, capitalist subjective knowledges combine this 
‘matter’, energy, and knowledge with the aim of obtaining a product whose 
sale on the market is beneficial to the objective of attaining a profit.
6. The ultimate source of said profit is capitalist exploitation,156 which con-
sists of the unremunerated harnessing of the knowledge that the worker 
and/or other human and non-human bearers contribute. Capitalist profit 
is, in the end, dead knowledge.
Thus we can see the relationship, in a given productive process, between phys-
ical matter and knowledge matter on the one hand, and the relations between 
capital and labour on the other. This definition of capitalist productive 
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processes as a particularisation of flows of ‘matter’, energy and knowledge 
aspires to tackle other stages of capitalism (an elusive task for characterisa-
tions based on the length of the working day and on the immediacy of the 
categories capital and labour), and to characterise various modalities of capi-
talist exploitation: not only the Fordist model of the twentieth century, but 
also the twenty-first century Google modality.
However, the logical presentation of the concepts of labour and capital as 
being derived from those of ‘matter’, energy and knowledge should not obscure 
the fact that the historical evolution of these concepts has been in the opposite 
direction (with some exceptions). It is worth introducing a brief parenthesis 
into the characterisation of capitalist productive processes, to make a comment 
about the evolution of the conceptualisation of these processes by mainstream 
economics. In effect, productive processes since industrial capitalism began to 
be conceptualised on the basis of a series of ‘factors’ that intervene into them. A 
series of ingredients which, when combined, generate a product.
Traditionally, land, or natural resources (N), labour (L), and capital (K) 
were asserted as factors of production that resulted in a product (Y). Over the 
course of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, different 
approaches emphasised one aspect over another, subdivided these factors into 
various forms, labelled them heterogeneously, but ultimately remained safely 
in orbit around them.
Starting from the 1950s, when it became clear that the product could not 
be explained using the aforementioned factors alone, the idea of a fourth fac-
tor emerges, linked to knowledge (the form of combining the other factors, 
organisation, technique), and is symbolised by an A. Thus, what neoclassical 
economics describes as a ‘production function’ can be expressed in a simplified 
way as Y = (N + K + L) A. In other words, the wealth produced depends on 
natural resources, capital, labour, and the specific combination of them that is 
employed.
However, with the advent of informational capitalism and the collection 
of fashionable discourses about the ‘knowledge society’ and similar flights-
of-fancy, the idea that productive processes should be conceptualised on the 
basis of other factors began to gain strength. Principally, it is the belief that 
knowledge is deserving of a central role (surpassing that of A) when it comes 
to explaining production that motivates alternative perspectives (Romer 1993; 
Chartrand 2007; García Camarero 2001). Despite these perspectives suffering 
from various limitations, they are correct about a key aspect: knowledge matter 
has special economic characteristics that differentiate it clearly from physical 
matter, as was discussed in chapter 1. As a consequence, in order to understand 
the functioning of productive processes, it is necessary to isolate knowledge.
It is immediately noticeable that knowledge is not only present in factor A, but 
also in L (e.g. techniques) and K (technologies, etc.). If we extricate knowledge 
from the other factors, what remains? The response is predictable: ‘matter’ and 
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energy (García Camarero 2001). Indeed, with the cognitive materialist approach 
we find that the traditional factors of production are nothing more than his-
torically situated particularisations of knowledge, ‘matter’ and energy: labour 
is a combination of energy and knowledge (as Bentham stated at the end of the 
eighteenth century), capital is a combination of ‘matter’, energy, and knowledge, 
and natural resources are ‘matter’ and energy.
It is important to reiterate that, unlike Romer and other authors’ viewpoints, 
the emphasis we place on knowledge is by no means an attempt to dilute 
the contradiction between labour and capital. On the contrary, our aim is to 
develop tools which can analyse its varied manifestations, as shall be seen in 
the next chapter. Furthermore, it is this emphasis on knowledge that will allow 
us to understand the creation of value under capitalism, and to give an account 
of the manifold forms of exploitation and the accumulation of capital. This 
reconstruction of the categories of labour and capital cannot be explained by 
a vocation to advance our understanding of these two aspects, but is instead 
imposed as a consequence of knowledge matter and physical matter having, at 
least and from the historical vantage point of the present, radically divergent 
ontological, economic, and juridical properties which cannot be overlooked, as 
discussed in chapter 1. That said, the capitalist system should be differentiated 
from individual capitalist productive processes. Naturally, capitalism as a totality 
is, above all, an immense productive process. But it is situated on another level 
to individual processes. In this sense, some of the characteristics of the capital-
ist system that it is worthwhile underlining are as follows:
1. Capitalism is a totality that can be represented as a CMC whose fea-
tures (the form that different types of knowledge and physical matter 
assume) vary according to its various stages (mercantile, industrial, and 
informational).157
Fig. 4.2: ‘Production function’ and its relationship with ‘matter’, energy and 
knowledge.
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2. However, there are some aspects related to the normative intersubjective 
knowledges which are maintained over these different stages:
 2.1  The ensemble of normative intersubjective knowledges that produce 
normative intersubjective knowledges is the hard kernel of the ‘State’ 
form. Although it is concretised in many bearers, the capitalist state is 
first and foremost a regulatory intersubjectivity.
 2.2  All entities are related to capitalism through the regulation of access 
to them, or more generically, their inscription in the property register, 
both in their physical and knowledge aspects, as discussed in chapter 1. 
Beyond this static image, capitalism also implies a permanent move-
ment towards propertisation (exclusive access to those entities or derived 
products) and/or growing commodification (adoption on the part of 
these entities or their derived products of the commodity form).158
 2.3  All human subjects are property owners of (they have exclusive access 
to) the physical matter of their own bodies. This property is inalien-
able in legal terms: the subject cannot sell it.159 As such, the integral 
human subject cannot be a commodity.
 2.4  All commodities can be exchanged via a set of rules designed to foster 
free exchange of equivalent values, which are usually condensed into 
the expression ‘market’.
 2.5  Exclusive access to physical or knowledge matter pertinent to capi-
talist productive processes characterises the figure of ‘capital’, and 
non-exclusive access or no access to them characterises ‘labour’.160 
Although they can be translated to various bearers, both figures are 
principally normative intersubjective knowledges.
3. The origin and evolution of capital is defined by three processes: exploita-
tion, expropriation, and regulation.161 Capitalist exploitation stems from 
purchasing knowledge matter for less than its value. Capitalist expro-
priation refers to capital paying for physical matter at less than its value. 
Capitalist regulation consists of establishing norms which enable exploita-
tion and/or expropriation. Capitalist exploitation unfolds inside capitalist 
productive processes, within the norms that govern the production and 
exchange of commodities. Expropriation happens outside capitalist pro-
ductive processes,162 in the sphere of exchange, but against the norms of 
market. Regulation happens outside of capitalist productive processes and 
the sphere of exchange, and always entails more or less violently uproot-
ing pre-existing norms, including those which eventually sanction the 
exchange of equivalences and a particular property form.163 Thus, even 
though capital is, in the last instance, nothing more than dead knowledge 
matter, capitalism as a system also owes its progress to the theft of physical 
matter by means of the violence of the law.164
4. The origin and evolution of labour is defined on the basis of the regulation 
of access to physical matter and knowledge matter which result from the 
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exploitation of knowledge matter it carries, and the expropriation of the 
physical matter which it is deprived of.165
5. Capital and labour are the names that the fundamental dialectical con-
tradiction of capitalism assumes. Capital and labour may have differ-
ent bearers. Therefore, the contradiction can take shape between human 
subjects, within these human subjects, or between human and non-
human bearers.166
6. The capitalist system, as a productive process, includes capitalist produc-
tive processes but also, and decisively, all other productive processes.167 
These non-capitalist productive processes within capitalism are not inci-
dental or provisional phenomena: they constitute part of the essence of 
capitalism.168 In other terms, the second dialectical contradiction that 
defines capitalism is that which arises between capitalist and non-capital-
ist productive processes.169
With that, we have arrived at the end of this brief chapter which began by ana-
lysing the flows of different types of knowledge and swiftly moved on to the 
concept of translation. One type of translation focused on was what we call pro-
ductive processes. Within these we identified commodity production processes 
and a sub-set of these: (individual) capitalist productive processes. From that 
point, a condensed characterisation was presented of capitalism (as a system) 
as an immense productive process. From this last characterisation three key 
concepts emerged: exploitation, expropriation, and regulation. It is these that 
explain the origin and evolution of capital. And, taken as a whole, they are the 
motor that drives capital accumulation. Without doubt, the most significant of 




5.1 Introduction: Regulation, Expropriation and Exploitation
In this chapter a theory of capitalist exploitation will be advanced which, natu-
rally, stems from the concepts discussed in previous chapters and that, even 
though it has various points of contact with several other theories of exploi-
tation, entails a divergence from them. In this sense, the main thesis pre-
sented here in a systematic way is that capitalist exploitation depends, in the 
last instance, on unremunerated knowledge. And, more precisely, there are three 
varieties: capitalist exploitation through alienation, through reproduction, and 
through attention. However, to arrive at capitalist exploitation in its varieties we 
must first cover a considerable distance, and encapsulate it within two broader 
constellations.
Capitalist exploitation is, evidently, the central core of the capitalist dynamic, 
the accumulation of capital, the historical development of capitalism. However, 
conceptually capitalist exploitation is merely a particular form of exploitation, 
which is a much more comprehensive concept. Indeed, almost any generic defi-
nition of exploitation is applicable to the relationship between slaves and mas-
ters in antiquity or between serfs and lords in the Middle Ages. Furthermore, 
exploitation, even within the capitalist system, also occurs outside of capital-
ist productive processes. For example, traditional patriarchal exploitation in 
the home or the exploitation of illegally enslaved workers. We must, therefore, 
define the general concept of exploitation and then distinguish the particular 
features of capitalist exploitation.
But, on the other hand, even if capitalist exploitation is the essence of the 
accumulation of capital, this cannot be sufficiently understood if the processes 
of regulation and expropriation that frame and complement it are disregarded. 
In this sense, the idea that capitalist exploitation and, more generically, the 
accumulation of capital, rely on processes extrinsic to it, emerges for the first 
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time with Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation (Marx [1867] 1990, part 8): 
it was necessary to strip the peasants both of their lands and of their feudal ties 
in order to force them to seek out a subsistence from employment in the capi-
talist productive processes. Even in this extreme summary it can be observed 
that the idea of primitive accumulation combines two distinguishable ele-
ments that must have been present from the outset of capitalism: on the one 
hand, the sanction of laws, especially those which demarcated private property 
(the ‘enclosure acts’), but also those related to exclusive access to a subject’s 
own body, market norms etc.; on the other hand, the effective appropriation 
by various actors of land, precious metals, and other riches. After Marx, Rosa 
Luxemburg (1968) would make a crucial contribution: the observation that 
these processes of primitive accumulation, far from only taking place at the 
birth of the capitalist dynamic, are repeated time and again, in a style more 
closely resembling Sunday mass than original sin, and not only as the basis for 
exploitation, but above all as a consequence of it. In Marxist terms, the fact that 
exploited workers cannot absorb the totality of the commodities produced by 
capital leads to cyclical crises of capitalist overproduction. This obliges capi-
talism to expand into unknown regions, to export its markets, property and 
doubly-free labour to regions lacking agreed norms so that in them surplus 
value can be realised. Along the same lines, David Harvey (2003) proposes the 
term accumulation by dispossession to account for this continuous and system-
atic dynamic of the accumulation of capital. From other perspectives, various 
theories on imperialism (Hilferding., Hobson, Lenin) and unequal exchange 
(Emmanuel, Braun) have corroborated this source of capital accumulation 
independent from direct exploitation through productive processes.
Despite their value, these authors’ contributions suffer from some limitations. 
The one it is worth underlining here lies in them failing to clearly distinguish 
regulation from expropriation. And, although regulation and expropriation act 
together, and often simultaneously, they are logically independent and are even 
situated on different levels, as will be discussed below.170
In any case, expropriation and regulation also have an existence prior to their 
particular capitalist forms, so that we must also first understand regulation and 
expropriation in general in order to subsequently define their specifically capi-
talist forms. Only after covering this ground will we be able to define capitalist 
exploitation and its three varieties with any precision. In summary, the accu-
mulation of wealth by some subjects in detriment to others is not an innova-
tive phenomenon for capitalism but a feature of social organisations situated 
in widely diverse times and geographies. To give an account of these processes 
we deem these generic concepts of regulation, exploitation, and expropriation 
to be suitable.171
Provisionally, let us say that exploitation – this is, all exploitation, not only 
the capitalist type  – refers to the asymmetrical exchanges that occur within 
productive processes, exchanges that mean one of the parties, the exploiter, 
Capitalist Exploitation 117
obtains a greater economic value than the other and that it is obtained at the 
latter’s cost. Expropriation, on the other hand, supposes a direct confiscation 
of resources – often without compensation – that, crucially, takes place in the 
sphere of exchange and not that of production. Meanwhile, regulation consists 
of the imposition of norms (legally sanctioned or through other means) that 
frame exploitation and expropriation. For example, the conquest of America 
by the Spanish crown began with a process of regulation (through the violence 
of the law and the law of violence) that normalised the expropriation of lands, 
gold, and other resources, and the exploitation of the original inhabitants who 
were thrust into some kind of productive process. Naturally, these three con-
cepts should be discussed more thoroughly.
5.2 Regulation
Regulation, in its generic form, refers to the stabilisation of knowledges with 
normative intersubjective bearers that legalise and eventually legitimise rela-
tions of exploitation and expropriation. This merely reiterates a theme men-
tioned in the previous chapter, with the exception of now extending it to other 
historic forms beyond capitalism. In effect, the processes of accumulation of 
wealth at a macro level, at least since antiquity, have had the vocation and the 
need to put certain rules in place which would constrain them. This obviously 
does not mean that the norms governing expropriation and exploitation are 
transparent, consented to or just.
Of course, regulation, meaning the establishment of the norm across its 
diverse material bearers, is a potestas of power in relation to no-power. Regu-
lation separates the regulators from the regulated and this, usually, signifies 
oppressors from oppressed. The most incisive conceptualisation of this associa-
tion between power and regulation should not be sought out in the latter-day 
blasphemies of the heretics Marx, Nietzsche, or Foucault, but in the beautiful 
and sacred words that a millennium and a half ago descended to this earth 
through the immaculate quill of Saint Augustine.
Justice being taken away, then, what are kingdoms but great robberies? 
For what are robberies themselves, but little kingdoms? The band itself 
is made up of men; it is ruled by the authority of a prince, it is knit 
together by the pact of the confederacy; the booty is divided by the law 
agreed on. If, by the admittance of abandoned men, this evil increases 
to such a degree that it holds places, fixes abodes, takes possession of 
cities, and subdues peoples, it assumes the more plainly the name of a 
kingdom, because the reality is now manifestly conferred on it, not by 
the removal of covetousness, but by the addition of impunity. Indeed, 
that was an apt and true reply which was given to Alexander the Great 
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by a pirate who had been seized. For when that king had asked the man 
what he meant by keeping hostile possession of the sea, he answered 
with bold pride, “What thou meanest by seizing the whole earth; but 
because I do it with a petty ship, I am called a robber, whilst thou who 
dost it with a great fleet art styled emperor.” St. Augustine ([426] 1995, 
Book IV, chapter 5).172
The brave pirate’s riposte does nothing less than tear away the fetishistic veil of 
regulations, in other words, of the frontier that separates the pirate from the 
emperor. This is a frontier which does not obey the essence of regulated con-
ducts (that are fundamentally alike on either side of the limit of the law that 
separates them), nor does it obey any transcendent morals (which do not gov-
ern symmetrically). Regulation, obviously, has no purpose other than to treat 
differently what is equal, and as equal what is different, in the interests of the 
regulators. It is worth underlining that here the term regulation does not refer 
to any norm, or any standardisation of conduct, but specifically to those related 
to the processes of exploitation and expropriation.173 In effect, regulation produces 
normative intersubjective knowledge, but of a particular type, connected to the 
management of access to physical and knowledge matter, in other words that 
which will at some point take the form of physical and intellectual property.
Now, how is this difference between the pirate and the emperor established? 
It would be as foolish to deny the role of physical force or military power, as it 
would be to assume that they are sufficient in themselves. In reality, the pro-
cess of regulation has two instances, two dialectical moments, which have been 
described under different names by a wide-ranging literature of political phi-
losophy.174 The framework proposed here will be used to elaborate on them.
The first moment of regulation is the regulation of physical matter. That is, 
the domestication or annihilation of bodies and objects through wars, physical 
violence, destruction, repression, confinement. This is achieved through the 
mobilisation of (physical) technologies such as guns, bombs, prisons, and in 
many cases drawing on physical human energies (as with conflicts on a large 
or small scale). Within this moment of physical regulation two manifestations 
can be distinguished. On the one hand, constituent regulation and, on the 
other hand, constituted regulation. The former refers to physical regulation 
imposed on a given territory, against the extant norms in that territory, in order 
to impose new norms (at the second moment). It is the case of the foundation 
of any state or similar order. In the case of brutal invasions in the name of civi-
lisation, like the Spanish in America or the United States in the Middle East, 
it refers to the wars that overthrew the norms that governed the indigenous 
inhabitants, and to physical submission. The second manifestation relates to 
regulation that occurs within an existing normative order. That is, subsequent 
to constituent regulation and the act of regulating knowledge, again and again 
physical regulation appears as a reassurance of the existing order – remember that 
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here we are always specifically referring to an order which permits expropria-
tion and exploitation. This is no longer the inferno of invasion, but of repres-
sion and disputes around normative intersubjectivity. Where an Inca or an Iraqi 
(or entire cities, the same applies) breaks through the barrier of the dominant 
intersubjectivity and moves towards reviving the deposed norms, they run up 
against the edifying pedagogies of incarceration and assassination. Thus, while 
constituent regulation occurs against norms, constituted regulation takes place 
within them. Simplifying matters a little, while the former has a military char-
acter, the second is an order founded on police force.
The second moment is the regulation of knowledge. Here, in general, codified 
knowledges are produced as information:175 sheaves of great international trea-
ties, national laws, modest municipal ordinances, or non-state norms.176 Here 
as well, there is constituent regulation (for example the constitutions them-
selves), and constituted regulations (that are concerned with subordinated 
norms). But, the key is the inoculation of norms into intersubjectivity. This 
means the production of some solid normative knowledge, fed by all types of 
other intersubjective knowledges. Indeed, information is not sufficient for this 
task,177 but norms are also needed which enter into dialogue with linguistic 
knowledges (words, phrases, permitted and forbidden expressions which regu-
late conducts and opinions), with recognition (for example who should be rec-
ognised as King, which empire should be deferred to, which figures should be 
admired), with organisational knowledges (the norms about the organisation 
of productive processes) and, of course, with axiological knowledges (changes 
to the hierarchy of values, beliefs and specifically what has been defined earlier 
as ideology). Naturally, intersubjectivity also converses with subjective bearers, 
with variable outcomes: in each case the subjectivation of the norms can be 
more or less effective, reinterpreted as they are within the individual’s frame-
work. In turn regulation through knowledge also entails dialogue between nor-
mative knowledge and technologies: monuments, buildings, architecture, for 
example, all crystallise new norms. The Christian crusades constitute a simple 
example. There, the conquest of bodies was a mere prelude to the conquest of 
souls; the violence of physical matter is only the plough enabling the violent 
seeding of intersubjectivity. And both violences, under the ex-post guise of 
peaceful law, lay the foundations for exploitation and expropriation.
Of course, the process is not necessarily linear. Cognitive regulation is per-
petually shored up by physical regulation, and vice versa. Indeed, it is most 
usual to find a dialectical interaction between the two moments of regulation. 
The relationship between the process of regulation, in its two moments, and 
knowledge with normative intersubjective bearers should be evident. As men-
tioned in chapter 3, the latter are knowledges. Norms, regulations as relatively 
stabilised stocks, are nothing more than knowledges that have achieved norma-
tive intersubjectivity. Regulation, on the other hand, refers to: (i) the processual, 
dynamic, aspect of the management of (ii) some norms in particular (those that 
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define access and enable expropriation and exploitation), and to the fact that 
(iii) said management of intersubjective knowledges have physical matter (the 
first moment) and translations from other forms of knowledge matter (second 
moment) as their medium.
From a cognitive materialist standpoint, the state may be defined as an 
ensemble of normative intersubjective knowledges capable of successfully per-
forming both moments of regulation and, more precisely, as having a monopoly 
of production over the normative intersubjective knowledges that are legal in a 
given territory. Thus, other crucial properties that define the state in several 
theories (the monopolies of violence, of collecting taxes, etc.) are rather derived 
from the basic power of setting the intersubjectively accepted rules. Far from 
being linear, determined, immediately stabilised phenomena, the two moments 
of the processes of regulation are open fields in which the success of the regu-
lators is far from predictable with any clarity and, above all, in which there 
are always contradictions present. The dialectic of both moments seeks to con-
solidate regulation which is never complete or perfect. Indeed, a similar but 
opposite dialectic can always be traced for the regulated: the resistance of ‘mat-
ter’ and energy (rebellious bodies, limits transgressed) and cognitive resistance 
(alternative axiologies, norms, and languages for example). In turn, regulation 
does not occur just on one level, for example on that of national laws. It also 
takes shape on the supra-state (international treatises) and sub-national (pro-
vincial and municipal regulations) levels. Still more importantly, regulation can 
and often does exist in forms independent of, and even conflicting with, those 
that the state promotes. Illegal productive processes (of illicit substances for 
example), the exploitation within them and the expropriations they practice are 
perfectly regulated, regardless of this regulation being contrary to that belong-
ing to the states that contain them. Thus, regulation is an empirical phenom-
enon which may or may not be juridical.
This changes with specifically capitalist regulation. Here, expropriation and 
exploitation are moulded alongside the figures of capital and labour. Although 
in chapter 4, when characterising capitalism as a productive process, several of 
the features of capitalist regulation were mentioned, it is worth reiterating them 
here with some slight modifications specific to the approach being adopted now.
1. Normative knowledges that produce capitalist regulation have two char-
acteristics related to their forms:
 1.1  They are legal (meaning, they arise from laws, treaties, municipal 
ordinances, and other legal instruments).
 1.2 They are produced by the state.178
2. Regarding its content, capitalist regulation has four characteristics:
 2.1  All entities are related to capitalism through the regulation of access to 
them, or more generally, through their entry in the property register, both 
in their physical and knowledge aspects – as pointed out in chapter 1.
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 2.2  All human subjects are proprietors of (they have exclusive access to) 
the physical matter of their own bodies. This property, which intro-
duces a radical discontinuity between humans and non-humans, is 
imprescriptible in legal terms and the subject cannot alienate it. As 
such, the integral human subject cannot be a commodity.
 2.3  All commodities can be exchanged by means of a set of precepts 
designed to favour free exchange of equivalent values which is usually 
summarised by the expression ‘the market’.
 2.4  Exclusive access to physical matter or knowledge matter relevant to 
capitalist productive processes characterises the figure of ‘capital’ 
and non-exclusive access or no access to them characterises that of 
‘labour’. Although they can be translated into various bearers, both 
figures are, above all, normative intersubjective knowledges.
3. The beliefs (axiological knowledges, especially ideology) that capitalist 
regulation invokes are not of a transcendent (a divinity, monarch, or race), 
but of an immanent nature (society itself, reason).179
4. Capitalist regulation determines specific forms of exploitation and expro-
priation.
Next we shall explore what exploitation and expropriation involve in order to 
be able to apprehend their specifically capitalist forms.
5.3 General Concept of Expropriation and Exploitation: 
Common Aspects and Divergences
In their general and ahistorical forms, expropriation and exploitation, meaning 
the relations which regulation gives shape to, share some characteristics:
1. They are framed by some kind of norm, by definition.
2. They usually occur between human actors: there are actors E and e 
(exploiters and exploited, expropriators and expropriated).180
3. The E actors extract a surplus value from their relationship with the e 
actors.
 3.1  The acquisition of this surplus value by the E actors is only possible 
through the loss of the same by the e actors.
 3.2  The acquisition of this surplus value by the E actors is an objective 
economic phenomenon that does not necessarily correspond with the 
subjective or intersubjective representations the e actors hold about 
the equivalence of values ceded by both parties.
 3.3  The e actors, however, would not refuse to accept a higher portion of 
value than that which the relationship provides them.
4. The relations may or may not have the consent of the e actors.
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Thus, even on this generic level which combines both types of relations,181 it is 
evident that both are distinguished from other social relations: in effect, we can 
infer from the third characteristic that, of course, they are differentiated from 
the relations which do not entail production or economic exchange, and also 
from those in which, these being present, the portions of value that the differ-
ent actors acquire is equivalent to the value they have contributed. Specifically, 
characteristic 3.1 indicates that furthermore, all those relationships in which, in 
a context of relations between two types of actors, A and B, A obtains a greater 
economic value than B are not necessarily relations of expropriation or exploi-
tation. This could be due to A exploiting or expropriating a third type of actor, 
C. Therefore, the exploitation or expropriation between A and B requires that 
the source of additional value that A obtains from this relationship to specifi-
cally be extracted from B.
Characteristic 3.2 indicates that the fact that the e actors consider the rela-
tionships they establish to be legitimate or even desirable does not prevent 
those relationships from entailing exploitation or expropriation. An extremely 
frequent error is associating social relations eschewed by the e actors with sub-
jective suffering on their part etc. This use of common sense that unfortunately 
permeates the world of academia assumes that, for example, being ‘exploited’ 
is just having wage or working conditions that are subjectively judged to be 
unsatisfactory. And vice versa: ‘no, these subjects are not exploited, she likes 
doing it/they think it’s a decent salary/he chose that job’. The point is that nei-
ther exploitation nor expropriation depends on these perceptions, but rather 
on an objective asymmetry.182
Of course, this discrepancy acquires particular force as regards capitalist 
exploitation (under which by definition human subjects face each other as free 
individuals).
However, it does not necessarily have to be this way, and in fact it is not 
at all clear that this situation is the rule, in empirical terms. Some exploited 
or expropriated actors, in many of the heterogeneous situations in which 
they have historically been manifested, prefer to enter into certain relations 
of expropriation or exploitation, rather than other, worse, forms of exploita-
tion and expropriation, or other alternatives. For example, the peasant who 
abandons their labours in the rice paddy in exchange for being exploited by 
capitalist industry hardly misses their agricultural work; the expropriated sub-
ject who is paid a given sum for their land, far below the market value, could be 
satisfied with this transaction for various reasons: it could be the case that the 
typical customs of the time and place did not involve any compensation, that 
the alternative was summary execution, or even in another context, that they 
lacked explicit subjective knowledge of values on the real estate market. But 
these examples assume rationality, a calculation of costs and benefits, in the 
definition of exploitation and expropriation. More specifically, they assume an 
assessment on the individual, subjective, level. However, this is no more than a 
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level. On the contrary, more relevant is the action of ideology that occurs on the 
intersubjective level, and for the acceptance of which no rational calculations 
intervene but rather emotional attachment, such as in the case of expropriation 
in which the colonised subjects accept that a new monarch will levy a new tax 
in kind on them, by cross and sword.
However, it is more important to assert that a central part of the process of 
regulation, particularly the second moment, consists of inoculating axiological 
knowledges, specifically the right doses of ideology, to stimulate the acceptance 
of expropriation and exploitation as legal, legitimate and even natural relations. 
In other words, a cognitive material configuration (CMC) in which the bulk 
of the e actors intersubjectively reject expropriation and exploitation is one in 
which the process of regulation is obstructed and, consequently, cannot sus-
tain itself for long. Resorting to fire and bloodshed at the moment of physi-
cal regulation can buy a little time, but if the knowledge regulation does not 
become intersubjective, the cognitive material configuration and along with it 
the forms of exploitation and expropriation in question, are mortally wounded.
The fact that the relations of expropriation and exploitation are not necessar-
ily rejected and that, at least partially, they must be ideologically accepted on the 
intersubjective level, does not mean that these actors are completely satisfied. 
As characteristic 3.3 shows, these actors are willing to receive more resources. 
The peasant transformed into industrial worker or the formerly unemployed 
person who has now been hired prefer their current situation to the previous 
one, but they would not turn down a wage increase; the person who accepts a 
minimal payment for their land would not be offended if the agreed value of 
the contract of sale were higher, nor would the colonised subjects who submit 
to an order that two cows be expropriated from them protest if only one was 
taken. These examples serve to distinguish expropriation and exploitation from 
donation and gift. Indeed, in those relations (which fulfil criteria 3.1 and 3.2) 
the person who cedes a greater value would not usually prefer that a portion of 
them be reimbursed to him.183
However, not every relationship in which A obtains an economic advan-
tage over B fulfilling characteristics 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 constitutes exploitation or 
expropriation. The first characteristic of these relations shows us that expro-
priation and exploitation are distinct from unsystematic theft, looting, kidnap-
ping and bondage because the former are protected by some type of norm. This 
is what, in relation to expropriation, the story of the pirate and Alexander the 
Great exemplifies. Theft, due to the two moments of regulation, has transmuted 
into legal and even virtuous conduct. As for exploitation, while the term suit-
ably describes part of the situation of a slave in antiquity for example, its appli-
cation to a situation of forced labour under capitalism is more questionable. In 
effect, if we are dealing with a prolonged, systematic, normalised bondage – 
such as the case of many textile workshops and brothels all around the world – 
it is indeed a form of exploitation. The fact that actually existing regulation 
124 Knowledge in the Age of  Digital Capitalism
contradicts state regulation in no way dismantles it.184 If, by contrast, the situa-
tion is unsystematic and lacking rules, the term exploitation is not appropriate 
to describe it.185
Now, expropriation and exploitation have substantial differences between 
them in any of their manifestations (and even more under capitalism). Therefore, 
while expropriation generally occurs in the sphere of circulation and exchange, 
exploitation occurs within the productive processes. In turn, expropriation refers 
to the dispossession of physical matter (mostly non-human, although human on 
exception) which previously was under the control or at least within reach of the 
expropriated. This means, the expropriated subject stops having access to lands, 
precious minerals, clean air, animals, utensils, or their own body, as productive 
resources. This dispossession of physical matter usually occurs with no compen-
sation, though sometimes with non-economic compensation or with economic 
compensation whose eventual value is objectively lower than the value of the 
expropriated resources (for example, ‘security’, the permission to carry out some 
type of economic activity, an insignificant payment, etc.).
By contrast, exploitation refers to the unpaid character of human energies and, 
above all, to the diverse types of knowledges utilised in a productive process. 
Thus, the exploited subject no longer possesses the energies that she has spent in 
the productive activity, although she still carries the knowledges that, for exam-
ple, have been objectified in the product of the labour. Furthermore, in general 
exploitation entails an exchange, more specifically, an economic exchange: the 
exploited subject receives compensation in goods or services (in kind or money) 
for the productive deployment of their energies and knowledges.186
Thus, we can characterise expropriation and compare it with exploitation:
We are now presented with a characterisation of expropriation and exploi-
tation as generic relations. It is important as a complement to this, to insist 
that expropriation must be distinguished from regulation. The establishment of 
rules, for example, that legalise the appropriation of land, and the appropriation 
itself, are two different processes. In some cases they can overlap in time, which 
tends to engender confusion. Typically, the conqueror’s regulation of natural 
resources and the expropriation of them may occur on the same day and be 
carried out by the same actors. The violent drive to impose regulation (in its 
first moment) can be extended and lead to expropriation. But this simultaneity 
of the conquering ‘big bang’ obscures the fact that both processes can develop 
while disentangling themselves and separating. Expropriation can potentially 
continue long after the conqueror’s regulatory law is imposed. In fact, at the 
second moment of regulation when the norm achieves intersubjectivity, expro-
priation continues. The regulation has established orbits but the planets of 
expropriation continue their rotations and movements. The law declares land 
or slave to be property of the expropriator. But he must organise the process 
in order to concretely appropriate them. He must enclose territory, evict and 
dispossess its inhabitants, he must safeguard the confinement of his slaves and 
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administrate their lives and deaths, he must dirty his hands with the concrete 
dynamic of the appropriation of physical matter.187
The concept of regulation with its two moments, and its difference from 
expropriation, enable us to study the tensions, struggles, and instabilities of 
these processes. Even when regulation was stabilised, expropriation would 
open space for resistances; even when the conqueror was successful in inocu-
lating norms into intersubjectivity, the peasants whom the law orders to be 
dispossessed or the subjects who were ordered to be enslaved can struggle in 
the interstices, combating the molecular process of expropriation.
5.4 Capitalist Expropriation
So far, a set of generalities about expropriation have been detailed. But what 
specificity does capitalist expropriation present? Predictably, capitalist expro-
priation must accommodate itself to the corresponding regulation. This, con-
cretely, means that three features should be added to those which all expropria-
tion presents:
1. Capitalist expropriation only includes non-human physical matter.
2. Capitalist expropriation must take the form of exchange, and even equal 
exchanges between free subjects.
3. Capitalist expropriation is legal.
Expropriation Exploitation
Similarities Framed by norms 
Relations between two types of human actor, E and e 
The E actors obtain an objective surplus value in relation to, and at 
the expense of, the e actors 
The subjective perceptions of the e actors about the nature of the rela-
tions between E and e are not relevant when defining them
The e actors would accept a greater portion of value than they receive
Differences Sphere of circulation and 
exchange 
Sphere of production, within 
productive processes 
Confiscation without exchange or 
asymmetrical exchange 
Asymmetrical exchange
‘Matter’ and/or Energy (mostly 
non human)
Knowledges and/or energies 
(human)
Table 5.1: General concepts of expropriation and exploitation: similarities and 
differences.
Source: prepared by author.
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The first feature points to the idea that physical human bodies cannot be 
appropriated. Therefore, capitalist expropriation relates to non-human physi-
cal matter. In contrast, every subject is their own master. This assertion, in 
the contractualist spirit, can be improved by emphasising the ‘doubly-free 
character of labour’, as Marxists do: the flesh of the worker cannot be expro-
priated, but that of the cattle that gives them sustenance must be forcibly 
expropriated. A third way, perhaps the clearest, of presenting this first fea-
ture of expropriation under capitalism stems from stretching Latour (1993) 
a little: capitalist regulations introduce a radical discontinuity between human 
and nonhumans, in such a way that the former are inalienable while the lat-
ter must be traded. This approach allows us to reinforce one of the argu-
ments running through this book: humanism (that leads in theoretical terms 
to privileging categories of ‘action’ and, as highlighted above, its derivative: 
‘labour’) has no other material basis than this; it is irrevocably associated with 
capitalist regulations that are clearly expressed in the modality of capitalist 
expropriation itself.188
The second feature of capitalist expropriation, the second discontinuity 
regarding other forms of expropriation, lies in it appearing phenomenally 
as the negation of its essence, as its own inversion. Expressed more simply: 
expropriation is nothing more than legalised theft, but under capitalism it must 
appear to be an exchange between free subjects. While, for other regulations, 
explicitly assuming expropriation as a part of the transcendent attributes of 
the expropriator was an option, capitalism can only assert the market and the 
exchanges of equivalents, so that expropriation cannot be simply presented as a 
straightforward confiscation. Capitalist expropriations cannot manifest them-
selves as they usually are: appropriations without exchange or with minuscule 
compensations. Ergo, the losers of a war relinquish their lands, but receive in 
exchange ‘security’, ‘mutual aid’, possibilities that their citizens can travel to the 
empire, or some other aspiration. This, in effect, was an option for prior expro-
priations. But for capitalism it is a necessary modality; a cosmetic modality 
that, nevertheless, has acquired such a sophistication that on many occasions it 
has become extremely effective. In this sense perhaps the arena in which capi-
talist expropriation is expressed more strikingly is that of ‘unequal exchange’ 
(Emmanuel 1972) under the auspices of international trade. The norms that 
present interactions as an equal exchange obscure the expropriation based on 
the power of regulations (that either stimulate supply and demand or strictly 
prohibit it). Typically, the physical matter of the peripheries are acquired by the 
centres (within a national sphere or between countries) through a framework 
of exchanges, the disparity of which leaves traditional colonial transactions lit-
tle envied now.
The third and last feature of capitalist expropriation relates to legality. Here 
it is not the case that expropriation is subject to some type of informal, para-
state norm, but that the properly capitalist modality of expropriation requires 
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sanction by state or supra-state authorities. This does not mean, obviously, 
that the domination of capitalist regulation prevents non-legal expropriations, 
but simply that the latter must be distinguished from properly capitalist forms. 
Now that regulation and expropriation have been minimally characterised, 
we can go on to discuss exploitation in general, and then focus on capitalist 
exploitation.
5.5 Commercial and Non-Commercial Exploitation
Relations of exploitation include temporally and spatially far-flung productive 
processes, but also vary in terms of the goals pursued by said processes. We shall 
now distinguish two types of exploitation, commercial and non-commercial.
Some forms of exploitation are orientated towards the production of com-
modities.189 Others, although they take shape in processes which produce 
goods and services, do not have this goal. From among the latter, the most 
important are those associated with domestic labour and other forms of pro-
duction for domestic consumption. These forms of exploitation include a broad 
spectrum that ranges from ancient slave labour in agricultural production for 
domestic consumption, to the current and still unrecognised domestic labour 
of women under the patriarchal order.190 It is worth stressing that not just any 
form of unpaid domestic labour configures a relationship of exploitation, but 
rather the specific situation in which the aforementioned features are observ-
able, particularly when the set of exchanged values are clearly asymmetrical in 
terms of their commercial equivalences.191 It is necessary to emphasise that non-
commercial productive processes, meaning those which take place outside of 
the price system and, specifically, those that occur within domestic units, have 
not only been extremely important in pre-capitalist societies but continue to be 
so today. So although these forms of non-commercial exploitation are not the 
object of this book, they should not be relegated to the margins in any serious 
analysis of exploitation.192
But, beyond domestic exploitation, another form of non-commercial exploi-
tation is one of those which can occur in statist, meaning self-proclaimed 
socialist or communist societies (Castells 1996).193 In those societies, it is 
assumed (in many cases accurately) that what is produced does not take the 
form of commodities. The productive processes are not directed towards realis-
ing profit through exchange on the market. However, the fact that it is the state 
that manages the productive processes and the destiny of the products does 
not in any way guarantee the absence of exploitation. Here the key lies in find-
ing out to what extent the physical and knowledge resources appropriated by 
the state are returned, in equivalent terms, to the e actors. In effect, in the case 
that the e actors receive compensation inferior to the contribution they make, 
non-commercial exploitation is taking place. In other words, in order to define 
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whether or not there is exploitation, the question of if it is a private actor or the 
state (independently of whether this is done in the name of this or that ideol-
ogy – for example, abolishing all forms of exploitation) that appropriates the 
surplus is irrelevant. For its part, commercial exploitation is that which, as has 
been stated, fulfils the features of all forms of exploitation discussed above, and 
additionally the feature that the productive processes it is incorporated into are 
orientated towards the production of commodities. However, not all commer-
cial exploitation is capitalist exploitation. Indeed, there are numerous forms 
of commercial exploitation that do not fulfil the criteria imposed by capitalist 
regulation: legality of the relationship, and human subjects being proprietors of 
their own bodies (or physical freedom).
For example, the relations that in pre-capitalist periods could be observed 
between masters and slaves, lords and serfs and that resulted in the produc-
tion of commodities (not goods and services for the direct consumption of the 
exploiter actors) conform to this description, though even if the condition of 
legality is observed, they do not necessarily establish human subjects’ owner-
ship of their own bodies. In a similar way, the slave or quasi-slavery relations 
that can be observed in modern capitalist societies must be paid due attention: 
their illegal character should not lead to a belief that they are scarcely relevant 
in capitalist societies. For example, the cases of slave or quasi-slave labour in 
the textile industry or trafficking of women for sexual exploitation, configure 
situations of exploitation that, far from being a residue from the feudal past, 
have an evident continuity with, and in some cases are integrated into global 
value chains. But, in that case, are they forms of capitalist exploitation or not? 
It should be stressed that they are not, wherever the requirements of relative 
liberty and legality that define capitalist bonds are not present. Thus although 
logically capitalism is defined partly by its characteristic form(s) of exploita-
tions, other modalities enter into dialogue with it/them.194 In generic terms the 
totality plays out its development in the dialectic between capitalist and non-cap-
italist relations that occur at its heart.
In turn, these relations of non-capitalist commercial exploitation, similar to 
the forms of non-commercial exploitation, in almost all cases present a feature 
worth mentioning so it can then be contrasted with properly capitalist forms 
of exploitation. This is the fact that the exploiters exercise domination over the 
exploited. The meaning of domination used here is close to that proposed by 
Weber: the existence of a high probability that an order issued by the domina-
tor will be obeyed by the dominated subject.195 And, indeed, in the relations 
proper to the slave-owning and feudal modes of production, in patriarchal 
relations and other forms of non-capitalist exploitation, the exploiter is at the 
same time the dominator: they exercise a decisional power that, notably, sur-
passes the productive activities and influences all life activity of the dominated 




One feature of this concise book, and this long chapter in particular, is the pri-
ority given to presenting a theoretical proposal through the process of anchor-
ing each idea in bibliographical references. However, before defining capitalist 
exploitation it would be wise to at least minimally show the relationship of 
our approach with other previous perspectives. Of course, the basis for these 
discussions about capitalist exploitation is the approach taken by Marx ([1867] 
1990) and Marxism, from which we retain the necessity of exploitation, under-
stood as a relationship of free and legal exchange of objectively asymmetrical 
magnitudes, to all stages of capitalism. In opposition to that approach, neoclas-
sical economics considered exploitation to be a problem of compensation for 
a factor of production at below its marginal productivity (Pigou 1920; Flatau 
2001). A liberal theory of exploitation can be found in Steiner (1984), who con-
ceives of exploitation as situations in which a third party (i.e. the state) limits 
an actor’s exercise of liberty, making it impossible for this or other actors to 
be able to buy or sell a good for the value that another party was willing to 
offer. Among other limitations, not that of the actor’s freedom but of these per-
spectives, is that they only give an account of individual, contingent situations; 
another more significant limitation is that according to these approaches the 
exploiter could be, for example, a worker who in the face of the capitalist asserts 
her techniques in order to demand a wage increase. In that view, the unionised 
worker would exploit the capitalist. Other significant approaches arise from 
reformulations of the Marxist theory of exploitation which criticise and aban-
don the labour theory of value, an idea shared here. In sociology this is the 
case for analytical Marxism (Cohen 1979; Roemer 1989; Elster 1985) and some 
institutionalist authors (Hodgson 1980) and the Sraffians in political economy 
(Garegnani 1979). However, none of these perspectives sufficiently incorpo-
rates the exploitation of knowledge. The explicit idea that the surplus value the 
exploiter appropriates (the capitalist exploiter in particular) could have some 
relationship with the knowledge carried and put to use by the exploited, is not 
adequately discussed. However, in various investigations into the relationship 
between knowledge and capitalism time and again we have empirically found 
diverse manners by which companies successful in the accumulation of capital 
legally take control of those vital knowledges without paying their value for 
them (Zukerfeld 2010; 2012; 2016). In these cases, labour does not lose those 
knowledges, it continues possessing them, but capital has copied them and can 
then dispense with the bearer that the workers represent.
Partial exceptions to this disdain for the role of knowledge in the tendencies 
mentioned above are the formulations suggested by Roemer and, especially, Erik 
Olin Wright. Wright proposes a theory of exploitation based on the unequal 
distribution of property of different productive assets, two of those being ‘skill 
assets’ and ‘organisation assets’ (Wright 1985; ‘inalienable assets’ and ‘status’ in 
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Roemer 1985). In such a way, knowledges would be resources that allow their 
owners to exploit other actors. In reality this relates to the exclusive access to 
knowledge that the capitalists enjoy.197 However, this is not the issue that stood 
out for us empirically, in fact quite the contrary. The interesting question to 
explore is that of knowledges which upon being cultivated by the exploited are 
then harvested by the exploiter. In this sense some research has studied capitalist 
exploitation of knowledge (Kreimer and Zukerfeld 2014; Liaudat 2015) and par-
ticularly the modalities that take shape through the internet (Terranova 2000; 
Petersen 2008; Briziarelli 2014; Dolcemáscolo 2014; Yansen 2015; Zukerfeld 
2014a), the treatment of which is unavoidable for any theory of exploitation in 
capitalism’s present stage. However, this research has not adequately integrated 
these modalities occurring mostly in leisure time and in spaces outside the 
company into a general and systematic theory of capitalist exploitation.
On the other hand, authors from the autonomist, and cognitive capitalism, 
current in particular have repeatedly given consideration to the production 
of value outside of working hours and have discussed, to a greater or lesser 
extent, the relationship between knowledge and exploitation and even the role 
of intellectual property in this process (Vercellone 2011; Fumagalli 2015; and 
especially Moulier Boutang 2011). Moulier-Boutang in particular makes a 
valuable contribution by identifying two forms of exploitation (‘degree 1’ and 
‘degree 2’). However, the author assumes that each form of exploitation is spe-
cific to a stage: degree 1 exploitation (traditional Marxian) principally occurs 
in industrial capitalism while that at degree 2 (related to knowledge, creativity, 
inventiveness) occurs largely in (what the author calls) cognitive capitalism. 
However, there are various difficulties with this perspective. On the one hand, 
although Moulier Boutang recognises that both forms of exploitation are pre-
sent over the various stages of capitalism, he concretely asserts that the manual 
worker is not exploited at degree 2. This presupposes a risky conception: that 
manual skills have no relevant cognitive component.198 On the contrary, as any 
academic who has turned their hand to repairing electrical wiring or plumbing 
would confess, what explains their failure are not physical shortcomings, which 
are otherwise undeniable, but their cognitive limitations. Moreover, there is 
no unequivocal, operationalisable, definition of either of the two degrees of 
exploitation. In any case, it is clear that exploitation at degree 2 refers to ‘inven-
tion-power’. But the exploitation of knowledge on the part of capital cannot 
be reduced to new, innovative, knowledges, that is, to inventions. As the cases 
of reproduction of traditional knowledge demonstrate, capital also exploits 
knowledges that were honed and polished by human collectives in illo tempore 
and which the worker merely carries.
In any case, the idea of the production of value outside the working day 
and the integration of intellectual property into the analysis can be retained 
from these authors, while taking care to avoid the aporias that the concept 
of cognitive capitalism implies. Along these lines, in relatively recent studies 
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(e.g. Zukerfeld 2015) we suggested a distinction between two forms of exploi-
tation: one we called ‘material’ (traditional industrial exploitation, identified 
by Marx), and the other called ‘cognitive’ (which entails the reproduction 
of knowledge which capital does not pay for). Both, of course, operate con-
stantly over the different stages of capitalism. We have integrated them into 
a general theory of capitalist exploitation and conducted fieldwork on that 
basis (Liaudat 2015; Yansen 2015; Dolcemascolo 2014).
Nonetheless, this approach had at least three limitations. The first, funda-
mentally, is that it was misguided to designate one of the modalities with the 
term ‘cognitive’. In effect, all capitalist exploitation has a cognitive component; 
as will be explored below, it is based in the last instance on unremunerated 
knowledge. Therefore, even for capitalist exploitation in its traditional Marx-
ian sense, in which the worker generates more value than she receives in 
exchange for her labour power and skills which are objectified in the product 
of labour, these skills are a key ingredient in the relation of exploitation. The 
second limitation lies in the ill-advised choice of the term ‘material’. As has 
been discussed in chapters 1 and 2, from a materialist perspective it is impos-
sible to conceive of a modality of exploitation that is not material.199 However, 
that the names were unfortunate is not to say that the concepts were com-
pletely erroneous. Now it is possible to address two of the varieties of capital-
ist exploitation which will be presented here: exploitation through alienation 
and exploitation through reproduction. In both cases the capitalist appropri-
ates knowledge without paying, but the first case concerns knowledges which 
have been objectified in the product of labour – the physical property of the 
capitalist – while the second relates to the copying, usually by codification – 
in texts, recordings, and their respective intellectual property rights – of the 
knowledges the worker carries.
However, this does not complete the panorama of exploitation under capi-
talism and particularly the forms proper to informational capitalism. Indeed, 
a part of the exploitation of internauts by companies like Google and Face-
book cannot be understood as exploitation through reproduction (or even 
less as exploitation through alienation). Here we have exploitation that stems 
from mass exposure to advertising, as cultural materialism and associated 
approaches point out. It is, more precisely, a capitalist exploitation of the audi-
ence commodity (Fuchs 2010, 2012a, 2015b; Fisher 2012, adopting Smythe’s 
concept, 1977, 1981). From our perspective, this modality is not based on the 
objectification or codification of knowledges but quite the opposite, on the cap-
ture of attention to inoculate certain knowledges, and so we shall call it exploi-
tation through attention.
Having made these superficial references to the literature, we can now move 
on to defining capitalist exploitation and its three varieties. Some features of 
capitalist exploitation are intrinsic to all forms of exploitation and have already 
been discussed. Meanwhile, others will appear here for the first time. Capitalist 
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exploitation refers to reactions between human subjects that can be defined by 
the following characteristics:
1. They occur in the framework of capitalist productive processes.
2. They generate exchanges that are objectively asymmetrical in terms of the 
economic value exchanged between two types of actors, E (exploiters) and 
e (exploited).
3. The E actors acquire an objective surplus value in economic terms in rela-
tion to, and at the expense of, the e actors.
4. The e actors contribute their energies and different types of knowledge to 
the productive process, and receive a compensation approximately equal 
to (not less than) the value of the expended energies, but not all (or noth-
ing) of the value of the translated knowledges. Thus, the essence of capitalist 
exploitation is the unremunerated knowledge of the e actors.
5. The E actors, in subjective terms:
 5.1 Set in motion the productive processes with the aim of:
  5.1.1 Producing commodities.
  5.1.2  Obtaining an economic profit from the sale of these commodities.
 5.2 Have a wide-ranging vision of the productive process.
6. The e actors, in subjective terms:
 6.1  Consent, to a greater or lesser degree, to the specific exchange they 
participate in.
 6.2  May represent to themselves the exchanged values as equivalent or 
otherwise.
 6.3  Have a fragmentary, limited, view of the productive process in which 
they are incorporated.
7. In terms of intersubjective knowledge:
 7.1  Regarding normative knowledges, the productive processes and 
exchanges within them take place within the framework of the law.
 7.2  With respect to axiological knowledge, exploitation takes place framed 
by ideologies.
Characteristics 1, 2, and 3 are shared by all forms of exploitation and have 
already been adequately discussed above. Characteristic 4, however, although 
it has been partially anticipated, is crucial. Our starting point is that the e 
actors contribute their energies and knowledges to the productive processes. 
These are knowledges of different types, in different bearers, and different 
proportions of knowledge in relation to the energies expended, depending on 
which productive process is in question. These energies and knowledges have, 
as seen in chapter 1, quite diverse economic, ontological, and legal properties. 
The energies utilised in the productive process are exhausted in their produc-
tive consumption, while the knowledges are not. But for now we will focus 
on energies. They set a clear parameter for the compensation of the exploited 
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subject: the set of goods and services that allow them to reproduce their physi-
cal attributes, that is, to recover their energies in order to participate in the 
productive process. Thus, the goods and services that the exploiter contributes 
may meet these basic living expenses for food, clothes etc., or may not. In the 
negative case, we are presented with a situation in which the exploited will 
not be able to remain within the productive process for long and, this is the 
point, this modality was part, even an essential part, of some forms of pre-
capitalist exploitation. For example, many slaves received (and receive) com-
pensation below the minimum needed to guarantee their subsistence. In these 
cases, a considerable portion of the surplus value appropriated by the exploiter 
stemmed from these unremunerated human energies. Of course, this human 
consumption in which their cognitive capacities were misused constituted a 
pitiful basis for accumulation. So, the repugnant character of compensating 
humans as though they were animals (or even worse when the former were 
more abundant than the latter), does not permeate our intersubjectivity for 
the ethical caresses of the humanist velvet glove so much as for the iron fist 
of capital encased within it. It is capital that discovers that paying for basic 
household provisions (that is to say, treating humans better than animals) can 
result in greater accumulation, on the basis of unpaid appropriation of knowl-
edge in its various bearers. The physical reproduction of the exploited must be 
assured in order to be able to exploit them on more solid foundations: their 
productive knowledges which, although consumed every day, do not require 
feeding any more than sporadically. Because, if what is exploited, for example, 
are the manual skills of the worker, undermining the bearer in which these are 
embedded, the body, only damages the scaffolding which upholds profits for 
the capitalist. This, self-evidently, is due to the fact the knowledge cannot exist 
without a physical bearer. In this sense, resorting to the depletion of physical 
human life does not form part of the repertory, however wide that may be, of 
distinctively capitalist exploitation. When the compensation of the exploited 
for their participation in the productive process is situated below the energy 
subsistence level, we are faced with a different, well-known, phenomenon: 
super-exploitation. Naturally, super-exploitation is not an exceptional phe-
nomenon in the capitalist system, but it places the productive processes that 
practice it inside the crowded territory of non-capitalist productive processes 
that operate within the capitalist totality.200 On the other hand, the idea that the 
energies spent are integrally compensated under capitalist exploitation should 
not deceive us: it could mean that the compensation represents an ample provi-
sion of goods and services in the case of energy-intensive tasks but, at the same 
time, it could mean that the compensation becomes negligible when the ener-
gies consumed are equally as negligible. This is the case, as shall be seen below, 
for some forms of exploitation through reproduction and attention, in which 
knowledges are exploited without requiring a great deal of energy expenditure 
on the part of the exploited.
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So far we have run through some general comments about compensation for 
expended energies. With regards to knowledges, their compensation can vary 
under capitalist exploitation. It can never be complete, as this would dissolve 
the exploitation. However, it can vary from the total absence of cognitive com-
pensation to considerable reimbursement. Of course, this is not a question of 
nominal values, but of proportions: if there is capitalist exploitation, there is a 
portion of knowledge which is not adequately compensated.
Characteristic 5 refers to exploiters. On the one hand it asserts that, as with 
all processes of commercial exploitation, the productive process must pro-
duce commodities. But to be capitalist it must also produce commodities that 
are a means for obtaining an economic profit, whose origin lies in exploita-
tion but that can only be realised on the market. Thus, the exploitation in 
productive processes for which the driving force of the exploiter is merely to 
exchange commodities in order to harness their utility, their ‘use value’, does 
not constitute capitalist exploitation. However, we can add a relevant aspect 
here: the exploiters, or their representatives, have a general broad view of 
the productive process, in contrast with the standpoint of the exploited. The 
latter, moving on to characteristic 6, have a decidedly fragmentary, limited, 
and partial view of the productive process they are integrated into. The idea 
of alienation in Marx’s 1844 manuscripts (1981) grasps this phenomenon 
for the case of productive labour processes. But others are included here, 
for example the internaut who uploads her videos to YouTube so that this 
company can use them for profit has a fragmentary and alienated view. How-
ever, the most significant aspect about the exploited is that they consent, to 
a greater or lesser extent, to the relationship they participate in (6.1). This is 
not to say that in all cases the subjects enter into these relationships by virtue 
of a purely free will, but that there are diverse degrees of consent. However, 
by definition, and this is crucial, in no case is there a total lack of choice, an 
inescapable obligation. This flows from the fact that they recognise them-
selves as owners of their own physical matter, their bodies, as free subjects 
(a recognition knowledge that defines capitalist productive processes). With 
regards to exchanged values it is irrelevant, for the definition of capitalist 
exploitation, whether the exploited consider the relationship to be asym-
metrical or not. This refers to a point discussed above: what interested us 
here is the objective phenomenon, not its subjective perception. Of course, 
the representations of the exploited actors are undeniably important on other 
levels, such as that of political action.
Moving to intersubjective normative knowledge, capitalist relations of exploi-
tation take place within the framework of the law (7.1). More precisely, they 
are not-illegal relations: they do not entail any clear, evident or indisputable 
violation of any current legislation. That is to say, they can occur in positively 
regulated zones, or non-regulated zones – as with the case of varied forms of 
exploitation through reproduction – but not in zones unequivocally prohibited 
Capitalist Exploitation 135
by capitalist law. As we have repeatedly asserted, in these latter cases there is 
still exploitation, but it is not capitalist exploitation.
Last but not least, capitalist exploitation is framed by ideologies (7.2) that to 
some extent veil the objective asymmetry in the exchanged values. As discussed 
above, the second moment of regulation involves the inoculation of ideologies 
that naturalise relations of expropriation and exploitation. Although in previ-
ous periods asymmetric exchanges did not necessarily need to be disguised, 
some normative knowledges of capitalism (the market, meaning exchanges of 
equal values; free individuals, meaning they can choose the relationships they 
participate in) require the intersubjective mediation of ideologies to close the 
breach between the objective asymmetry and intersubjective representations. 
The effectiveness of ideologies in achieving their goal is variable. Moreover, dif-
ferent stages and types of capitalist exploitation shape different kinds of ideol-
ogy. For instance, exploitation through alienation in industrial capitalism was 
based on the ideology of the hardworking, money-saving, autonomous, self-
made individual. In contrast, exploitation through reproduction in informa-
tional capitalism draws on the ideology of networked dividuals, free sharing, 
open knowledge, communities, collaborative production and so on. More pre-
cisely, both exploitation through reproduction and exploitation through atten-
tion rest on quite successful ideological efforts conducted by companies such 
as Google and Facebook towards internet users. The more an ideology becomes 
naturalised, the more difficult is to discuss it. Therefore, it is hardly surpris-
ing that the exploitation of internet users by those companies is energetically 
denied by prosumers and academics: ideology is operating at its zenith.
Beyond the explicit debates that the proposed definition implies, there are 
various tacit discussions within that. Enumerating them could help us to pin 
down the shared aspects and differences from other approaches.201 Firstly, it is 
necessary to discuss the convergences and divergences between the approach 
proposed here and the Marxist idea according to which workers must immerse 
themselves in relations of exploitation that have a ‘work’-related nature (they 
occur in ‘working hours’ and in a ‘productive unit’) because they lack ‘property’ 
of the ‘means of production’ and particularly of the ‘means of labour’. More 
generally, in some versions the worker tends to be represented as being dispos-
sessed of all productive resources extrinsic to his own corporeal energies. This 
situation that Marxism describes is contemplated in the proposal advanced here 
(in fact it is the most common example of what we call exploitation through 
alienation). However, the circumscription of exploitation to this concatenation 
of categories limits our understanding of other forms of capitalist exploitation.
Indeed, as pointed out in chapter 4, labour as a figure shaped by norms under 
capitalism is not necessarily characterised by an absolute lack of resources, 
beyond the possession of their own body. As we shall see in chapter 6, the 
lack of minimal knowledge or physical resources is only characteristic of one 
type of worker, the excluded. The usual situation in this case is that they suffer 
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super-exploitation or unemployment, rather than them being integrated into 
normal capitalist productive processes. In fact the typical workers in capitalist 
productive processes have at least non-exclusive access to certain knowledges. 
In many cases this is even extended to non-exclusive access to physical -inten-
sive resources – these types of productive resources are discussed in chapter 6. 
The point here consists of emphasising that the worker exploited by capital-
ism should not be imagined as being completely dispossessed of productive 
attributes. If it were otherwise, it would be difficult to appreciate the dynamic 
of capitalist exploitation in the twentieth century, to say nothing of the twenty-
first.. In contrast from a cognitive materialist perspective, the only prohibition 
that defines workers’ access to productive resources is having exclusive access 
(as defined in chapter 4) to any recourse that is extrinsic to their own physical 
energies.
Along these lines, a further step must be taken to point out that capitalist 
exploitation does not always and necessarily manifest itself in relation to the 
division between possession and non-possession of means of production in the 
traditional sense (artefacts – tools, machines etc. – inputs, ‘matter’, and energy). 
In informational capitalism in particular, informational workers – program-
mers, designers, journalists, musicians, data entry clerks, etc. (Zukerfeld 2013) 
- are ‘owners’ (in the Marxist sense) of the relevant ‘means of production’. In 
their homes they have, for example, computers, software and internet connec-
tions that are comparable to those provided by the company they work for; 
they possess the same techniques they use during working hours; the costs 
of the physical matter they consume in the productive processes can be inde-
pendently defrayed by them quite easily etc. However, this does not prevent 
many of them entering into capitalist productive processes in which they are 
exploited.202 Why do they participate in those processes then?203 In our view, 
this is because the (capitalist informational) companies enjoy exclusive access 
to certain types of knowledge (for example, recognition knowledge translated 
into a particular demand, organisational knowledge regarding the productive 
process, and others).204 On the other hand, still continuing to trace the diver-
gences from the bulk of Marxist approaches, rather than a simplified version, 
for cognitive materialism exploitation is not necessarily circumscribed either to 
a labour relationship or to a productive unit. In fact, we understand that capital-
ist exploitation can occur between different units of production as long as they 
form part of the same productive process.205
Moreover, although exploitation is intrinsic to capitalist productive pro-
cesses, the exploited may or may not be performing labour in the usual sense 
of the word. This implies at least two questions. On the one hand, the cognitive 
and/or material production that is harnessed by capital can occur during the 
working day or in free time. Some forms of exploitation through reproduction, 
for example those related to unremunerated videos uploaded to YouTube free 
by internauts, or the production of free software that companies like IBM or 
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HP later benefit from, typically occur in free time. More precisely, capitalist 
exploitation can take place in situations in which the variable ‘time’ is not espe-
cially relevant.206
Similarly, the idea of work,207 as a conscious activity in pursuit of a particular 
goal, may not be present in situations of exploitation.208 Indeed, situations are 
possible in which the exploited produce without having any conscious inten-
tion or information about what they are doing.209 What interests us here is that 
the conditions mentioned previously are in place. In other words, while activ-
ity channelled towards a particular objective, implying intentionality, is fun-
damental to defining work, from our standpoint considering the existence of 
exploitation without work to be possible, cases can exist in which the fruit of 
an involuntary, not intentional or conscious, activity can be exploited. Exploi-
tation through attention, that is, the unpaid harnessing of human attention by 
means of the inoculation of the exploited with determinate knowledges, is the 
simplest example but not the only situation in which exploitation without work 
occurs. The unpaid copying of the ethnobotanic knowledges of indigenous 
peoples, a form of exploitation through reproduction, can occur without nec-
essarily any conscious and intentional activity on the part of the exploited in 
relation to the productive process.
Secondly, capitalist exploitation is not necessarily linked to domination (in 
the usual, Weberian sense of the term). Unlike non-commercial, and non-capi-
talist commercial, modalities of exploitation, here domination may or may not 
coincide with exploitation. In many cases, the most well known ones, there is 
an alignment between exploitation and domination. But in other cases, that 
does not happen. There are two sources of this eventual discrepancy which 
have tended to dominate in successive periods of capitalist development. In 
the industrial period, the sharp division between work and free time also for-
mally demarcates the time and space of the exploiter over the exploited. At 
least in legal terms, the exploiter does not necessarily need to be obeyed by the 
dominated subject outside of the spatiotemporal structure of work. In infor-
mational capitalism, although forms of domination emerge outside of working 
hours (as autonomist and cognitive capitalist authors emphasise in their own 
terms), forms of exploitation that occur outside of any working environment 
also ascend, and are clear demonstrations of exploitation without domination. 
Producers of software, content, and data through which companies such as 
Google or Facebook make a profit are not contractually obliged in any way to 
obey the orders of these firms.
Third, and lastly, it must be underlined that the magnitude of the contribution 
by made by the exploited does not define exploitation. The interesting point is the 
asymmetry between what is given and what is received. That fact that an exploited 
individual makes a small or an enormous contribution is of no significance set-
tling the question of whether or not exploitation is present. What is relevant is 
the place that it occupies in the totality of the productive process. If the process 
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depends on this levy to exist, we are dealing with exploitation.210 This comment 
arises from a vital debate about whether it is appropriate to describe as exploita-
tion the profit-seeking use, not of contents (videos, texts, images), but of users’ 
personal data by companies like Google or Facebook. The objection raised to this 
was that the value of each individual’s personal data was so insignificant that it 
made no sense to describe this relationship as exploitation. However, the ques-
tion about exploitation must be raised in relation to the totality of the produc-
tive process. If, in a manufacturing productive process, a worker works ten hours 
and is paid for the value of five hours, evidently she is exploited. Is this situation 
different from those in which a thousand workers each contribute 36 seconds 
and are paid for 18? Is there not exploitation in this case? If the productive pro-
cess combines billions of contributions, the exchanges are asymmetrical, and the 
other conditions are fulfilled, then we are dealing with processes of exploitation, 
possibly exploitation through reproduction. These are situations in which large 
companies take large quantities of modest individual contributions in the form 
of digital information and profit from them. Disguised with discourse about col-
laborative production, networks and communities, the exploitative character, in 
the strictest sense of the term, of these social relationships is obscured.
Finally, two orientations about the relationship between exploitation and 
capitalist productive processes. On the one hand, capitalism cannot survive 
without capitalist exploitation – although it is complemented by other forms. 
It should not be deduced from this that all capitalist micro-productive pro-
cesses achieve success with their relations of exploitation. This inference would 
involve a confusion of levels, extrapolating what occurs on a macro level to 
the micro level. Any given capitalist productive process is described as such 
for its aspiration to realise capitalist exploitation. By the same token, it should 
not be concluded that any moral judgement is being made here about capital-
ist exploitation. The notion of capitalist exploitation does not arise, at least not 
in these pages, from anything other than the question about how the capitalist 
machinery is fed, how it expands, and how it reproduces itself.
5.7 Three Types of Capitalist Exploitation
Next a simple summary will be presented of the three types of capitalist exploi-
tation and then some specific aspects of each of them will be discussed. For the 
rest of the chapter, unless expressly stated otherwise, we refer to situations in 
which all the features proper to capitalist exploitation are present.
Exploitation through alienation: determinate knowledge borne by the e 
actors is objectified during work time in a product which is alienated by the E 
actor. This is the traditional conception of exploitation, with two caveats: the 
key lies in the knowledge (that is the source of surplus value) objectified in 
the product and that this modality includes not only what occurs within the 
productive unit but also the products of outsourced or autonomous workers.
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Exploitation through reproduction: Determinate knowledge borne by the 
e actors is codified by the E actor, who becomes the owner of this knowledge. 
The e actors, however, continue to possess it in the original bearer. This happens 
when capital copies knowledge that hadn’t typically been generated for profit, 
with the goal of making profit and without providing sufficient compensation 
(for example, the skilled movements and techniques of workers which are cop-
ied and translated into a procedure manual under Taylorism, who nevertheless 
still possess their knowledge after their dismissal).
Exploitation through attention: Determinate knowledge transmitted by the 
E actors is subjectivised or intersubjectivised towards the e actors. This moves 
in the opposite direction from the other two modalities: especially in an econ-
omy in which the scarce resource is attention (Simon 1996b), the attention of 
audiences is harnessed without sufficient compensation (Smythe 1977; Fuchs 
2010) and is sold to advertising companies (normally in combination with data 
obtained through exploitation by reproduction) in order to inject particular-
ised cognitive flows into it. In appearance, it seems that the E actor cedes or 
even gives something, whereas in reality they take something more valuable for 
free: human attention and the possibility of taking advantage of the cognitive 
structure of the e actors in order to dock advertising knowledges there.
It is crucial to point out that the three modalities are not mutually exclusive, 
but rather that two or three of them act in many productive processes simulta-
neously. In this sense, social media sites can provide a useful example. Indeed, 
exploitation through alienation occurs on social media sites for the paid back 
office and offline workers on the platform (programmers and other technicians, 
either in-house or outsourced), but also for those who act online (moderators, 
but also, for example, teachers who give live classes, or some other service). In 
turn, exploitation through reproduction encompasses user generated content 
(text, videos, photos, music) and all sorts of data whose profitable use is ceded 
through acceptance of the ‘terms of use’. Last but not least, exploitation through 
attention on social media sites occurs systematically, and on a massive scale, by 
means of numerous varieties of targeted advertising, which the users open their 
cognitive floodgates to in exchange for access to platforms, software, and con-
tent. Thus, for example, companies like YouTube or Facebook can potentially 
combine the three types of exploitation. Naturally, many other combinations 
between the different forms of exploitation are common. Now it is possible to 
explore each of the three types of exploitation in a little more detail.
5.7.1 Exploitation Through Alienation
This modality relates to the usual meaning of the concept of exploitation in the 
social sciences and, typically, designates situations that register on the Marxist 
radar and that in general are amenable to this approach. They refer to situa-
tions in which the worker ‘sells’ their ‘labour power’211 to the capitalist for a lim-
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ited period of time. In the case of manufacturing production this is expressed 
clearly: there is a working day and the fruits of it are the property of the capi-
talist. However, this is not the only situation that should be included here. In 
many cases during, but above all before and after the industrialist boom, the 
worker works outside of the productive unit and is paid a piece rate, meaning 
per unit. Both situations are homologous as regards the exploitation that occurs 
and can be extended to other economic sectors and historical periods.
We can illustrate this with the help of Guasuncha, a cook, as skilful as she is 
temperamental, who we find towards the end of her youth at the beginning of 
the 2000s. Guasuncha spends eight hours per day working in the stylish restau-
rant ‘La Boutique’ and there we observe her, arguing furiously with the owner, 
Raul, who is reprimanding her for the sin of gluttony while she hurls the accusa-
tion of greed at him. But first let us rewind a decade. La Boutique does not have 
its own premises yet and, far from being a restaurant, is just a delivery service 
with limited capital: a telephone line direct to Raul’s apartment and ovens, bak-
ing trays and other tools that Raul has deposited in the apartment of his then 
neighbour, Guasuncha. Raul had noticed Guasuncha’s culinary virtuosity and 
orders around 40 plates of food a day from her, without caring at what hour of 
the day they are produced; Edgardo, son of the porter of their building and the 
third member of this incipient gastronomic drama, is in charge of delivering 
them to the clients’ doors.
What these two moments in the life of La Boutique have in common is that 
at both points exploitation takes shape through the same crucial element: the 
capitalist has control of the product (good or service) of the work. Meanwhile, 
the worker only receives a portion of the wealth they have created, in the form 
of wages, that consist of the (exchange) value of the socially necessary (abstract) 
labour it takes to produce and reproduce their productive capacity under cer-
tain social conditions. For now it suffices to note that in both situations Guasun-
cha produces the same amount of meals and that to reproduce her productive 
capacities, the value of 30 meals, which is what Raul pays her, is enough.212 So 
far, nothing new: incorporating a series of plausible assumptions we arrive at 
Raul pocketing a surplus value of 10 meals or, amounting to the same thing, two 
hours of work for Guasuncha. However, a crucial question arises here: where 
does this difference originate from? At first glance the question might seem 
trivial, and the Marxist answer is vehement: ‘it evidently comes from Guasun-
cha’s labour’. Of course, but how to account for the fact that Guasuncha can pro-
duce, let us say 25 per cent more than she needs to reproduce herself? It is not 
at all clear that Marxism has equally emphatic answers to this question. Perhaps 
the response would be that this is due to ‘generic human capacities’ or some-
thing of the like. Next we would possibly be subjected to a succession of gen-
eralities that would likely include skilled bees and incompetent architects, con-
sciousness and tools, yards of linen and, above all, the ‘value’ form and exchange 
on the market, but no materialist explanation of the origin of this empirical, 
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ontological, feature that, in certain contexts (capitalist productive processes) 
facilitate Guansuncha’s exploitation through alienation. In all probability, the 
Marxist response would eventually slide into a circular reasoning that, stripped 
of all the dead foliage, sounds more or less like this: human labour has the prop-
erty of generating more use values than it requires to reproduce itself because 
that is a property that defines human labour. The limit of this reasoning and, 
indeed, the limit of labour value theory, is that labour appears as an ultimate, 
indivisible, unit, an atom in the sense imagined by the materialists of antiquity, 
as Echeverría (2011) points out. The decisive step then consists of asking what 
labour is made up of? From which substances is it composed? Naturally, this 
implies daring to consider that labour might not be an ultimate substance. This 
is the threshold which proponents of the labour theory of value would be wise 
to shelter behind: once the question about the elements that comprise labour is 
accepted (as a valid one), it is difficult to retreat.
But let us cross the Rubicon (that metaphor which transforms any fragile 
idea not only into truth but even into a heroic feat) and observe that, just as at 
one time it was useful to investigate what atoms were made of, in other circum-
stances it became expedient to wonder what labour is composed of. Surpris-
ingly or not, the latter actually occurred before the former, as this text from 
Bentham dated 1795 shows:
Under the general denomination of labour, considered as employed in 
the giving of increase to wealth in any shape, two particulars may be 
distinguished: 1. The mere bodily energy employed in the production 
of the effect in question: 2. The skill or mental power displayed in the 
exercise of the bodily act, in the choice of the bodily operations carried 
on in that view, and in the mode of carrying them on. (Bentham [1795] 
1954, 260)
In effect, Jeremy Bentham asserts that labour is nothing but a combination of 
energies and skills, or practical knowledge.213 Along the same lines, much later 
and among other authors, Echeverría argued:
…all labour is defined as a specific articulation that integrates, on the 
one hand, a certain amount of energy and, on the other, a particular 
information programme that defines the orientation of the deployment 
of energy in order to obtain a determinate result or product. (Echeverría 
2011, 294–5)214
In sum, beyond the concepts used by various authors, it is evident that in terms 
of cognitive materialism labour is composed of energies and (different types of) 
knowledges, which form a dialectical unity.215 Indeed, it is clear that energies, in 
other words the sweat and muscular effort Guansuncha employs to prepare her 
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dishes, are not sufficient. There is a portion, possibly the largest, of the wealth 
she creates that stems from her culinary skills, which are cultivated, inciden-
tally, outside of any process of formal education.
But how does the division of labour between energy and knowledge relate to 
capitalist exploitation? To understand this, firstly we must recall that knowl-
edge matter and energy (physical matter) have different, and even antagonis-
tic, ontological, economic, and juridical properties. In the specific case of the 
energies and knowledges carried by humans, it suffices to mention just one 
difference: while the former are consumed in productive use, the latter are not. 
Every day Guasuncha has to replenish the energies she has spent preparing 
her 40 dishes. Her extenuated body must rest in order to recover and must, 
above all, ingest a considerable quantity of calories (which Raul insists is sin-
fully excessive). On the other hand, her knowledges, especially her subjective 
knowledges about cooking (leaving other bearers to one side for the purposes 
of simplicity), that is her implicit skills in handling different utensils, detecting 
the perfect cooking time etc., her explicit knowledges about some secret ingre-
dient or recipe inherited and passed down by the women in her family, all those 
knowledges and many others, do not require rest or nourishment.
Therefore, insufficient compensation for the energy aspect of labour can 
only result in the depletion of the worker and, along with it, of the process 
of capitalist accumulation which becomes vexatious and fickle. Raul proved 
this when, appealing to God but praying to his own wallet, he conducted 
the experiment of reducing Guasuncha’s compensation to below the value 
of replenishing her energies: vexatious and fickle indeed the cook proved to 
be, and with her, the fate of the business. Therefore, surplus value, even that 
springing from the modality of exploitation rooted in labour, cannot arise 
from the energy component.
It is true that super-exploitation, however incompatible it may be with 
capitalist exploitation, is a minor vice that capitalists indulge in. When there 
is an extremely abundant mass of easily replaceable workers, who carry 
exceedingly modest or widespread knowledges, the capitalist feels the juve-
nile compulsion to assail the frontier of energy replenishment, becoming a 
super-exploiter. This is what Raul does, after having failed with the cook, 
with a dozen trainees who preceded Edgardo: with a very long list of can-
didates, he pays them well under the rate of basic living expenses and at 
instance of absenteeism, hires the next one. However, beyond the lost days 
and the transaction costs he incurs at each replacement, the situation changes 
when he hires the porter’s son: Raul senses firmer foundations for his busi-
ness in the recognition network between Edgardo and the neighbours (who 
have watched him grow up, and would usually refuse to open their doors to 
strangers, especially those from a lower class, but have invited him into their 
homes, exchanged jokes with him and, above all, lavished tips on him sys-
tematically), and his rollerskating skills (whilst carrying several bags). Raul 
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continues to pay Edgardo what he paid his predecessors, but pointing out 
to him that with the tips on top (the origins of which are not disputed) he 
receives the value of a minimum wage, or even surpasses it.
It is, in the end, the value of Guasuncha and Edgardo’s knowledges, diverse in 
quantity and quality that Raul exploits enthusiastically.216 No compensation is 
demanded for any of them, nor does he need to be concerned about replenish-
ing them. As if by magic, upon refilling the energy tank, the cognitive engines 
are kept in excellent condition. Furthermore, their use, far from depleting 
them, only makes them stronger. Guasuncha grows more skilful and Edgardo’s 
recognition network spreads. Learning by doing and learning by interacting, 
know-how and know-who, increasing returns to scale, network externalities, 
and other affiliated terms have been used in knowledge economics (Foray 
2004) to describe this dynamic, as Edgardo would read some years later. So, 
knowledges are much better candidates as sources upon which to establish 
exploitation. It is not just that having identified two components of labour 
and, one being discarded, the other is chosen. Instead it is the case that the 
properties of knowledge (zero subtractibility or non-depletion with productive 
consumption) supply positive foundations which make it manna from heaven 
for exploitation. Now, the capitalist pays the workers a given sum of values. 
Except in cases of payment in kind, there is no pay identified as corresponding 
to energy and another related to knowledge, which is to say that the capitalist 
makes no comment about whether the worker should spend the values they 
receive on rent and food rather than on books or dance classes. However, the 
worker’s point of view is the same as the capitalist’s in this respect: if energy 
needs are not covered in the first place, the bearer in which the knowledges of 
whichever character are embedded, becomes fragile.
So in general, the workers participating in capitalist processes of exploitation 
(not necessarily the case for other productive processes) effectively use their 
wages to satisfy their basic physical needs. In the case of Edgardo, although 
a portion of his income directly and manifestly springs from the recognition 
of his neighbours (who give him tips in a direct way) and less directly and 
manifestly from his implicit knowledges as a roller-skater (which increases his 
tip rate per hour, and even opens up the possibility of expanding the clien-
tele base), Raul regards this portion as going towards supplementing his basic 
energy requirements. Thus, it is clear that the value the proprietor of La Bou-
tique appropriates is that of a cluster of subjective and intersubjective knowl-
edges which Edgardo carries. And the point to emphasise here is that the cal-
culation the capitalist makes coincides with the one the worker makes because, 
although Edgardo would like to fund some kind of vocational training course, 
he must first cover his basic expenses. Nonetheless, Edgardo manages to scrape 
together some modest savings.
This leads on to the observation that the fact that the basis of exploitation 
through alienation is knowledge carried by the worker does not mean that he 
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does not receive any compensation for the knowledges he exercises. On the 
contrary, it is quite common that a part of those knowledges is acknowledged 
in the salary, as in the case mentioned. The essence of exploitation lies in the 
worker not receiving the total value of their knowledges, but there is a long dis-
tance between nothing and everything. It is common for capital to cede a por-
tion of the value of the knowledges it avails itself of, with the effect of paying 
for the knowledges (above all intersubjective, but also some subjective) of the 
future generation of workers, or to update the subjective knowledges of cur-
rently active workers. This can be effected directly through wages, or with the 
intervention of the state. In any case, capital still pays less for those knowledges 
than they yield, on an aggregate level.
In sum, we have distinguished two components of human labour – energy 
and knowledge  – and pointed out that surplus value, that is, the content of 
capitalist exploitation, can only come from one of them: knowledge.217 In real-
ity this is a phenomenon underpinned by a deeper issue discussed in chapter 1: 
while physical matter only transforms, knowledge matter is unique in its qual-
ity of being able to accumulate.
Picture Raul, Edgardo, and Guasuncha’s building and, zooming in closer, 
her apartment inside it, its walls and pipes, the oven and blender, baking 
trays and fridge, table and chairs, television and, of course, the cook her-
self: there is no more than a collection of entwined ‘matter’ and energy and, 
above all, a cosmic quantity of knowledges, of dated knowledges to para-
phrase Sraffa. That is, created at disparate times and places in history and 
which become incorporated into other knowledges, translated from one 
bearer to another.
Finally, why use the expression exploitation ‘through alienation’ to describe 
this modality? The concept of alienation is complex and has divergent uses in 
the literature that engages with the themes explored here. However, it is an 
appropriate term as it takes into account both the translation of knowledges 
from human bearers to an object and also the loss of this object in which 
knowledges have been objectified. The definitive reference in this sense is 
Hegel, who distinguishes between alienation as estrangement (Entfremdung) 
and alienation as externalisation (Entaüsserung) (Rae 2012). Both meanings are 
related to the objectification of knowledge (consciousness, spirit, or the idea, in 
Hegel). Both senses are reasserted here: the idea that the worker externalises 
their knowledges through objectification and also the idea that the product 
which arises from that objectification confronts them as a strange being, inso-
far as it is property of the capitalist. Therefore, when we highlight that exploita-
tion through alienation involves the capitalist appropriating the knowledges 
objectified in the labour product, the intention is not merely to refer to Marx’s 
concept of alienation (which emphasises the estrangement aspect, the loss of 
the object), but also to Hegel’s which specifically includes the objectification of 
what here are designated as knowledges.
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5.7.2 Exploitation Through Reproduction
What here is defined as exploitation through reproduction (which for some 
years we described as ‘cognitive’ exploitation) is the form that gave birth to our 
debates about the concept of exploitation in general. It arises from repeatedly 
having detected anomalies in the traditional concept of exploitation. In effect, 
in the history of companies, industrial branches and countries which have been 
successful in the project of capital accumulation, there are forms which can-
not be reduced to exploitation through alienation (for which capital critically 
depends on the mediation of the labour product and labour time). These com-
panies’, branches’, and countries’ processes of accumulation are fundamentally 
based on the unpaid copying of knowledges from the most diverse sources, 
as several studies have documented (Cimoli, Dosi, and Stiglitz 2008; Chang 
2009; Drahos and Braithwaite 2002; May and Sell 2006; Johns 2010; Zukerfeld 
2010, 2016). Unlike the unpaid knowledges exploited through alienation, those 
exploited through reproduction do not need daily replenishing. They become 
codified in texts, objectified in machines, and even housed in subjectivities reg-
ulated by specific contracts, in all cases under the ownership of capital.
While exploitation through alienation requires the relationship between the 
exploited and the product of their labour as the means by which to gain access 
to the knowledges carried by the former, for exploitation through reproduc-
tion the capture of this knowledge becomes independent of this relationship. 
For this reason it is tempting to claim that exploitation through alienation rep-
resents the formal subsumption of knowledge under capital, while exploitation 
through reproduction presents us with the real subsumption of knowledge under 
capital. Exploitation through reproduction can take place within or outside of 
the labour process, and the knowledges implicated can arise from quite het-
erogeneous contexts: scientists’ subjective knowledges, traditional or popular 
knowledges, knowledges codified as digital information and, of course, knowl-
edges associated with work skills.
Let us focus on this latter case and return to the beginning of our history 
of La Boutique. Raul accumulates and invests, Guasuncha cooks and protests, 
Edgardo converses and saves. On the basis of exploitation through alienation, 
the business thrives for a decade, and eventually makes the move to its own 
premises, where the traditional delivery is sidelined in favour of serving din-
ers in the restaurant’s ample space. We have returned to the beginning of the 
twenty-first century. However, there is no rest for capital, and Raul is faced with 
two problems. The first, main problem consists of not being able to expand pro-
duction. The limiting reactant, of course, is Guasuncha, whose culinary inven-
tions inspire a firm following among the clientele, and who responds to entreat-
ies to duplicate her production by insisting that she cannot produce more than 
her 40 daily dishes. Raul, after offering her – in what feels like a fit of heady 
generosity – a salary increase proportional to the number of additional dishes, 
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is rendered indignant by her negative response and request for an even higher 
raise which he, regaining composure, judges to be a futile excuse to conceal a 
new sin: sloth. Raul’s calculation is simple: he can concede an increase as long 
as this permits the relationship between the value that Guasuncha receives and 
the value she contributes to remain the same, that is, a 3:4 ratio. If the wage 
rise results in an increase in this proportion, the process of accumulation will 
deteriorate. It must be emphasised that Raul’s logic would be absolutely correct 
in a world in which only exploitation through alienation existed. Fortunately, in 
our world it is only partially correct, insofar as capital’s benevolent design has 
conceived of other figures with which to delight its faithful worshippers.
But on the other hand, Edgardo has also become a source of concern for Raul. 
Increasingly marginalised in the new scheme of things – in which deliveries are 
less and less important – Edgardo has found himself obliged, in order to main-
tain his purchasing power, to try to increase his tips. He has overstepped the line 
in this project, at least according to the husband of an old client of La Boutique 
who tells Raul that he has discovered the delivery boy and his wife embarked, 
not on the expected delivery of foodstuffs, but on an exchange of an altogether 
more compromising nature. “Lust”, cries Raul, gripped by rage;“Envy”, retorts 
Edgardo. With their recognition network destroyed, the already ailing delivery 
service of La Boutique is mortally wounded. Edgardo, who is now more the 
object than the messenger of the neighbourhood gossip, is forced into exile. His 
savings, a student grant, and a modest severance package from Raul combined 
enable him to transform his disgrace into a virtue and study management at 
a university in the USA. The growth of La Boutique stagnates for a few years. 
Raul does not accumulate or invest although Guasuncha cooks and argues. 
Meanwhile, Edgardo studies and plans, and eventually returns.
Upon his return, Edgardo shares his plan with Raul, who eagerly agrees and 
names him ‘Manager’. Edgardo summons Guasuncha and informs her that not 
only will she be granted the significant wage rise that she had been demanding 
for years, but that she will not even have to prepare more than 40 dishes per day. 
In addition, she will be assigned two employees to ‘assist’ her – all this and other 
details to be drawn up in a written contract which as soon as it is signed will be 
valid for six months. Guasuncha, taken aback, enjoys her pyrrhic victory. One 
of the assistants, a university student trainee, devotes her time to systematically 
making a record of the steps and ingredients, and even films the preparation 
of each recipe. The other, the assistant cook, has orders to faithfully reproduce 
each dish and to ask Guansuncha for as much instruction as is necessary for 
their food to be identical. Edgardo takes the precaution of obliging them to sign 
an agreement stipulating that all the knowledge acquired is the property of La 
Boutique. Six months later, Guasuncha is dismissed. The bulk of the recipes she 
inherited, her skills and years of experience, her implicit knowledges, are now 
reflected in a highly detailed book of recipes and procedures, accompanied by 
a collection of videos. They have now become, in part, objectified knowledges 
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(that La Boutique commercialises), but they have also been translated to the 
subjectivity of the assistant cook who in turn will have to reproduce them in 
other subjective bearers. Finally, in the second decade of the millennium, La 
Boutique embarks on its expansion to become a successful restaurant chain.
The idea that workers possess knowledges that are not objectified in the labour 
product but that are equally harvested by businesses without appropriate com-
pensation has been considered at least since Marx, from two angles. The first is 
connected to deepening the insights afforded by Marxian concepts related to 
the organisation of the labour process. For example, Coriat (1979), in his analy-
sis of Taylorism, has demonstrated how breaking the monopoly of workers’ 
knowledges has been a decisive task for the establishment of North American 
industrial capitalism. The other approach is underpinned by the notion of ‘gen-
eral intellect’ mentioned by Marx in The Grundrisse. This is the course taken by 
Italian autonomism (Lazzaratto and Negri 2001) and the theory of cognitive 
capitalism (Vercellone 2007; Moulier-Boutang 2011). In the present stage of 
capitalism, it is claimed, workers produce valorisable knowledges throughout 
the course of their lifetime and that firms appropriate them through the labour 
relationship. Beyond the literature which engages with Marxism in one way or 
another, the translation of knowledges carried by individual subjectivities into 
various forms of objective codification (or other bearers) is one of the central 
concerns of the management approach (e.g. Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). Of 
course, generally speaking this literature takes for granted the corporate owner-
ship of knowledge and does not question whether compensations to workers 
are appropriate or not.
In cases of exploitation through reproduction in work environments such 
as that of La Boutique, the relevant normative intersubjective knowledges are 
shaped by employment contract laws, regulations of trade secrets, and specific 
signed contracts. In our particular example, the business, which was initiated 
in an informal framework, had not regulated the ownership of the knowledges 
deployed by the cook (or any other employee) during working hours through a 
specific contract. Despite this, according to some legislations, the ownership of 
the inventions and works of authorship which appear in working hours belong 
to the employer; in the case of recipes the situation is more complex, given that 
these are not usually protected under such regulations of intellectual property. 
On the other hand, they can be considered as ‘trade secrets’, meaning if the 
cook from our example had wanted to take her knowledges to other firms, La 
Boutique could have attempted to prevent her, by litigation. But the problem 
the business faced was not obstructing the use of the knowledges carried by 
Guasuncha, but how to obtain said knowledges in order to preserve the pro-
ductive process intact once she, or any other specific worker, was dispensed 
with; or even better, how to multiply those knowledges. Here we can observe 
the relationship between capitalist regulation and exploitation. Edgardo, in his 
capacity as manager, and as his first action, produces a constituted regulation 
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of knowledge that enables Guasuncha’s exploitation through reproduction, by 
means of a six-month contract. He proceeds in the same way for the assistants, 
in order to avoid any similar problem in the future: it is stipulated that their 
roles as cogs in a process of knowledge translation does not in any way grant 
them ownership of said knowledges.
Above and beyond regulation, the key to exploitation through reproduc-
tion is always translation. While knowledges are carried by the subjectivity of 
a worker, the company has only very limited control: it can only gain access 
to them by means of the contingent labour relationship with their carrier. 
Thus, translation into bearers that facilitate the ownership of the company is 
imperative in relation to critical knowledges. The most significant translation is 
that which involves codification, that is, translation from implicit and explicit 
subjective knowledges into diverse types of information (the copyrights for 
which would belong to the company): texts, instruction manuals, videos. The 
other translation, which has another subjectivity as its destination – the cook’s 
apprentice – is more of a complement to the first: the manager knows (having 
studied the texts about ‘tacit’ and ‘explicit’ knowledge) that codification has its 
limits and that there are certain forms of knowledge that are better transmitted 
through prolonged face-to-face contact.
A decisive ideological aspect of this subtype of processes of exploitation 
through reproduction (in which the E actors exploit the ‘manual’ skills of the e 
actors) consists of the e actors failing to identify their own knowledge as such. 
They may, like Guasuncha, value their efforts, their time spent working, and 
demand wage rises but, paradoxically, their recognition knowledge as workers 
(which generally refers to ‘manual workers’) sometimes prevents them from rec-
ognising themselves as producers, carriers or owners of valuable knowledges. 
Those axiological and (micro) recognition knowledges do not only affect the 
workers who suffer their consequences, but they are also disseminated across the 
whole intersubjective fabric – both the workers themselves and many academ-
ics have paid little attention to the utilisation of those knowledges by capital. 
Of course, this is definitively connected to the fact that these knowledges were 
acquired outside of formal education and by and large without the support of 
information, that is to say, as mere translations from one subjectivity to another, 
in general implicitly. One last noteworthy question is the relationship between 
both forms of exploitation (through alienation and through reproduction). Evi-
dently, both can act simultaneously: the same worker can be exploited by both 
forms. However, in the example, Edgardo utilises a different strategy. Where Raul 
refuses to concede a significant raise – that would conspire against exploitation 
through alienation – Edgardo knows that by relinquishing some, or all of, the 
exploitation through alienation, he can acquire the most valuable resource: the 
knowledge, now extricated from the cook. Better the fishing rod than the fish.
In effect, capital can, in certain circumstances, pay not only above the value 
of energy replenishment, but also recognise the total sum of knowledge that 
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the worker translates to the product. That is, it can temporarily suspend exploi-
tation through alienation in the interest of procuring exploitation through 
reproduction. Naturally, the latter enables the exploitation through alienation 
of future cooks to be intensified. This pass-the-parcel between different forms 
of exploitation (that also includes exploitation through attention) is extremely 
relevant for understanding the dynamic of informational capitalist corpora-
tions, as will be noted below.
So far we have examined a general example of exploitation through repro-
duction, linked to productive labour processes, specifically to those of the 
‘physical workers’ who will be identified in the next chapter. However, exploita-
tion through reproduction presents manifestations that are also associated with 
other types of knowledge and that, above all, combine these different types of 
knowledge.218 This leads us to a brief presentation of these varieties, with the 
caveat that this is not a typology with mutually exclusive categories (like those 
used in this chapter and throughout this book in general), but rather Weberian 
ideal types. There are other types of exploitation through reproduction that 
occur in the labour process. These affect the workers we label ‘cognitive’. Let 
us imagine a professional musician, for example a pianist, hired by a producer. 
When she provides a service (accompanying a singer in a live performance), for 
which she receives remuneration, if everything proceeds properly she will be 
exploited through alienation: the fruits of her labour, and specifically her time, 
will be the vehicle by which the company obtains a surplus value. In order to 
exploit her again, her services will be required show after show. But when this 
musician is contracted to record, in other words, so her subjective knowledges 
are translated into codification as digital information, the situation is quite dif-
ferent, and takes the form of exploitation through reproduction: the company 
can reproduce those objectified knowledges as many times as it chooses, with 
marginal costs tending to zero, without any additional compensation given to 
the exploited party, if the company proceeds according to the contract.219 This 
enables the payment for a recording to be set much higher than that paid for a 
live performance. In effect, exploitation through alienation has once again been 
transitorily suspended in order to stimulate exploitation through reproduction. 
This form of exploitation through reproduction of cognitive workers is thriving 
under informational capitalism. Therefore, we can find it not only in the world 
of art and entertainment but also in software production and even in formal 
education. Of course, the process of transformation from traditional face-to-
face commercial education (which involves the familiar exploitation through 
alienation) towards ‘virtual education’ is striking although scarcely remarked 
upon. In the case of the latter, simplifying matters somewhat and concentrating 
on the example of a teacher who is filmed or who writes content, they are paid 
only once (just as the session musician) for ‘virtual classes’ which are repeat-
edly reproduced. The company pays the teacher for their ‘working time’ triple 
what they would receive for a normal class, but instead of charging 50 students, 
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now payment is collected from 5,000. The teacher, naturally, believes this to be 
an excellent change. Furthermore, they may even receive a minimal additional 
income each time the course is repeated, which they judge to be a reward for 
the excellence of their erudition. Shortly afterwards, when they find themselves 
unemployed, the similarities between the teacher’s fate and that of Guasuncha 
will become all too apparent.
A notable aspect of these cases of exploitation through reproduction lies in 
the ideological role of payment by the hour. The idea of labour time as the 
equivalent and source of wealth, brandished by both the right- and left-wing 
naturally leads to demands for increases to the workers’ ‘hourly’ pay. When 
the source of exploitation is the knowledges objectified in a consumable prod-
uct (that are no longer reasonably associated with the length of the working 
day) this demand leads, although along a meandering path, to confrontation 
between labour and capital. However, in the case of exploitation through repro-
duction, the repertoire of demands appropriate to exploitation through alien-
ation leads to defeat for labour. Trade unionists, steeped in the traditions of 
industrial capitalism, are generally experts at negotiating break times, leisure 
time, overtime etc., but are usually unequipped to deal with the regulation of 
the knowledges carried by workers.220 As emphasised from the beginning of 
this book, the bundle of rights known as intellectual property is one of the arms 
of capitalism that is no less powerful for being inconspicuous.221
With the examples of physical and cognitive workers we have left the zone of 
exploitation through reproduction in which exploiters contract the exploited as 
workers, and moved into situations in which the capitalist productive process 
expands further than the time and space of the labour process.
For example, here we find exploitation through reproduction of traditional 
knowledge. Over the last two decades the term traditional knowledge became 
widely used to refer to intergenerationally transmitted knowledge embedded in 
intersubjective structures, typically of indigenous peoples. It includes not only 
ethnobotanical and medicinal knowledges, but also cultural expressions (sym-
bols, music, designs, artisanry, linguistic terms etc.) (Visser 2004, 207; Finger 
and Schuler 2004). The uncompensated appropriation of these knowledges for 
the purposes of profit-making is often called ‘biopiracy’:
… it is a practice through which researchers or companies illegally uti-
lize the biodiversity of developing countries and the collective knowl-
edges of indigenous peoples or peasants, in order to develop products 
and services that are commercially and/or industrially exploitative 
without the consent of their creators or innovators (Delgado 2004, 1).
Despite an extensive literature on the subject of ‘biopiracy’ it has rarely been been 
integrated into a general approach to capitalist exploitation. An example of this 
is Liaudat’s (2014) beautiful study of the exploitation through reproduction of 
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Guaraní knowledge about káa hée (known as stevia). Here one of the two typical 
issues related to the exploitation of traditional knowledge can be observed: on 
the one hand, the processes of translation are protracted over an extremely long 
timespan; on the other hand, the knowledges with subjective and intersubjec-
tive bearers (for example, about the sweetening properties of the plant, but also 
about how to use it, its place in a belief system), are associated with knowledges 
with a biological bearer (the plant’s genetic properties). Thus the exploitation 
through reproduction requires multiple translations. The Guaraní translated 
some of the plant’s properties into some subjectivities, and then into intersub-
jectivity. Towards the end of the nineteenth century a scientist translated those 
knowledges into his subjectivity, and later into knowledges codified as a scientific 
paper. Simultaneously, the plant itself was reproduced in its biological bearer in 
places geographically distant from its native habitat, first for scientific purposes 
and later for commercial ones. In turn, at some point during the twentieth cen-
tury these knowledges were translated into a technology: a sweetening product 
and along with it the patenting process (which implies a new codification).
With regards to regulatory issues, the exploitation through reproduction of 
traditional knowledges proceeds typically, although not necessarily, in a con-
text in which the patenting of biological material is permitted and/or in which 
traditional knowledges are not specifically protected.222 In some manifesta-
tions, copyright systems (that do not permit, for example, the registration of 
rhythms or harmonic sequences, and previously did not allow the registration 
of melodies that were not translated onto staff paper) have enabled the exploi-
tation through reproduction of popular music from around the world. As in 
the case of knowledges carried by the subjectivity of physical workers, here 
as well the status of ‘knowledge’ (academically attained, scientific erudition) 
is often denied to knowledges acquired or disseminated outside of the sphere 
of formal education. Once again, this denial should not be viewed so much as 
undervaluation, but above all as an ideological means to cheapen and silence its 
uncompensated use by companies.
The other form of exploitation through reproduction that usually occurs out-
side of the working hours of the exploited subject that we wish to highlight 
here is that related to the production of knowledges codified as digital informa-
tion during free time, which in previous studies we called ‘informational cog-
nitive exploitation’ (Kreimer and Zukerfeld, 2014) or ‘inclusive appropriation’ 
(Zukerfeld 2014a). The emergence of this form should be contextualised in the 
framework of informational capitalism. Indeed, widespread opposition to the 
recent and dramatic expansion of intellectual property  – and particularly to 
copyright transmogrification – (Zukerfeld 2010, volume III) helped to boost 
the diffusion and legitimacy of concepts such as ‘free knowledge’, ‘intellectual 
commons’, ‘open access’, and ‘p2p production’. Along with the emergence and 
growth of the General Public License (GPL), Creative Commons (CC), and 
other licenses, this phenomenon has had a well-known consequence: the growth 
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of a quasi-public sphere of non-commercial informational goods223 (Benkler 
2005; Ostrom and Hess 2006; Bauwens 2006). Nevertheless, the flows of ‘free 
knowledge’ also enabled the development of a (partially) unexplored region 
of the private and for-profit sphere. A new kind of business method is being 
shaped, and the management literature has already offered a warm welcome 
to this novelty (Tapscott and A. Williams 2007; Anderson 2009). It is based on 
the disguised exploitation of unpaid digital knowledge, carried out mostly dur-
ing free time, for non-commercial purposes. This exploitation aspect has only 
recently received specific attention (Terranova 2000; Pasquinelli 2008; Petersen 
2008; Van Dijck and Nieborg 2009; Andrejevic 2011; Fisher 2012; Ross 2013; 
Rey 2012; Fuchs 2013, Scholz 2013). However, these valuable studies feature 
several limitations.224
This form of exploitation through reproduction is expressed in three forms 
of informational goods: software, content, and data (Zukerfeld 2014a). The first 
concerns free software. Collaboratively produced for the most part during free 
time and regulated by licenses which permit their use, copying, and modifica-
tion, free software can also be legally used by companies for profit with no com-
pensation given to the community of producers. Typically, IBM and HP have 
benefited from the unpaid knowledge of thousands of workers who developed 
Linux, the most efficient operating system. These corporations copy and utilise 
it, with slight adjustments, in the hardware they sell and save themselves the 
costs of licenses that the use of other operating systems, e.g. Microsoft Win-
dows, would entail. The second type concerns content (music, texts, images, 
videos). The typical example is video sites like YouTube that profit from the 
advertising attracted by the content that users upload without profit-making 
intentions (Dolcemáscolo 2014; Yansen 2015). The third type concerns the 
reproduction and exploitative use of data. This does not refer to the problem of 
the violation of privacy etc., but to the aspect specifically linked to exploitation: 
companies like Google and Facebook freely collecting data from user activities 
and profiting from them (Reischl 2008).
The normative knowledges vary slightly for each of the three forms of infor-
mational goods. In the case of free software, it is framed within the GPL license 
(that has contractual scope) and copyright legislation. Such a license consists 
of the owner ceding some of their rights granted by law with the effect of con-
cretising the ‘freedom’ of the creation. It therefore permits, besides modifica-
tion, copying, distribution etc., its for-profit use without the authorisation of 
the authors or any kind of monetary compensation.225 It is in this sense that, 
continuing in the vein of Marxian paraphrasing, we describe these knowledges 
as ‘doubly free’ (Zukerfeld 2014a). As regards the contents and data, another 
normative instrument becomes particularly relevant: the ‘terms of service’ that 
are accepted with a click. Such contracts facilitate the business of data for firms 
such as YouTube, Google, or Facebook, despite these contracts sometimes 
coming into conflict with local legislation.
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As for translations between different bearers, in this case the knowledges from 
programmers’ individual subjectivities are translated into objectified informa-
tional goods. These goods, of course, undergo many types of translation, but 
always with digital information as their bearer: fragments of code are combined 
with new ones and create a software programme; later this software is adapted 
and the name is changed. Videos to which advertising is added, data combined 
with other data. The digital bearer is, of course, not a mere detail: it enables 
copying with close to zero costs, spatial distribution across the internet, etc.
In addition to the generic division presented thus far in relation to labour 
processes, exploitation though reproduction has hybrid forms. One of them, 
for example, concerns scientific knowledges in situations in which they are pro-
duced by researchers subsidised by the state, but in which the findings of the 
research are developed and eventually patented by companies that are often 
foreign. In these cases those directly disadvantaged by exploitation through 
reproduction are not necessarily the scientists. These receive a level of income 
from the state which – for the time being – does not usually bear any direct 
relationship with the commercial usefulness of the knowledges they produce. 
Furthermore, they can cede the knowledges to companies with the aim of 
attracting flows of attention, invitations to speak at conferences and publica-
tion opportunities, in other words, different forms of recognition IK (Kreimer 
and Zukerfeld 2014).
5.7.3 Exploitation Through Attention
Exploitation through attention is of a different nature to the two previous 
modalities and is possibly the most distant from the usual notion of exploi-
tation.226 This is a type of exploitation that occurs mainly outside of working 
hours;227 the exploited usually have a relationship of externality with the com-
pany that exploits them. Additionally, as a general rule monetary exchanges 
are not implicated in the relationship and it is not at all clear that the exploited 
carry out any type of ‘work’. However, all the requirements of the definition 
of capitalist exploitation may be fulfilled if the digital information, that is the 
informational goods received by the exploited, have a lower value than the 
attention, which they give in return. Of course, the distinctive feature is that in 
comparison with the other types of exploitation, the direction of the flows of 
knowledge is reversed: capital profits from selling the cognitive storage capacity 
of the exploited, the space to which the captured attention admits access. In this 
way two classes of informational goods are translated to the fertile subjectiv-
ity of the exploited subjects: advertising (the currency they pay with) and the 
contents and software they use (the currency they receive).
Guasuncha, (now) unemployed, spends her free time watching soap operas, 
chat shows and some cookery channels on TV. She is enjoying the rest, but 
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her meagre redundancy pay imposes a short timespan on this idle interlude. 
Being neither passive nor lazy, she uploads her CV onto internet platforms 
dedicated to human resources, she joins Facebook groups related to culinary 
activities and she even occasionally watches videos about some recipe or 
another on YouTube. Job offers are not quick to appear, but Guasuncha builds 
a ‘social network’ of ‘friends’ with whom she shares interests and, significantly, 
she starts to receive (via emails and adverts off the websites she frequents) all 
kinds of publicity linked to her interests. Offers of herbs, spices, and oils, which 
she samples one by one and then discusses her evaluations of them with her 
friends, but also offers of varied courses that promise to enhance her employ-
ability: how to prepare rapid meals for executives, chocolate desserts without 
chocolate, cola-flavoured poisonous drinks, and one in particular that repeat-
edly and systematically appears: ‘scientific innovation in gastronomic practices’ 
from the company Cutting Edge Flavors. Guasuncha and her friends decide to 
enrol. They enter a website, where a welcome video appears in which the ‘fla-
vour researcher’ introduces herself stating that she is ‘just a professional willing 
to share the science of culinary audacity with even the lay public’. ‘Pride’, com-
ments Guasuncha while scrolling to the next video. No sooner does this begin, 
than she goes pale upon noticing a familiar face, and then immediately flushes 
red when she spots a caption which reads: ‘All contents of this site, including 
videos, images, audio, texts, the Cutting Edge Flavours logo, are the exclusive 
property of La Boutique Inc. according to copyright law and applicable inter-
national treaties’. After hearing the details of her violent outburst, ‘Wrath’, is the 
relevant authorities’ verdict.
The first clear formulation of the idea that advertising can, in certain cases, 
transmit a form of exploitation originates from Dallas Smythe, who elaborates 
it in relation to the analogue world of televisions and radios. In several texts, 
but especially towards the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, 
Smythe defines the idea of an ‘audience commodity’.
Because audience power is produced, sold, purchased and consumed, 
it commands a price and is a commodity. […] You audience members 
contribute your unpaid work time and in exchange you receive the pro-
gram material and the explicit advertisements (Smythe 2006, 233, 238).
Another relevant contribution, along the same lines, is from Sut Jhally (1987) 
who states that
When the audience watches commercial television it is working for the 
media, producing both value and surplus value (Jhally 1987, 83).
With the birth of the internet and, especially, of social media sites and their 
intensive use of advertising, the concept of audience commodity regained force, 
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particularly through the work of Christian Fuchs and other authors in the field 
of the political economy of communication and Marxism (Fuchs 2015a, 2015b, 
2013, 2012b; 2010; Fisher 2012; Kang and McAllister 2011; Lee 2011; Manze-
rolle 2010; McStay 2011; Napoli 2010; Prodnik 2012). This valuable literature 
shares various features: the idea that value production can take place outside of 
the labour process and the unit of production (that ties in well with the sugges-
tions of autonomists such as Lazzaratto and Negri); the idea that ‘audiences’, the 
‘public’ or internauts are exploited; a critical heterodox approach to a greater 
or lesser extent. However, as a whole it also possesses some rough edges which 
should be smoothed.
The first arises from the explicit assertion that the audience’s activity is a form 
of work. This includes two possible objections: one is that it is an ‘unproduc-
tive’ activity. This assertion is refuted by several of the texts that point out the 
importance of audiences to the production of concrete and measurable capital-
ist commodities. In our perspective, the key to dismissing this objection is that 
the productive process produces knowledge with a subjective (and eventually 
intersubjective) bearer, and that there is a process of exploitation. Guasuncha, 
prostrate on her armchair in front of her screens, opens the floodgates of atten-
tion and participates in a productive process that facilitates the extraction of 
surplus value, but does this in such a way that the appearance of the process on 
its surface is the inversion of its essence: participation in a capitalist produc-
tive process manifests itself as the quintessence of leisure and unproductivity. 
The second objection is more important. This consists of the idea that work (as 
activity) supposes a conscious practice, a prefiguration of action, an intention 
engaged in production. None of this is true in Guasuncha’s case. While even 
the most alienated of workers is aware that they are participating in a produc-
tive process, the subjects exploited through attention perceive themselves to be 
engaged in processes of recreational consumption. Again we come up against a 
key point: here there are capitalist productive processes, and therefore exploita-
tion, but there is no work on the part of the exploited.
Another problem is that in the literature mentioned there is no clear differen-
tiation between exploitation through attention and exploitation through repro-
duction of content and data that companies like Google and Facebook conduct. 
However, both modalities are distinguishable and, moreover, if they are treated 
as a homogeneous block it is not possible to properly appreciate the difference, 
in terms of exploitation, between a traditional television producer and a com-
pany like Facebook. Guasuncha is exploited through attention when she con-
sumes adverts on the television. However, the platforms she uses on the web 
combine this exploitation with the extraction of data (that Guasuncha legally 
accepts, albeit unconsciously, with a click) and exploitation of content. In effect, 
while the contents of chat shows, for which Guasuncha is willing to consume 
advertising, are the fruit of a labour process (at least, there is a swarm of hosts 
and panellists, opinion merchants and celebrities who receive payment), the 
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gossip she obtains from her Facebook groups is elaborated by the same social 
network of ‘friends’ who, naturally, do not receive any income in exchange for 
their generation.
A third question it is important to clarify concerns the relationship between 
time and knowledge in this modality of exploitation. In the case of television, 
but also for YouTube, Facebook, news websites, free apps for mobile phones and 
other software programs, the subject exploited through attention feels that she 
receives a quantity of informational goods that she enjoys for proportionally 
lengthy time periods, while as compensation she must consume advertising for a 
much reduced amount of time. Although this latter quantity is increasing and is, 
above all, difficult to measure in contexts in which advertising appears in diverse 
and simultaneous forms (pop-ups, marketing publicity on different areas of the 
screen, product placement on the television, etc.), the equation does not seem 
to resemble the character of exploitation: more time of the desired information 
than the non-desired is received, therefore, the balance is positive and there 
is no exploitation. The error in this reasoning which denies there is exploita-
tion arises, once again, from forcing this reflection onto the Procrustean bed of 
time. In fact, what the E companies concede is not time but access to informa-
tional goods with reproduction costs tending towards zero. The costs of those 
goods have no relation of equivalence with the time taken to consume them. It 
would be another matter if the case were a theatrical play or a musical for which 
the only admission was the consumption of advertising. In that case perhaps it 
would make sense to compare both times as an approximate measure of the val-
ues exchanged. However, the exploited subject concedes her attention time that, 
unlike the informational goods, is of a scarce nature. As pointed out above, both 
things are in fact related: the superabundance of informational goods makes a 
prized good of human attention in informational capitalism. In turn, the atten-
tion of the exploited subject is far from having close to zero marginal costs. The 
cost of receiving a new advertisement (or the same one repeated) does not nec-
essarily decrease. Furthermore, the storage of the knowledges that she receives 
in her mind, in her subjective knowledges, occupies valuable and limited space. 
These are knowledges that must be connected, at least this is capital’s hope, to 
consumer behaviour, but at the same time, they are knowledges which block 
the access of alternative knowledges. In this way, the comparison between times 
received and conceded does not make a great deal of sense; instead the value of 
what is received should be estimated in relation to the value conceded, the value 
of the informational goods vis-á-vis the value of the attention and incorporation 
of the advertising knowledges.
Fourthly, objectors to exploitation through attention could remark that there 
is no salary. What is the significance of this objection? The argument goes that 
without a monetary equivalent the energy resources to replenish those spent 
in the productive process cannot be acquired. However, there is nothing in the 
definition of capitalist exploitation that obliges the compensation the exploited 
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receive to take a salary, monetary, form. The exploited can and often do receive 
the most diverse compensations, for example for exploitation through repro-
duction many exploited subjects receive recognition knowledge (like the free 
software programmers or musicians who upload videos to YouTube). However, 
the objection can be further refined: the use values the cognitively exploited 
receive cannot be exchanged. This is an important objection. Indeed, in the 
case of exploitation through reproduction, the recognition that is acquired 
among programmers or the general public, even though it is not a salary, is 
perfectly capable of being translated to other bearers and, with some media-
tions, of being utilised as a means of gaining access to goods and services. Skil-
ful programmers may be contracted; musicians can draw in larger crowds to 
their concerts. On the other hand, in the case of exploitation through attention 
this is more opaque. In the case of advertising connected to software, there 
is a possibility that this software could be used as a means of labour for the 
acquisition of goods and services. The same occurs in the case of the TV shows 
through which Guasuncha learns culinary skills (or via exchanges with her 
Facebook friends): the informational goods received can be translated to sub-
jective knowledges that subsequently allow her to access goods and services. 
But these possibilities dwindle in the case of advertising consumption asso-
ciated with the reception of purely recreational products, such as chat shows 
(assuming that Guasuncha will not forge a new career as a panellist). What the 
exploited subject receives here does not enable any translation that would result 
in energy replenishment. In this way, a unique situation is configured. Indeed, 
in the definition of capitalist exploitation we stipulated the requirement for the 
exploited to obtain a value not less than that of the energies consumed (and 
not all the value of the knowledges involved). That in general is expressed in 
such a way that the exploited either receives some kind of resource that can be 
exchanged for goods and services that enable them to replenish their drained 
energies, or they receive those goods and services directly. However, for exploi-
tation through attention, at least in some cases which are not at all exceptional, 
this does not occur. In general, the exploited receives an untransferable cogni-
tive payment in kind, that is, a payment which cannot be transformed into 
energy inputs. Does this mean that the criteria of capitalist exploitation are 
not fulfilled? In fact they may be, because in the definition nothing related 
to exchange potential is required. What must be registered is that the value 
received by the exploited should be at least equivalent to the energy output, not 
that it is directly compensated. However, the fact that digital information can-
not be exchanged has a crucial consequence: the value of the energies (which 
must always be restored) must be obtained from another source, from another 
productive process. Additionally, if this is closely scrutinised, this conclusion 
follows on from the fact that the advertising takes effect if the subject exploited 
through attention completes the process by, occasionally, acquiring the prod-
uct. Thus, evidently there are necessary resources which the exploited does not 
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receive here. Therefore, in exploitation through attention we manifestly dis-
cover something which could be present in other forms. The exploited sub-
ject, typically, must be incorporated into another productive process (imagine 
a typical labour process) from which they obtain compensation for the energy 
expended in that process and the former one as well. In this way the capital 
that directs the exploitation through attention benefits from the fact that the 
capital that exploits through alienation pays for a whole day’s energies and only 
utilises (generally) some of them. Reciprocally, the capital that exploits through 
alienation can proclaim that aspects surpassing the mere physical reproduction 
of life are included in the salary, encompassing the cognitive aspects which are 
returned to the capitalist who exploits through attention.
This leads us to observe a significant phenomenon: there may be asymmetry 
between the exploiter and exploited in the sense that the former collects all the 
surplus value from this productive process (exploitation through attention), 
while the exploited do not gather the resources they need to reproduce them-
selves from this productive process.
Finally, in terms of cognitive materialism, the subject exploited through 
attention unquestionably participates in a capitalist productive process. This 
process includes capitalists and workers from internet sectors and the enter-
tainment industry (who are part of labour processes) but crucially, also the 
public who effectively contribute energies and knowledges (although without 
the consciously oriented activity that work supposes). This happens under 
the form of attention, and in exchange a bundle of digital information flows 
is received: applications and other software, access to internet platforms, tel-
evision and radio programmes, etc. The value of what is received is extremely 
modest (because the marginal cost of its production, of offering it to an addi-
tional user) tends to zero. But the energy consumption of the spectator or inter-
naut is also very modest. There are no great energy expenditures to replace. 
Here the surplus value does not arise from the knowledges that the exploited 
was already carrying, but from those that they end up carrying after their par-
ticipation in the productive process.
Naturally, as in any of the other types of capitalist exploitation discussed, 
the existence of exploitation through attention cannot be confirmed for each 
particular case ex ante. In each specific situation both values would need to 
be compared. However, at an aggregate level, it seems plausible that compa-
nies such as television production companies or Google obtain part of their 
profits from this form of exploitation. For each individual situation, the fact 
that both the value received and that conceded, and the energies and knowl-
edges involved represent tiny quantities makes it difficult to apprehend this 
nanoexploitation.
However, a decisive element is that the companies based on offering free 
software and contents (analogue and digital) through a recourse to advertising 
have prospered for decades and that, furthermore, in an attention economy in 
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which Google is above all else a vast advertising business, for those who wish 
to study the functioning of capitalism it would be a grave error to disregard an 
analysis of exploitation through attention.
To conclude, below the three forms of capitalist exploitation are presented. 







The energies and the 
knowledges of the 
exploited are translated 
by objectification in the 
product of labour whose 
ownership is in the hands 
of the capitalist. 
The knowledges of the 
exploited are translated 
by codification (with a 
possible transitory passage 
through subjectivity) 
(in)to different forms 
of information whose 
ownership is in the hands 
of the capitalist. 
The knowledges admin-
istered by the exploiters, 
generally digital informa-
tion, are translated to the 
subjectivity or intersub-
jectivity of the exploited. 
The capitalist obtains 
labour time (energy + 
knowledge). This time can 
be inside or outside the 
productive unit, but the 
capitalist appropriates the 
fruits of the labour time. 
The capitalist acquires 
ownership of certain 
forms of knowledge 
(produced over longer or 
shorter time spans, within 
or outside of the working 
day). 
The capitalist obtains 
human attention time in 
order to inoculate certain 
knowledges (generally 
outside of the working 
day). 
The capitalist pays, usually 
in monetary terms, for the 
cost of the energies neces-
sary for the reproduction 
of the worker.
The capitalist pays in 
monetary or, more com-
monly, in non-monetary 
terms (such as recognition 
knowledge). 
The capitalist pays in 
non-monetary terms 
(with access to contents or 
software, whose monetary 
cost is lower than that of 
attention). 
The commodity (or its 
intermediary products) 
that arises from the pro-
ductive process (a good or 
service) is alienated and 
erodes with consumption, 
meaning that the identical 
repetition of the produc-
tive process requires 
the subject be exploited 
through alienation again. 
The knowledges (subjec-
tive or codified as infor-
mation) are not alienated 
(they do not erode with 
use), so the exploited 
subject they have been 
extracted from is not 
generally necessary for 
the repetition of the same 
productive process. 
The commodity is an 
accumulation of attention, 
and is consumed with 
its productive use. This 
means that the identical 
repetition of the produc-
tive process requires 
the subject be exploited 
through attention again. 
Table 5.2: The three types of capitalist exploitation.
Source: prepared by the author.
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Naturally, a theory of exploitation is linked to a theory about stratification 
and classes. The next chapter will focus on this area. However, before that we 
should introduce a comment that frames this link, relating to an asymmetry 
between capital and labour. In effect, any of the three forms of exploitation 
and their combinations can define one of the capitalist classes. However, in the 
case of the working classes, what defines them is above all the link between the 
forms of exploitation and the reproduction of their living conditions, that is to 
say their integration into productive processes that permit them to gain access 
to basic reproduction of energies. Therefore, it is exploitation through aliena-
tion and exploitation through reproduction that are associated with labour 
market insertion and determine membership of the working class. This does 
not prevent these subjects from being exploited in a capitalist mode in other 
productive processes.
CHAPTER 6
Classes: A Theory from a Cognitive 
Materialist Perspective
Acknowledgement: A previous version of this chapter was originally pub-
lished in the journal tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique: Mariano 
Zukerfeld and Guillermina Yansen. 2016. ‘Access, Resources, and Classes in 
the History of Capitalism: A Theory of Social Stratification from a Cognitive 
Materialist Perspective’. tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique 14 (1): 
208–231 http://www.triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/704. The article 
has been reproduced with the kind permission of tripleC.
6.1 Introduction: The Need for a Theory of Social Classes
It is difficult to imagine a more natural subject for a social scientist than social 
stratification: natural in terms of being proximate, but also indomitable. In the 
first sense, it is clear that the organisation of society into groups whose mem-
bers present certain affinities between them, as well as particular divergences, 
is a universally accepted phenomenon. In fact, social stratification is one of the 
few themes in which social science finds it easy to make contact with the aver-
age person in the street. In the everyday speech and practice of this individual 
(who knows little to nothing of Durkheimian solidarity, Weberian typologies 
of action or Marxist surpluses), the notion of class pulsates. Hence, every sub-
ject who appears before his/her gaze triggers an instantaneous and profound 
examination: their wealth and power, their work and their way of looking at the 
world will be weighed up and they will end up being inscribed ineffably in this 
or that region of the class register.
But the problem of social classes is also natural, we claim, because it is far 
from having been overcome by social sciences. In effect, despite this theme 
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having been approached by all the classics there is not yet anything resembling 
a consensus around the problematic. An analysis of the extensive bibliogra-
phy about the specifics of this question is not within the remit of this text (see 
Wright 2015). However, we should point out that our intervention is not acci-
dental. It emerges from a period in which the notion of class and, indeed, the 
idea of social strata, have been blurred in the social sciences and humanities. 
In this era of networks, rhizomes, multitudes, social movements, citizens, etc., 
class divisions are dealt with derogatorily, as a hindrance coming from out-
moded totalising theories; as a simplification that commits outrage against the 
diverse multiplicity of Being. Naturally, it is the history of capitalism (and of its 
classes) which explains these trends and not the other way around.
6.2 The Proposal: Classes from an Abstract Perspective
Going back to cognitive materialism concepts introduced in chapter 1 of this 
book, we need to highlight that both entities (physical and knowledge matter) 
combine in a variable way in goods and subjects.. In such a way that every 
good (and every subject) is linked to capitalism in two ways: both by some 
form of regulation of their physical aspect and also in some way relative to 
their cognitive side.228 To extrapolate these ideas into a theory about social 
stratification we must clarify some notions about different types of resources 
and access to them.
6.2.1 Types of Resources: PIR and KIR
Evidently the resources contain variable proportions of physical and knowl-
edge matter, as a result of which the weight of both regulatory methods will 
be varied. Both types of rights are applicable to a book, for example, but those 
pertaining to intellectual property, those related to the cognitive aspect, are 
usually more economically relevant than those pertaining to ownership of the 
pages, covers, etc. – in other words the physical property of the physical object 
itself. On the other hand, intellectual property carries less weight in the case of 
a table (generic) in which the most relevant regulation is that related to physical 
ownership of the object.
Now, beyond resources in general, for our objectives it is necessary to take 
into account the productive resources, that is, those which are usually called 
means of production. We would like to analyse two kinds: physically-intensive 
productive resources (PIR); and knowledge-intensive productive resources 
(KIR). But, how do we understand which aspect is the more or less relevant? 
Although the question seems intuitively simple, it is actually complex in ana-
lytical terms. There are two variables which can be confidently used to differ-
entiate PIR and KIR:
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 i. The relative costs of physical and knowledge matter contained in each unit 
of the resource, that is to say, the proportion of production costs for the 
resource in question.
ii. The proportion of effective use of the physical and knowledge matter of 
the resource in question in the production process in which it functions as 
a means of production.229
Two further clarifications are necessary with regard to these conceptualisa-
tions. The first is that we are discussing proportions of physical and knowledge 
matter, and not absolute quantities. This implies that there could be KIR that 
contain and use lower magnitudes of knowledge than some PIR in cases when 
the former have recourse to tiny quantities of physical and knowledge matter. 
Take the example of the productive process in which a worker uses a computer 
merely for the purposes of inputting data. Here the worker is a KIR, because in 
spite of the fact that the cognitive mass put into motion by his or her activity is 
very small, the expenditure of energy is even lower. A contrasting case would 
be a highly qualified sportsperson bearing a great deal of knowledge who could 
be a PIR due to the expenditure of vital energy predominating in the particular 
productive process they are involved in.
The second clarification points to the idea that this conceptualisation can 
only be made in a historically situated way, which is to say synchronic and 
comparative. A ‘manual’ worker at the beginning of the twentieth century (who 
we imagine exhausting their vital energies to the limit and with a cognitive 
heritage marked more by experience than by the complexities of a prolonged 
apprenticeship) is a PIR, while a cognitive worker of the period, such as a jour-
nalist, is a KIR. This does not mean that if the comparison were made in a 
diachronic way that the result would be the same: the ‘manual’ worker of the 
twentieth century compared to a hunter from a prehistoric tribe is, of course, a 
knowledge-intensive resource. For this reason the classification only holds for 
historically determined situations.
6.2.2 Types of Access: Exclusive, Non-exclusive and No Access
We will now move on to look at the types of access230 to these productive 
resources.231 In addition to the exclusive regimes through which subjects either 
do or do not have access to goods, these goods can be regulated by intermedi-
ary methods. In effect, goods can – and usually do – have one (or two) of their 
aspects regulated under a non-exclusive regime (in other words, not privative). 
For example, a recently published book in a public library has its material com-
ponent covered by state public property even though its intellectual aspect is 
subject to copyright law. The reverse happens in the case of the generic table 
mentioned earlier: the stored-up knowledge matter this contains is within the 
public domain, while its physical matter aspect is subject to private ownership. 
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In a more systematic way, if we imagine the relationship between a determined 
subject and any productive resource it is useful to present three situations, three 
types of access.
To recap directly from p. 109, the first is exclusive access: it relates to the 
property forms in which the subject is owner of the resource and utilises the 
possibility of excluding third parties as a means of obtaining an economic 
advantage. Physical private property and intellectual property are some current 
forms of this type of access, although not the only ones.
The second is non-exclusive access: it relates to the possibility of the use of a 
resource of which the subjects using it are either not the title-holders – but have 
acquired a use-right – or being the title-holder use it for themselves – without 
obtaining profit from the use of third parties – without availing themselves of 
the possibility of exclusion as a means by which those third parties are sub-
sumed within it.
The third is the condition of no access: this usually indicates situations in 
which the subject gains access to the resource in question in invalid or pro-
portionally insufficient quantities to be able to have an effect on a determined 
productive process. The condition of no access implies that the resource is not 
useful for the subject in question to differentiate themselves from other sub-
jects and to compete for consumer goods by virtue of this resource. In excep-
tional circumstances, this category refers to situations in which the subject 
gains access to the resource, but for whatever reason doesn’t use it as a means of 
production in any significant way.
The main argument of this chapter is that, combining these forms of access, 
which include but exceed ownership, with the two types of resources, which 
broaden the typically considered variables, we can obtain a potential model of 
diverse social groups. A model that, at the same time, gives an account of the 
complexity without losing the antagonistic dimension that confronts owners 
and non-owners of resources, exploiters and exploited, and which also allows 
us to think about the various historical stages of capitalism.
6.2.3 The Abstract Schema of Classes
In effect, combining the three modalities of access to both types of resources 
we can obtain an abstract and, within capitalism, a-historical schema of social 
classes. This is a preliminary but fundamental step before observing how each 
category takes a particular and variable physiognomy, how history moulds it 
and reshapes it again and again in its transformation. We will look at not only 
how these classes have adopted different forms and roles throughout history, 
but also how they have been variously described by authors from heterogene-
ous time periods and geographical locations. Each period will see the rise of 
some classes at the same time as the silent or explosive decline of others; the 
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period will lend its name to some of them, and at the same time those classes 
will name the period after themselves.
Naturally, the distinction between an abstract schema of social classes and 
a concrete one is not a novel innovation of this chapter. However, a contribu-
tion that we do seek to make is to take a step towards the systematisation of 
this distinction and to theorise about what is invariable and what is contingent 
in the history of classes in capitalism. That said, we can consider the schema 
presented in Table 6.1.
At the most general level, we must distinguish between those who obtain 
their income from some form of exclusive access or property and those who, 
lacking exclusive access, must earn it from their work.232 The former group, 
who we generically call capitalists includes, in addition to capitalists strictly 
defined (1), two sub-groups of the same: cognitive capitalists (2) and physical 
capitalists (4). Additionally the extended capitalist family includes two types 
of rentier: cognitive (3) and physical (7) (the latter, unlike the former, do not 
in any way participate in the productive processes to which they lend their 
resources). For their part, the workers include principally the cognitive workers 
(6) and physical workers (8), but there are also self-employed workers (5) and 
excluded workers (9). We agree with several theories regarding the fact that 
capitalists and workers are linked, as a whole, by relations of exploitation, as 
discussed in chapter 5.
Perhaps it would be advantageous to specify the scope of each of these 
abstract categories.233 However, due to space constraints, we prefer to allow the 
historical transformation to help us trace the contours of each. Throughout 
the remainder of this chapter the reader will repeatedly see in parentheses the 
numbers that identify each one of the classes from our abstract schema. In 
doing so we will relate determined concrete groups situated in specific coordi-
nates with the generic classification we have presented.
Access to Physical Intensive Resources





















Table 6.1: Abstract schema of classes.
Source: Yansen and Zukerfeld 2016.
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6.3 From Feudalism to Mercantile Capitalism
To understand capitalism we have to start from the feudal stage that preceded 
it. To do this, we turn back to the schema presented in Table 6.1, but with 
some caveats. The first is that we are not yet dealing with classes, given that 
we maintain the Marxist idea that classes, in the strictest sense, appear with 
capitalism (Marx and Engels [1846] 1970; Giddens 1973). The second is that as 
a consequence, specifically capitalist social groups (1, 2 and 4) do not appear 
in any significant way. However, social groups composed of rentiers and work-
ers do appear. The third is that, once we bear the typology from Table 6.1 in 
mind, it is helpful to complement it by giving an account of specific periods 
with other charts that allow us to visualise the relative power and quantity of 
the different strata.
It is usually claimed that the fundamental contradiction in the feudal stage is 
between the feudal lords and the serfs (Marx and Engels [1846] 1970). While 
the former are merely physical rentiers (7), landowners and warlords, and 
removed from the productive process, the latter are a specific form of physi-
cal worker (8), especially agrarian workers. Put simply, in a rural economy the 
serfs carry out tasks which are based much more on the consumption of their 
energies than on the application of their mental faculties. However, this funda-
mental contradiction is very far from being sufficient to understand the social 
stratification of the period.
Meanwhile, the apex of the feudal pyramid belongs as much to the landown-
ers as it does to the proprietors of the soul; as much to feudal powers as to 
ecclesiastical powers. In fact, the friendships and conflicts, the circulation and 
splits between them populate the surface of the history of feudalism. Here a 
fundamental feature of our schema appears: the religious structures, as much as 
those of the feudal estate, base their power on the monopolisation of resources: 
here not the land or military forces (which come to them as an added extra), 
but knowledge. Indeed, the clerical strata are nothing more than cognitive rent-
iers (3), wealthy proprietors not only of knowledge related to the afterlife, but 
also a broad range of secular knowledge; legal proprietors of a good part of 
knowledge as a whole.
More important is to show that, with the transformation of feudalism, 
between the lords and the serfs new lateral categories increasingly emerged. 
Categories that share an origin: they begin as serfs who in some way manage 
to make themselves wholly or partially independent from their lords. Some 
of these serfs, with the consent of the local noble, become small-scale inde-
pendent farmers, exploiting communal or even privately owned parcels of land. 
These proprietor or smallholder peasants from the commons who have a non-
exclusive access both to cognitive as well as physical resources are a type of self-
employed worker (5) in our schema. That said, other serfs, far from receiving 
the consent of their lord, flee the estate and take refuge in the cities. There, some 
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remain without distinctive cognitive resources, and offer their physical energies 
as day-labourers (8). Others fall into vagrancy (9). But a large quantity of these 
escaped serfs, or rather their children and grandchildren, will arm themselves 
with practical knowledge. Their families and their bodies will put these valu-
able skills to use in order to put clothes on someone else’s back. At some point, 
guild organisation will be born as the legal form that will regulate those cogni-
tive monopolies,234 and at least three types of individuals are integrated into it. 
At the bottom of the corporative pyramid are the apprentices, dispossessed of 
physical resources to strike out on their own, but with increasing knowledge. 
They will become, therefore, the cognitive workers (6) par excellence of this 
period. The clerks succeed them in rank: having certificated skills and, usually, 
acquiring some tools, they will have a certain level of independence (5) that will 
make them equivalent to free proprietor peasants. At the top of the guild hier-
archy will be, of course, the masters. Holding the title to craft knowledge and 
with the ability to exclude, they are the ancestors of the cognitive capitalists (2). 
Of course, the relative fluidity of movement between these areas of artisanship 
makes the separation of these groups into strictly separated classes unjustifi-
able. We are dealing with groups with often contradictory interests between 
and among them, but also with a series of vigorous instrumental and affective 
connections as well as the bonds of tradition.
But to understand the progressive transformation of feudalism into mercan-
tile capitalism, it remains to observe the appearance of a key element: the mer-
chant class (4). Given that exchange was geographically limited, confined to the 
city and its environs, those who would liberate it were destined to expand the 
world. Indeed, the merchant class of this period is characterised by handling 
physical resources in space, by transporting them towards itself and its com-
modities. This class still hasn’t managed to make these materials and energies 
submit themselves to its domination in the factory (as the capitalists will); but 
it does manage to transport itself with them, ploughing the seas and oceans, 
bringing back marvels from the Orient and from the Indies.235 It is through 
the action of this class, along with a multitude of other factors of course, that 
mercantile capitalism starts to take shape.
Before moving on, we here present a graphical summary (which seems static 
but should be understood in relation to the transformation we have suggested) 
of the social groups from the period we have discussed. The intended purpose 
of this is to arrange the stratification of social groups from this period in rela-
tion to the criteria proposed by this chapter, emphasising by visual means the 
existence of a determined hierarchy and its respective relationship to power. 
If, in turn, we were to think about the chart that represents the typology in an 
abstract way, we can observe that there are still no strictly capitalist classes and 
so category 1 would be empty. Note that in this chart we represent, to the left, 
the social groups distinguished by their access to PIR, while to the right we 
locate those that owe their status to their access to KIR.
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6.4 From Mercantile to Industrial Capitalism
Mercantile capitalism as a category is not clearly defined. Leaving to one side 
the clarifications that Sombart, Braudel and other authors introduce, it suf-
fices here to note that the term underlines the vigorous activity, or rather, the 
economic leadership of the mercantile groups (a kind of physical capitalists). 
More precisely, it aims to highlight the systematic and rational profit motive 
which drives them. However, naming this period ‘capitalism’ is a risky busi-
ness, since the capitalist organisation of production appears at the end rather 
than the beginning of the period. For our practical means, we will use the term 
mercantile capitalism to refer to the period between the decline of the feudal 
mode of production and the consolidation of industrial capitalism; roughly 
between the fifteenth and the middle of the eighteenth centuries. In fact, rather 
than seeing it as being a period of stabilisation of a new order, in our perspec-
tive it is more useful to understand it as a period of transition, of preparation 
of the forces that would lead to industrialism (although, clearly, this was not 
an inevitable result). In this period the clear division between capitalists and 
workers, with their respective varieties, took shape. At least five intertwin-
ing processes must be named: (i) the expropriation of the land, particularly 
through the process of enclosure of communal land; (ii) the breaking up of the 
guild crafts; (iii) the emergence of intellectual property laws; (iv) the fall of the 
monarchic/feudal order; (v) the ascent of instrumental rationalism, especially 
around modern science. While the first three are related to normative inter-
subjective knowledge and to regulations, the last two are linked to axiological 
knowledge. Here we can only develop some of these processes, but the rest 
must not be overlooked.
The process of expropriation of the land was eventually helped by a specific 
type of regulation: the ‘Bills for Enclosure of Commons’. The enclosures them-
selves began in England between the end of the fifteenth century and the begin-
ning of the sixteenth, were focused on the countryside, and were stimulated 
(in the case of England) by the blossoming of the wool industry. This process 
meant, above all, the eviction of the peasants who were previously relatively 
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Table 6.2: Classes towards the end of the feudal period.
Source: Yansen and Zukerfeld 2016.
Classes: A Theory from a Cognitive Materialist Perspective 169
independent (5). These free peasants in some cases became the agricultural 
proletariat, rural workers, employed by the other class that, although it had 
existed in earlier epochs (Marx [1867] 1990), was now gaining strength: that of 
the small capitalist farmers, physical capitalists (4) who organised agricultural 
production with a view to attaining profit by the means of capitalist exploita-
tion. This whole process, particularly the equation of the small capitalist farm-
ers, was favoured, among other factors, by the relationship between contracts 
stipulated by long terms (Marx suggests that 99 years was most common) at 
fixed prices, the depreciation of gold – occasioned by the arrival of vast quanti-
ties of the metal brought from the Americas – and the rise of cereal prices.
Of course, at the root of these expulsions, legal or not, violent or peaceful, lies 
the tendency of the nobility to become active rentiers, maximizing the profit 
they could obtain from their land (7), renting it to the free farmers instead of 
leaving it in the fallow economic state of the commons. As is well-known, the 
landed nobility did not only drag the collectively owned land into the world of 
commodities; they appropriated for themselves the land owned by the church 
and the monarchy at the same time as these institutions were losing power. Nat-
urally, this process eroded not only one aspect, but the entire feudal order itself. 
The relations between lords and serfs, the non-commercial bonds between sub-
jects, etc., were inexorably dissolving. Regardless, here we are still in a transi-
tional stage – thus the ambiguous term that gives its name to this sector: they 
still remain the nobility (we are not yet dealing with subjects that have attained 
their land in the clamour of the market); in the subsequent period they will 
simply be landowners.
But returning to the peasants freed both from feudal shackles and from the 
means of production, a large bulk of them could not be absorbed by agricul-
tural production. It is precisely these masses who gave the impetus to capital-
ist manufacturing as Marx has shown in detail. That is, manual workers dedi-
cated to more or less basic artisanal activities; but manufacturing workers after 
all, dependent on the means of production (especially on the raw materials) 
belonging to other humans: the manufacturing capitalists (4). These are a type 
of physical capitalist for the simple reason that their ability to exclude lies in 
the physical resources, and not in any knowledge they hold. In fact, these capi-
talists have no reason to possess any skills relating to the productive process, 
and in many cases are much more closely related to the merchant than to the 
master craftsman. Particularly at the beginning of the eighteenth century, these 
manufacturers assume the initial organisation of capitalist production. They 
adopt, in general, the putting out system, a system in which workers produce 
in their own homes or in workshops without yet being placed under the direct 
control of the capitalist. Of course, this source of production contributed to and 
benefited from the blossoming growth of the aforementioned commercial capi-
talists (4) who handled the buying and reselling of the manufactured goods. 
The development of this group is inseparable from a new group of rentiers: the 
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mercantile financiers (a type of financial rentier) (3). This group is so signifi-
cant that for some authors (Braudel, 1985) it is their emergence that marks the 
beginning of capitalism. In any case, the fact of having originated in merchant 
capital does not impede the class that gave birth to it from transcending, or 
from establishing a relationship of control over other capitalist classes.
However, this is not enough to understand the transformation of classes 
in this period. On the one hand, it must be added to the map of knowledge 
intensive activities, which are usually urban. Within these, the most notable 
phenomenon is the progressive breaking up of craft guild organisation. This 
process becomes effective in the subsequent period, through the well-known 
Le Chapelier Law in France (1791) and the Combination Acts in England 
(1799–1800). What falls apart is not so much the monopoly over certain knowl-
edge – contrary to capitalist rationality – but the link, more contradictorily still, 
between guild masters, journeymen, and apprentices. The former, and perhaps 
the second too, established themselves as artisanal capitalists. The legal bear-
ers of secret knowledge, possessors of specialist skills, they use that ages-old 
knowledge to set up workshops from which magical commodities now flow. 
In contrast, the old apprentices, but also some day-labourers arrived from the 
countryside, managed to appropriate certain techniques, becoming artisanal 
workers (6). That said however, the form in which the cognitive capitalists 
became holders of knowledge which they carried was by means of securing 
patents, and much later on, of copyrights.
Actually, in the period between 1474 (The Venetian Patent Act) and 1653 (The 
English Statute of Monopolies), positive regulations began to take shape – no 
longer concessions at the grace of the king, at least in theory – on exclusive and 
temporally limited rights over technical knowledge: patents. Starting from 1709–10 
(The Statute of Queen Anne, in England) a particular type of intellectual prop-
erty right over literary works would be defined, namely copyright. At the same 
time, there is another parallelism that contributes to the formation of the physical 
capitalist and cognitive capitalist classes: what happens to the monarchy – and to 
a certain extent to some of the aristocracy – with regard to physical resources, 
happens to the church with regard to knowledge. From having almost absolute 
control over these in the previous period, they now find themselves entangled 
in a series of battles that, increasingly, end in defeats. Some of those defeats are 
a consequence of the Protestant Reformation.236 But the most significant are 
those associated with the rise of modern science, and in a more profound way, 
of instrumental rationality. We are not particularly interested here in the content 
of those scientific advances, but rather the fact that these effectively disputed the 
church’s privileged claim to knowledge. The clerical class, as cognitive rentier, was 
wounded, and its European flock of faithful souls was proportionally reduced. 
However, the overseas conquests of the crown amply compensated for these 
defeats. Actually, in spite of the loss of the monopoly over cognitive resources 
and the emergence of other suppliers to the European market, the contribution of 
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a large volume of ‘demanders’ for Christianity helped to maintain the economic 
health of the clerical class.
In sum, it is important to stress that the process of regulation that results in 
the commodification of the land and other physical intensive resources takes 
place simultaneously with that process related to knowledge. In both cases, 
capitalist regulation of access appears, setting the boundaries of inclusions and 
exclusions, hand in hand with capitalist exploitation and expropriation. And 
in both cases these regulations open the way for divisions between subjects 
who do and don’t have access to different types of resources: exploiters and 
exploited, expropriators and expropriated. Table 6.3 sums up the schema of 
classes in this period.
6.5 From Industrial to Informational Capitalism
The analysis of the development of classes over this extended period requires, 
at least, a division. Firstly we will discuss the period between the first industrial 
revolution and the dissemination of Taylorism; a ‘long nineteenth century’ that 
runs from approximately the last decades of the eighteenth century to the first 
decades of the twentieth. Following this we look at the period from, approxi-
mately, the 1930s until the 1970s.
6.5.1 The Long Nineteenth Century
Between the end of the eighteenth century and the first decades of the fol-
lowing century not only did a whole series of decisive revolutionary events 
take place, but also the most virulent economic transformation that humanity 
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Table 6.3: Classes in mercantile capitalism.
Source: Yansen and Zukerfeld 2016.
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spread, humans dominate raw materials and energies, productive processes 
are rationalised and the quest for profit plants its flag firmly into every sum-
mit. Capital and labour finished freeing themselves from their feudal ties, and 
the dichotomisation between these classes becomes hardened. More specifi-
cally, industrial capitalism implies, above all, the relations of capitalist exploi-
tation through alienation between industrial capitalists (4) and industrial 
workers (8). This means, in both cases, subjects that profit (the former) or 
work (the latter) – with different levels of access (and exclusion) to physical 
intensive resources.
Indeed, mechanised industry gradually destroyed in its path all possibility of 
competition from those sectors of physical and cognitive capital that didn’t rise 
on the wave of the modernisation of production, most of all in the urban envi-
ronment, but also gradually in rural areas. So both small manufacturing capi-
talists, small capitalist farmers and merchants as well as the small artisanal capi-
talists, in sum, the entire group of physical and cognitive capitalists from the 
previous stage, who yesterday fought against the feudal fetters, today merged 
into the great class of physical (industrial) capitalists. Others perished on the 
way, becoming a part of different elements of the mass of physical workers. 
Thus, while in the cities the industrial capitalists progressively implemented 
mechanisation and appropriated a large proportion of available raw materials, 
in the countryside the agrarian physical capitalists had to join the old nobility 
that acquired the form of modern landowner (7) – rentier par excellence of the 
current stage – following suit by taking for themselves a good part of the land.
In a parallel way, the industrial working class (8) (Marx [1867] 1990; Coriat 
1979) – the class of physical workers – expands its ranks. However, the intro-
duction of machinery means, primarily, the translation and objectification 
of knowledge previously carried by the ‘social brain’ into technological arte-
facts capable of being appropriated by capital (Marx 1857/58; Coriat 1979). Of 
course, this is an example of what we called exploitation through reproduction 
in chapter 5. In this way, mechanised industry brings with it, on the one hand, 
the use of unskilled workers, women and children among them – ‘cheap labour’ 
(Marx [1867] 1990, 504); on the other hand, it forces out a section of the labour 
force that would go on to form the so-called ‘reserve army of labour’, that only 
periodically participates in production.
A description centred on industrial workers must not obscure the fact that 
‘physical workers’ also includes many workers from (what was later called) the 
service sector – that grows on a daily basis in the tumult of the large cities – 
such as messengers, transport workers, domestic workers and so on, as well as 
many others in rural areas. As a group, they all share the fact of working funda-
mentally based on their physical resources.
The totality of these movements will have as their result the brutal elimina-
tion of the class of self-employed workers (5), up until now made up of small-
holding farmers and the independent craftsperson who had survived in the 
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cities. This class of workers is extremely diminished in this period and will not 
swell in size again until well into the next period, principally with the influx 
of self-employed professionals. In turn, although being quantitatively less rel-
evant than physical classes, new cognitive classes began to grow. These cogni-
tive classes were split into two branches. Indeed, still, and up until the second 
half of the twentieth century, regulation of knowledge clearly differentiated 
between industrial creations – or economic goods – and artistic and literary 
spheres – or cultural goods. In this way, we find, on the one hand, a modest 
kind of individual inventor connected to the industrial revolution (2), whose 
profits were ideally based on the patenting of diverse types of machinery: James 
Watt and his steam engine; James Hargreaves and the Spinning Jenny; Richard 
Arkwright and the Water Frame; Samuel Crompton and his Spinning Mule are 
some examples. It would be years later, on the other side of the Atlantic, that 
this class would flourish.
In addition, another group of cognitive capitalists exists (2), dedicated to 
the artistic or literary spheres or that of cultural goods in general, incipient 
information industrialists. In fact books, newspapers and magazines, but also 
plays, etc., become a necessity for the cities, at the same time as the first laws of 
obligatory primary school education are passed, which little by little expand the 
market for the production and consumption of these goods.
Schools and the books that circulated at that time imbued increasingly 
more social sectors with varied types of subjective and intersubjective knowl-
edge, not least among them the values and norms of industrial society (Zuke-
rfeld 2010). Also the political and administrative class, the Weberian bureau-
cracies – teachers, architects and other professionals – working both for the 
state and for capitalist businesses, form part of this still nascent cognitariat, a 
group of intellectual workers (6). This stratum of capitalists and their work-
ers represents a much larger number than the stratum of inventors, although 
not more important.
In summary, a group of intellectual workers at the service of a still modest but 
not inconsiderable cognitive capital (although also belonging to state organisa-
tions) slowly develops during the period under analysis. By the beginning of 
the twentieth century we will find cognitive classes – capitalists and workers – 
already well developed.
Finally we must observe the enlargement of the excluded (9) sector. This 
is fed, in this period, by the lowest category in the Marxist reserve army of 
labour: pauperism. ‘Pauperism is the hospital of the active labour-army and 
the dead weight of the industrial reserve army’ (Marx [1867] 1990, 707), and is 
composed of invalids, workers of a non-working age, the chronically ill, muti-
lated, etc., in sum, degraded people that, for the most part, have been dismissed 
from their own jobs. In this way pauperism, a typical feature of this epoch, 
joins the ranks of the lumpenproletariat of the previous period, which has not 
disappeared.
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6.5.2 Maturation and Decomposition of Industrialism in the  
Twentieth century
As we have indicated above, this period begins with the interwar years and con-
cludes with the global economic crisis of the mid-1970s. Generally speaking, 
the so-called ‘Thirty Glorious Years’ constituted a period of stabilisation of the 
salaried society, with the hallmark of the welfare state that, utilising Keynesian 
policies, mediates capital-labour relations (Castel 2009; Hobsbawm 1994; Offe 
1996). Of course, the period continues to be hegemonised by the industrial 
capitalists, as a concretion of the physical capitalists (4). However, it is appro-
priate here to mention some widely known transformations.
Firstly, the class of ‘white collar workers’, as a paradigmatic type of cognitive 
workers (6)  – technicians, professionals, scientists and administrators, but also 
politicians, teachers and workers in the entertainment industry – takes on an unu-
sual quantitative leadership role (Mills [1951] 1969; Lipset and Zetterberg 1963; 
Bell 1973). A significant proportion of them would find a home, naturally, in the 
service sector, which grows progressively in this period; but another, sizeable, por-
tion would locate itself in the industrial sector, in the heart of the factories, in a 
context in which access to primary and secondary education continues expanding 
and in which college and university education begins to take off. This tendency is, 
in general terms, shared by all industrialised countries (Meyer and Schofer 2006; 
Windolf 1992; Barro 1991). In fact, subsequent generations of the working class 
now find themselves in a position to be able to abandon the family tradition of 
manual work, to join the ranks of the cognitive working class (Castel 2009), which 
means the shift of a substantial mass of workers from category (8) to (6).
But, we said, also within the factories. Actually, first Taylorism and then 
Fordism or the model of mass production which developed to complement 
it, had a serious impact on the productive processes and the nature of work, 
decreasing the presence of physical or blue collar workers (8) and increasing 
that of the cognitive workers (6). In this trajectory, the loss of the monopoly 
over productive knowledge that industrial workers had previously held took 
shape. Certainly, the scientific organisation of labour produces a translation of 
said knowledge, from the subjectivities of the workers into the codification of 
corporate property in procedural manuals. This is, of course, another form of 
exploitation through reproduction. Later the assembly line and the conveyor 
belt would mean – as we had identified in the case of industrial machinery – the 
transference of the same to the machines, imposing a strict working rhythm 
onto the workers. Thus, while the diversification and increasing complexity of 
industrial productive processes advanced, work in the factories depended less 
and less on the physical energies of the workers and increasingly on machines 
and the knowledge of cognitive workers.
Secondly, in this period, many workers, above all of the cognitive variety (liberal 
professionals, Bell 1973), but also – although to a lesser extent – physical workers 
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(taxi drivers, gas fitters, etc.), would converge in the class of self-employed work-
ers (5). Although the growth of this class can be located, primarily, towards the 
end of the twentieth century, we can observe that in the current period it has 
begun to slowly expand again. Thirdly, the excluded (9) class is greatly reduced 
and re-signified thanks to the aforementioned welfare state. However, what we 
can call the marginalised class persists. The terms ‘marginal mass’ (Nun 2003) 
or ‘marginal pole’ (Quijano 1971), although with differences, refer to a mass of 
unemployed people who, both in urban and rural areas, seek refuge in subsistence 
activities such as waste collection, street selling etc. All are precarious activities 
that require only a negligible level of access to PIR and KIR, but that actually expe-
rience a certain containment by the state (Castel 2009). Fourthly, the cognitive 
capitalist class (2), as in the previous period, is still constituted by capitalists who 
profit from two different kinds of knowledge: those who profit from knowledge 
with an industrial application, and those who profit from artistic or literary works. 
The former and the latter, the stratum of inventors and individual authors identi-
fied previously, start to grow as corporate actors and to invest an ever increasing 
quantity of resources (in their R&D departments in the case of the former, see 
Drahos and Braithwaite 2002).
Thus, on one side the industry of radio, music, books, cinema and television, 
reaching mass audiences by the end of the period, ascends vertiginously. On 
the other hand, for example, the chemical (with its diverse facets) and pharma-
ceutical industries boom as well.
Next, it should be noted that in this period, many of the aforementioned cog-
nitive capitalists incrementally start to position themselves as the pure capitalist 
class (1), that is as cognitive and physical capitalists combined. The Ford Motor 
Company for example, starts to have its physical assets closely connected to 
the ownership of industrial property rights: brands, designs, patents. Or AT&T 
industries that on one side is based on an enormous quantity of patents and 
rights over telecommunications, and on the other on US $5 billion worth of 
physical resources, and was the most capitalised company in the world in the 
1930s (Johns 2010, 405–412).
Finally, in this period there is a development of the two types of rentier that 
merit a more detailed analysis than we will give here. Paradoxically, the most 
pertinent aspect is that they merge and to a certain extent become part of the 
same class, the analogue financial rentiers (3 and 7). That means, the finan-
cialisation of the economy by means of the mass expansion of shares, govern-
ment bonds and other financial instruments, partially dilutes the origin of their 
assets. In the secondary market, the holders of these instruments don’t differ-
entiate if their rights pertain to cinematographic works or mineral resources. 
We label them with the adjective ‘analogue’ to highlight that their operations 
depend on technologies of processing and storing information of the following 
type: the telegraph and the telephone, paper and the typewriter, the pen and the 
banknote. This, of course, will change in the subsequent period.
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6.6 Classes in Informational Capitalism
This section covers a period that begins halfway through the 1970s and takes 
us up to the present day. The first classes that concern us here are, naturally, the 
cognitive workers and capitalists. These take the specific form of informational 
workers and capitalists (6 and 2). What do we mean when we refer to infor-
mational work? An activity in which the worker has a PC, tablet, netbook – or 
something similar – as a principal work tool and whose principal output in the 
productive process is an informational good – that basically produces digital 
information (Zukerfeld 2013). The output of informational workers could usu-
ally be reproduced by close to zero marginal costs. Thus, when capitalists buy 
labour time from the informational workers, they receive a product that bears 
reproducible knowledge. Indeed, it is not uncommon for informational work-
ers to turn out to be exploited both through alienation and through reproduc-
tion in the same productive process.
Informational work has been measured particularly in the USA and it has 
been found that at the beginning of the millennium it already occupied the 
greater part of the work force (Apte and Nath 2007; Wolf 2006). Definitively, in 
its activity, access to physical ownership over the productive resource par excel-
lence (digital technologies, with falling prices for a constant capacity) doesn’t 
carry great costs or importance, except for their own cognitive resources 
applied during the productive process and now objectified in an informational 
good, regulated fundamentally by intellectual property.
An important point in relation to this type of worker – and that is related, 
among other things, to the ambivalence of their main instrument of labour – is 
that their cognitive resources, in contrast with the previous stage, aren’t nec-
essarily acquired in formal institutions, or rather, that these skilled workers 
don’t necessarily have formal qualifications. The instrument of labour itself is a 
powerful tool for the incorporation of informal knowledge (through tutorials, 
videos, forums etc.). In the same way, the previously mentioned ambivalence of 
this tool is manifested in its potential to construct networks of recognition, or 
social capital in Bourdieu’s terminology (1985). At the same time, it is impor-
tant to note that – unlike the workers of the previous stage, liberal profession-
als and physical workers in the service sectors – informational workers have a 
smooth path to freelance work (5). Certainly, the falling prices of the means of 
production such as the computer, are a defining factor. But not only that: the 
infrastructure that an informational worker requires (space, energy, devices of 
a different nature like modems, telephones, etc.) is easily assimilated into either 
the domestic environment itself or a less costly (in relative terms) space. Natu-
rally, the conditions of the infrastructure, although in different proportions, are 
also modified in the case of companies.
In the capitalist sphere, the most profitable economic activities are concen-
trated in the exclusive form of intellectual property, but in addition, these are 
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the most diverse: the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry, the audio-
visual and music content industry, software production and informatics ser-
vices; all these productive areas come together in the stratum of informational 
capitalist (2), that is constituted as a hegemonic fraction of capital during 
this period. Said heterogeneity and unity corresponds, naturally, to the mar-
riage that the institution of intellectual property had managed to consummate 
between knowledge with an industrial or technological application and artistic 
knowledge, that up until the 1970s had not combined. Indeed, just as the access 
to goods regulated by private property loses significance in the face of access 
to knowledge for the informational worker, this type of capitalist is not con-
cerned with monopolising physical intensive resources, but rather, and above 
all, knowledge intensive resources. In this regard, Nike is a good example, not 
owning ‘a single factory, or machinery, equipment or real estate property’ but 
only intellectual property (Rifkin 2000, 32). That said, if a company like Nike 
represents the ideal type of informational capitalist, the case of the Ford Motor 
Company represents the ideal type of pure capitalist (1). Indeed, a significant 
layer of capitalists base their profits on patents, or more generically, on intel-
lectual property rights over their products or parts of them and, at the same 
time, on the sale of these articles. So it is that Ford (but also Sony and oth-
ers) own both factories and R&D laboratories. A particular characteristic that 
capitalists assume in this period is that if, to some degree, they need the indus-
trial workers, they have a much greater need for the informational worker, and 
consequently their research departments. In fact, the product life cycle is an 
important factor: the profits of these capitalists come much more from new and 
innovative products than from the prolonged sale of a standardized product.
The quantitative growth of informational workers takes place in a 
simultaneous – and complementary – way alongside the quantitative growth 
of physical workers, particularly a fraction of precarious manual workers (8) 
and the excluded (9), radically increasing the polarisation between these classes 
(Castells 1998; Rifkin 2000; Fuchs and Sandoval 2014). The well-known fact 
that Nike’s subcontractors utilise child and semi-slave labour to lower their 
costs points to this relationship between informational capitalists and workers 
on the one hand and precarious manual workers, on the other (Rifkin 2000, 75). 
This is a stratum of ‘vulnerable’ physical workers (Castel 2009) concentrated in 
the marginal elements of the productive processes, although not completely 
excluded from them. In contrast, the excluded (8) (Castel 2009; Nun 2003), 
in the present stage take the concrete form of the chronically unemployed and 
structurally impoverished. This social class, unlike the vulnerable group, ‘are 
superfluous, they are not needed’ (Nun 2003), but they also manifest an unu-
sual quantitative explosion (Castells 1998). Naturally, the watershed between 
these two classes is very diffuse. Although nation states in different locations 
and decades adopt varying attitudes regarding these sectors, the most pertinent 
difference compared with the previous period is that the capitalist productive 
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processes make do without them. Thus, whether we’re dealing with subsidised 
poor or those completely without assistance, the productive apparatus experi-
ences them more as a dead weight than as a source of energy.
Lastly, it remains to emphasise that digitalisation increases global integration 
of the cognitive and physical rentiers, between sectors and nations. No longer 
are there analogue rentiers, but rather digital rentiers who deal in informational 
goods: money, after all, is essentially a kind of digital information. Of course, 
the possibilities of an acceleration of the monetary multiplier which digital 
technologies bring are huge, and encourages ‘rentierism’ to move rapidly from 
one productive sector to another.
In sum, this chapter has attempted to put into motion a series of catego-
ries. Here at the end of our trajectory we consider it appropriate to point out 
some of its limitations. Indeed, to be able to give an account of the historical 
and conceptual exercise which we have attempted, we have evaded a whole 
series of important debates. For example, we did not engage with other theories 
about class and we only mentioned in a very incomplete way which ideas we 
have borrowed from those theories and which not. We have not included any 
review of the literature about social stratification and our historical references 
have been brief, simplistic and overly accommodating. Likewise, we have not 
engaged enough with the issue of exploitation, its different kinds according to 
cognitive materialism and its links with classes. With these and other issues we 
have treated certain questions as axiomatic when in fact they should instead 
have been presented as hypotheses, given that they are open to many alterna-
tive perspectives. However, this has been a consequence of choice rather than 
absolute necessity. In this instance we preferred to concentrate on outlining a 
proposal, rather than tracing the divisions and contours of the arguments prof-
fered by others.
Access to Physical Intensive Resources





Exclusive 1. Capitalists 2. Informational 
Capitalists
3. Digital Rentiers







No access 7. Digital 
Rentiers
8. Preca rious 
Manual Workers
9. Excluded
Table 6.4: Classes in informational capitalism.
Source: Yansen and Zukerfeld 2016.
Conclusions
I
All readers of essayist or academic books yearn to find a summary at the end. 
Sometimes this is due to needing to be apprised of, or even formulate vehement 
opinions about books, we have neither the time nor the inclination to read. We 
shall contribute to this worthy custom with the synopsis that follows.
This book was structured around a line of argument that sprang from 
the following question: How do all goods and subjects relate to capitalism 
(understood as a totality that governs our societies)? We argued that, in the 
last instance, it is through two types of regulations: those shaped by physical 
property and by intellectual property, which in general act simultaneously. 
This rests on the fact that goods and subjects are made up of variable com-
binations of two entities: physical matter and knowledge matter. Then, we 
presented a comparison between these two entities in philosophical, physi-
cal, and economic terms. For the two latter categories, we stated that while 
physical matter is consumed in the process of its productive use, knowledge 
matter does not erode in this way; while the former can only be transformed, 
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knowledge can be accumulated. However, knowledge does not exist as an 
immaterial entity (contrary to arguments sustained by numerous authors), 
but instead exists as an emergent property of physical matter. This led us to 
propose a materialist analysis of knowledge. Indeed, the particular character-
istics of any physical bearer of knowledge condition several of the ontologi-
cal, economic and legal properties that such knowledge matter assumes. For 
example, that the abstract idea of a wheel can become knowledge either as a 
reification in a determined object, a codification in a text, or an individual 
mental representation (three different bearers), confers very varied possibili-
ties to this knowledge: of, as the case may be, being transmitted widely, being 
considered useful, or falling into oblivion.
So to recap exactly from p. 51 we can say, cognitive materialism has been 
located in relation to gnoseological traditions. It is proposed as a third position 
confronting epistemology, on the one hand, and Marxism and the sociology of 
knowledge, on the other. In all cases what is fundamental is that the disciplines 
that have studied knowledge share the practice of having understood it as a 
product of human – individual, collective etc. – subjects.
The bulk of the epistemological tradition is idealist, in two senses. Firstly, 
for locating these discussions around the truth-falsity axis; specifically, for the 
association between epistemology and the truth-falsity axis, rather than the link 
between knowledge and truth. Secondly, the subject whose possibilities of know-
ing are explored is either a universal, ahistorical, completely abstract subject, or 
an embodiment of the systematic thinker: the philosopher or the scientist.
The tradition of Marxism and the sociology of knowledge, in contrast, 
gravitates around three ideas: (i) knowledge is a product of material, concrete, 
empirical and contingent human subjects, and not of transcendental beings 
like those of epistemology, (ii) the subjects elaborating those knowledges are 
conditioned or determined by diverse factors, in general social in nature, (iii) as 
a consequence, in order to study the features of knowledge, these factors should 
be elucidated and studied.
From the perspective of cognitive materialism, these previous approaches 
have three limitations which can be identified: idealism, humanism, and the 
lack of a definition of knowledge. Ergo, the next step was to define our approach 
on the basis of its features as follows: materialist, emergentist, dialectical, non-
humanist, scientific, and cognitive.
In order to study knowledge empirically, it is necessary to grasp its material-
ity: not only the ‘idea’ of the wheel (epistemology), or the social insertion of the 
subjects that create it (Marxism, sociology), but also the concrete materiality 
of the knowledge in question: the sensual object, the textual description, or the 
mental image of a given individual, and the translations between all these bear-
ers. Thus, both the question of what knowledge is (chapter 1), and the question 
of how to understand knowledge (chapter 2) led us to the need to study knowl-
edge on the basis of its material bearers.
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Chapter 3 introduced one of cognitive materialism’s central tools: the typol-
ogy of knowledge based on its material bearers. This enabled us to distinguish 
between knowledge with biological, subjective, intersubjective, and objective 
bearers. Biological knowledge includes the genetic, endocrinological and neural 
information flows of living beings. Subjective knowledge includes the explicit 
and implicit memories of an individual’s mind. Intersubjective knowledge rests 
on social groups. It comprises five sub-types: linguistic (knowledge about codi-
fying, decodifying and creating intersubjective codes), recognition (knowledge 
of others and of the self, the glue of social networks, similar to ‘social capital’ or 
‘know who’), organisational (knowledge that arises in any form of division of 
labour or other activities), axiological (intersubjective beliefs and values) and 
normative (regulations internalised by people and usually enacted by the law – 
physical property and intellectual property are the two main types of normative 
intersubjective knowledge). Objective knowledge encompasses technologies 
on the one hand (among them, digital technologies), and information on the 
other. As is well known, information and, particularly, digital information, has 
marginal costs close to zero. We call this the replicability of digital information.
We used the term Cognitive Material Configuration (CMC) to describe the 
totality of this variety of knowledge for a historically determined situation. Of 
course, the knowledges of a particular cognitive material configuration (an 
institution, a society, an epoch) present all kinds of contradictions. Normative 
intersubjective knowledge is an especially significant group, as it forms part of a 
totality with which it is in a dialectical relationship. The cognitive material con-
figuration has a relationship with normative knowledge which is in many ways 
similar to the relationship posited by Marxist theory between productive forces 
and the social relations of production: faced with a particular development of 
the former, adaptive changes are produced to the latter. By way of an example, 
the cognitive material configurations of the three periods of capitalism (mercan-
tile, industrial and informational) were characterised in a condensed fashion.
While chapter 3 was dedicated to stocks of knowledges, presenting them as 
immobile, chapter 4 introduced the categories necessary to understand the 
dynamics in order to give an account of the flows of different types of knowl-
edges. The principal concept, in this sense, is translation: a translation is the 
movement of knowledge from one bearer to another. This occurs perpetually: 
from an individual representation to objectification in an artefact, from a tex-
tual codification to an individual piece of knowledge etc. The movements from 
bearer to bearer, however, are not neutral: they modify the ownership of knowl-
edge, operate changes to relations of power etc.
For the purposes of discussing the translations to human bearers it was nec-
essary to introduce the concept of attention and to address its special features 
in informational capitalism: while information is superabundant and, in gen-
eral terms, cheap, attention is scarce and valuable. However, the most impor-
tant type of translation we presented is the one we designated the name of 
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productive processes. These can be organised around two variables: (i) whether 
they are commodity productive processes or not; (ii) whether they produce 
goods, physical services, or cognitive services. The combinations of these vari-
ables generate six categories.
Next, within the commodity productive processes we defined a particu-
lar type: capitalist productive processes and then, on that basis, the capitalist 
system as a whole. From these definitions three characteristic concepts arose: 
exploitation, expropriation, and regulation.
The lengthy chapter 5 concentrated on these three concepts, particularly 
exploitation. First we discussed the generic, ahistorical concepts of exploitation, 
expropriation and regulation. We asserted that exploitation relates to the asym-
metrical exchanges that occur within productive processes, which result in one 
of the parties, the exploiter, obtaining a greater economic value than the other 
and that this is obtained at the expense of the latter. Expropriation, by contrast, 
entails the direct confiscation of resources – often with no compensation – that, 
decisively, occurs within the sphere of exchange and not that of production. 
Regulation, for its part, consists of the imposition of norms (legally sanctioned 
or by other means) that frame exploitation and expropriation. In each case, after 
the generalities, we discussed the capitalist particularities of each concept. In 
this way we arrived at the central object of this chapter: capitalist exploitation.
Capitalist exploitation means the appropriation (neither violent nor illegal) 
by the capitalists of surplus value that arises from the partially or completely 
unremunerated knowledge produced by or borne by other subjects. This exploi-
tation takes three forms: exploitation through alienation (the traditional mode 
described by Marx, based on the idea that it is the capitalist who owns the 
product that is a result of the labour time), exploitation through reproduction 
(the mode through which the capitalist translates the knowledge that was pos-
sessed by the workers into a codified bearer in their ownership, without cor-
responding compensation), and exploitation through attention (the mode by 
which capitalists capture the scarce attention of subjects in order to inoculate 
them with certain knowledges).
Naturally, the theory of exploitation is related to a theory of stratification and 
classes which was the object of this book’s final chapter.
Thus, chapter 6 advances a theory of classes for different stages of capitalism. 
To arrive at this theory of classes, two types of concepts developed in previ-
ous chapters were operationally defined. On the one hand, a division was pre-
sented between two types of resources: those which are physically intensive, and 
those which are knowledge intensive. This meant operationalising the entities 
physical matter and knowledge matter in concrete goods, those in which one or 
other entity predominates in economic terms. On the other hand, the study of 
normative knowledge was summarised. The categories of physical and intellec-
tual property were operationalised into three alternative conditions of access to 
these resources: exclusive access (applicable to physical or intellectual property), 
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non-exclusive access, and no access. Combining the different types of resource 
with the different types of access, a general proposal for a theory of classes was 
presented. At the most general level, we distinguished between those who obtain 
their income from some form of exclusive access or property and those who 
earn it from selling their labour power. The former group, capitalists, includes, 
in addition to capitalists strictly defined, two sub-groups: cognitive capitalists 
and physical capitalists. Additionally the extended capitalist family includes two 
types of rentier: cognitive and physical. For their part, the workers include prin-
cipally cognitive workers and physical workers, but there are also self-employed 
workers and excluded workers. Then this schema was applied, in a simplified 
way, to various periods. We analysed strata in the transition from feudalism 
to mercantile capitalism, the subsequent transition to industrial capitalism (in 
which two clearly differentiated stages were distinguished), and finally, in the 
current transformation into informational capitalism.
II
When the time comes to form a general opinion about the theory presented in 
this book, it is possible that the reader may harbour some doubts and disagree-
ments. These apprehensions, in all probability, point to the jumble of incom-
plete and unresolved issues that have fallen by the wayside. The objective we set 
out to fulfil was broad, as is the number of loose ends that have been left hang-
ing. However, this does not necessarily constitute a flaw. Faced with these pend-
ing tasks (the uncited references, discussions evaded, data not included), the 
question is: can they be tackled in other, complementary, studies? Or, on the 
contrary, does this proposal contain such inherent limitations that this book 
represents the apex of its possibilities rather than the bottom rung? This is up to 
the reader to judge. In any case, the question of limitations and shortfalls brings 
us to another point we must address, that of future lines of investigations: in 
which direction to continue? What further research should be undertaken on 
the basis of the theory advanced here? And perhaps, how to approach it? Next, 
with these questions in mind, some comments will be made about the lacunae 
in this text, suggestions about ways to resolve them and, more generally, pro-
posals for future research. These comments are organised around three axes: 
theoretical, historical, and empirical.
In terms of the theoretical axis there are at least four pending areas. The first 
is that of value theories. A significant limitation consists of not having devel-
oped a knowledge theory of value. On discussing the theory of exploitation in 
chapter 5, and also in other passages, we have highlighted some deficiencies we 
find in the Marxist theory of value. The limitations of other value theories, i.e. 
neoclassical and Sraffian, are hardly trivial either. In all three cases we believe 
that the role of knowledges in the creation of value is insufficiently considered. 
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However, we have not systematically developed these criticisms, nor have we 
advanced an alternative theory, a knowledge value theory, although it has been 
implicitly suggested. Therefore, a future project, at least, is to develop a system-
atic critique of Marxist, neoclassical, and Sraffian value theories from a cog-
nitive materialist perspective. Ergo, the development of a knowledge theory 
of value, that is, a theory specifically designed on the basis of the cognitive 
materialist approach, is desirable.
The second, third, and fourth areas concern power, money and affects: three 
central themes that we have not explored. The second we barely touched on, 
though we did make some tangential allusions to the conterminous concept 
of domination. The third we referred to only in a marginal comment, and we 
said absolutely nothing about the fourth. These are, of course, all extremely 
important areas with their own influence and independent bodies of literature. 
However, we unite them in this comment for a simple reason. The way in which 
cognitive materialism should approach them is similar. All three cases should be 
analysed as forms of knowledge with different bearers. In effect, when we speak 
about money the fundamental question, from a cognitive materialist perspec-
tive, is where is this money found? Is it money as an intersubjective belief?
Is it regulated by norms that indicate it is a valid form of currency for a given 
society? Is it in the form of linguistic signs shared by an intersubjectivity, or 
knowledges objectified in particular technological artefacts such as gold ingots? 
Is it codified as analogue information in dollar bills, or as digital information 
on hard drives? ‘Money’, considered without differentiating its material bearers, 
can only be studied in an idealist way. In contrast, the type of approach we have 
proposed suggests that it should be studied on the basis of its material bear-
ers. Of course, a cognitive material configuration of money will uncover ten-
sions between different bearers: a norm can assign a price to a local currency 
(for example, saying that ten peso coins are equivalent to a dollar bill) while, 
however, the intersubjective axiology could contradict this norm, assigning it a 
different price (let us say, fifteen pesos per dollar). In turn, the translations that 
occur, the passages from bearer to bearer, have enormous consequences. For 
example, the digitalisation of money was the condition that enabled derived 
financial products to generate the 2008–09 crisis. Similarly with the concept of 
power (and associated concepts such as domination, control, etc.). Power in a 
strict sense is an intersubjective axiological belief. But to study it systematically 
it is necessary to track it through its multiple bearers and, obviously, analyse 
the translations it undergoes. Power exists, unquestionably, in biological bases 
associated, for example, with corporeal forces. Naturally, it also depends on 
the subjective level. There are, therefore, techniques for the subjective exercise 
of power, some of which are well known and applied by businesses’ human 
resources departments. In linguistic intersubjective terms, the disputes over 
imposing certain words to the detriment of others, especially in relation to 
public discourse, have been studied more than on one occasion. With regards 
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to recognition, power is expressed in hierarchy, in authority. As for norms, 
power can be understood as the ability to regulate, impose, or transgress norms 
(although it may be on the micro level). Finally, power is related to objective 
bearers. For example, it is clear that the technological artefacts of war, although 
also architectures of peace, should be considered when attempting to under-
stand the exercise of power.237
In terms of affects, desires, passions, emotions, the fact that we have not con-
sidered them at all is a serious defect of this book, as it has deprived us of engag-
ing, for example, with authors from autonomism and post-structuralism who 
we hold to be of great importance. Therefore, two questions must be underlined 
sharply. First, the study of affects is a crucial phenomenon which helps us to 
understand any human organisation. This implies, on the one hand, rejecting 
the assumption typical of some schools of economics, but also of some forms 
of Marxism, that humans are rational agents, and on the other hand, suggests 
a hypothesis contradicting that adopted by authors from those currents: it is 
not at all evident that the manipulations of affects plays a more significant role 
for informational capitalism (or control societies, empires etc.) than it did for 
industrial capitalism. The second question is the idea already mentioned in 
relation to power and money: affects are forms of knowledge, and should be 
studied as such, that is, on the basis of their material existence in different bear-
ers. Affects (passions, desires etc.) undeniably exist in their biological bearer. It 
would be a grave error, based on a sociological reductionism, to fail to study the 
biological manifestations of passions, starting of course with sexuality. Natu-
rally, on the subjective level we find conscious and unconscious affects. On the 
intersubjective level there are a wide range of affects that society inoculates 
its members with: the axiology of consumption, passion for recognition etc. 
Of course, the regulation of the passions is a constitutive element of any col-
lective human organisation, and in the development of capitalism it assumes 
specific forms. To express this simply, regulations that prohibit certain passions 
in industrial capitalism, encourage them in the informational period. In turn, 
in terms of objectified knowledges for example, certain objects are invested 
with desire: e.g., certain types of clothing, in any period. Thus, three pending 
projects are those that, in theoretical terms, provide an account of power/domi-
nation, money, and affect/desire as cognitive material configurations.
With regards to the axis of historical research, there are three fundamental 
questions. Firstly, the development of the study of the cognitive material con-
figuration of each stage of capitalism. Although we have partially made some 
progress with this project in other works, this has been done on a highly aggre-
gate level. However, a narrower spatio-temporal framework could be fruitful 
for obtaining more fine-grained results. Secondly, we have data which sustains 
the hypothesis that the histories of companies and countries which are success-
ful in the accumulation of capital are riddled with diverse forms of exploita-
tion through reproduction at the outset, in their take-off period. The cases of 
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industrial publishing, chemistry, cinematography, and software in the United 
States, which took off on the basis of unpaid knowledges, constitute simple 
examples. It would be useful then, to trace the evolution and especially the ori-
gins of cognitively successful companies in order to verify whether, effectively, 
exploitation through reproduction is a necessary modality. A third historical 
question concerns the relationship between regulation, expropriation, and 
exploitation in different concrete historical situations. Here we have proposed 
these concepts in an abstract way, but it is highly important to analyse their use-
fulness to account for specific spatio-temporal configurations. Although there 
are partial accounts, they do not integrate the three processes. This is due to 
that fact that where the expropriation of physical matter has been studied, the 
regulation of knowledge matter has not been considered, and vice versa. How-
ever, both regulations (access to physical and knowledge matter) have advanced 
in step with each other throughout the history of capitalism. For example, in 
eighteenth-century England with the enclosures on the one hand, and the legis-
lation and jurisprudence pertaining to copyright and patents on the other, they 
conjointly laid the foundations for the genesis of the industrial period.
The third and final axis concerns empirical studies. A strength and vocation 
of cognitive materialism, as we have pointed out, is that of nourishing itself 
from empirical sources. This is not an essayist or philosophical approach, but a 
social science theory, which must interact with data. However, we have scarcely 
included any data in this book, merely reiterated allusions to the data which 
can be found in previous research that we have based this or that assertion on. 
Quite justifiably the reader could easily demand hic Rhodus, hic salta or, the 
proof of the pudding is in the eating. The impossibility of satisfying this just 
demand here does not, however, prevent us from gesturing towards three ways 
of applying cognitive materialism to empirical primary and secondary sources. 
Here, in addition to mentioning some areas, it is worth referring to some pos-
sible operationalisations.
A first area on this empirical axis concerns the study of the cognitive material 
configuration of productive units. Having a systematic register of the stocks of 
knowledge the unit of production (a company, a state institution) has at its dis-
posal and, especially, of the translations between the different types of knowl-
edge, is essential in order to understand and intervene into the productive pro-
cess that this organisation participates in. In particular, mapping the tensions 
manifested between different types of knowledge (e.g. technologies incompat-
ible with organisational knowledges, knowledges codified as norms which are 
not intersubjectivised, etc.) could be extremely useful in order to streamline 
those productive processes. This project requires additional operationalisations. 
However, they should be concretised for each specific case. Typically, each type 
of knowledge has numerous manifestations that cannot be integrally captured 
in a survey. This obliges us to prioritise certain manifestations. For example, 
in an investigation into the flows of knowledge in public secondary schools 
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in Argentina, taking each type of knowledge as a variable, we had to choose 
dimensions and then indicators which entailed prioritising some aspects and 
sidelining others. For example, when analysing technological knowledges we 
left out (on the basis of criteria related to the particular objectives of that inves-
tigation) blackboards, buildings, and pens and we concentrated on digital tech-
nologies in particular. Zooming in on them, we realised a further adjustment 
through constructing indicators related to hardware and connectivity.
A second area concerns the study of different forms of exploitation through 
reproduction. In effect, while exploitation through alienation is widely known, 
this modality has been studied less. However, several investigations have made 
contributions (Yansen 2015; Dolcemascolo 2014; Liaudat 2014). One way of oper-
ationalising this analysis is to track the translations across different knowledge 
bearers and their relationships with the norms that frame them. In the particular 
case of exploitation through reproduction that occurs on the internet, it seems 
useful to include the study of different flows that circulate (money, attention, con-
tents, advertising, see Dolcemáscolo 2014). But exploitation through reproduc-
tion, as we asserted, can be found in working environments, the sphere of science, 
in relation to ‘traditional knowledge’ and a diversity of combined situations.
Of course, following the flows of knowledges we inevitably encounter 
humans. Some of them act as exploiters, others exploited. But there are also 
those who participate in the process without being on either of those two 
extremes. In order to analyse these actors (as well as non-human bearers), in 
other texts we have had recourse, with slight alterations, to Latour’s (2005) con-
cepts of mediators and intermediaries (Kreimer and Zukerfeld 2014). These 
enable us to give an account of the humans and non-humans that carry those 
knowledges without modifying them (intermediaries) and those that introduce 
important translations (mediators).
The third area of an empirical character consists of the empirical study of 
the class schema in concrete societies. The analysis presented here remains at 
an aggregate level. However, there is nothing to prevent operationalising it for 
each country. Of course, the occupational statistics for many countries are lim-
ited, but that should not completely obstruct advances being made with these 
secondary sources. In turn, useful contributions can be made through pri-
mary sources. In qualitative terms, the realisation of comparative case studies 
between different classes in concrete societies should generate fertile ground.
III
What of public policies? It could be imagined that a theoretical book such as 
this would not generate recommendations along these lines. However, here we 
would like to make five suggestions which are simple to enumerate, but natu-
rally not necessarily easy to implement.
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Firstly, the statistical systems should be adapted, in the least worse way pos-
sible, in order to measure knowledges. Since the pioneering works of Machlup 
(1962) and Porat (1977), it has been well understood that measuring knowl-
edge in economic terms is as difficult as it is necessary and, in turn, that rea-
sonable approximations can be achieved even in the face of the existing statis-
tical apparatuses. However, measures such as educational certification in the 
labour market, patents awarded, expenditure on R&D and the like, are simply 
not sufficient. We need to be able to measure unaccredited subjective knowl-
edges, intersubjective and objective knowledges;, in other words, we need the 
power of the state to be able to develop statistical systems. This is a pending 
project which went unmentioned in areas for further research because it does 
not depend on individual researchers, but instead requires the political will of 
state organisations.
Secondly: knowledge should be overseen at a ministerial level. The dispersal 
of the production and distribution of knowledge across a myriad of institutions 
without much coordination imposes a significant limitation on the develop-
ment of countries. Therefore, at the very least – and without requiring the vio-
lent incorporation of a materialist perspective overnight – the subordination 
of various portfolios related to knowledge (starting with the traditional science 
and technology, innovation, education, culture) under a specific institution, a 
ministry of knowledge.
Thirdly, there is a case in which it is necessary to implement an adaptation on 
the basis of cognitive materialism: that of knowledges with an objective bearer. 
That is, in informational capitalism an institution is needed which would cen-
tralise the diverse areas related to digital technology and information. Their 
dispersal across a diversity of state departments generates all kinds of redun-
dancies, inefficiency, and unnecessary transaction costs.
Fourthly, labour legislation should consider the production of knowledges. 
Workers’ rights, particularly but not exclusively those of cognitive workers, should 
include both the knowledges they objectify in the product of their labour as well as 
the knowledges that are so often reproduced without those workers receiving any 
specific compensation. This implies that labour legislation should surpass the con-
cept of time to settle on knowledge as the basis of what is disputed between capital 
and labour. The cases of professions in which knowledges are copied without com-
pensation and subsequently generate unemployment on the basis of exploitation 
through reproduction (as with the example of teachers mentioned in chapter 5) 
will drag this problem into the public arena sooner rather than later.
Fifthly, and finally, intellectual property legislation, in a broad sense, should 
adapt to the necessities of the development of a country: in other words, it must 
do what the successful countries did (maximise exploitation through repro-
duction by means of specific regulations) and not what they tell others to do 




Beyond the virtues and defects of the contents presented on the surface of this 
book, in terms of form we have attempted to provoke dialogue across a plu-
rality of diverse academic fields. This attempt includes a stance that should be 
elucidated with precision and that implies distinguishing between two terms 
that have proliferated in contemporary social sciences, treated almost synony-
mously. One of them is multiplicity and the other is plurality. Both are extolled 
and seem to point to the same phenomenon: celebrating diversity, denouncing 
the silencing of difference and the repression of the Other etc. However, in our 
view both are quite distinct. After a long period of hegemony enjoyed by the 
so-called ‘dogmatic’ or totalitarian discourses, multiplicity now reigns in the 
social sciences and humanities: new academic fields spring up constantly, with 
their own referential authors, concepts and institutions. Diversity is thriving 
and there is no kind of opposition to it. The most miscellaneous knowledges are 
tolerated by the academic community in a way that would have been inconceiv-
able a few decades ago. The postmodern thaw bathes all shorelines. However, 
and this is the key point, all these autonomous fields that respect the existence of 
others have not the least interest in fostering dialogue between them. If by dia-
logue we do not mean exchanging opinions with those who think exactly alike.
Among other motives, the logic of accumulation within the same field, so 
favoured by the current regulations of the scientific system, discourages any 
search for translation of foreign concepts. It is much more efficient to adhere 
to a tendency, or an association, and remain there for one’s entire academic 
or intellectual life. It is true that many academics or intellectuals occasionally 
change their research interests, their theoretical points of reference, their con-
cepts. Unfortunately, in the vast majority of cases, this is due to direct or indi-
rect financial incentives: typically, concepts endorsed by international organi-
sations or the whims of bureaucrats. On the other hand dialogue, as a radical 
practice, is seen as a distraction, as a demonstration of a lack of seriousness. In 
this reign of multiplicity, difference is tolerated while it is autonomous, while 
there is no argument or controversy. Why debate and attempt to reach agree-
ment if each academic atom can have its own research group, journal, and con-
cepts? Let us avoid the overly frustrating loss of time that debate implies. Set 
aside the exhausting effort to convince the Other, and acrimony in the face of 
defeat. Why oblige the Other to speak our language? Just allow the otherness 
to flow, adrift on its own contingencies. Put to one side our repudiation of a 
colleague’s paper (the expression of which would lead to an irksome argument) 
and shake their hand saying that we found it ‘very interesting’. We should even 
raise a toast, be friends and commingle in a heartfelt embrace. But never, under 
any circumstances, should we get ourselves entangled in debate and even less 
one in which their arguments would oblige us to change the orientation of our 
own analyses and research. By no means should we interfere in their world of 
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beliefs – to do so would be an intolerable act of violence – and in exchange 
they should not trespass in ours. Ultimately, each will continue their process of 
academic, intellectual, and political accumulation; the postmodern multiplicity 
has room for infinite independent fiefdoms. If academic conferences are per-
fectly designed for mingling, drinking alcohol and political accumulation, why 
spoil them with debate? Thus, multiplicity, in the guise of a love of difference, is 
nothing less than its most profound negation. Behind the sophisticated loquac-
ity alluding to the liberation of the diverse, hides a profound lack of commit-
ment towards the Other. In turn, behind the critique of rationality, and the 
vindication of instant gratification and the event, lurk all kinds of speculations 
and unutterable calculations. Favouring multiplicity, especially in its Dionysian 
consumerist version, is a profit maximising strategy, for all that it presents itself 
as an ethical choice. In sum, behind the celebration of multiplicity is concealed 
a profound rejection of dialogue, of plurality.
Plurality, at least as it is understood here, includes but transcends multi-
plicity (dogmatism, multiplicity and plurality configure the three moments of 
a dialectical movement, of course). It is imperative to respect diversity, but 
this respect can only be consummated in the framework of dialogue. Dialogue 
entails a certain degree of commitment, a certain mutual recognition, a shared 
vocabulary, that does not necessarily mean accepting the position of the Other 
as correct. On the contrary, dialogue only has meaning as the confirmation of 
and critical respect towards difference, but with its incorporation into a total-
ity. The search for languages in common is, therefore, an essentially political 
activity: that of including but not silencing the constitutive tensions of each 
totality.
The typology of knowledges on the basis of their material bearers, for exam-
ple, seeks to offer a conceptual terrain on which different knowledges can 
express their differences. Thus, an important parameter by which to evaluate 
this study is how far it stimulates exchange between the varied discourses we 
have invoked in these pages. We hope that Marxists, postmodernists, post-
structuralists, economists, lawyers, scholars of communication, sociologists, 
proponents of systems thinking, and others, will agree on two points by the end 
of this book. On the one hand, that there are defects – several in each case – in 
our theory. But, on the other hand, that there has been the chance to enter into 
dialogue with proposals, not so much our own, but those from other authors, 
other books, other fields than those they usually frequent. Having achieved that 
will suffice for us to feel satisfied with the project here undertaken.
It is no mystery that the notion of dialectics was, at its origin, associated 
with dialogue. Especially, in the earlier works of Plato, the need to per-
sonify the different forms of knowledge expressed through this discursive 
modality. However, over recent years, a number of the ideological features 
of informational capitalism which deserve a detailed exploration have come 
to associate the notions of dialectics, totality, and negativity with Marxist 
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or capitalist totalitarianisms, with the rejection of difference and cultural 
diversity. Below the surface of this book we have attempted to show that 
this is a grave mistake and that, on the contrary, the notion of dialectical 
totality offers fertile ground for those who would encourage plurality. The 
dialectical totality should return to being an integrating and transcending 
dialogue, a dialogue that strives to include difference (rather than ignoring 
it while applauding), dialogue capable of integrating even the ideas of those 
who debase the dialectic.
V
What of political action? Micro or macropolitics? Political parties? The hori-
zontal democracy of networks? Class struggle? The struggle against patriarchy? 
The destruction of the ecosystem? Wealth redistribution? Is this a work critical 
of capitalism or not? In other words, if this theory is correct in any way, what 
is to be done? We do have opinions about some of these questions; about oth-
ers we do not. But in any case, here we will not spend time on them. Why? 
Because we prefer to take shelter in an idea that Slavoj Žižek and Manuel Cas-
tells shared, two great thinkers who otherwise have little in common. This idea 
stems from inverting Marx’s legendary thesis 11 (‘Philosophers have hitherto 
only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it’).
One is therefore tempted to turn around Marx’s thesis 11: the first task 
today is precisely NOT to succumb to the temptation to act, to directly 
intervene and change things (which then inevitably ends in a cul-de-sac 
of debilitating impossibility: “what can one do against the global capi-
tal?”), but to question the hegemonic ideological coordinates. (Žižek 
2002, 544)
There is, in effect, a particular impatience to act, for immediate practice, to 
search for recipes for political action which assume that theoretical questions 
have already been resolved (by Marx, Deleuze, or whoever). The succession of 
failures and frustrations that abounded in the twentieth century should suffice 
as indicators that the theoretical foundations upon which were raised the most 
praiseworthy and committed initiatives, were more fragile than was believed. 
This leads us, once again, to underline that the category of action (and political 
action as its prototype, as Arendt pointed out) is not the basic substance for 
social science; that place belongs to knowledge. We need political action, of 
course, but action dialectically related to knowledge (and this is not resolved by 
sprinkling the word praxis here and there). The time has come for emancipa-
tory projects to free themselves from action emptied of theory on the one hand, 
which brandishes, even with pride, its incapacity to understand and transform 
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the capitalist totality, but also from action born of a dogmatic construct and 
intolerance of uncertainty. As Castells states:
I come from a time and a tradition, the political left of the industrial 
era, obsessed by the inscription on Marx’s tomb at Highgate, his (and 
Engel’s) Eleventh thesis on Feuerbach. Transformative political action 
was the ultimate goal of a truly meaningful intellectual endeavour. I still 
believe that there is considerable generosity in this attitude, certainly 
less selfish than the orderly pursuit of bureaucratic academic careers, 
undisturbed by the labours of people around the world. […] I have seen 
so much misled sacrifice, so many dead ends induced by ideology, and 
such horrors provoked by artificial paradises of dogmatic politics that 
I want to convey a salutary reaction against trying to frame political 
practice in accordance with social theory, or, for that matter, with ide-
ology. […] The most fundamental political liberation is for people to 
free themselves from uncritical adherence to theoretical or ideological 
schemes, to construct their practice on the basis of their experience, 
while using whatever information or analysis is available to them from 
a variety of sources. In the twentieth century, philosophers have been 
trying to change the world. In the twenty-first century, it is time to inter-
pret it differently. (Castells 1998, 358–359)
Our work comes from a time and tradition partly different from and partly 
coincident with Castells’. It is not traversed by Marxist dogma, but rather by 
the still thunderous echoes of the genocide which occurred in Argentina in 
the 1970s. It is not the inscriptions on famous tombs that ignite our activity, 
but the unmarked mass graves of thousands of the disappeared who gave their 
lives trying to build a more just world. Or, more precisely, it is not even these 
massacred beautiful willpowers that appear before us every day we write, but 
the mutilated lives of those who survived and stayed afloat on little vessels of 
quiet dignity.
Those of us who navigate on those vessels, those of us who saw the noblest 
dreams go adrift and sink, and especially, those who choose to dedicate our-
selves to the social sciences because we believe that they still have much to 
contribute to the construction of fairer, more equal, and freer societies, must 
tread a narrow path: tracing out maps without imposing the way of travelling 
them, being rigorous while at the same time enjoying our activity, committing 
ourselves without losing pluralism and aiming to understand the world with-
out being indifferent to it. This is what we have attempted in this book.
Notes
 1 With regards to the original proposal, four chapters have been left out for 
the purposes of conciseness and flow of argumentation. Three of these con-
sisted of discussions of various bodies of literature that have contributed 
to a materialist approach to knowledge. The first concerns the theory of 
public goods (and those related: club goods, knowledge networks etc). The 
second concerns the debates around the opposition between tacit and codi-
fied knowledge. In the third, the debates with various tendencies from the 
social sciences in general, and economics in particular are the basis for the 
typology presented in chapter 3. For the interested reader, these works are 
available in Spanish, and will hopefully soon be published in English as 
journal articles.
   The fourth chapter that has been removed is much more relevant and 
polemical. This concerns the presentation of a knowledge theory of value, 
subsequent to discussing the contributions and limitations of the Marxian, 
neoclassical, and Sraffian theories of value. Besides the prohibitive length of 
this chapter, I decided that the thread of the argument in chapters 4, 5, and 6 
would be interrupted by the lengthy parenthesis that including a discussion 
of value would entail. Regardless of this reasoning, I am not entirely con-
vinced that the choice to remove this chapter was the correct course of action.
 2 Of course, the argument I will present is not that there is a myriad of partial 
truths and that therefore we must speak of knowledges because we have 
the truths of the indigenous peoples, of science, of common sense, and all 
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should be equally respected, in other words that we should use knowledges 
by virtue of postmodern relativism. On the contrary, I intend to advance a 
materialist use of the concept of knowledge that should completely distance 
it from the truth-falsity axis.
 3 The expression ‘intellectual property’ rights includes, at present, a wide 
bundle of regulations of knowledge: among them are patents, copyrights, 
trademarks, trade secrets, and others which are less common such as tra-
ditional knowledge, right of publicity and sui generis rights. The idea that 
these rights form part of the same cohesive whole, and that they bear a 
resemblance to the concept of property has been diligently constructed over 
the last few decades. For a summary of these issues see Merges, Menell, and 
Lemley 2006 and Zukerfeld 2010, Volume 2.
 4 This point is explored in more detail in a previous study (Zukerfeld 2010, 
Volume 2, chapters 3 and 4).
 5 This clarification follows an insightful suggestion by Prof. Christian Fuchs.
 6 The pre-Socratic period runs from 585 BCE to 463 BCE. It should be noted 
that they considered themselves to be physiologists and not philosophers – 
this term would not acquire definition until Plato.
 7 The metaphor of fire as a foundational element is also expressed in the 
myth of Prometheus: humanity gains access to fire (knowledge, technology, 
power) thanks to their intrepidity. In turn, Heraclitus’ conception of humid-
ity as alien to the equilibrium of logos, as opposed to brilliant fire config-
ures the first philosophical critique of inebriation: a fragment is preserved in 
which the Ephesian thinker deplores those who go about ‘with a moist soul’.
 8 It is unavoidable to mention that this simple idea is much more accurate 
than the profusion of nonsense about the ‘immaterial’ and ‘intangible’ 
which we are inundated with in postmodernity. When our typology of 
knowledge is presented in chapter 3 this kinship should become clearer.
 9 For a defense of Epicurus confronting the criticisms of Cicero and others, 
Marx’s elegant doctoral thesis [1841](2000) can be consulted.
 10 In The Book of the Balance of Wisdom, he proposed that the gravity and the 
gravitational potential energy of a body varied depending on its distance 
from the centre of the Earth, anticipating Newton.
 11 In effect:
Finally, therefore, we discover the problem of physical material science 
to be to refer natural phenomena back to unchangeable attractive and 
repulsive forces whose intensity depends wholly upon distance. (Helm-
holtz, cited in Einstein and Infield 1958, 58).
 12 A example of this is that in his Lectures on Physics, the Nobel Prize winner 
for Physics Richard Feynman asserts that if, anticipating some catastrophe, 
there were a single concept from science that must transmitted in order 
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to begin reconstructing contemporary knowledge, it would be the atomic 
hypothesis: all things are made of tiny particles in perpetual movement and 
attract or repel each other according to particular circumstances (Feynman, 
Leighton, and Sands 1963).
 13 Indeed, according to Einstein, before the theory of the electromagnetic 
field, that is at the beginning of the nineteenth century, all physics seemed 
to be constructed on the idea of matter (Einstein and Infeld 1938, 256).
 14 Of course, the emergence of the idea of energy is inseparable from the rise 
of industrialism and its machines, and the human being domesticating the 
energies of nature. In other studies we have engaged with this connection, 
which cannot be discussed here (see Zukerfeld 2010,Volume. 2).
 15 Contrary to the view of Galileo-Newton-Helmholtz, forces become ener-
gies, and cannot be explained by mass-matter. The energy field appears as 
an irreducible ontological reality.
 16 For example, Miller tackles it thus in Living Systems:
Mass and energy are equivalent. One can be converted into the other 
in accordance with the relation that rest mass energy is equal to the 
mass times the square of the velocity of light. Because of the known 
relationship between matter and energy, throughout this chapter I use 
the joint term matter-energy except where one or the other is specifically 
intended. (Miller 1978, 5)
 17 Of course, some clarifications have to be made, but they are not relevant at 
this stage in the development of the argument. Indeed, ‘matter’ and energy 
may have different regulations in other aspects. For example, nuclear 
energy is subject to specific regulations, but this derives from the magni-
tude of power it represents, and not from the fact that it is energy. Radio-
active materials must also abide by non-proprietary regulations. That is, 
under capitalism there evidently exist other regulations that surpass forms 
of property, and these are distributed in many ways over the different enti-
ties. The point is that in the basic aspect, property relations, capital treats 
physical matter as a whole.
 18 I owe a debt of gratitude to Christian Fuchs for suggesting the use of this 
expression.
 19 Again this is a phenomenon which is neither alien to, nor completely deter-
mined by, the history of capitalist development (Zukerfeld 2010, Volume 3).
 20 The relationship of the signifier with the Aristotelian form is self-evident.
 21 As Morin points out:
Information is a central yet problematic notion. From this stems all its 
ambiguity: we can say very little about it, but we can do nothing without 
it. (Morin 2008, 13)
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 22 Morin perfectly describes the relationship between the theory of informa-
tion and biology:
More fascinating yet was the possibility of extrapolating the theory very 
heuristically to the biological domain. As soon as it was established that 
a cell’s (or an organism’s) self-reproduction could be conceived from a 
duplication of genetic material or DNA, as soon as it was conceived that 
DNA constituted a sort of double helix whose rungs were constituted 
of chemical quasi-signs of which the whole could constitute a heredi-
tary quasi-message, then reproduction could be conceived of as a copy 
of a message. In other words, reproduction could be conceived of as 
an emission-reception covered by communication theory: it was pos-
sible to link each chemical element to discrete units, empty of mean-
ing (like phonemes or letters of the alphabet), combining into complex 
units, carriers of meaning (like words). Even more, genetic mutation 
was likened to ‘noise’ disrupting the reproduction of a message, provok-
ing ‘error’ (at least in respect to the original message) in the constitution 
of the new message. The same informational scheme could be applied to 
the functioning of the cell, where DNA constitutes a kind of ‘program’ 
that orientates and governs metabolic activities.(Morin 2008, 13)
 23 Two complementary approaches to the relationship between the neuro-
sciences and the concept of information can be found in Kandel 2006 and 
Damasio 1995.
 24 Miller’s studies are the most comprehensive attempts to unite the different 
sciences in a theory of systems with a natural origin. Of course, he shares 
some aspects of the theories of Luhmann, Parsons and Morin, but in this case 
articulated by a biologist who places the greatest emphasis on living systems.
 25 Karpatschof and Kirschenmann take up Wiener’s argument from a per-
spective akin to Marxism.
 26 Umpleby’s paper compiles mathematical relationships between ‘matter’, 
energy, and information. The first two are connected by Einstein’s equation, 
‘matter’ and information by Bremermann’s limit, and energy and informa-
tion by Szilard’s equation. Umpleby, based on Bateson, suggests replacing 
the term information with difference.
 27 Gershenson’s research not only analyses the relationship between ‘matter’/
energy and information, but also attempts to invert the usual approach: 
thinking about ‘matter’ and energy as information. We adopt some of this 
when pointing out that knowledge is present in forms of ‘matter’ and energy 
that are not codified in any way.
 28 Although the authors do not make any particularly original contributions, 
they do offer a good summary of the ‘matter’/energy/information approach, 
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its relationship with living systems, the laws of thermodynamics, and the 
theory of information.
 29 The work of Gitt and Maartens is framed within the portentous debates 
about ‘intelligent design’ that still rumble on today in the USA. Contrary to 
the usual image of followers of religion or mysticism as hostile and suspi-
cious of Western science, these texts – and many others – are part of a move-
ment that perhaps can be described as ‘hi-tech spiritualist’. They are writ-
ten by scientists who postulate the discontinuity between ‘matter’/energy 
and information/design. The idea is simple: if we can agree that something 
exists which is not ‘matter’/energy and that it cannot be explained how the 
design emerged from what was inanimate, then we must acknowledge the 
intervention of an ‘intelligent design’. Note that it is not relevant whether 
this design was made by a Christian god or an extraterrestrial civilisation. 
The point is to offer a scientific argument that disavows both materialism 
and the immanence of Being. It is an argument that, incidentally, is far from 
being naive or clumsy, as can be seen in Gitt’s book.
 30 García Camarero’s work is less academic than others cited here. However, 
long before this book was conceived he suggested an idea that we cannot 
fail to concur with: labour or economic processes (productive processes in our 
schema) should not be conceptualised on the basis of land, labour, and capi-
tal, but on ‘matter’, energy, and information (knowledge, for us). To a certain 
degree he shares Paul Romer’s critique of the traditional theory of factors of 
production and our criticism of Romer that his approach (things, ideas, and 
people) is not suitable for a scientific perspective, as we shall see later.
 31 For example:
The lack of knowledge and information science-based concepts in eco-
nomics literature about growth, science and technology, and in the 
broader field of innovation, has been acknowledged in recent papers 
(Ramlogan and Metcalfe 2002). This may be due to a defensive attitude 
manifested by mainstream economists who refrain from interdiscipli-
nary dialogue and easily admit that the discipline should economise this 
kind of speculation. Therefore, a large number of texts adopt some kind 
of folk psychology or, at best, a widely diffused (although problematic) 
model of cognition. (Bateira 2003, 2)
 32 I owe the expression ‘knowledge matter’, which, by the way, does not have 
an equivalent in Spanish, to a suggestion made by Prof. Christian Fuchs.
 33 Schrödinger (1944) and Von Neumann (1966) refer to negentropy in rela-
tion to information, but here this aspect is assimilated into the concept of 
knowledge.
 34 As discussed elsewhere (Zukerfeld 2010, Vol. 1, Chapter. 3), the term rivalry 
is an unfortunate one. It imputes highly determined social relations to 
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objects. If the Marxian term ‘fetishism’ is at all useful, it is to denounce this 
kind of operation. However, this idea of ‘rivalry’ is superficially mentioned 
here because economists habitually use it.
 35 Romer’s approach is subtler and indicates that in certain circumstances 
knowledge is non-rival, but it remains a reference for this basic level.
 36 The earliest formulation of these ideas was not provided by an economist, 
but sprang from the eloquent pen of Thomas Jefferson:
Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because 
every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from 
me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who 
lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. That ideas 
should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral 
and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, 
seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, 
when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space, without less-
ening their density in any point, and like the air in which we breathe, 
move, and have our physical being, incapable of confinement or exclu-
sive appropriation. (Jefferson, letter to McPherson, cited in Koch and 
Peden 1972, 576–577)
 37 Here we refer to the properties of knowledge in an abstract way, removed 
from all historicity. Once the relationship between certain modes of pro-
duction and a given economic organisation is introduced, it is evident 
that knowledge tends to suffer something resembling attrition, consisting 
of being surpassed by new knowledges that take their place at the vanguard 
of the productive process in question. Marx called this  – thinking only of 
technologies, not knowledge in general  – ‘moral attrition’ (Marx, 1990: 
492–493). However, to express this in a Marxist lexicon, it makes sense in 
relation to the production of exchange values, but not in terms of produc-
tion of use values. The principle that governs a wheel functions just as well 
(or badly) when this artefact is on the technological cutting-edge as when it 
has been relegated to the sidelines. Even in the case of exchange value, the 
term ‘attrition’ does not seem to be the most suitable for giving an account 
of Marx’s idea. It is not productive consumption that makes the knowledge 
carried by the wheel become obsolete, but the development and diffusion of 
other knowledges. The latter constitutes a process entirely independent of 
how much the first wheel is used.
 38 Evidently knowledges do suffer the disappearance of their bearer. This, how-
ever, is not due to repeated use if the bearer is kept in good condition.
 39 That is, it would not make sense to say that our artisan achieves the exclu-
sion of their neighbour if, for example, that neighbour is imprisoned or 
banished.
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 40 These are the costs of producing an additional unit, once the productive 
process is underway.
 41 These are the costs of producing the first unit.
 42 Bentham explains this idea to justify intellectual property:
Mere labour, exclusive of skill, cannot be copied without equal labour: 
of mere labour no one therefore can have the benefit but the particular 
individual at whose expense (sic), or on account of whom, it is exerted. 
Of skill, on the other hand, it is the property to be capable of being 
indefinitely imbibed and diffused and that without any exertion of men-
tal labour comparable to that, at the expense of which it was acquired. 
Of skill, therefore, it is the property that, the benefit derivable from it, 
unless effectual measures can be taken and are taken for confining it, 
may and naturally will be reaped by all persons concerned in any of the 
businesses to which such skill is capable of being applied; and, thereby, 
to the thousand of the millions into whose possession it is come without 
any expense, as well as to the individual at whose sole expense it has 
been acquired (Bentham [1795] 1954, 260).
 43 As is repeated in the field of social studies of science and technology, often 
citing Michael Polanyi and Wittgenstein but, in the best cases, having read 
Nonaka and Takeuchi. On the concept of tacit knowledge in relation to cog-
nitive materialism see Zukerfeld 2010, Vol. 1, chapter 4.
 44 In relation to the idea of knowledge bearers, in addition to Romer (1993) 
and Chartrand (2007), the idea of ‘carriers’ from Mokyr (2002, 9) must also 
be mentioned; the term ‘bearer’ was introduced in Zukerfeld 2006 and, in 
more detail, in Zukerfeld 2010.
 45 This methodological choice may seem paradoxical: the physical bearer is 
used to typologise that which is more than physical. However, the defini-
tions deal with this: any entity is determined in relation to what it is not. 
The formula that this procedure condenses unites the two philosophers that 
current trends address: Hegel takes Spinoza’s ‘omnis determinatio est nega-
tio’ to its utmost conclusion.
 46 However, there are numerous antecedents that, without claiming a materi-
alist vocation, have typologised knowledge in a way similar to a non-idealist 
approach. See Zukerfeld 2010, Vol. 1, chapter 5. Likewise, there are authors 
who use this logic without producing exhaustive typologies. For example:
   Yet, as has just been suggested, there is also a peculiar, and metaphysi-
cally interesting, feature of knowledge, to wit, that it can be embodied in 
rather disparate ways. Knowledge is said to be contained in (at least) books, 
brains, and databanks — three sorts of things that are produced in quite 
different ways, yet for roughly the same reason (if not to the same effect), 
namely, to provide knowledge. (Fuller 2005, 2)
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 47 Additionally the present stage of capitalism contains, as the most complex 
anatomies contain, the simpler, earlier stages. We are prisoners of our own 
epoch, but not necessarily of those from the past.
 48 To be sure, some thinkers who have made strictly epistemological contribu-
tions should be separated from this truth-falsity axis. The most obvious case 
is Kuhn.
 49 Naturally, the idea of the categories of understanding that Kant developed 
leans on Aristotle’s categories. This does not mean that the analysis of the 
characteristics of the knowing subject begins ex nihilo in modernity, but 
that the subject becomes the central, and certainly transcendental, axis.
 50 Here we use the term ‘social’ as a category proper to the authors analysed, 
not because we judge it to be appropriate or precise. As a great professor 
once pointed out, and will be reiterated below, if you want to put a social 
scientist in a tight spot, one only needs to ask them to simply and precisely 
define what ‘social’ means. In addition, we largely share the criticism that 
Latour (2005) developed about the vagueness of the term.
 51 There could be read:
Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. – real, active 
men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their 
productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, 
up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else 
than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual 
life-process. […]
In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven 
to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not 
set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as nar-
rated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the 
flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-
process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and 
echoes of this life-process. (Marx and Engels [1846] 1970, 47)
 52 Expressed thus by Marx and Engels in The German Ideology:
Where speculation ends – in real life – there real, positive science begins: 
the representation of the practical activity, of the practical process of 
development of men. Empty talk about consciousness ceases, and real 
knowledge has to take its place. (Marx and Engels [1846] 1970, 48)
 53 For an excellent and comprehensive compilation of the fundamental contri-
butions to the sociology of knowledge, see the two volumes edited by Irving 
Horowitz 1968.
 54 For a presentation of the history and tendencies within the STS field, see 
Sismondo 2010 and Kreimer 1999.
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 55 As Bottomore states:
Mainheim explicitly rejected these categories, in favour of relativism. 
In his essay on ‘Historicism’ (1924), he accepts the point of view of the 
German historicist authors for whom each historical period has its own 
style of thinking and for whom all styles of thinking are equally valid 
(Bottomore 1956, 54).
 56 The problem of reflexivity is that of the relationship between the author and 
her own theory, which has been imputed to Mannheim:
For if all propositions are existentially determined and no proposition is 
absolutely true, then this proposition itself, if true, is not absolutely true, 
but is existentially determined. (Bottomore 1956, 55)
 57 Curiously, the partially constructivist critique of Mertonian sociology of 
science, with its accusation of functionalism, partly and tacitly adopts the 
relative aspects of Mannheim’s work.
 58 It is unavoidable to point out that such an emphasis, celebrated as a dis-
covery by these schools, is only useful for criticising positivist Marxism or 
functionalism. In Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit much more profound 
formulations of these ideas appear.
 59 Three examples: Latour, Callon, and Law’s actor-network theory  – when 
thinking about networks of human and non-human actors composed of 
diverse materials, see Latour 2005  – the ‘Fragment on Machines’ in the 
Grundrisse by Marx  – when discussing the objectification of science in 
machinery  – and Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge  – when analysing 
texts as sedimentations of knowledges – etc. However neither in these nor 
other cases is the emphasis placed on the materiality of knowledge.
 60 Indeed, we invite the reader to conduct the following experiment: identify 
a social scientist who now and again uses the word ‘knowledge’. Ask them, 
cautiously, what they understand by ‘knowledge’. We hypothesise that, dur-
ing a disorderly withdrawal, partially dissembled by hurling smoke bombs 
of confused jargon, the subject will appeal to the standard mantras heard at 
conferences. They will say, perhaps, that knowledge is more than another 
thing: for example, ‘knowledge is more than information’. This type of man-
tra is based, in the last instance, on the humanist supposition that knowledge 
is something that only exists in human minds. Another commonly sought 
escape route is that ‘knowledge is a social product’. If the reader succeeds in 
interrupting the flow of opaque verbiage to ask what ‘social’ is, the unfortu-
nate academic will immediately be seen to grow visibly pale. Because in the 
post-modern social sciences the most extreme curiosities are stimulated, the 
most irreverent postures are celebrated, but asking for clear definitions of 
basic concepts – therein lies a real taboo. Only the academic impunity of the 
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current stage of capitalism would allow the bulk of scientists to use a word 
like ‘knowledge’ (or ‘social’) in the titles of their papers, books, lectures, and 
all manner of academic exhibitions, without feeling that it would be helpful 
to have at least a minimal operative definition of the term. Indeed, only the 
postmodern rejection of definitions, precisions, systematicity, coherence, 
and other values suspected to be highly repressive and authoritarian, enables 
what would make the most shameless of the moderns blush to be flourished 
almost with pride by postmodern academics.
 61 This literature has been discussed in detail in Zukerfeld 2010, Vol. I, 
 chapter 2.
 62 This literature has been discussed in detail in Zukerfeld 2010, Vol. I, 
 chapter 4.
 63 This literature has been discussed in detail in Zukerfeld 2010, Vol. I, 
 chapter 5.
 64 We follow Mario Bunge in this regard: ‘An object is real if, and only if, it 
influences, or is influenced by, another object, or is composed exclusively of 
real objects’ (Bunge 1981, 23).
 65 We follow Fuchs (who draws on Engels to some extent) regarding the rela-
tionship between matter, motion, space and time:
Motion is the mode of existence of matter in space-time. […] Both 
space and time express the permanence of change that is a fundamental 
property of matter. Matter permanently organises itself and produces an 
irreversible sequence of states. (Fuchs 2003, 196, 197)
  This quote offers a clear link between materialism and the dialectic – we will 
revisit the notion of irreversibility below, when we discuss the dialectic.
 66 As Hofkirchner puts it:
It need not necessarily be a substance in its own right (like matter is said 
to be) in order to qualify for a materialistic ontology. It is sufficient to 
consider it as a derivative of matter, that is, as a property of matter (such 
as structure), which holds for signal transmission as well. Either way, it 
is considered a material object. (Hofkirchner 2013, 151)
  Here Hofkirchner uses the word matter in order to refer to what we call 
‘matter’ here, that is, the subset of physical matter, as opposed to knowledge 
matter. Nonetheless, we concur with his approach to this topic.
 67 Our perspective draws to a great extent on Fuchs’ works (e.g. Fuchs 2003). 
He offers a sound theoretical framework that is at the same time material-
ist, emergentist and dialectical. However, here we present a slight difference 
that arises from our distinction between physical matter and knowledge 
matter. Thus, where Fuchs (along with other authors), states, for instance, 
that ‘Matter […] is uncreatable and indestructible’ (2003, 196), we tend to 
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believe that a property of physical matter is being generalised to all matter – 
i.e. including knowledge matter. However, as discussed in chapter 1, knowl-
edge matter has its own properties, among them those of being capable of 
being created or destroyed.
 68 This leads them to another, monumental, error, which is to confuse infor-
mational goods (basically composed of digital information: software, music, 
films, data) that are objectified, survive the moment of their production and 
to which can be assigned property rights, with services (that, in contrast, 
are not objectified, do not outlast the moment of their production, and to 
which property rights cannot be assigned). This point has been discussed in 
more detail in Zukerfeld 2013.
 69 It is remarkable that numerous social science scholars continue to forge suc-
cessful careers on the strength of denying materiality to the electrons from 
which bits are composed. It is to be expected that progress in the ‘sociology 
of knowledge’ will soon catapult to fame and fortune those who disavow the 
materiality of atoms and molecules and reward them with PhDs, publica-
tions, research grants and other transcendent forms of the post-modern 
academic Being.
 70 Worse still, the idea of immateriality is not a marginal feature of the 
approaches of the authors that utilise it: it is the foundation of their division 
between two stages of capitalism. Of course, we concur that there is a trans-
formation from one stage to another, but what changes is the predominant 
type of knowledge bearer, and what we call the cognitive material configu-
ration, not any move from materiality to immateriality.
 71 We have tried to avoid bibliographical references in the body of the text 
wherever possible. These notes are based on our own reductive interpreta-
tions of Žižek (2012, mainly), but also of Hyppolite 1974; Valls Plana 1979 
and Dri 1994, 1995.
 72 Presently, three principles of dialectics suggested by Levins and Lewontin 
will be mentioned. The fourth specifically relates to this question: ‘Because 
elements recreate each other by interacting and are recreated by the wholes 
of which they are parts, change is a characteristic of all systems and all 
aspects of systems. That is a fourth dialectical principle’. (Levins and 
Lewontin 1985, 275)
 73 Hofkirchner’s systemic approach is materialist, emergentist, dialectical, sci-
entific and non-humanist. His titanic endeavour to build a monumental 
Unified Theory of Information (UTI) is admirable, and we draw to a great 
extent on his developments. Nonetheless, it is necessary to highlight some 
differences between his approach and ours. First, cognitive materialism is 
interested in the historicity of the concepts and, more precisely, in how they 
are born and raised by particular stages of capitalism. The UTI, on the other 
hand, is presented mainly as an ahistorical theory. Secondly, as pointed out 
in the main text several times, our theory arises from trying to understand 
capitalism as a totality, rather than from an ontological inquiry. Thus, we 
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arrive at the concept of knowledge matter as a consequence of inquiring 
into property regulations. As a result, the discussion of capitalism (prop-
erty, exploitation, classes) is crucial in our perspective, and mostly absent in 
the UTI. Whereas the UTI is to some extent a conflictless theory, a theory 
of social harmony, about what is better for everybody (Hofkirchner 2013, 
Chapter 7), cognitive capitalism is exactly the opposite, i.e. a theory about 
the inner and inescapable conflictivity of capitalist societies. Thirdly, the 
UTI (as with most serious emergentist theories), resorts to the concept of 
information, instead of knowledge. We have tried to argue in favour of our 
admittedly polemical choice in chapter 1. Fourthly, in cognitive material-
ism, knowledge matter is studied mainly in relation to its physical bearers. 
The UTI, in turn, tackles information primarily through its function and 
complexity (Hofkirchner, 2013, Chapter 6). Indeed, systems theory (in sev-
eral of its varieties) is closely related to functionalist approaches.
 74 For the reader completely new to these questions, we offer two simple (and 
somewhat imprecise) examples to illustrate, although in an over-simplified 
fashion, the functioning of these categories. A mother and her newborn 
child form a family as an abstract universal. This is a unity in which the 
infant is not separated from the totality. Their individuality has not yet 
‘arisen’. Puberty and adolescence give a form to the concrete particular, 
leading to a split: a confrontation is produced in which the youth struggles 
to find their own place. The adolescent separates their life off from familial 
rhythms and customs, dichotomising the previously undivided family. But 
the affirmation of the nascent identity through the work of negation is also 
expressed in other ruptures that the adolescent performs: regarding edu-
cational rhythms, societal values, etc. The universal concrete arrives with 
adulthood. The family (in whichever constellation it adopts) often recovers 
its unity – which continues to be contradictory – but this is mediate: it has 
transcended the oppositions and integrated them into a new level. Ideally, 
it is not the immediacy of obligatory cohabitation or economic depend-
ence that unites the adult family, but the self-conscious choice of particular 
group rituals.
   The second example is quite different: it relates to the histories of modern 
states. In all cases there is an abstract universal, in which the regions of a 
given geography are part of a unity that has not been constructed or rec-
ognised as such. A unity in itself. The concrete particular appears when the 
dichotomisations arise: different factions confront each other, often dyadi-
cally, to impose their particular as universal, to dominate the totality. These 
particulars can take the form of religious creeds, ideologies, or geographical 
specificities. What is crucial is that in this second moment the differences, 
the individualities assert and recognise themselves through the negation of 
the other’s Being. The third moment is that of the constitution of central-
ised states. After wars, discourses and laws, a certain equilibrium emerges 
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between the victors and the vanquished. The dichotomies can – and often 
do – persist, but now subordinated to the concrete universal of the state 
that by definition subsumes, by means of violence and a certain degree of 
consent, all the particulars.
 75 These principles are better understood by contrasting them with their 
non-dialectical counterparts: (i) There is a natural set of units or parts of 
which any whole system is made. (ii) These units are homogeneous within 
themselves, at least insofar as they affect the whole of which they are the 
parts. (iii) The parts are ontologically prior to the whole; that is, the parts 
exist in isolation and come together to make wholes. The parts have intrin-
sic properties, which they possess in isolation and which they lend to the 
whole. In the simplest cases the whole is nothing but the sum of its parts; 
more complex cases allow for interactions of the parts to produce added 
properties of the whole. (iv) Causes are separate from effects, causes being 
the properties of subjects, and effects the properties of objects (Levins and 
Lewontin 1985, 269).
 76 This idea of emergence can be found in Hofkirchner 2013, 183.
 77 Now we can better understand the idea that the physical and knowledge 
matter distinction is a contingent product of this stage of capitalism, men-
tioned at the end of chapter 1: it is a product of its time, an interpretation 
of capitalism marked by the current stage, an owl with wings spread as the 
shades of night gather in this informational dusk.
 78 A comment for those interested in the STS field. Latour repeatedly, 
emphatically and convincingly criticises the subject-object/culture-nature 
split, that the subjects he calls the ‘Moderns’ (Latour 1993) attempt to 
produce. However, he retains the concept of action (despite attempting 
an imprecise reformulation). Maintaining it as a central conceptual idea 
and combining it with the principle of generalised symmetry (particularly 
with non-humanism) leads as a consequence to one of his most notori-
ous and criticised ideas: that of nonhuman actants. That is, if the central 
category of analysis is action, and if the analysis must include humans and 
non-humans, the latter must act in some way. By contrast, if we make the 
category of knowledge the central idea, as we attempt to do here, there 
is no need to impose action on non-human entities: it suffices to under-
stand them as knowledge bearers. Of course, from our perspective Latour’s 
approach has other limitations: flattening the emergent levels into a single 
plane is one that he has started to redress in his more recent work (Latour 
2013), but the lack of any interest in studying capitalism is fundamental to 
his work and therefore insurmountable.
 79 In other works we have produced operationalisations and empirical anal-
ysis of different objects. Regarding the history of capitalism and its three 
stages, see Zukerfeld 2010, vols 2 & 3 for an extensive study. For a cognitive 
materialist analysis of the structure of the internet see Zukerfeld, 2014b. 
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A study of educational institutions from this perspective, by means of a 
national survey, can be found in Zukerfeld and Benítez Larghi 2015.
 80 These four types of knowledge roughly coincide with the four types of sys-
tems Luhmann introduces: Machines (objective knowledge), Organisms 
(biological knowledge), Social Systems (intersubjective knowledge), and 
Psychic Systems (subjective knowledge) (Luhmann 1995, 27). Of course, 
our approach has a number of differences from Luhmann’s, but it is inter-
esting that the distinction between four levels is similar. By contrast, it 
is very distant from Parsons’ concept of systems and his trisystemic or 
AGIL approaches. In the latter there is no notion of levels, but instead the 
emphasis is on aiming for the four functions to account for different sys-
tems. In the first schema, the personality system is similar to our knowl-
edge with a subjective bearer. However, the distinction between culture 
and society (or between the symbolic and norms) occurs, in our view, on 
a different level to that which Parsons suggests. Both are subtypes (which 
we shall call axiological and normative) of knowledge with an intersub-
jective bearer. Likewise, Parsons’ framework, while making a distinction 
which we judge to be futile on the more comprehensive level, omits the 
biological and objective levels of knowledge. This was partly redressed in 
Parsons’ cybernetics phase, but only with Luhmann’s decided rejection of 
humanism was the problem resolved with greater clarity. For a discussion 
about Parsons’ different frameworks José Almaraz’s (1981) text is highly 
recommended, for the discovery of which we owe a debt of gratitude to the 
erudite Pablo Nocera.
 81 Searle describes materialism as one of these, reductionist, forms of monism – 
something that is perfectly applicable to some forms of Marxism, but not to 
other materialist philosophies, such as the approach here.
 82 This, in passing, can help us to imagine that just as the neurological basis for 
ideas about the conscious and unconscious, that had been formulated long 
beforehand (e.g. Freud [1915] 1996), were discovered (on Milner and her 
case study of H.M. see Kandel 2006, 155ff.), perhaps at some point we will 
have the scientific elements necessary to account for the biological fraction 
of knowledges with an intersubjective bearer.
 83 Although various texts have been mentioned that accept the idea that objec-
tified knowledge exists, it is worth reproducing David Baird’s introduction 
to his book dedicated to supporting this argument on the specific terrain of 
science:
Knowledge has been understood to be an affair of the mind. To know 
is to think, and in particular, to think thoughts expressible in words. 
Nonverbal creations - from diagrams to densitometers - are excluded as 
merely “instrumental”; they are pragmatic crutches that help thinking - 
in the form of theory construction and interpretation. In this book I urge 
a different view. I argue for a materialist conception of knowledge. Along 
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with theories, the material products of science and technology constitute 
knowledge. (Baird 2004, 1)
 84 In contrast, knowledges objectified in the form of goods that have only con-
summatory ends, are not technologies, or artefacts, but ludic objects.
 85 For example:
Simply put, technology is knowledge, even if not all knowledge is tech-
nological. (Mokyr 2002, 2)
The production of one type of knowledge  – namely, technology – 
results in continuing changes in the conditions of production of many 
goods and services. (Machlup 1962, 9)
  In Chartrand’s case, the term ‘tooled knowledge’ is used instead of technol-
ogy, but the idea is similar:
I will be dealing […] with the knowledge tooled into matter, knowl-
edge embodied as physical functioning things (technology). (Chartrand 
2007, 77)
 86 In other studies we have attempted to connect, without any type of causal 
relationship, the development of some artefacts with that of the techniques 
possessed by subjects, productive organisations, the values of an era and 
other kinds of knowledge. See Zukerfeld 2010, vols 2 & 3.
 87 Note that technologies of information are not information but particular 
objectified knowledges which information is embedded in.
 88 We owe the first observation that these technologies can capture uncon-
scious aspects of human activity to Walter Benjamin ([1936] 1969).
 89 These specifics have been explored in Zukerfeld 2015.
 90 More precisely, these are artefacts in which biological energies occupy a 
negligible – not necessarily zero – percentage of the total energy utilised.
 91 What are the practical advantages of these definitions? If there are any, they 
will be discovered once the end of this book has been reached, not here, but 
perhaps a brief comment will suffice for now. This distinction allows us to 
register not only the relationship of each type of artefact with the energy 
source, mentioned explicitly, but also the role of knowledge. In the case of 
raw materials, we have artefacts that receive physical and knowledge matter. 
Tools are artefacts that transmit them, with greater or lesser modifications, 
to the object of the work. The crux is that for tools the source of energy and 
the source of knowledge is usually one and the same. A hammer receives its 
ultimate control and momentum from the same human source. These func-
tions can even be relatively differentiated, like in the case of a bicycle: feet 
provide the energy and hands the knowledge, in the form of steering. Marx 
states that once this separation has been produced, the origin of the energy 
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is a side issue. Motorcyclists do not seem to agree, and neither do we. By 
contrast, the innovative feature of a machine is that it enables the radical 
separation of the source of knowledge from the energy source. Whoever 
drives a car only contributes knowledge – if the marginal physical effort of 
stepping on the accelerator and turning the steering wheel is discounted. 
The energy source of a machine is just that, a mindless force. Therefore, 
while machines can be fed by biological energies on some occasions, these 
must be dumb energies, without the capacity to reflect.
 92 In some sense, the concept of information that economists like Hal Var-
ian use is similar to that used here. This is inseparable from the fact that a 
majority, and increasing, portion of all information that is produced will 
never be digested by humans, but is rather doomed to drift between giant 
databases (Lyman and Varian 2003).
 93 A more precise definition can be found in a text by Emilio Cafassi:
So-called analogue information, or information through analogy, is 
connected to the mediation of continuous, not disaggregated, physical 
quantities such as time, distance, velocity, weight, temperature etc. Their 
magnitude can give rise to any intermediate value from among a con-
tinuous spectrum of possible values, which is at least theoretically infi-
nite. The idea of continuity is mathematically associated with a line and 
assumes that, given two sequential points, it is always possible to find an 
intermediate one. The physical continuity of the quantities mentioned 
cannot be broken, whether it is because the continuity is inherent – as 
in the case of time – or for practical reasons that prevent it, like the fact 
that it is impossible to split an object in order to find out its length or 
weight (Cafassi 1998, 6).
 94 As Cafassi asserts:
The first disadvantage lies in its limited and incomplete character as an 
original transduction, which is something like an endemic defect of the 
bit. It is nothing but a process of deconstruction by sampling, in order 
to later reconstruct the rest of the original signal by approximation. The 
analogue world is that of continuities, the digital that of formal discon-
tinuity. Digital information, when emulating analog signals, represents 
a limit, an obstacle which only the limitations of the human senses to 
apprehend this character can explain its use (Cafassi 1998, 7).
 95 Software and other forms of digital information are dealt with extensively in 
Zukerfeld 2010, Vol. 2, Chapter 9.
 96 Although the term codification can be intuitively understood, perhaps it 
would be useful to clarify that here code has a meaning closer to the concept 
of sign, if this is understood without a humanist accent. In that sense, one 
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of the definitions provided by Peirce (along with associated concepts like 
quasi-mind) is useful.
For the purpose of this inquiry a Sign may be defined as a Medium 
for the communication of a Form. It is not logically necessary that any 
thing possessing consciousness, that is, feeling or the peculiar common 
quality of all our feeling should be concerned. But it is necessary that 
there should be two, if not three, quasi-minds, meaning things capable 
of varied determinations as to forms of the kind communicated. (Peirce 
1998, 544, MS 793:1)
  In effect, here the sign is not necessarily intended for a human interpreter 
(and this is a period long predating computing). Of course, Peirce’s theory 
is not materialist (the bearer is irrelevant), and the sign includes informa-
tion as we understand it here, but exceeds it by far. Indeed, the focus of 
the author’s research is on what below we will label linguistic knowledge. 
However, why use the term codification if this precedent exists regarding 
the term ‘sign’? On the one hand, precisely because the concept of a sign 
does not assume an objective materiality and includes orality without any 
differentiation. But, on the other hand, not to dwell on the limitations of 
the one term but to highlight the virtues of the other, it must be said that 
codification is a particularly opportune term. This, beyond its use among 
economists, is due to the fact that ‘codification’ has extended to the area of 
informatics to refer to the operation of writing instructions for computers. 
Thus, the term already has connotations that link the human and the non-
human, on the basis of an inert material bearer.
 97 In general, biologists tend to accept that the concept of information is use-
ful for describing various biological entities. For example:
Both philosophers and biologists have contributed to an ongoing foun-
dational discussion of the status of this mode of description in biology. 
It is generally agreed that the sense of information isolated by Claude 
Shannon and used in mathematical information theory is legitimate, 
useful, and relevant in many parts of biology (Sterelny, 2007, 1).
  In any case, it is important to clarify that from our perspective, in order 
to speak about knowledge with a biological bearer, utilising the term 
information is a convenience we could easily dispense with. What is 
crucial is that these are codified forms that can be translated into other 
forms of knowledge, for example natural languages, comprehensible to 
humans.
 98 At least since the discovery of the double helix of DNA by Watson and Crick 
in 1953, it is common to speak about genetics in terms of codes and informa-
tion. Although it is often used with diverse, and even polemical, meanings, 
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there is a degree of consensus about applying the term, if a restricted use is 
made of it, similar to that which Shannon proposed.
 99 The neurosciences, for example, constantly refer to the flows of the central 
nervous system as information. For example:
…observing the spinal cord it is possible to understand what the purpose 
of the central nervous system is: to receive sensory information coming 
from the skin through bundles of elongated nerve fibres called axons, 
and to transform it into coordinated motor signals that are transmitted to 
the muscles through other bundles of axons (Kandel 2006, 66).
 100 For example:
But there is also another interesting category of biological processes that 
lend themselves naturally to an informational treatment. This includes 
hormonal signalling systems, and other mechanisms by which one part 
of the body conditions the activities of another by means of an interme-
diate molecule. Here, there is an obvious and almost undeniable anal-
ogy between a biological process and paradigm cases of representation 
use in everyday life. An example is the way that hormones such as insu-
lin, testosterone, and growth hormone are produced in one part of the 
body, and travel to other parts where they interact with ‘receptors’ in a 
way that modifies the activities of various other structures. It is routine 
to describe hormones as ‘chemical messages’. (Sterelny 2007, 10–11)
 101 The term ‘post-organic’ comes from Paula Sibilia’s book El hombre pos-
torgánico (The Postorganic Man) (2005). Used here, it refers to the crucial 
change in the capacity to manipulate life that arises as a consequence of the 
translation of the genetic code into a code understandable to biologists and, 
more specifically, to the possibilities that genetic engineering provides.
 102 In effect, more than half a century ago biologists started to translate the 
language of genes; three decades ago they started to create their own words. 
But the frontier of language creation is still very far off on the horizon. It 
is in this bunker that the defenders of ‘intelligent design’ take refuge (for 
example see Gitt 2006).
 103 So that any form of knowledge understood as such, and as highlighted in 
chapter 1, can be included in one of the categories from the typology.
 104 For example:
A central idea in contemporary biology is that of information. Devel-
opmental biology can be seen as the study of how information in the 
genome is translated into adult structure, and evolutionary biology of 
how the information came to be there in the first place. (Szathmáry and 
Smith 1995, 227–232)
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 105 Remarkably, even creationist scientists, opposed to the atheist Darwinians 
in all other respects, agree on the analogy between genetic codes and infor-
mation. The most worthy example is the wonderful book In the Beginning 
was Information (Gitt 2008).
 106 For example:
Well, to speak to this, for the past 15 years, we have been digitizing biol-
ogy. When we decoded the genome, including sequencing the human 
genome, that’s going from what we consider the analogue world of biol-
ogy into the digital world of the computer. (Craig Venter, in Dawkins 
and Venter 2008)
 107 Nevertheless, it is important to point out that we do not possess evidence to 
support the idea suggested by all these authors that biology borrowed a set 
of concepts from the information sciences that had already been previously 
established. Therefore, the possibility that developments in genetics and 
biotechnology influenced the intersubjective expansion and stabilisation of 
computing codes is not refuted. Although this issue merits a more detailed 
analysis, to us it seems more likely that a dialectical interaction between 
these and other codes has contributed to reinforcing both.
 108 As Tennessee Williams exquisitely illustrates in The Milk Train Doesn’t Stop 
Here Anymore:
MRS GOFORTH: Has it ever struck you, Connie, that life is all memory 
except for the one present moment that goes by you so quick you hardly 
catch it going? It’s really all memory, Connie, except for each passing 
moment. (T. Williams 1963, 33)
 109 As Schacter states:
Implicit memory is revealed when previous experiences facilitate per-
formance on a task that does not require conscious or intentional recol-
lection of those experiences; explicit memory is revealed when perfor-
mance on a task requires conscious recollection of those experiences. 
(Schacter 1987, 501)
 110 Why do we only partially salvage the ‘social fact’? Durkheim considered 
social facts as collective modes of acting, thinking, or feeling. Only the last 
two interest us here, since action is not only knowledge. In turn, Durkheim’s 
emphasis on the coercive character of social facts is not relevant or at all 
clear for all the forms of intersubjective knowledge.
 111 Qualms about Luhmann’s concept of communication (synonymous with 
knowledge with an intersubjective bearer) arise from the Kantian founda-
tions underpinning the author’s approach.
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 112 Besides the references to the social sciences made above, it is worthwhile 
remarking that similar ideas also exist in the exact sciences. For example, 
from the physicist Bernardo Huberman:
Intelligence is not restricted to single brains; it also appears in groups, 
such as insect colonies, social and economic behavior in human soci-
eties, and scientific and professional communities. In all these cases, 
large numbers of agents capable of local tasks that can be conceived 
of as computations, engage in collective behaviour which success-
fully deals with a number of problems that transcend the capacity of 
any individual to solve […] When large numbers of agents capable of 
symbolic-processing interact with each other, new universal regularities 
in their overall behaviour appear. Furthermore, these regularities are 
quantifiable and can be experimentally tested. (Huberman 1995, 250)
 113 As illustrated in previous chapters, we take the liberty of using this term 
(‘social’) from time to time, for the purpose of facilitating a flow of com-
munication with the reader, but we share Latour’s (2005) criticisms of the 
ontologisation of the social. In fact, our recurrence to the term intersubjec-
tivity is done with the aim of replacing ‘the social’ with an alternative rooted 
in the Hegelian tradition.
 114 It is tempting to point out that the combination of these five types of knowl-
edge with an intersubjective bearer constitutes what is often denominated 
Culture. However, this term generates much confusion. Even though in 
some anthropological perspectives the concept of culture is used in a sense 
similar to the one mentioned here, in sociology (particularly the functional-
ist current) culture refers to a system characterised by the consummatory 
and non-instrumental (art, philosophy), as opposed to the sphere of the 
economy and instrumental reason. This use of the term culture, a product of 
industrial capitalism, is widespread and, evidently, is not materialist. A third 
type of meaning of culture is that which is associated with ‘the immaterial’, 
‘the intangible’. Although this meaning can refer to intersubjective aspects 
(or not), the problem is that it tends to emphasise a supposedly abstract, 
ethereal, mystical character of what is more appropriate to study in its con-
crete material manifestations. The cultural materialism of R. Williams or 
Fuchs strives to overcome this limitation. The concept of culture, in sum, 
requires an exploration that there is no space for in this succinct book.
 115 For an erudite and rigorous take on the production of Bakhtin and his cir-
cle, see Nocera 2009.
 116 As a dictionary of linguistics states:
Natural Language: Term for languages which have developed historically 
and which are regionally and socially stratified, as opposed to artificial 
language systems, which are used for international communication or 
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for formulating complex scientific statements. Natural languages differ 
from artificial languages particularly in their lexical and structural poly-
semy, the potential ambiguity of their expressions, and their susceptibil-
ity to change through time. (Bussmann, Trauth and Kazzazi 1997, 322)
 117 Elsewhere (Zukerfeld 2009a) we have attempted to explain that the con-
cept of ‘capital’, whichever adjective is attached to it, has shortcomings when 
accounting for the different forms of intersubjective knowledge, given that 
it has diverse properties which are even contradictory to the properties of 
the latter (deterioration with use, increasing returns to scale etc.).
 118 Of course, defining social collectives on the basis of a certain type of knowl-
edge is relatively unusual for traditional sociology. In general, concepts such 
as society or community are employed in relationship with certain types of 
social action, following the influential work of Weber. Furthermore, the idea 
of action in many cases appears as the foundation of all the sociological cat-
egories. However, as stated above, here we adhere to the interrogation that 
Luhmann submits this conception to (e.g. Luhmann 1995, 163–171). In that 
author’s perspective, the concept which is key to understanding the articu-
lation of social systems is ‘communication’, associated with the reduction of 
complexity, in other words, opposed to the idea of transmitter-receiver and 
which resembles the features we attribute to intersubjective knowledge. In 
fact when Luhmann (1995, 154) states that ‘communication is coordinated 
selectivity’, the idea of ‘selectivity’ is similar to what we define as knowledge 
in chapter 1, while the idea of coordination is subsumed, from our perspec-
tive, under intersubjectivity. Although we have some differences with his 
position, the points of agreement are obvious: social bonds are made of a 
certain form of what here we call knowledge, and not of actions. Moreover, 
Luhmann’s communication, just as our knowledge with an intersubjective 
bearer, exists on a different level to individual human subjects.
 119 As Boorstin asserts, celebrity cannot be explained by the possession of any 
technique (SK) or axiology, but simply by fame itself: ‘A celebrity is a person 
known for his well-knownness. Celebrities intensify their celebrity images 
simply by being well known for relations among themselves. By a kind of 
symbiosis, celebrities live off each other.’ (Boorstin [1961] 1992, 57)
 120 It could be argued that this is a phenomenon typical of any period. After 
all, the powerful were always celebrities, in a certain way: kings, athletes, 
politicians, actresses. However, whoever received attention in other peri-
ods had it as a consequence of other well-defined attributes. By contrast, 
as Boorstin or Bauman show, the prototypical celebrity does not emerge 
from any inheritance or from possession of a technique. In turn, the pur-
suit of a maximum amount of attention as a mass and structuring element 
of the ideal subject type  – the measurement of the volume of followers, 
‘friends’, likes, video views, etc – is a phenomenon unique to informational 
capitalism. The issue is not how many celebrities there are, but rather to 
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what extent the logic of attention-capturing moulds the intersubjectivity of 
dividuals.
 121 But, as mentioned a few endnotes ago, in our opinion the concept of ‘cul-
ture’ is put to better use if it designates all forms of intersubjective knowl-
edge, and not only this type of knowledge.
 122 As well as the very distant concept of symbolic system or culture in Parsons, 
the social imaginary in Castoriadis exceeds our axiological knowledge and 
includes, for example, linguistic knowledge and normative knowledge.
 123 Rationality itself (in a Weberian sense) is a non-rational historical belief, a 
type of axiological IK.
 124 This distinction between bearers is useful for elucidating the materiality of 
the beliefs Žižek refers to in his discussion of the Critique of Cynical Reason 
by Peter Sloterdijk: the fact that the subject unveils a concealed order does 
not dissolve it. The materiality of the other, intersubjective, level is imposed 
on the subject, and they must behave, as Sohn-Rethel says, as a ‘practical 
solipsist’ (see Žižek 1989, Chapter 1).
 125 One of the concepts that take pride of place in the most varied social sci-
ence theories is power. We cannot linger here to discuss it with the caution 
it deserves, but we can say that stemming from the theoretical framework 
presented here, power – understood in the Foucaultian sense, in the sense 
of Spinoza’s Potestas or Weber’s domination – is a form of knowledge, par-
ticularly axiological knowledge. The ‘probability that a given command 
will be obeyed’ (Weber [1922] 1968, 43) alludes precisely to the existence 
of a web of intersubjective beliefs that make obedience probable. Of course, 
in a restricted sense we are removing ‘violence’ from the semantic field 
of power. Naturally, this issue is more complex and although axiological 
knowledge is the decisive foundation of power, this can be effectuated 
through the different knowledge bearers. In fact, a task for the studies which 
will follow this work is to use the typology of knowledge as a tool to capture 
the diverse forms of power (biological, subjective, technological, linguistic, 
organisational, etc). In any case, it suffices to say that, in our opinion, and 
contrary to Weberian genealogy, power is not situated in the lineage of the 
concept of action, but rather in that of knowledge. A final clarification: it is 
enough to couple power and knowledge (‘understanding’ would be more 
fitting here) for Foucault’s ghost to be conjured. However, Foucault’s con-
ception of knowledge-power, of the irrevocable contiguity of power and 
knowledge, differs from ours in various respects. One of them is that for 
Foucault (e.g. [1975] 1995, 27–28) both terms have a relationship of prox-
imity, of mutual necessity, but they are distinct. In our case the concept of 
knowledge – which as the reader will have observed, differs greatly from 
Foucault’s – entirely subsumes power.
 126 This procedure is, partially and in the last instance, based on Durkheim’s 
methodology in The Division of Labour in Society ([1893] 1993).
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 127 Ostrom 1990, 2009; Ostrom and Hess 2006; Eggertsson 2003; Vercelli 2009; 
Zukerfeld 2005, 2008b.
 128 In chapter 6 we shall see that it can be useful to study the variable combina-
tions of physical and knowledge matter, that is, resources. But for now the 
distinction between the two entities mentioned will suffice.
 129 It is interesting that the need to conceptualise forms of the non-state pub-
lic comes from at least two completely unrelated tendencies: one is Ital-
ian autonomism (e.g. Lazzaratto 2006; Hardt and Negri 2000; Virno 2003, 
2015). The other is the study of ‘common pool resources’ by Ostrom and her 
colleagues (e.g. Ostrom and Ostrom 1977; Ostrom and Hess 2006).
 130 This distinction is one of the relevant elements which are useful to respond 
to Hardin’s article The Tragedy of the Commons (1968), as famous as it is 
indefensible, lacking even the most minimal sociological bases.
 131 This distinction can be found in the works of Ostrom (e.g. Ostrom and Hess 
2006) and Eggertsson (2003), but its first formulation seems to be from 
Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop (1975).
 132 Further distinctions could be made about the proprietor’s rights that each of 
the regulations entail. For example, expanding the traditional ideas of usus, 
fructus and abusus (Moulier-Boutang 2004), although without explicitly 
naming them, Schlager and Ostrom (1992) offer five types of rights whose 
presence or absence characterises the different regulations: non-subtractive 
use, subtractive use, and the possibility of excluding from, managing, or 
alienating a resource. However, in none of the texts, as far as we are aware, 
is a clear separation made between the forms in which these regulations affect 
physical matter and knowledge matter. Remember that in Ostrom’s division 
between ‘high subtractability’ and ‘low subtractability’ (that could resemble 
physical matter vs knowledge matter) both the light of the moon and a piece 
of digital information appear as carriers of the same properties, which is 
clearly mistaken.
 133 These phenomena have been scrutinised in Zukerfeld 2010, Vol. 3, chapters 
1 and 2.
 134 In the abstract universal, the productive forces are barely differentiated, the 
different types of productive forces flow in a relatively unmediated way. At 
the second dialectical moment, the concrete particular, a certain degree of 
splitting is produced: here is where the social relations of production stand 
out as distinct and contradictory – to a greater or lesser extent – from the 
other productive forces. This micro or macro contradiction tends to resolve 
itself at the third dialectical moment. The social relations of production – 
and the other productive forces – reach a new condition, not of rest but of 
less tension than in the previous moment; a new fusion arises.
 135 These last paragraphs could be extended considerably, if this book belonged 
to the erstwhile abundant genre of Marxist theology. Before any objection 
that our interpretation is mistaken, ill-informed, or forms part of a global 
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conspiracy to prevent a revolutionary party from taking power, we at once 
bow down in homage before the exegetes of the sacred texts. Texts that, 
surely, those titans of social transformation seem to inoculate themselves 
with more by propinquity or osmosis than by the bourgeois habit of read-
ing. We also, naturally, genuflect before the Marxists who may think, after 
reading what follows, that on the contrary, the central ideas unpacked over 
the length of this book ‘had already been perfectly suggested-anticipated-
explained-and-overcome by Marx’, and that our only contribution is to 
change some words, adding some complicated and woolly terms in order to 
claim undeserved merit. To this, we throw our hands in the air and confess: 
guilty of both sins, if that is possible.
 136 The curious reader can find an exploration of this characterisation as well as 
empirical sources on which it is based in Zukerfeld 2010, Vol. 2. Due to lack 
of data, for the first two periods knowledges with a biological bearer are not 
discussed.
 137 In this sense, among others, mercantile capitalism continues to be a period 
of preparation for the future dominion of specifically capitalist regulations 
that would only take place in industrial capitalism.
 138 Although many terms from physics are employed here, it is important to 
clarify that they are given a use which only serves the objectives of this theo-
retical framework. The bibliographical references merely suggest the texts 
that these terms have been taken from, but in no way are they a suggestion 
that those texts justify the use made here of those signifiers, which is highly 
unlikely. This section has benefitted from opportune comments made by 
Prof. Emilio Cafassi a decade ago.
 139 This concept shares a resemblance with Freud’s use of it to designate psy-
choanalytic work: the translation of the unconscious to the conscious 
(Freud [1915] 1996, 161). More generally, in content it is also similar to 
Nonaka and Takeuchi’s concept of ‘conversion’ (1995: 68–102). Likewise, 
the concept of translation is used by the actor-network theory (for good 
summaries see Latour 2005 and Law 1992). However, for this theory, trans-
lation refers to the possibilities an actor – specifically a scientist – has of 
modifying their ideas in order to galvanise the support of ‘powerful allies’. 
Without attempting to assess this framework, suffice it say that the meaning 
we attribute to the term is different. We do not refer to operations directed 
towards a particular goal, or even those necessarily driven by a human, but 
exclusively to the process by which a content of knowledge mutates on its 
journey from one form to another.
 140 The objection could be raised that it is not appropriate to call this translation. 
That actually, there are signs, symbols, or rather, ‘strings’ that do not carry 
knowledge but are instead ‘affordances’: they allow the human to eventually 
construct knowledge. In our opinion, Harry Collins (2010) provides the best 
version of this approach. It is, of course, a humanist perspective which brings 
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us to the debate about what is and is not knowledge. For Collins, and many 
others, knowledge only exists inside and between humans. What remains 
are merely patterns, among which there is no distinction between their 
character of being natural or a human product. And, for example, between 
different pieces of information there is no translation, only transformation. 
Meanwhile, translation refers only to languages, interpretation, to meaning; 
in other words, to humans. While in other aspects not mentioned here this 
approach has much in common with cognitive materialism, it does present 
several limitations. Two of these are: (i) It prevents us from conceptualizing 
the importance that objectified knowledge in different bearers (through pat-
ents, copyrights etc) has for capitalism. The division between strings (objec-
tive) and interpretation (human) is not consistent with capitalist regulations 
of knowledge and, consequently, thwarts our understanding of them. Indif-
ference towards the capitalist dynamic is an explicit feature of Collins’ per-
spective and, certainly, of a large part of the Science, Technology and Society 
field. That is not to criticise the internal coherence of the approach, but to 
point out the limited nature of the terrain on which it acts. (ii) It prevents 
analysis of the material aspects of translation. Everything seems to depend 
on human interpretation, when it is evident that the properties of the bear-
ers are a significant element in order to explain the dissemination or disap-
pearance of different knowledges. Although Collins’ work in particular has 
evolved since the 1970s until today, placing greater emphasis on material 
entities and, more specifically, on translations associated with digital infor-
mation, the dichotomisation between subjects and objects, in other words 
the humanist prejudice, deters him from analysing flows of knowledge in a 
sufficiently materialist way.
 141 This simple definition aims to integrate and overcome the reductionisms 
that characterise human beings by a particular type of translation or bearer. 
For example, the idea that the human being is the only being which can cre-
ate technologies, that is, objectify knowledges, has some shortcomings. In 
the face of this, as with Marx’s famous example of bees, spiders, weavers and 
architects, another form of knowledge is resorted to: those with a subjec-
tive bearer are those which would characterise the human being. However, 
these two aspects, even taken together, are insufficient, insofar as they elide 
the other knowledges that characterise human beings.
 142 A few provisory notes. Communication, in this text, designates any chain 
of operations that has two (or more) subjective knowledges at both ends. 
Thus, communication does not only involve humans interacting face-to-
face or by telephone, in other words to processes occurring simultaneously 
which may or may not be mediated technologically, it also accounts for 
exchanges that occur diachronically. There is communication when a letter 
is found many years after it was written, but also when a melody is heard at 
a time and place far from the point at which it was recorded. In these cases, 
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communication must not be confused with translation from informational 
OK to SK. Communication comprises the chain that goes from a handful of 
broadcasting subjective knowledges to those who receive it. Learning can be 
seen as a form of translation in that, whatever is at one extreme at the opposite 
end is a specific form of subjective knowledge: explicit or implicit long-term 
memory. The original source could be another SK – communication from a 
teacher – and information IK – reading a text or even a SK (a knowledge which 
moves from explicit to implicit). Thought can perhaps be grasped as a transla-
tion of implicit to explicit SK. What was vague becomes clear, is articulable, 
takes shape if not in words then in images.
 143 As shall be seen in chapter 5, this is an important element which enables us to 
understand the existence of forms of capitalist exploitation that occur outside 
of the so-called ‘working day’, typical forms of informational capitalism.
 144 Otherwise, absurdities are produced, such as the one that Samuelson is 
credited with having indicated: according to a calculation of GDP (much 
like those which are still dominant) which does not take these domestic 
processes into account, if in an economy the employers of domestic workers 
married them en masse, the gross product would fall although economic 
activity would be identical. In this case, it is clear that the disavowal of the 
economic significance of these activities has a gender component. On rec-
ognition of these activities see Mokyr 2002, 10, footnote 12.
 145 Of course, these productive processes are highly dependent on flows of 
attention. More precisely, in mass audiovisual communication the produc-
tive processes of the radio or TV commercially produce attention with two 
aims: the construction of intersubjective beliefs (ideology among them) and 
exploitation through the inculcation of particular knowledges, as we shall see 
in chapter 6.
 146 Another approach that informs our concept of productive processes comes 
from Harry Hillman Chartrand, who specifically considers that the results 
of productive processes are persons, tools, and code. The former are explic-
itly considered to be intermediate or final outputs (Chartrand 2007, 103–5).
 147 Marx adopts this idea, although in a restricted sense, for his contentious 
division between productive and unproductive labour, which followed on 
from the discussions of classical economists (for a history of this discussion 
see Hill 1999).
 148 Remaining within the inner workings of commodity production processes, 
the inoculation of subjects with knowledge sometimes occurs not as a pri-
mary objective of the productive process but as a complementary or inter-
mediate activity. On the terrain of neoclassical and evolutionary econom-
ics, concepts such as ‘learning by doing’, ‘learning by interacting’, ‘routines’, 
‘skills’, ‘tacit knowing’ and many others refer to this: the activity of work 
produces certain subjective and intersubjective knowledges among those 
who participate in said activity, which are not objectified in goods, but in 
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the subjects. Naturally, in some cases this production of subjects is a mere 
externality of the productive process, but is increasingly a conscious and 
internalised aim.
 149 A resource is, for now, a combination of physical and knowledge matter. 
This concept will be explored in more depth in chapter 6.
 150 The norms referred to here can have an extremely variable scope. For exam-
ple, they may be informal agreements, contracts with a company and, of 
course, local and national laws. However, the crux of the matter is that they 
are in an intersubjective bearer; in other words, they have been internalised 
by the subjects participating in the productive process.
 151 That is, subjects liberated from feudal fetters, from slavery and other forms 
of personal interdependence.
 152 The worker has non-exclusive access to knowledge. To put it another way, 
she carries productive knowledge (usually skills, implicit knowledges, 
although possibly explicit knowledge as well, such as formulas) for which, 
however, she is not the exclusive title-holder (she lacks intellectual prop-
erty rights to them). In turn, she has non-exclusive but necessary access to 
a broad spectrum of intersubjective knowledges (starting with language, 
her participation in an organisation, a set of beliefs roughly compatible 
with those of the capitalist, recognition of herself and the capitalist and, of 
course, internalisation of norms), and in many cases to technologies (which 
she uses but cannot profit from excluding third parties, for example, as they 
are pervasive like screwdrivers, or computers in certain contexts).
 153 Although a labour contract is usually associated with working hours, this 
has not necessarily been the case in historical terms, nor today, and more 
importantly neither are there logical motives to reduce the subordination 
of labour to capital to a question of time. The notion of labour time, useful 
to give an account of numerous capitalist productive processes from the 
mid-nineteenth century up to the beginning of the twentieth, is insufficient 
for the periods prior to and after that. The category of time (as well as those 
of action, labour, humans) must be subordinated to other more general 
ones in order to be able to understand the productive processes that can be 
observed in the current stage, informational capitalism. For example, vari-
ous forms of capitalist exploitation, as we shall see later on, do not depend 
on the limited notion of labour time.
 154 This can take the form of salaries, or more generally, money. But it can also 
assume other forms, such as recognition, access to software etc.
 155 Capital feeds diverse knowledges into the productive process which are not 
necessarily carried by labour. The knowledges borne by machines, by sci-
entific manuals, by the codification of knowledge stemming from previous 
processes, by the subjectivity of the capitalist etc., all play a central role.
 156 In the next chapter our concept of exploitation which evidently differs from 
the traditional definitions, will be discussed in detail.
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 157 For a characterisation of these three stages, see Zukerfeld 2010, Vols. 2 & 3.
 158 The capitalist dynamic entails the broadening of exclusive access regula-
tions and commodity production to arenas where those normative inter-
subjective knowledges are absent. Thus, the dialectic between capitalist and 
non-capitalist productive processes (mentioned below) advances in detri-
ment to the latter, although never managing to eliminate them entirely.
 159 In other words, human subjects are legally ‘free’ from the fetters of feudal-
ism or slavery. This fundamental rule of capitalism, however, is constantly 
under threat. The forms of slavery or quasi-slavery, which are nothing more 
than a form of expropriation – explored in chapter 5 – represent the strug-
gle of practical capitalism against its formal norms.
 160 The combination of non-exclusive access or no access to physical and/or 
knowledge matter produces four types of workers: autonomous workers, 
cognitive workers, physical workers, and excluded workers, as we shall see 
in chapter 6.
 161 These three concepts, particularly exploitation, will be discussed in detail in 
the next chapter.
 162 As indicated above, the ‘matter’ and energy that are fed into capitalist pro-
ductive processes operate under the logic of the exchange of equivalents.
 163 How is it possible to abolish a given form of property and exchange of equiv-
alents for the sake of expanding the realm of property and the exchange of 
equivalents? Here we have one of the striking paradoxes of capitalism. The 
property titles of some capitalists must be torn up in order to save those 
belonging to the most powerful; the market must be sacrificed so that oli-
gopolistic expropriation can do its will on earth as in heaven, as Saint Mat-
thew proclaimed.
 164 This characteristic is, of course, far from being specific to capitalism.
 165 Thus, the figures of labour and capital at a systemic level are not a mere 
accretion of the figures of the worker and the capitalist in individual pro-
ductive processes. They represent emergent levels whose properties cannot 
be reduced to the meanings on the other level (or vice versa) as indicated in 
chapter 2.
 166 Indeed, the capital-labour contradiction is typically observed between 
human subjects. In this case, it refers to the traditional representation of 
workers and capitalists as mutually exclusive groups of subjects. This inter-
subjectivisation, however, is not by any means the only possible option. The 
contradiction between capital and labour can also manifest itself within 
particular subjects that in many cases act as a bearer for capital and/or 
of labour alternately (like a share-owning worker). Or it can be particu-
larised between capital as knowledge objectified in technologies and the 
human workers (such as in a factory in which the workers only have contact 
with an assembly line or a computer). And, to the extreme irritation of the 
humanists, the possibility should not be discarded of future forms of the 
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contradiction between capital and labour arising which may adopt com-
pletely non-human manifestations (if we had Žižek’s talent we could enu-
merate some films that suggest this, and combine them with a joke about 
eastern European peasants).
 167 Such as, for example, the processes mentioned above: ideologies, unpaid 
domestic chores, war.
 168 Productive processes as heterogeneous as war, unpaid domestic activities, 
and the intersubjectivisation of ideologies are as important as the processes 
that happen in businesses.
 169 Of course, this relationship in which a totality A is defined in relation to 
the dialectic between A and not A can be conceived of on the basis of a 
Aristotelian logic of identity in which A=A. In contrast, in the Hegelian 
dialectic a totality A is never equal to A. It always contains contradictions 
and excesses etc.
 170 The second limitation is connected to the fact that they do not even inter-
pret expropriation as a phenomenon associated with physical matter, while 
exploitation, under capitalism, rests on the ontology of knowledge.
 171 It is important to note here that these concepts are not based on the labour 
theory of value as developed by Marx, and later Marxists. In any case, the 
specific relationship of the concept of capitalist exploitation with Marxian 
value theory is discussed below.
 172 I have used this beautiful quote in classes, lectures and articles, and it is 
generally well received by the audience. Though I have made no attempt to 
prevent my occasional readers and listeners from forming the opinion that 
the text had been harvested as a ripe fruit plucked from the tree of erudi-
tion, here it is probably prudent to clarify that in fact my transparent igno-
rance has been preserved from any direct contact with St Augustine’s works 
that could have clouded it. Instead, I took the quote (with the only precau-
tion of checking it against the original) from an excellent text by Kavita 
Philip (2005), whom I wish to express my gratitude to in this understated 
but emotive ceremony.
 173 This marks one of the several differences between the term regulation as 
used here, and concepts like codification (or axiomatic for capitalism) in 
Deleuze, which is broader.
 174 Arendt, Castoriadis and Negri, among others.
 175 Writing, of course, is not a necessary pre-condition. Both ancient societies 
that have left no written record, and present-day mafias who prefer not to 
leave any, have regulations that are no less strict for lacking codified mani-
festations in texts.
 176 Indeed, regulation can take a para-state form on macro and micro levels. 
In the first case, a family could have clear regulations that allow expro-
priation and exploitation. Usually, in a typically heteronormative family, 
the male figure is the regulator (who determines the norms), the exploiter 
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(who keeps a portion of the value that the female figure and eventually the 
children produce) and the expropriator (who dispossesses the other family 
members of certain goods). In this case the dialectic between the regulation 
of physical matter and that of knowledge matter can be seen clearly: the 
dialectic between physical violence and declarations of love that construct 
relationships of domestic violence are a well-known phenomenon. On the 
macro level, the regulations proper to religions or organisations dedicated 
to criminal activities are obvious examples. In effect, both modalities over-
see specific forms of expropriation and exploitation that may or may not be 
in contradiction with the directives of the state they are embedded in.
 177 All states have more or less important cases of norms that have become (or 
always were) a dead letter not incarnated in intersubjectivity. According to 
Lawrence Lessig and other authors, this is the case for copyright regulations 
after the appearance and diffusion of the Internet.
 178 The state extends beyond capitalist regulation, that is, it produces norms 
that exceed those specific to the capitalist dynamic. Meanwhile, the state, 
that is usually but not necessarily present in other forms of regulation, is an 
essential component for capitalist regulation.
 179 Of course, the idea is not that capitalist regulation is immanent whilst the 
former are transcendent. All regulations are immanent. Here the argument 
relates to beliefs, values which underpin the regulations. Thus, capitalist regu-
lations, in historical terms offer the first mass example for which the imma-
nence of regulation is explicitly recognised: this self-consciousness goes 
hand-in-hand with the theories of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and others. 
Capitalist regulations, however, are not the only ones based on a non-trans-
cendent axiology: socialist, communist, and anarchist regulations have this 
characteristic.
 180 The expression ‘usually’ might be disturbing. In fact, over the course of this 
chapter we will only discuss relations of expropriation and exploitation 
between humans. So, why introduce this uncertainty, this gateway through 
which non-humans can enter the relations of expropriation and exploita-
tion? Simply because it is possible to conceive of social organisations in 
which intersubjectivities could arise that would enable these practices. This 
is conceivable along two lines (next follows two partly imagined examples, 
and then a conceptual argument). On the one hand, the blurring of the reg-
ulation that separates humans from robots; on the other hand, that which 
separates humans from animals. As regards the first of these, although 
property, exploitation, and expropriation are not the favourite concepts of 
Hollywood science fiction, it is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which 
these concepts apply to robots, cyborgs, or any other non-human entity 
capable of producing knowledge and eventually reproducing them. Could 
not a robot be the owner of the physical matter it carries, just as a human 
is? Is the robot not expropriated when it is sold? Is the robot not exploited 
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when it receives only a portion of the product it generates (that, incidentally, 
is related to its physical reproduction, while just like humans, it does not 
receive any compensation related to the knowledges it objectifies)? While in 
this case it is sufficient for Haraway to be invoked by a scriptwriter, reflec-
tions about the expropriation and exploitation of animals would require 
an emulator of Houellebecq to write a novel in which an extremist envi-
ronmentalist party won a general election in some European country and 
decreed that animals had rights to the land that humans have expropriated 
from them. Extending the idea, their own ‘matter’ and energy (which this 
Green party would declare the animals proprietors of) would not be alien-
able (mandating veganism, naturally). Of course, the exploitation (overex-
ploitation, technically) of those extenuated and undernourished working 
horses would have to be regulated too. Now, the possibility that there could 
be organisations for which expropriation and exploitation without humans 
could take shape indicates that we should use concepts such as actants 
(Latour, 2005) to refer both to human and non-human bearers in action 
alike. The use of this controversial category is extremely tempting, not least 
because it could prove as irritating for Latour enthusiasts (whose texts do 
not tolerate the word capitalism, let alone exploitation) as for Marxists (who 
refuse, with understandable reasons, to see the relationship between scal-
lops and Che Guevara).
 181 The terms relations or social relations have begun to be used surreptitiously 
over the last few pages. This is a consequence of having defined expro-
priation and exploitation (for the purposes of the current presentation, it 
is worth repeating) as connections between humans. Once on the level of 
humans, these bonds can be understood as ‘social relations’ in a Weberian 
sense.
 182 This does not mean, of course, that in all cases measuring the magnitude of 
this asymmetry is simple or even possible. But the difficulty of numerically 
measuring something does not imply that it is impossible to capture, nor 
much less imply its inexistence.
 183 It is true that this idea (based on Steiner 1984) belongs in certain measure 
to the imaginary world of liberal political correctness. In practice, there are 
colleagues, acquaintances, and above all, companies that make contribu-
tions to political campaigns, who challenge this notion of the donator and 
gift-giver.
 184 For example, even though slave labour is legally prohibited in Argen-
tina, many textile workers originating from Bolivia are submitted to this 
wretched condition in the city of Buenos Aires. The two moments of regu-
lation are present: the domestication of the body through the separation of 
the worker not only from any means of autonomous subsistence, but also 
from those needed to access the free labour market – by the forced seizure 
of their identity documents – material restrictions of the buildings, doors, 
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security cameras, the regulation of knowledge through the organisation of 
the workshop – roles in the productive process, working hours etc – a spe-
cific vocabulary, recognition – of authority, of the other workers – a set of 
beliefs – that escape is impossible or disadvantageous because the worker 
will be deported, that it is possible to save money in order to send remit-
tances home to their families or to free themselves in the future – and spe-
cific norms – how much should be produced, how much wages are, which 
conducts are allowed and which forbidden etc.
 185 Of course, the idea that expropriation and exploitation are distinct from 
other relations (such as theft) because the former are protected by some 
kind of norm is clear for the extreme cases, but it can be ambiguous in 
intermediate situations. In effect, where appropriation of resources occurs 
when there is law (in other words, a norm legally sanctioned by the state), 
we are without doubt in the territory of expropriation and exploitation. 
Contrastingly, when this occurs exceptionally, contingently and unsys-
tematically without being framed by any regulation (there is no norm), 
it is evidently not expropriation or exploitation, but rather theft or some 
other relation. But what happens in the grey areas, where there are non-
legal norms, or where the situation changes over time? It has already been 
emphasised above that in cases of well-defined and intersubjective norms 
illegality is not an obstacle that prevents the application of the concepts 
expropriation and exploitation. The productive and exchange processes 
of mafias exemplify this with crystal clarity, as do those of guerrilla and 
other para-state organisations. The question, however, is how ‘well-defined 
norms’ is defined. Or where to draw the line between the contingent event 
and a habitual practice – where, for example, something starts off being an 
individual act of piracy and ends up being becoming a fleet of pirate ships 
with well demarcated regulations. Although each situation merits specific 
consideration, two comments can be made. First, the idea of ‘protected by 
norms’ means either legal or intersubjectivised. Intersubjectivised means, 
here, that the norm (e.g. ‘peasants from this region must contribute 10 per 
cent of their production to a particular organisation’) must be extended to 
a large collective of subjects, and that its validity is not weakened by the 
disappearance of one or another believing individual. Second, explicitly 
drawing on the Hegelian perspective presented in chapter 2, let us say that 
like Minerva’s owl, here we are only able to unfurl our theoretical compre-
hension at dusk, at a prudent distance after the events have occurred. If in 
eighteenth-century England the enclosure of a field by an individual was 
the subjective expression of a vocation for appropriation (let us say theft) 
or, if in contrast, it was the manifestation of an intersubjectivity suffused 
with norms about the individual and property that would be extended day 
after day, year after year (an expropriation), was an unknown that only 
time could reveal.
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 186 Among other concerns, the question could arise about the unpaid appro-
priation of human energies in a non-capitalist context – is this a relation 
of exploitation or expropriation? It would be exploitation if what actor E 
appropriates is the fruit of the application of that energy to a productive pro-
cess; it would be expropriation, on the other hand, if what E appropriates is 
the totality of the vital energies. Of course, in the case of expropriation of 
human beings it is likely that processes of exploitation will also be observed 
if some kind of productive process is involved.
 187 It is true that the action of constituted regulation can come to his aid when 
the forces of the expropriator falter.
 188 To put it more abruptly, it is curious that self-described critical thoughts 
essentialise the categories of ‘action’, ‘relation’, ‘individual’, but above all 
‘labour’, without observing that they are based on a split that capitalism 
introduces. It is capitalism that materially invents humanism (including its 
liberal and Marxist varieties). Therefore, the humanist critique of capitalism 
is armed with a vocabulary forged by its enemy. This does not imply a refu-
tation of humanism, but rather an appeal about its lack of self-awareness of 
the material conditions that gave birth to it.
 189 Goods and services produced with the aim of being exchanged on the mar-
ket for other goods and services.
 190 However, it should not be assumed that domestic exploitation cannot take 
capitalist forms. Of course, situations exist in which the patriarchal relation-
ship leads to forms of capitalist exploitation in which the fruits of women’s 
labour are appropriated by men who commercialise them. It is not difficult 
to find examples of this – from agricultural labour to sex work.
 191 The reader must not confuse the term ‘commercial equivalent’ with the fact 
that we are dealing with non-commercial exploitation. The idea here is to 
compare the cost of the approximate monetary equivalent of the goods and 
services offered with those received by a producer. For example, one could 
compare the total goods and services that a housewife receives with the 
market value that the goods and services she produces outside of the price 
system would supposedly acquire on the market (for example by a domestic 
employee). If the second amount is significantly higher than the first, we 
have a case of non-commercial exploitation.
 192 It is not a question of studying these forms for ethical motives, to make vis-
ible and reappraise the role of women in economic production but above 
all, for strictly scientific reasons, because of the role that these modalities 
have in the functioning of the economic totality.
 193 In Castells’ terms, those societies in which the state controls the surplus 
(1996: prologue).
 194 It is tempting to make an analogy with the humanist concept of action in its 
finest version, that of Weber. Indeed, the existence of an ‘ideal type’ of capi-
talist action (goal-oriented rational action) does not prevent that in practice 
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this is mixed in an essential, that is to say not ancillary or contingent, way 
with others (actions orientated by affects, values, tradition).
 195 Weber [1922] 1968, Chapter 3.
 196 In slave and feudal non-commercial exploitation this is stipulated positively. 
The master or the lord issue orders and the slave or serf obey, regardless of 
their economic or non-economic nature. With the exploitation of women 
(or children) in patriarchal homes the same occurs: the exploitation is a 
consequence of the legitimation of relations of domination. And in the stat-
ist cases in which there is exploitation, despite it formally being supposed 
that there is no domination, it is evident that the exploitation is accompa-
nied by state encroachment into extra-economic aspects of life activity.
 197 Anyway, the proposed typology of knowledge allows us to incorporate both: 
skills relate to subjective knowledge while ‘organisation assets’ can be bet-
ter understood by deconstructing them into organisational knowledges and 
recognition knowledges. In contrast the approach of these authors shares 
some common ground with the liberal idea mentioned earlier, and both are 
in the last instance connected to Weber’s theory of stratification.
 198 This conception is inseparable from the idea of a ‘cognitive’ stage of capital-
ism, an idea which assumes that there have been stages for which knowledge 
was less significant. On the contrary, we have repeatedly attempted to show 
that knowledge (and regulations of it) has played an equally important role 
throughout all stages. What changes, evidently, are the predominant types 
of knowledge (Zukerfeld 2010).
 199 I am grateful to Prof. Christian Fuchs for judiciously pointing this out.
 200 Additionally, super-exploitation is often illegal under capitalism, wher-
ever adequate compensation for basic energy replenishment, within a 
framework of productive labour processes, is habitually defined by a min-
imum wage.
 201 In general, these comments are the result of having modified the definition 
of exploitation to give an account not only of the merchant and industrial 
stages, but also the current stage, informational capitalism. Informational 
capitalism sheds light on the previous periods, much as human anatomy 
gives us insight into that of the ape.
 202 Of course, it could be argued here that ‘means of production’ properly 
understood includes, for example, the network of relationships (recogni-
tion) and the flows of attention necessary for, let us say, a self-sufficiently 
recording band of musicians to be able to go independent of the record 
label that exploits them. The key lies in ‘properly understood’. It is as true 
that anything could be included in the concept, as it is that for Marxism 
the strong emphasis is on land and, especially, machines. In any case, even 
though it can be pointed out that informational workers do not control all 
the means of production, it is hard to deny that they control (and are even 
owners in the Marxist sense) many of them.
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 203 For an exploration of informational workers and their relationship with the 
means of production, see Zukerfeld 2013.
 204 This idea signals a difference with authors such as Roemer and Wright, who 
both hold that the exploitation processes based on this kind of resources are 
not capitalist. They describe them as socialist or statist. Of course, this arises 
from the limited way in which they incorporate knowledge into the study of 
capitalist exploitation.
 205 This is an issue that has been considered by the literature (Roemer 1985; 
Wright 1985). However, the problem becomes apparent and pressing in 
relation to the tendency towards outsourcing that is increasingly observed 
in informational capitalism. It is unconvincing to maintain that if a worker 
inside a productive unit experiences exploitation, that if the same services 
are provided in exchange for a similar income from a unit of production or 
even from the worker themselves (in the case of a self-employed worker), 
that it would not be exploitation.
 206 Typically, for exploitation through reproduction, time is not a relevant variable.
 207 The category of labour, in the sense given to the term in this text, as a figure 
resulting from capitalist normative knowledges must not be confused with 
work as an activity, as a type of action, which is the sense given to it here, 
following a use shared by several authors.
 208 In this sense it is interesting that even in critical approaches to the Marxian 
labour theory of value that attempt to maintain the notion of exploitation, 
it continues to be couched in this notion of work (Roemer 1985; Yoshihara 
2006).
 209 It is important to note that though participation in the productive processes 
may be unconscious (that is to say, it is not perceived as such), this does not 
mean that it is not consented to: the e actors consent to perform concrete 
actions (sharing ancestral knowledge, submitting themselves to advertis-
ing, giving up personal data etc) although they might not be aware that this 
means participating in a capitalist productive process.
 210 This distinction arises from group discussions in which some colleagues 
raised whether it made sense to speak of exploitation in situations in which 
the contribution made by each individual subject to the productive process 
was infinitesimal. I would especially like to thank Andrés Rabosto for his 
critical contributions to the position defended here.
 211 It is not possible here to devote any space to the origins and limitations 
of these expressions, other than to draw attention to the notion of ‘force’, 
omnipresent in Marx, that is indissociable from the ‘mechanical physics of 
his era’ (Echeverría 2011, 300). It would be interesting to investigate to what 
extent the relative (total in the case of intellectual property) neglect of the 
role of knowledge in Marx’s thought is related to the axiological and lin-
guistic knowledges of the time, in which force was a completely naturalised 
concept.
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 212 A serious limitation of this book is the lack of space to dedicate an entire 
chapter to value theories. Nevertheless, we can make two brief comments. 
One the one hand, the term ‘value’ will be used in a sense roughly similar 
to the ideas of exchange value, long-run equilibrium price, prices of pro-
duction, according to different economic tendencies. On the other hand, 
the labour theory of value is manifestly limited in its ability to account for 
the situations of exploitation analysed in this chapter. But neoclassical or 
Sraffian value theories are hardly satisfactory either. As a result, this theory 
of exploitation is better complemented by a value-knowledge theory that, 
although it is hinted at in the main body of the book, deserves a dedicated 
exploration.
 213 Other aspects of Bentham’s work have been emphasised and criticised, 
fairly or otherwise, but not this one, which offers the key to the notion of 
capitalist exploitation, proposed here. It is unavoidable to comment that 
this distinction between a cognitive component and an energy component 
of labour, carriers of differential characteristics and requiring specific regu-
lations, was not noted by Marx who, however, did not shrink from referring 
to Bentham as ‘…that insipid, pedantic, leather-tongued oracle of the ordi-
nary bourgeois intelligence of the 19th century’ (Marx [1867] 1990, 755) and 
immediately afterwards, ‘…Had I the courage of my friend Heinrich Heine, 
I should call Mr. Jeremy a genius of bourgeois stupidity’ (Marx [1867] 1990, 
756). I owe my reading of Bentham’s text to Dr Valentina Delich.
 214 Echeverría’s ideas, for which he recognises the influence of Herman 
Schwember, combine a Marxist background with a critique of the per-
spective of systems theory. Unfortunately, after acknowledging these two 
entities, he places emphasis on the energy aspect, sidelining the dimen-
sion which he calls ‘information’. As a result of these and other motives, the 
author does not relate these questions with the capitalist dynamic in general 
or with exploitation in particular, at least in the texts we have perused.
 215 Of course, this idea of taking a concept perceived as unitary and splitting it 
into two aspects that form a dialectical unity is a typical technique of Marx.
 216 Questions of space mean that it is not possible to discuss all of the observa-
tions that could be made here. But let us explore one: returning to the defi-
nition of capitalist exploitation, is there not a contradiction? Do not these 
workers have exclusive access to the knowledges that the exploiter requires? 
And if this were the case, would it not violate the criteria of exploita-
tion? However, neither Guansuncha nor Edgardo have exclusive access 
because, remember, exclusive access implies ownership, the legal possi-
bility of excluding third parties. Exploitation through alienation, like the 
other capitalist forms of exploitation, takes place in a framework defined 
as capitalist productive processes in chapter 4. Characteristic 2.3 stipulates 
that within these, labour lacks exclusive access not only to knowledge, but 
also to ‘matter’ and energy. In other words, Guasuncha and Edgardo are 
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able to participate in a process in which they are exploited because they 
do not have a legal monopoly over the wide range of knowledges they use, 
(through intellectual or other property rights), nor over the physical inten-
sive resources (such as the technological artefacts that Raul contributes).
 217 Although it is not possible here to present a theory of value, we can note 
a simple idea: the value creating entity is knowledge, across its different 
bearers, which pushes us out of our comfort zone and leads us to assert that 
knowledges in other bearers can also create value. As Echeverría states:
Given that any allusion to the human factor is dispensed with, the dis-
tinctions between the subjective and the objective, alive and dead, active 
and passive, lose all meaning. Labour comes to be defined as the articu-
lation between two factors (energy and information), with either being 
assumed or not by human beings (Echeverría 2011, 296).
 218 An earlier approach, with shared aspects and some differences, can be 
found in Kreimer and Zukerfeld 2014.
 219 Even in cases when compensation for performers’ rights (a right ‘related’ 
to copyright) is legislated, on the rare occasions when it is recognised it is 
always extremely modest in relation to the value generated.
 220 Unlike the guilds that were perfectly clear about their role as regulatory 
institutions of productive knowledges.
 221 Another issue to mention is that in these cases it is the exploited subject 
themselves who translates their subjective knowledges to a bearer, of which 
the company then becomes owner.
 222 For example, the Andean Community of Nations, who often fall prey to this 
modality, has introduced sui generis legislation for this area, and Ecuador 
in particular has incorporated it into its constitution (Chapter 5, Article 84). 
However, this apparent defence of the exploited is not necessarily straight-
forward, due to the fact that it is the nation state of each country, which 
the indigenous peoples do not automatically consider to be a legitimate 
defender of their interests, that juridically represents them. Even while it is 
perfectly possible that these states play a role in combating exploitation, it 
is also plausible that they behave as intermediaries between exploiters and 
exploited, or even swell the ranks of the former.
 223 The term informational goods refers to goods that are fully or mostly com-
posed of digital information and, therefore, can be copied with close to zero 
marginal costs. Software, movies, recorded music, texts and data are some 
examples.
 224 The first of these lies in the fact that in the majority of cases the concept 
utilised has not been exploitation (but rather, for example, ‘free labour’, or 
‘unpaid digital labour’). The second consists of the problem that, where the 
term has been utilised, it has been employed in an indirect way and/or it has 
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not been given a systematic definition (Reveley 2013). Thirdly, no typology 
has been presented which gives an account of the varieties of exploitation 
that take place under capitalism in general, and in the social media in par-
ticular, and more importantly, the relationship between the general and the 
particular levels has not been systematised.
 225 Unlike other ‘free’ licenses, such as Creative Commons, GPL licenses have 
no option that would permit the other transfers while at the same time pre-
venting profit-making uses.
 226 I owe the idea of considering this as a modality of exploitation as such to the 
work of Prof. Christian Fuchs.
 227 Exceptionally, it might take place during worktime, in the case of employees 
who use ‘social media’ as a part of their work duties.
 228 As discussed in chapter 1, the ownership of both aspects (physical and cog-
nitive) of a resource can – and usually does – fall on distinct legal subjects: 
whoever buys a car becomes the owner of the physical aspect, while one or 
more signatories continue being owners of the patent rights and brands that 
pertain to various parts of the vehicle. At the same time, whoever is title-
holder of the authorship rights of a song is not necessarily owner of the CDs 
on which the music is recorded.
 229 The variable of costs refers here to the productive process of the origin of 
the resource, while the variable of effective use refers to the productive pro-
cess of the destination. A significant limitation to the use of costs as an iso-
lated variable lies in the fact that, as is well known, the effective use can vary 
in relation to the proportions in which the resource was produced. This is 
particularly common where the resources are subjects: in these cases it’s 
possible that they were created as a KIR but that they end up being applied 
in productive processes in which they function as a PIR. But there could 
also be, as technological constructivism demonstrates, divergences between 
production costs and effective use when the resources are commodities. For 
example a computer, a KIR due to its production costs, can be utilised as a 
typewriter (a PIR).
   Inversely, defining PIR and KIR based on their effective use has the draw-
back of losing sight of objective aspects: to continue with the example of the 
computer, the fact that in one given productive process it is utilised as a PIR 
does not remove its objective potential to be put to use as a KIR, let’s sup-
pose by another worker as the case may be. The same occurs with subjects: 
their objective cognitive foundation, their unutilised skills can be exploited.
   How do we resolve this tension? In practical terms, maintaining both 
variables. Given that in most cases they coincide, there are no difficulties 
in classifying the resources. But in those cases where they diverge, we turn 
to an intermediary concept: the potential use of a resource. This refers not 
only to the current use of the resource, but also to the possible uses within 
the productive process it is inserted into. This potential outlook includes, 
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indirectly, the question of production costs, which configure a certain 
objective potential for use as PIR or KIR.
 230 The idea of using the notion of access to property in relation to social strat-
ification is in line with Zukerfeld (2009) and, in the final analysis, takes 
inspiration from Rifkin (2000).
 231 This typology has been used in chapter 4, and it is related to the one pre-
sented in chapter 3 regarding normative intersubjective knowledge. How-
ever, while the latter is focused on the regulations themselves, the former 
refers to the relationship between subjects and resources.
 232 This scheme focuses on the productive processes where monetary exchanges 
take place. Unpaid workers (such as domestic workers and voluntary work-
ers of digital media) are subsumed to the class of who pays his/her bills. This 
does not mean that these workers are not exploited and, even, exploited by 
capitalists, as discussed in chapter 5. However, we tend to think that classes 
should be defined according to the productive process that allows subjects 
to reproduce their physical life.
 233 For a more detailed description, see Yansen 2012.
 234 Marx puts it thus:
The competition of serfs constantly escaping into the town, the constant 
war of the country against the towns and thus the necessity of an organ-
ized municipal military force, the bond of common ownership in a par-
ticular kind of labour, the necessity of common buildings for the sale 
of their wares at a time when craftsmen were also traders, and the con-
sequent exclusion of the unauthorised from these buildings, the con-
flict among the interests of the various crafts, the necessity of protecting 
their laboriously acquired skill, and the feudal organization of the whole 
of the country: these were the causes of the union of the workers of each 
craft in guilds. (Marx and Engels [1846] 1970, 69)
 235 It is tempting to paraphrase Marx and say that where mercantile capital-
ism takes shape we are facing a formal subsumption of physical resources, 
and that only when industrial capitalism makes its triumphal entry will this 
subsumption be real.
 236 It is significant that one of the factors that precipitated the reform move-
ment was the scandalous use of the cognitive monopoly: the sale of all kinds 
of indulgences, privileged seats in the celestial theatre, and other divine 
commodities.
 237 Without diving into theoretical discussions, it is worth emphasising that 
here we do not place power in the same line of descent as the concept of 
action (as in Weber and many other authors), but that of knowledge.
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